JUDGMENT Somasundaram, J. 1. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. No.598 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif of Turaiyur are the appellants in S.A. No.2146 of 1986. The plantiff in O.S. No. 1829 of 1980 on the file of the same court is the appellant in S.A. No. 2147 of 1986. The defendant in both the suits is the respondent in these second appeals. The second plaintiff in O.S. No. 598 of 1981 and the plaintiff in O.S. No. 1829 of 1980 is the wife of the first plaintiff in O.S. No. 598 of 1981. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to by the nomenclature given to them in the suit, O.S. 598/87. 2. The plaintiffs filed the suit O.S. No. 598 of 1981 for mandatory injunction for directing the defendant to remove the fence put up by the defendant on the southern boundary of the suit properties, for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men and servants from in any manner interfering with the plaintiffs, their men and servants having access from the suit properties/to the road on the south; and for declaration that the defendants refusal of permission to put up construction in the suit properties as per the plans submitted by the plaintiffs is illegal and for a consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant from in any manner interfering with the plaintiffs putting up constructions in the suit properties. The case of the plaintiffs in O.S. No.598 of 1981 is as follows: The suit properties were originally belonged to one Krishnaswami Reddiar and they are bounded on the south by the Local Fund Road. The said Krishnaswami Reddiar was having access to the said Local Fund Road running on the south of the suit properties and it is a public street intended for the use of the public. The said road was maintained by the panchayat when there was a panchayat. Subsequently when the panchayat was upgraded as the defendant municipality the said road is being maintained by the defendant-municipality. The said Krishnaswami Reddiar sold the suit properties to the plaintiffs and from the date of purchase the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit properties and they are having access to the suit properties from the road on the south. Subsequently when the panchayat was upgraded as the defendant municipality the said road is being maintained by the defendant-municipality. The said Krishnaswami Reddiar sold the suit properties to the plaintiffs and from the date of purchase the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit properties and they are having access to the suit properties from the road on the south. Just before the filing of the suit the defendant-municipality put up a wire fence with stone pillars along the southern boundary of the suit properties obstructing the, plaintiffs' access to the suit properties from the road on the south. The road on the south of the suit properties is a public street maintained by the defendant-municipality and the defendant has no right to obstruct the plaintiffs hurried access to the suit properties on the north from the street in question. The plaintiffs applied to the defendant with necessary plans seeking permission to put up constructions in the suit properties, but, the defendant, without any justification, refused the permission. The said refusal is illegal and void. 3. The defendant resisted the suit contending as follows: The property north of the suit street originally belonged to Krishnaswami Reddiar. At no point of time the suit properties were reached through the street in question. The suit street is not a public street. There has never been a public street on the south of the suit properties. The suit properties were reached throughout only from the property situated on the west. The deft put up the fence with stone pillars because the defendant has got right to put up such a fence since the street in question is exclusive property of the defendant and the plaintiffs have no right of access to the street on the south of the suit properties. The property south of the suit properties were purchased by the then town panchayat on 26.5.1955 and the town panchayat built its office in or about 1964 and the suit street was laid for the private use of the panchayat and, therefore, the suit street is a private street belonging to the defendant municipality. The plaintiffs cannot claim any right of access to the suit street on the south which belongs to the defendant. 4. The plaintiffs cannot claim any right of access to the suit street on the south which belongs to the defendant. 4. The second plaintiff in O.S. No. 598 of 1981 also filed another suit O.S. No.1829 of 1980 and this relates to the second item in O.S. No.598 of 1981. The reliefs claimed in O.S. No.1829 of 1980 and the pleadings raised by the parties in the said suit are similar to the reliefs claimed and pleadings raised in O.S. No.598 of 1981. 5. The trial court, by a common judgment, disposed of both the suits. The trial court held that the street on the south of the suit properties is not a public street and that it is a private property of the defendant, and therefore, the plaintiffs have no right of access to the suit properties from the street on the south. Consequently the trial court dismissed the suit O.S. No. 598 of 1981 and decreed the suit O.S. No.1829 of 1980 declaring that the plaintiff in O.S. No.1829 of 1980 is entitled to reach the suit properties from the Tiruchi Main Road. In other respects, the trial court dismissed O.S. No.1829 of 1980. As against the common judgment in O.S. Nos. 1829 of 1980 and 598 of 1981, the plaintiffs filed two appeals A.S. Nos. 18 and 29 of 1982 before the District Judge, Tiruchi. The appellant court confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed both the appeals. Aggrieved by the judgment of the courts below the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeals. 6. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff would contend that the suit street is a public street within the meaning of Section 3(21) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, hereinafter called the Act; that the plaintiffs as owners of the property abutting the public street is entitled to have access to and from the suit street; that the defendant is not entitled to put up any fence preventing the plaintiffs and their men from having access to the suit street from their properties on the north and that the courts below erred in going into the question whether the defendant- municipality has dedicated the street in question expressly or impliedly for public use. There is substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. There is substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 180-A of the Act runs as follows: All streets vested in or to be vested in or maintained by a municipal council shall be open to persons of whatever caste or creed. According to Section 180-A of the Act, all streets maintained by a municipal council shall be open to persons of all castes and creed. Ex B7 is the resolution of the panchayat dated 24.9.1964 for the formation of the suit street Ex B7 shows that the suit street was formed for going to Tiruchi-Thuraiyur road and to the panchayat office out of public funds. Subsequently the panchayat was upgraded as a municipality. Ex B8 is another resolution of the panchayat dated 13.5.1964 for providing lights for the suit street connecting Tiruchi road and the panchayat office out of the funds of the panchayat. Ex B21 is yet another resolution of the panchayat dated 30.7.1964 for laying metal road connecting Tiruchi road and the panchayat office out of the funds of the panchayat. The resolution of the panchayat passed under Exs.B7, B8 and B21 show that the street in question is formed in the year 1964 connecting Tiruchi-Thuraiyur road on the west Singaravelu Street, on the east and that the suit street is maintained by the defendant-municipality out of public funds. 7. The trial court on the basis of the evidence on record has also given a finding that the suit street was formed in the year 1964 and it connects Tiruchi-Thuraiyur road on the west and Singaravelu Street on the east. Once when it is established that the suit street is maintained by the municipality, then, by virtue of Section 180-A, such street shall be open to all persons irrespective of caste or creed. Any street over which the members of the public have a right of way is a public street within the meaning of Section 3(21) of the Act. The relevant portion of Section 3(21) runs as follows: Public Street means any street, road, square, court, alley, passage or riding-path over which the public have a right of way whether a thoroughfare or not, and includes- Section 61 of the Act provides that all public streets in any municipality shall vest in the municipal council. The relevant portion of Section 3(21) runs as follows: Public Street means any street, road, square, court, alley, passage or riding-path over which the public have a right of way whether a thoroughfare or not, and includes- Section 61 of the Act provides that all public streets in any municipality shall vest in the municipal council. Admittedly the suit street is maintained by the defendant-council and, therefore, by virtue of Section 180-A the members of the public are entitled to a right of way over the same and in these circumstances it has to be held that the suit street is a public street within the meaning of Section 3(21) of the Act and it is vested in the defendant-council. 8. The Commissioner's report and plan marked as Exs. C1 and C2 in the suit also go to show that the suit street connects Tiruchi Thuraiyur road on the west and Singaravelu Street on the east The Commissioner at the time of his inspection found that lorries and carts are passing through the suit street The Commissioner has stated in his report Ex. C1 that the municipality has provided street lights in the road lying on the south of the fence at S points and from Thtyagi Singaravelar Street Up to the bus stand the road has been metalled in the middle. The Commissioner in his report has further stated that the width of the road is 30 links and the bus stand and the said road has been black-topped. The Commissioner's report and plan, Exs. C1 and C2 also show that the buses coming from the bus stand have to pass through the suit street to reach the Tiruchi-Thuraiyur main road and that the members of the public have to use the suit street to reach the bus stand. All these circumstances go to show that the suit street running east to west on southern side of the suit properties belonging to the plaintiffs is a public street within the meaning of Section 3(21) of the Act and that there is an implied dedication of- the suit street by the defendant-municipality for public use. The Commissioner in his report has stated that the fence on the southern side of the suit properties has been put up recently. 9. The Commissioner in his report has stated that the fence on the southern side of the suit properties has been put up recently. 9. Once when it is proved that the suit street is a public street it follows that the plaintiffs being owners of the property abutting the public street have the right of access to the suit street from any part of their premises and that the defendant is not entitled to put up any fence preventing the plaintiffs from having access to the suit street. In Govinda Asari v. Kanrheepuram Municipal Council (1981) II M.L.J. 336, Suryamurthi, J. dealing with the rights of the owners of houses abutting a public street has held as follows: The owners of houses abutting on a public street, have right or access to and from the public street, and if anything is done by the municipality, to interfere with the rights of such owners, the owners have an actionable claim. 10. In Damodara Naidu and Ors. v. Thirupurasundari , Raghavan, J., dealing with the rights of the owners of the land abutting the Highway has held as follows: The plaintiffs being owners of land abutting the highway have an undoubted right of access to the street from any part of their premises. In Mackenzie's Law of Highways, 21st Edn. at page 58 it is stated as follows: The owner of land adjoining a Highway has a right of access to the highway from any part. of his premises. This is so whether he or his predecessors originally dedicated the highway or part of it and whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground adjacent to the highways or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of access. of his premises. This is so whether he or his predecessors originally dedicated the highway or part of it and whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground adjacent to the highways or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of access. Just as the right of access subject to the right of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligations as to nuisance and the like imposed upon a person using the highway -The right of the owner of land adjoining a highway to access to or from the highway from or to any part of his land is a private right distinct from the right to use the highway as one of the public and the owner of the land whose access to the highway is obstructed may maintain an action for the injury, whether the obstruction does or does not also constitute a public nuisance. Thus it is seen that where there is public highway the owners of land adjoining the highway have a right to go upon the highway from any point on their land; and if that right is obstructed by any one the owner of the land abutting the highway is entitled to maintain an action for the injury whether the obstruction does or does not constitute a public nuisance. In Bharathamatha Desiya Sangam v. Roja Sundaram 99 L.W. 833, Ratnam, J., dealing with the rights of the owners of houses or premises abutting a roadway has observed as follows: The owner of houses or premises abutting a roadway are.entitled to have access to that roadway from all points on the boundary of their land and if any obstruction is caused over the road margin securing such access, the person entitled to have such an access cancertainly enforce that right. In this context would be relevant to refer the decision of the Supreme Court in Mangalone Municipality v. Mahadeoji , wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that the municipality cannot put up any structures on a public pathway which are not necessary for the maintenance or uses of it as a pathway and that the installation of a statue or the putting up of other constructions cannot be said to be necessary for the maintenance or user of the road as a public highway and such acts would be unauthorized acts of municipality. It was also laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred above that the owner of the property adjoining the public pathway was entitled to ask for an injunction restraining the municipality from acting in excess of its rights. 11. In view of the above settled position of law, it is clear that the defendant cannot put up any structure or fence which are not necessary for the maintenance of the street. Admittedly in this case the defendant has put up a fence on the southern boundary of the plaintiff from having access to the public street on the south from their property abutting the suit street. The defendant has no right to put up the fence on the northern side of the public street so as to prevent the plaintiffs from having access to the suit street. In these circumstance, it has to be held that the suit street is a public street within the meaning of the Section 3(21) of the Act and the plaintiffs have a right of access to the suit street by reason of their ownership of the property abutting the public street and that the defendant is not entitled to put up any fence or obstruction preventing the plaintiffs and his men from having access to the public Street; south of their property. The infirmity in the judgments of the courts below is that the courts below have not approached the issue in the proper perspective in the light of the provisions of the Act and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in the decisions referred above. The above discussion of mine obliges me to interfere with the judgments of the courts below in these second appeals. The above discussion of mine obliges me to interfere with the judgments of the courts below in these second appeals. Accordingly the second appeals are allowed, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suits O.S. Nos. 598 of 1981 and 1829 of 1980 are decreed as prayed for. However, in the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.