ORDER Bellie, J. 1. This is a review petition. A Judgment dated 23.2.1990 in Second Appeal No. 839 of 1988 is sought to be reviewed. The Review Petitioner are the defendant is the suit. 2. The plaintiff who was a Government employee filed the suit for correction of his date of birth entered in the Secondary School Leaving Certificate and Service Register etc. alleging that whereas his correct date of birth is 1.8.1932 it has been wrongly entered in the said documents to as 1.7.1930. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court but in the appeal it was decreed by the first appellate Court. As against that the second appeal was filed and the second appeal was dismissed. 3. In the second appeal it was contended by the appellants - defendants that the plaintiff has no right to file the suit for correction of his date of birth as prayed for him since he has failed to file an application for correction of his date of birth before the authorities as per Rule 49(c) of Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules in Volume I of the Madras Service Manual, 1977 within five years from the date of his entering into service. But it was argued for the plaintiff that the five years period was inserted by way of an amendment dated 27.3.1978 and the plaintiff having entered into service on 14.5.1962 that Rule is not applicable to the plaintiff. This contention of the plaintiff was accepted and therefore the second appeal was dismissed. 4. Now in the review application, it is contended that the acceptance of the plaintiffs contention that the five years period does not apply to the plaintiff is erroneous since even before the amendment as per the original rule, such application should have been filed normally within five years and if it was filed beyond five years adequate explanation must be given. But at the time of arguments of the second appeal the original rule was not brought to the notice of the Court and from what was argued it appeared then that there was no limitation of period in respect of the plaintiff. But now the original rule is produced as per which, as contended by the revision petitioners, the employee could file an application before the authorities normally within five years and if it was beyond five years adequate explanation must be given. But now the original rule is produced as per which, as contended by the revision petitioners, the employee could file an application before the authorities normally within five years and if it was beyond five years adequate explanation must be given. The present Rule 49(c) is only a substitution of the Original Rule 49(c). It is therefore clear that even under the Original Rule normally the employee should file an application before the authority for correction of the date of birth within five years' time and if the application was belated adequate explanation must be given. Therefore even under the original rule the plaintiff employees ought to have filed an application within five years or adequate explanation should have been given if the application was belated. That being the position the suit cannot be maintained. 5. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff would contend that having failed to properly argue the case and thus the fault being theirs the appellant-Government cannot seek for review of the judgment. In this connection the learned Counsel relies on a decision in Bhagwati Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation A.I.R. 1977 All. 163. The learned Counsel, stating that on the ground that the judgment is wrong a review cannot be sought for, relies on S.O. Krishna Ayyar v. S.V. Narayanan alias S.V. Doraiswami . But in the instant case it is obvious that the original rule is clearly applicable to the plaintiff and that was not brought to the notice of the Court at the time of arguments. It was clearly so inadvertence on the part of the defendants, and no new evidence is adduced and no new case is put forth. The relevant rule is only brought to the notice of the Court now. It appears to me that if the review is not allowed it may have far reaching consequences since there may be several such suits by Government employees. Therefore it appears to me that it is a fit case in which review can be allowed. 6. However, Mr. Somayaji raised another point contending that the defendants (review petitioners) had filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and that has been disposed of by an order of dismissal and therefore the review petition is not maintainable. In support of this contention the learned Counsel relies on a Calcutta case in Chandra Kishore Sukla v. Remika Ballav 84 Cal. Somayaji raised another point contending that the defendants (review petitioners) had filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and that has been disposed of by an order of dismissal and therefore the review petition is not maintainable. In support of this contention the learned Counsel relies on a Calcutta case in Chandra Kishore Sukla v. Remika Ballav 84 Cal. W.N. 324. In the said Calcutta case a judgment of the Supreme Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh , was referred to and in that case it was held that a review application can be heard if subsequent to the review application a Special Leave Petition is filed but subject to the condition that the Special Leave Petition is not disposed of before hearing of the review Application. In the instant case, as stated above, Special Leave Petition has already been disposed of. 7. But Mr. V. Sridevan, learned Government Pleader would submit that a reading of the order of the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition would show that the Supreme Court has refrained from going into the merits of the points involved in the case and it was dismissed on other grounds stating to the effect that the Special Leave Petition has become in fructuous. A reading of the order of the Supreme Court clearly shows that the learned Government Pleader is absolutely correct. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that. The High Court took the view that the amended rule did not apply. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness of this view, but we are disinclined to interfere as the order has served itself and the employee must have retired even according to the corrected date. It appears that it has not been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court that at the time of the admission of the second appeal an undertaking has been given by the defendant Government that if ultimately the second appeal is dismissed they (petitioner-appellant) undertake to pay all the pay and allowances to the respondent to which he would be entitled to and since this undertaking has not been honoured a contempt application has been filed. 7. Be that as it may, the question is considering the manner in which the Special Leave Petition has been disposed of, can it be said that the review petition cannot be maintained? 7. Be that as it may, the question is considering the manner in which the Special Leave Petition has been disposed of, can it be said that the review petition cannot be maintained? Article 136 of the Constitution enables the Supreme Court that it may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, etc. It is therefore clear that though the Special Leave Petition is dismissed there is no question of any appeal having been dismissed or disposed of. As per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thungabhadra industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, only if an appeal has already been disposed of then a review petition cannot be heard. In the instant case the Special Leave Petition itself having been dismissed no appeal has been disposed of. In this context it will be relevant to note that the Supreme Court has stated in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar. The dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine by a non-speaking order docs not justify any inference that by necessary implication that contentions raised in the Special Leave Petition on the merits of the case have been rejected by the Supreme Court. The effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to be that Supreme Court had decided only that it was not a fit case where special leaveshould be granted. It cannot be assumed that it had necessarily decided by implication all the questions in relation to the merits of the award, which was under challenge before Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition. In Controller of Estate Duty, Baroda v. Pratap Singhji Ramsinghji , the Supreme Court has quoted with approval an earlier decisions of that Court in Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan v. C.W.T. , wherein relying on a still earlier decision of it the Supreme Court reiterated that dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine did not clothe the order on the Special Leave Petition with the authority of a decision of that Court. As we have seen above, the Supreme Court, while dismissing the Special Leave Petition No. 6674 of 1990 has expressly stated that it is not giving any opinion on the point of controversy. As we have seen above, the Supreme Court, while dismissing the Special Leave Petition No. 6674 of 1990 has expressly stated that it is not giving any opinion on the point of controversy. Considering all these it appears to me very clear that it cannot be stated that any appeal in the Supreme Court against the decision in the second appeal has been disposed of within the meaning expressed in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh. 8. Mr. Somayaji then again contended that as per Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. a review application can be filed against a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but no appeal has been preferred, and in this case a special leave application has been preferred on 28.4.1990, i.e., earlier to the filing of the review application is not maintainable. The question is whether the Special Leave Petition is an appeal within the meaning or Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. The important words are: from which an appeal is allowed, This clearly means, there must be provision in law for filing an appeal against the decree or order in question and if such an appeal has been filed then it would bar filing of a review application. There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for filing an appeal against a decree passed in a second appeal. It is only in Article 136 of the Constitution it is stated that the Supreme court may in its discretion grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree etc. Therefore an application for special leave cannot be said, by any stretch of reasoning, to be an appeal allowed against a decree with in the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1. It is manifest therefore that the filing of a Special Leave Petition cannot operate as a bar to file a review application subsequently. However, Mr. Somayaji brought to my notice one judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Veluri Sitarama Sastry v. Isukapalli Sundarama , in support of his contention. These two judgments are by single judges, and on going through them I find that the point discussed above i.e., whether-a Special Leave Petition is an appeal within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1 has not been discussed at all. Therefore with great respect I am unable to be persuaded by those judgments. These two judgments are by single judges, and on going through them I find that the point discussed above i.e., whether-a Special Leave Petition is an appeal within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1 has not been discussed at all. Therefore with great respect I am unable to be persuaded by those judgments. Therefore find no merit in the last contention raised by the counsel also. 9. In the result, therefore, I find that the review application can be maintained. The review application is allowed. The judgment dated 23.2.1990 in S.A. No. 839 of 1988 is set aside and the second appeal is allowed. The suit is dismissed. Considering the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.