JUDGMENT Lakshmanan, J. - The facts are fairly clear and simple. But certain important questions arise for consideration in this case. The applicants had entered into a contract with the respondent under which the respondent had agreed to provide accommodation to the applicant on a ownership basis on the terms and conditions, set out in the agreement. There were disputes between the applicants and the respondent. The disputes were eventually referred to the arbitration. The sole arbitration (Mr. Justice M. R. A. Ansari (retired) made an award in favour of the respondent Gautham Construction & Fisheries Private Ltd., on 24th May, 1980). He made the award and sent a copy of the award and enclosing the same to both the parties and authorised them to file the signed copy of the award on his behalf in this court and inform him so that he shall send the original award and the records of the proceedings to this court. The respondents herein on receipt of this signed copy of the award from the arbitrator filed O.P. No. 216/90 under Sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 praying. x x x x x 2. It is seen from the receiving seal of the original side of this court that the O.P. 216/90 was filed by the respondent herein on 21.6.1990. On 30.7.1990 I passed the following order, "Award filed. Receive the award, Notice returnable by three weeks. Private notice is also permitted". 3. On 31.7.1990 Mr. J. Krishnamachary counsel for the respondent herein and petitioner in O.P. 216/90 sent a private notice to the petitioner herein by registered post acknowledgment due. The counsel, in the said notice informed the petitioner that the notice was sent as directed by this court returnable on 20.8.1990 and requested the petitioner to enter appearance on that date. The counsel for the respondent has also filed an affidavit of service stating that the notice sent by registered post acknowledgment due to the petitioner has been received and in token of such service the acknowledgment received by him has been filed in this court. It is seen from the acknowledgment card produced alongwith the affidavit of service that the notice was served on the petitioner on 4.8.90 itself. On 20th Mr. It is seen from the acknowledgment card produced alongwith the affidavit of service that the notice was served on the petitioner on 4.8.90 itself. On 20th Mr. J. Krishnamachari counsel for the respondent mentioned before me that the notice ordered by this court has been served on the petitioner on 4.8.90 and hence he may be permitted to move the O.P. 216/90 on 21.8.90. On 21.8.90, the said counsel appeared before me and invited my attention to the affidavit of service filed. Further the matter was adjourned by me on 21.8.90 by one week for appearance of the respondent. When the matter was listed before me on 28.8.1990 I again adjourned the matter on 4.9.90 and the matter was again listed before me on 5.9.90 and after hearing Mr. J. Krishnamachari learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. 216/90. I passed the following order. 4. On 30.7.1990, I passed the following order : "Award filed. Receive the award. Notice returnable by three weeks. Private notice also permitted. Accordingly, the counsel for the petitioner sent a notice by registered post acknowledgment due to the first respondent on 31.7.1990. It is seen from the acknowledgment now produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice has already been served on the first respondent on 4.8.90 itself. The counsel for the petitioner has also filed an affidavit of service along with the copy of the notice and the acknowledgments. Inspite of service of notice on the first respondent as early as on 4.8.1990, the first respondent did not choose to appear before this court. In the result, there will be a decree in terms of the Award passed by the Arbitrator in favour of the petitioner. The Arbitrator has himself awarded interest from the date of final bill i.e. 21.12.1987 till the date of payment of the decree of the court whichever is earlier. Considering the award and the sake involved in these proceedings, I order payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as the petitioners Advocate's fee payable by the petitioner directly to the counsel". 5. To set aside the decree dated 5.9.90 passed by me in O.P. 216/90 and dispose of the said O.P. 216/90 on merits application No. 5161/90 has been filed. 5,000/- as the petitioners Advocate's fee payable by the petitioner directly to the counsel". 5. To set aside the decree dated 5.9.90 passed by me in O.P. 216/90 and dispose of the said O.P. 216/90 on merits application No. 5161/90 has been filed. According to the applicant, the counsel appearing for the first respondent has sent a letter dated 31.7.1990 to the applicant at Bombay informing them that the award had been filed into court and that they received the above letter from the counsel for the first respondent on 6.8.90 (Actually received on 4.8.90 as per the acknowledgment card) and that the said fact of receipt of the notice was immediately communicated to the Regional Office at Madras to take steps to set aside the award, by filing an application under Sec. 30 of the Act within 30 days from 6.8.90. It is the further case of the applicant that the necessary arrangement to file an application under Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the award, and filed the same into court on 28.8.90 (Diary No. 16822) now numbered as O.P. 483/90, it is also seen from the office endorsements that the O.P. diary No. 16822 was presented in this court on the original side on 28.8.90. The same was returned for compliance of certain directions. It was represented on 18.10.90 and admitted by this court on 30.10.90. As stated above the notice sent by the counsel for the first respondent under Sec. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act in regard to the filing of the award was served on 4.8.90 itself and that original petition now numbered as O.P. 483/90 was presented in this court under Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act, for setting aside the award on 28.8.90 itself well within the prescribed time. 6. It is also alleged by the applicant that the notice in the original petition 216/90 had not been served on them through the court and that the letter dated 31.7.90 sent by the counsel for the first respondent did not also state that either this court had ordered private notice or that the said notice was sent as a private notice permitted by the court. The applicants have further stated that they were also not served with the copies of the petition filed by the first respondent in O.P. 216/90 to pass a decree in terms of the award and they were awaiting the same to be served through court along with summons or notice from this court. They further contended that since the applicant had filed an application under Sec. 30 of the Act, to set aside the award within 30 days from the date of the filing of the award, they were under the impression that the O.P. 261/90 filed to pass a decree would have to await the disposal of their application filed for setting aside the award. Further to the shock and surprise of the applicants they received a letter from the counsel for the first respondent dated 22.9.90 alongwith the copy of the order passed by this court dated 5.9.90 granting ex parts decree in terms of the award in favour of the first respondent, and that the applicants have come to know from the said communication that this court had construed a letter sent by the counsel for the first respondent on 31.7.1990 as a notice in the said O.P. No. 216/90, in terms of the order passed by this court on 30.7.1990. The applicants were therefore in the bona fide impression that notice in O.P. 216/90, would be served through the court alongwith the petition. It is also stated that the applicants were also not served with the copy of the petition alongwith the letter dated 31.7.90 even though in the said letter a references made to an enclosure. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the application 5162/90, the applicants have stated thus, x x x x x 7. It is also stated that the applicants were also not served with the copy of the petition alongwith the letter dated 31.7.90 even though in the said letter a references made to an enclosure. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the application 5162/90, the applicants have stated thus, x x x x x 7. The applications 5161/90 and 5162/90 were resisted by the first respondent/petitioner in O.P. 216/90 stating that the applicants though received the notice from the counsel on 4.8.90 as time No. 15 together with the applicants' name printed, no one appeared on their behalf and on 5.9.90 i.e., after the expiry of 30 clear days the case was posted in the list again as item No. 21 together with name of the applicant in order to give final opportunity to the applicant, but the applicant failed to make arrangements to appear in the court on 5.9.90, and on their failure to appear in the court on 5.9.90 this court had to decree the petition as prayed for after setting the respondent ex parte. It is also stated in the counter that the respondent's counsel had enclosed a copy of the petition alongwith the registered letter dated 31.7.90 as evidenced by the Postal receipt. In answering the allegations made by the applicants in their affidavit regard to the filing of the O.P. to set aside the award under Sec. 30 of the Act, the respondent has only stated in para 6 of the counter thus. 8. Further the fact remains the petitioners have already filed a O.P. under Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the award on 28.8.90 and the same was admitted by this court on 30.10.90. It is also pertinent to note that when the applications 5161/90 and 5162/90 were posted before me for orders on 16.10.90. I passed an order of stay in favour of the applicants as prayed for and directed the respondent herein to file their counter by 22.10.1990 and posted both the applications for enquiry on 22.10.1990. On 24.10.90 a common counter affidavit in these two applications have been filed in O.P. 216/90. I directed the office to number the O.P. diary No. 16822/90 (now numbered as O.P. 483/90) and post the same on 31.10.90 alongwith the application No. 5161/90, 5162/90 for enquiry. On 24.10.90 a common counter affidavit in these two applications have been filed in O.P. 216/90. I directed the office to number the O.P. diary No. 16822/90 (now numbered as O.P. 483/90) and post the same on 31.10.90 alongwith the application No. 5161/90, 5162/90 for enquiry. It is also to be noted that the first respondent has also filed its counter affidavit in O.P. 483/90 which is a petition filed by the applicants under Sec. 30 to set aside the award. The counter affidavit was sworn to on 5.11.90 and the signature of the first respondent has also been attested by an advocate and identified by the counsel for the first respondent. According the first respondent, there is no justification for the applicant to approach this court belatedly when they have been actually served with the notice alongwith a copy of the petitions as early as 14.8.90 and hence prayed this court to dismiss the application as time barred and not maintainable. The first respondent have raised three contentions with regard to the maintainability of the present applications, the first one is the respondent does not admit the fling of petition under Sec. 30 of the Act by the applicants in the absence of the diary number and the respondent is yet to be served with the said petition and the second one is the applicants have not explained the reasons for absenting before the court on 21.7.90 as well as on 5.9.90 when the names printed in the cause-list, especially when they had claimed that they filed petition under Sec. 30 of the Act on 28.8.1990. Thirdly it is contented by the first respondent that there is no justification for the applicants to approach this court belatedly when they have been actually served with the notice as early as on 4.8.90 and hence the applicants have to be dismissed as time barred and not maintainable. 9. I have heard the elaborate arguments of Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, the learned senior advocate on behalf of M/s. R. Muthukumarasamy and K. Sundareswaran advocates for the applicants and Mr. Vedanthan Srinivasan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Mr. 9. I have heard the elaborate arguments of Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, the learned senior advocate on behalf of M/s. R. Muthukumarasamy and K. Sundareswaran advocates for the applicants and Mr. Vedanthan Srinivasan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Mr. J. Krishnamachari, the learned counsel for the petitioner have reiterated the contentions raised by the applicant in application No. 5161/90 and 5162/90 and argued that this court should recall the judgment and decree passed on 5.9.90 in O.P. 216/90 by exercising its inherent jurisdiction. The Learned Counsel further submits that this court has its inherent jurisdiction and power to recall the order of decree passed under Sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act if it was passed irregularly without complying with the requirements of Sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act. The learned counsel next contended that in order to be effective both for the purpose of obtaining judgment in terms of the award and for setting aside the award there must be (a) the filing of the award in the proper court and (b) service of notice by the court. According to the learned counsel though I ordered notice to the applicants on 30.7.1990, in regard to the filing of the award through court and also privately, no notice was served on the applicants through court which is a mandatory requirement. Elaborating the said contention Mr. Krishnamoorthy submitted that there must be service of notice or intimation or communication of the filing of the award by court to the parties is essential. In support of his contention Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy has cited the following judgments. 1. AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1233. 2. AIR 1952 Calcutta 10. 3. AIR 1951 Madras 658. 4. AIR 1969 Calcutta 381. 5. ILR-II Madras 144. 6. AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2054. (AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1233) = (1952 Calcutta 10 = 1952 I Calcutta 196). While dealing with the services of summons and notices of the filing of the award under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court was of the view that the notice of the filing of the award must be made by the court and that the notice received by a party aliunde and not through court is not sufficient. The learned Judge further held that as services must be in the manner provided for in the Act for services of summons we must look at the relevant provisions which are contained in OR. V. of the Civil Procedure Code which has provided for the methods of service of summons shall be made by delivering or tendering a copy of the summons and Rule 16 provides that the serving officer shall require the signature of the person to whom the copy is tendered or delivered. 10. In my opinion, the service of summons must be effected strictly in the manner prescribed by law if any period is to be charged with its receipt. In the instant case through I had ordered notice of the applicants herein through court and also by privately, the notice through court has not been served till date on the applicants. The notice sent by the counsel for the first respondent herein by the registered post acknowledgment due alone have been served on 4.8.90. As stated above notices through court and also privately has been ordered by me. When that is the order, the service of summons must have been made on the applicants must also be complied with as per the provisions prescribed for services of summons in suits and also the rules framed for services of summons for the proceedings initiated under the Arbitration Act. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 44 of the Act, Our High Court framed rules consistent with the arbitration Act regarding the filing of awards and all proceedings consequent thereto or incidental thereto. The rules framed by our High Court for the proceedings under the Arbitration Act provides for service of notice on the filing of the award on the parties concerned. Rule 4(1) provides that the registrar shall as soon as the petition is admitted and the award is filed issue notice to the parties interested in the award informing them that the court will pronounce judgment here on a date to be fixed in the said notice. Such notice served by the party by whose instance the award was filed into court in the manner provided for service of summons in a suit within such time as the registrar may fix. 11. Such notice served by the party by whose instance the award was filed into court in the manner provided for service of summons in a suit within such time as the registrar may fix. 11. In the instant case there is no record to show that notice of the filing of the award has been served on the applicants herein through court and as provided under the rules framed for the proceedings under the Arbitration Act or as provided under the procedures prescribed for service of summons in a suit. The only document that has been produced by the learned counsel for the first respondent is the acknowledgment for service of notice on the applicant on 4.8.90 pursuance to my order dated 30.7.90 ordering private notice, also be served on the applicants. As stated supra I ordered notice to the applicants on 30th July, 1990 returnable by three weeks through court and also directed private notice which will go to show that the notice/summons shall be served on the applicants through court primarily as provided under the rules framed by this court for proceedings enunciated under the Arbitration Act and also under the procedure prescribed for services of summons in suits, on the original side. Private notice was ordered to be served on the applicants only with a view to complete service of notice on the parties concerned by Quicker methods and not with a view to over look the statutory requirement prescribed under the Arbitration Act and also service of summons in suits, as per the provisions prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. The purport of my order dated 30.7.90 should be construed as an order ordering notice through court which was also a mandatory requirement. As stated above the mandatory requirement of service of summons has not been complied with on the applicants. Hence I am unable to construe the service of notice on the applicants privately as sufficient service. Even assuming that the said service by private notice on the applicants on 4.8.90 is sufficient, the applicants have filed O.P. diary No. 16822/90 (O.P. 418/90 on 28.8.90) well with in the prescribed time. It is a fact that on 5.9.90 when I passed the judgment and decree in terms of the award in O.P. 216/90 in this court to set aside the award passed by the arbitrator. It is a fact that on 5.9.90 when I passed the judgment and decree in terms of the award in O.P. 216/90 in this court to set aside the award passed by the arbitrator. I was not aware of the filing of the O.P. 16822/90 which was taken on file on 28.8.90 long before the passing of the impugned order dated 5.9.90. Hence, in my opinion the order passed by me on 5.9.90 without hearing the objections raised by the applicants herein under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act is irregular and hence I feel just and proper to set aside the order of mine dated 5.9.90 which I have no hesitation in doing so in the interest of justice and fair play, since the decree in O.P. 216/90 was passed by me without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, I am also of the view that I have inherent powers to recall the previous order of decree if it is passed without jurisdiction and hence I hold that have power to set aside my earlier order. 12. (1951 1 M.L.J. 93 = AIR 1951 Madras 658). In this case Justice Mr. Chandra Reddi has held : x x x x x 13. (AIR 1969 Calcutta 381). The learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held : x x x x x 14. In the instant case, I passed a decree in terms of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act without complying with the requirements of Section 17 of the Act, namely without disposing of or dismissing of an application made by the applicants herein for setting aside the award under Section 30 of the Act, which in my opinion is an irregularity. 15. Rangasamy v. Muthusamy (ILR-II (1988) Madras 144). The division bench of our High Court consisting of M/s. Justice Muthusamy Iyer and Justice Parker held : x x x x x It is seen from the above decision, passing a decree in terms of the award without hearing the objections of the concerned parties is a material irregularity. 16. (AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2054) x x x x x 17. The learned counsel Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy has also placed reliance on certain passages in the Handbook of Arbitration by Justice Mr. Mallick, particularly para 7 at page 71 and para-18 at page 73. 16. (AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2054) x x x x x 17. The learned counsel Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy has also placed reliance on certain passages in the Handbook of Arbitration by Justice Mr. Mallick, particularly para 7 at page 71 and para-18 at page 73. Inviting my attention to the above passages, the learned counsel has submitted that, "where the decrees has been passed contravening the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, the principles laid down in Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code are attracted and court must exercise its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree." Further placing reliance on AIR 1969 Calcutta 381, the learned counsel has submitted that even though the party has no power to apply under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code for setting aside the ex parte decree an award passed under Section 17, yet this court can recall its judgment and decree on the award if it was passed without complying with the requirements of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act by exercising its inherent jurisdiction. I see much force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicants. 18. Per contra, Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, the learned senior advocate while reiterating the contentions raised by the first respondent in his counter affidavit has invited my attention to the ruling in AIR 1978 Madras 215 = 91 Law Weekly 279. The learned counsel has contented that the present applications to recall the order are not maintainable and are to be dismissed as the award has ready became by the rule of the court and ripened into a decree. According to the learned counsel Sections 14 to 17 and Section 30 deal with the period before a decree is passed and that the objections are filed to set aside the award in the Arbitration Act and not the decree. According to the learned counsel once the award has become the rule of law and therefore become a decree, Section 30 will not operate because it is only to set aside the award and hence the proper course is to file an appeal under Section 39 of the Act. The learned counsel further contented that the applicants have knowledge about the passing of the award by the arbitrator himself and produced a zerox copy of the letter sent by the applicants herein dated 1st June, 1990 addressed to Mr. The learned counsel further contented that the applicants have knowledge about the passing of the award by the arbitrator himself and produced a zerox copy of the letter sent by the applicants herein dated 1st June, 1990 addressed to Mr. Justice M. R. A. Ansari, Sole Arbitrator, wherein the applicants have stated that they are in receipt of the copy of the award passed by the arbitrator and that the same was received by them on 30th May, 1990. According to the learned counsel for the first respondent, the applicants had knowledge about the passing of the award as early. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent for this reason. The fact that parties have received knowledge of the passing of an award by the arbitrator or of the filing of the award in court does not relieve the court of its obligation of service of notice and that the time has to be reckoned only from the date of service of notice and in fact as stated above immediately after service of notice provided the applicants have taken prompt action in filing the O.P. under section 30 of the Act to set aside the award as early as on 28.8.90 well within the time prescribed under the Act. In my opinion it is incumbent on the court to give a notice to the parties under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment referred to above in AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2054. Service of summons and notice by the registry of the court to the parties concerned is essential which has not been complied through court on 30.7.1990. 19. Mr. Vedanthan Srinivasan, the learned counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of the Division bench of our High Court consisting of Mr. Justice Ram Prasad and Mr. Surya Moorthi, as they then were in support of his contention. In my opinion the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case and is distinguishable. 19. Mr. Vedanthan Srinivasan, the learned counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of the Division bench of our High Court consisting of Mr. Justice Ram Prasad and Mr. Surya Moorthi, as they then were in support of his contention. In my opinion the said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case and is distinguishable. The above decision is a case in which the respondent therein had lost its right to seek for to set aside the award as under the Limitation Act, the period had expired and that it was only in November, 1972 the respondent therein had knowledge of the passing of the award and the same have been brought into the court at the instance of the arbitrator. The learned judges of the Division therefore felt that there is no scope for the contention that that is a case in which an ex parte decree ought to be set aside. The learned Judges as a fact held that the services on the respondent should be deemed to be valid service and that the person who received the notice had implied authority to act for the respondent firm and that the person who received the notice had failed to convey the information of such service to the respondent firm. In the circumstances stated, the Division bench held the respondent company had lost its right and entitlement to have the award set aside in a manner known to law and as prescribed under the Limitation Act. The appellant in the above case after having been satisfied that no application was filed by the other party either for modification or correction of the award within the meaning of Section 15 for remittance of the award within the meaning of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, filed the application for passing a decree in terms of the award, which was ordered by this court and a decree in terms of the award was passed. The learned Judges of the Division bench have rejected the case of the respondent before them mainly on the ground that the respondent had lost its rights to seek for setting aside the award as under the Limitation Act, the period had expired. The learned Judges of the Division bench have rejected the case of the respondent before them mainly on the ground that the respondent had lost its rights to seek for setting aside the award as under the Limitation Act, the period had expired. But, in the instant case as mentioned above, the applicants have already filed an O.P. under Section 30 for setting aside the award for the grounds morefully mentioned therein within the prescribed time of 30 days. Hence I am unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the first respondent and accept the above ruling as applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. In the instant case, the applicants herein have filed O.P. Dairy No. 16822/90 on 28.8.90 itself. They having been served with the notice of filing the award on 4.8.90 and filed the O.P. under Section 30 of the Act within 30 days from the service of even the private notice. Thus, the petition filed under Section 30 of the Act by the applicants was pending on the file of this court, but was not posted alongwith the other O.P. 216/90 which was filed under Section 14(2) of the Act. Things would have been entirely different had there not been the O.P. dairy No. 16822/90 filed under Section 30 and was pending in this court. In my opinion unless the provision of Section 17 of the Act are complied with the judgment and decree passed by me on 5.9.90 in terms of the award is without jurisdiction. Section 17 provides for judgment in terms of award in cases where the court sees no cause (a) to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration, or (b) to set aside the award. If both these conditions are fulfilled, the court (a) after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or (b) such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award. If the court so pronounce decree must follow, and no appeal can lie from such decree except on the ground (a) that it is excess of or (b) not otherwise in accordance with the award when these two stages have been passed the court has no option but to no pronounce the judgment according to the award. If the court so pronounce decree must follow, and no appeal can lie from such decree except on the ground (a) that it is excess of or (b) not otherwise in accordance with the award when these two stages have been passed the court has no option but to no pronounce the judgment according to the award. It is a fact even before the time for making an application to set aside the application had expired, the applicant has filed O.P. to set aside the award under Section 30 of the Act. Hence it is not open to this court to pass a decree in terms of the Section 17 of the Act provided to pronounce the judgment according to the award without refusing the original petition filed under Section 30 of the Act. In my opinion all these conditions mentioned above are cumulative and must be strictly fulfilled. If any of these conditions are not complied with the court. should not pronounce judgment and if it do thus, it is open to this court to recall the judgment and the order passed on 5.9.90 and the decree which followed thereupon. I have also not given an opportunity to the applicants/objector to prove his objections and I had no occasion to deal with the objections judicially. 21. In my opinion, even in a case where judgment upon an award has been passed under Section 17 of the Act if the judgment debtor can satisfy the court that such a decree should be set aside on ground appearing sufficient to the court, the court has jurisdiction to set aside such decree in its inherent jurisdiction to meet the ends of justice. In the instant case, in my view, the applicants have made out a prima facie case for seeking the aid of this court in invoking its inherent jurisdiction to meet the ends of justice. 22. It is well known that no party can suffer because of the mistake committed by the court. In this case, the mistake committed by the original side of this court in not numbering the O.P. Diary No. 16922/90 though it was presented on 28.8.90 which was numbered and filed only on 30.10.1990 and in the meanwhile the impugned order had been passed. In this case, the mistake committed by the original side of this court in not numbering the O.P. Diary No. 16922/90 though it was presented on 28.8.90 which was numbered and filed only on 30.10.1990 and in the meanwhile the impugned order had been passed. Though the counsel for the petitioner in O.P. 483/90 could have acted in a more diligent manner in numbering the O.P. It is not in any way affect the case of the applicants in regard to its bona fide in presenting the matter, having presented O.P. 16882/90 well within the prescribed time of limitation. The maxim act of court should do no harm to a litigant has been more elaborately dealt with by the Highest Court of the land in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1631. 23. The decree in this case was passed by me without serving a notice under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act duly and in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules framed by our High Court for the Proceedings under the Arbitration Act. In my judgment the decree in accordance with the award was passed without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Under that section no decree can be passed unless the time for complying to set aside the award has expired or if such application has been made it has been refused. Under the Limitation Act, such time is 30 days from the service of the notice of the filing of the award through court. In the absence of lawful service by court, mere knowledge of the passing of the award in this court as contended by the learned counsel for the first respondent is not sufficient and I am unable to countenance the same as there is no service as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The limitation for applying to set aside the award therefore never started to run and the decree was passed before the expiry of the time for applying to set aside the award and without complying with in mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. The limitation for applying to set aside the award therefore never started to run and the decree was passed before the expiry of the time for applying to set aside the award and without complying with in mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the service is completed by private notice as ordered by this court the applicants have already filed O.P. Diary No. 16822/90 well within the prescribed time under the Limitation Act and that the order passed by this court without passing any order on the O.P. filed under Section 30 of the Act is irregular and without complying with the mandatory requirements under Section 17 of the Act. As mentioned above trial court has inherent power to recall in order or decree passed under Section 17 of the Act. This order was passed irregularly. Hence exercising my inherent jurisdictions. I set aside the judgment and decree passed by me on 5.9.90 in O.P. 216/90. It has also been conceded by the first respondent that there is no service of notice on the applicants through court, even though necessary process fee has been paid and steps taken. Now that the petitioner has filed O.P. 483/90 under Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the award, the same will have to be disposed of in accordance with the alongwith O.P. 216/90. 24. There is nothing wrong in becoming wiser when demonstrably the conscience of the Judge dictates that what ought not to have has been done. In numerable are instances where a Judge in confrontation with a difficult position ruminates and ultimately comes to a conclusion that when originally he thought it ought to be is insupportable. In such circumstances it is fair and just that the Judge should make amends for a wrong he never intended to commit. Human process of thinking is a complicated one and should not be permitted to be hijacked by strange notions of propriety which may ultimately lead to injustice. 25. Hence, I feel in this case, I shall resile from my original stand in order to do complete justice in this case, which I should not fail under any circumstances. 26. In the result, the application Nos. 5161/1990 and 5126/1990 are ordered as prayed for. 25. Hence, I feel in this case, I shall resile from my original stand in order to do complete justice in this case, which I should not fail under any circumstances. 26. In the result, the application Nos. 5161/1990 and 5126/1990 are ordered as prayed for. Consequently, I recall the order and decree passed on 5.9.1990 in O.P. 216/1990 and restore the same to file to be heard alongwith O.P. 483/90. Both O.P. 216/1990 and O.P. 483/1990 shall be deposed of no merits and in accordance with law.