Judgment S. Roy, J. The defendants are the petitioners. The Opposite party filed a suit for their eviction from a building and that has been decreed by the trial court in his favour. The decree and judgment have been impugned in this Civil Revision application. 2. According to the plaint the petitioner No.1 and 2 and Katti Rai, husband of respondent No.3, were employed by the Opposite party to take care of his pond and fish reared by him in that pond. After the death of Katti Rai, his widow, petitioner no. 3 was employed in her husband's place. A building was• constructed for the residence of care taker of the pond and the same was allotted to the petitioners on a monthly rent of Rs.30/-. They were engaged for the purpose of taking care of pond and fish therein. The rent of Rs.30/- per month was adjusted out of salary of Rs.60/- payable to them. The petitioners had left the services of the Opposite party in October, 1984 and the Opposite party had engaged another person as care-taker for the pond. The building in question was required for residence of the new care-taker. As the petitioners did not vacate the building in question the opposite party filed the suit bearing Eviction Suit No. 50 of 1985 for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the Opposite party required the building in question for his use and occupation i.e. the occupation of the new caretaker. 3. The petitioners filed joint written statement. They, inter alia, contended that they were living in the house in question since long and the same was constructed by the father-in-law of petitioner’s no. 1 and 2. In the written statement they did not disclose as to how they claimed title to the property. 4. The court below has held that the Opposite party was the owner of the property. It further held that there was relationship of land lord and tenant between him and the petitioners. It also held that the requirement of the building for the use and occupation of the new caretaker was the requirement of the Opposite party. The suit was decreed in favour of the Opposite party. 5. The only point urged by Mr. Prasad learned counsel for the petitioners, was that the requirement of the building for the caretaker cannot be said to be the requirement of the Opp-party. The suit was decreed in favour of the Opposite party. 5. The only point urged by Mr. Prasad learned counsel for the petitioners, was that the requirement of the building for the caretaker cannot be said to be the requirement of the Opp-party. He argued that the care taker being a servant is a tenant within the meaning of its definition in 2 (b) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (the Act), and as the Opposite party wanted to evict the petitioners for inducting another tenant, no decree for the eviction of the petitioners from the building in question on the ground of personal requirement could have been passed by the Court he law. Reliance was placed by Mr. Prasad in M.J. Issacs Vs. E.Y. Mansa Brothers, (A.I.R. 1924 Rangoon, 164), Rameshwar Lal Sharma Vs. Sardar Amrik Singh (A.I.R. 1974 Patna, 195) and Life Insurance Corporal ion of India Vs. Govt. of Tamil Nadu & ors [1977 (2) R.C.R. 524J]. 6. Mr. Sahay learned counsel for the Opposite party, submitted that the requirement of tile Opposite party for use and occupation of the house by the new care taker will amount of requirement by the Opposite party himself, and the court below was correct in law in decreeing the suit in favour of the Opp.-party. Reliance was placed in Purnendu Narayan Vs. Narendra Nath AIR 1943 Patna 31. 7. For appreciating the submissions made on behalf of the parties it is necessary to quote relevant portions of different sections of the Act; - Sec. 2 (h) "tenant" mean any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes- (i) ........................... (ii) A person who occupies a building as an employee of the landlord of such building either on payment of rent or otherwise. (iii) .............................. (ii) A person who occupies a building as an employee of the landlord of such building either on payment of rent or otherwise. (iii) .............................. Section 11: Eviction of Tenant:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the following grounds: (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion there of without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) ................., (c) Where the building is reasonable and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord; 8. It has not been stated in the plaint that the new caretaker, i.e. the servant, will occupy the building in question on payment of tent. Under general law a person when occupies as Building without payment of any rent does not become a tenant in respect of that building notwithstanding the fact that that person may be a servant of the landlord. But in view of the definition of the word 'tenant' in the Act, a person who occupies the building as an employee of the land lord either on payment of rent or otherwise is a tenant. By fiction of Jaw, therefore, an employee of the landlord who does not pay rent is a tenant within the meaning of the Act. The new care taker of the Opposite party, even if he does not pay any rent will be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of the Act. 9. Section 11 (1) (c) empowers the court to pass a decree for eviction of tenant when the building is reasonably and in gold faith required by the land lord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. 9. Section 11 (1) (c) empowers the court to pass a decree for eviction of tenant when the building is reasonably and in gold faith required by the land lord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord. So far as the second part is concerned, it has no application to this case. The question is whether for the occupation of the new care taker i.e. the employee of the Opposite party it can be said to be requirement of the opposite party. I have already held that in view of the definition of the word 'tenant' in the Act, the new care taker of the opposite party, if he is allowed to occupy the building, he shall be his tenant. The position is, therefore, that the opposite party wants a decree for eviction of the petitioners-tenant from a building for inducting a new tenant. This surely is not covered by Section 11 (1) (c) of the Act. 10. This finding is supported by section 17 of the Act, which reads as follows:- "Where a tenant is entitled to restoration of possession and compensation - Where the landlord recovers possession of any building from the tenant by virtue of a decree secured because of clause (c) and (e) of sub section (1) of section 11 and the building is not occupied by the landlord, or by the person for whose benefit the building is held, within one month of the date of the vacation of the building by such tenant, or the building, having been so occupied, is relet within six months of the date of such occupations to any person other than such tenant without the permission of the Controller, the Court may, on the application of such tenant, made within one month of his vacating the building, and giving the landlord an opportunity of being heard by order direct the landlord to put such tenant in possession of the building or to pay him such, compensation as may be fixed by the court or both". The Opposite party wants eviction of a tenant to induct another tenant. The landlord cannot do this. 11. The Opposite party wants eviction of a tenant to induct another tenant. The landlord cannot do this. 11. In Purnendu Narayan vs. Narendra Nath: A.I.R. 1943 Patna 31 it has been held with regard to Cinema Hall that the owner of the Cinema house should be held to be in occupation of it. The ratio of that case has no application to the facts of this case. That judgment, therefore, does not held us is deciding the question involved. In M.J. Issacs Vs. E.Y. Mamsa Brothers: A.I.R. 1924 Rangoon 164 prayer was for a decree of eviction of a tenant so that the building, may be occupied by the servant of the landlord. It was held that under section 10 of the Rangoon Rent Act, the requirement of the building for occupation of the servant of the landlord could not be held to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use and occupation. The same finding has been recorded by me with reference to the definition of tenant in the Act. In Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu: 1977 (2) Rent C.R. 524: prayer for eviction of the tenants of the buildings acquired by the L.I.C. for the occupation of its employees, was made. It was held that as the L.I.C. did not require the buildings for its own use and occupation or for its own purposes i.e. for carrying on the Life Insurance business but for residential accommodation of its employees, it was not requirement of landlord. The law so laid down does not help us in this case. 12. Section 11 (1) (a) empowers the court to pass a decree for eviction, if the person occupying the building as an employee of the laud lord ceases to be the employee. The court below has held that the petitioners have ceased to be the employees of the opp-party. But no decree for eviction can be passed on that ground because the present suit was disposed of by the trial court by following the special procedure provided in section 14 of the Act, as the prayer for eviction was on the ground of personal necessity in section 11 (1) (c). But no decree for eviction can be passed on that ground because the present suit was disposed of by the trial court by following the special procedure provided in section 14 of the Act, as the prayer for eviction was on the ground of personal necessity in section 11 (1) (c). That procedure is not available where decree is prayed on the grounds mentioned in Section 11 (1) (a) and the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure for disposal of the suit shall have to be followed." 13. The civil revision application is allowed. The judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the matter is sent back to the trial court. The trial court shall proceed to dispose of the suit by following the general procedure. Application allowed.