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1990 DIGILAW 1012 (ALL)

Chunni Lal Gupta v. K. P. Singh, District Magistrate, Sonbtaandra

1990-11-13

R.K.GULATI

body1990
JUDGMENT R.K. Gulati, J. 1. Through this application under Section 12 of the contempt Courts Act, 1971 (for short "the Act") the applicant has desired that this Court may take contempt proceedings against Sri K. P. Singh, District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, and Sri P. K. Srivastava, Entertainment Tax Inspector, Robertsganj, to punish them for having wilfully flouted the order of this Court dated 19th April, 1990 passed in writ petition No. 6483 of 1987 Chunni Lai Gupta v. State of U. P. 2. The applicant runs a video show parlour. It appears that under the provisions of U. P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act. 1951, the applicant was being required to pay entertainment tax at the rate of Rs. 150/- per day, i.e. Rs. 1050/- per week towards the running of his video parlour. The applicant challenged the said levy as unauthorised by filing a writ petition before this Court, being Writ Petttion No. 6483 of 1987. While entertaining the writ petition, by an order dated 26th March, 1987. a Division Bench of this Court granted an interim order which was to the following effect :- "In case the petitioner pays the rate of Rs. 500/- per week towards the entertainment tax and furnishes security for the balance to the satisfaction of the District Entertainment Tax Officer, Mirzapur, the respondents shall not interfere with the running of his business of exhibiting pictures. The petitioner shall be entitled to exhibit the picture only on complying with the aforesaid conditions. In the event of default this stay order shall stand automatically vacated". The above order was subsequently confirmed by an order dated 27-11-1987. With effect from 1st May, 1989 it seems that some amendment was brought about in the provisions of 'the Entertainment Act as a result whereof, the applicant felt-that under the amended law he could be charged entertainment tax only at the rate of Rs. 250/- per week. Accordingly, the applicant/petitioner moved this Court for the amendment of the interim order aforesaid. By an order dated 19th April. 1990 a fresh interim order was passed which reads as under - "The interim order dated 26-3-1987 is modified as below : - In case the petitioner pays Rs. 250/- per week towards the entertainment tax, the District Entertainment Tax Officer, Sonbhadra, shall not interfere with the running of the business of exhibiting picturess. By an order dated 19th April. 1990 a fresh interim order was passed which reads as under - "The interim order dated 26-3-1987 is modified as below : - In case the petitioner pays Rs. 250/- per week towards the entertainment tax, the District Entertainment Tax Officer, Sonbhadra, shall not interfere with the running of the business of exhibiting picturess. In case of default, this interim order shall stand automatically discharged". On 31st March. 1990, before the interim order was amended, the applicant made a deposit of Rs. 2000/- towards the entertainment tax which was in respect of the period 2nd April, 1990 to 29th April, 1990, i.e. for four weeks at the rate of Rs. 500/- per week in terms of unamended earlier interim order. According to the applicant as the interim order bad been modified on 19th April, 1990, and under the amended order he was required to pay after that date only at the rate of Rs. 250/- per week, thus the deposit made by him on J31st March; 1990 was in excess by Rs. 392/86P than what he was required to pay in respect of the period to which the payment of Rs. 2000/- pertained. 3. In the next deposit towards the entertainment tax made by the applicant-petitioner on 1st May, 1990, the petitioner adjusted the sum of Rs. 392/86 which be thought, was excess payment already made, and deposited the remaining amount of Rs. 107/14 towards entertainment tax for the period 30th April, 1990 to 13th May, 1990. Thereafter, by an order dated 25th October, 1990 the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, the first respondent, ordered the closure of the applicant's video parlour, taking the view that the deposit of Rs. 107/14 was not in terms of the stay order dated 19th April, 1990, inasmuch as, the deposit ought to have been at the rate of Rs. 250/- per week. Further, as the petitioner had failed to abide by the stay order dated 19th April, 1990'strictly to its terms, that order automatically stood vacated as envisaged in the stay order itself. 4. It is in this background that the present application for contempt has been filed on the allegation that the order of the first respondent while effecting the closure of the video parlour acted in flagrant violation of the stay order dated 19th April, 1990 granted by this Court. 4. It is in this background that the present application for contempt has been filed on the allegation that the order of the first respondent while effecting the closure of the video parlour acted in flagrant violation of the stay order dated 19th April, 1990 granted by this Court. According to the applicant the opposite parties have committed a contemptuous act in passing the order dated 25th October, 1990 and directing the closure of the video parlour. Having heard Sri Ashok Khare, the learned counsel for the applicant in my opinion, no case for taking any proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act has been made out. 5. Now under clause (b) of section 2 of the Act "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Thus, before a violation of a Court's order could constitute a contempt it must be wilful. 'Wilful' in this context simply means that the violation or a disobedience is not accidental or unintentional. It has to be remembered that the contempt proceedings are in the nature of quasi criminal proceedings. The benefit of doubt belongs to the contemner. The contempt jurisdiction is required to be exercised with utmost restraint and scruplous care, the object of exercise of this jurisdiction being that dignity and authority of the Court is not impaired. The proceedings under the Act for punishment for contempt of Court can only be taken where a case for such action is clearly made out beyond doubt. 6. It is not in dispute that the payment of Rs. 2000/- on 31st March, 1990 was much earlier to 19th April, 1990 when the interim order was amended. IT cannot also be disputed that the said payment was in terms of the amended interim order. Now whether the applicant was entitled to adjust the amount unilaterally which he thought became an excess payment on the coming into being of the order dated 19th April, 1990, as a question on with certainly two opinions could be possible. The payment of Rs. 107 and odd as entertainment tax which was for a period of two weeks, was not strictly in terms of the stay order under which the applicant was enjoying the protection. The payment of Rs. 107 and odd as entertainment tax which was for a period of two weeks, was not strictly in terms of the stay order under which the applicant was enjoying the protection. The stay order itself contemplated that on the petitioner's failure to make the deposit at the rate of Rs. 250/- per week, the stay order shall stand automatically discharged. If the first respondent, namely, the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra bonafide believed that the applicant-petitioner was not entitled to adjust the excess payment, if any, on his own, from the entertainment tax falling due in respect of the subsequent weeks, no fault can be found in his taking action and affecting the closure of the petitioner's video parlour by his order dated 15th October, 1990. If the order is capable of two interpretations, the party who acted on the basis of one such interpretation, cannot be held to have wilfully disobeyed the order so as to haul him up for contempt of Court. For recording a finding of guilt against a person in contempt proceedings a clear case has to be made out namely, that an order passed by the Court in its terms was defied, disobeyed or disregarded by the person to whom such breach is attributed. As already observed on the acts obtaining in the present case no such case is made out. 7. The application for contempt is without merit and is rejected summarily.