NEW EXCELSIOR THEATRE PVT. LTD. v. SHRI M. B. NAIK, INCOME-TAX OFFICER
1990-03-15
T.D.SUGLA
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT (Per T. D. Sugla, J.) The petitioner is a limited company. The proceedings relate to its assessments for the assessment year 1975-76. Return for the year was originally filed on 25th March, 1976 and the assessment was completed under section 143(3) read with section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 18th September, 1978. During the previous year relevant for the assessment, the petitioner, it maybe stated, had purchased a property known as New Excelsior Theatre Building for a sum of Rs. 61,00,000/- on 6th December, 1974 from Messrs S.P. Builders, a partnership firm which is stated have held 40 shares in the petitioner company. After the assessment as stated above was completed in the case of the petitioner, the said property came to be valued by a departmental valuer in the case of Messrs S.P. Builders. According to the valuation officer, the fair market value of the property on the date of the sale was Rs. 1,04,00,000/-. The assessment of that firm for that year was made totaling the market value of the property at Rs. 1,04,80,000/- and the said firm was charged to capital gains accordingly. In the petitioner's case, assessment was sought to be revised under section 263 and after allowing the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, an order was passed on 11th September, 1980 whereby the difference between the market value of the property and the consideration shown in the sale document was treated as the petitioner's income from undisclosed sources. This order was, however, set aside by the Tribunal in appeal on the ground that the assessment had in the meantime merged with the order of the appellate authority and could not, therefore, have been revised by the Commissioner under section 263 of the Act. The order of the Tribunal is dated 30th January, 1984. Soon thereafter the Income Tax Officer issued a notice under section 148 read with section 147(a) of the Act requiring the petitioner to file a return in response thereto. This notice is dated 14th March, 1984. In the meantime gift tax proceedings were also taken against Messrs S.P. Builders, the vendors from whom, the petitioner had purchased the property in dispute. As in the meantime another valuer had valued this property at Rs. 93,75,000/- the difference between that amount and the amount of Rs. 61,00,000/- i.e. Rs.
This notice is dated 14th March, 1984. In the meantime gift tax proceedings were also taken against Messrs S.P. Builders, the vendors from whom, the petitioner had purchased the property in dispute. As in the meantime another valuer had valued this property at Rs. 93,75,000/- the difference between that amount and the amount of Rs. 61,00,000/- i.e. Rs. 32,75,000/- was treated as gift in the hands of Messrs S.P. Builders. It is, however, not known as to what happened in subsequent proceedings in the case of S. P. Builders both as regards income-tax and gift tax assessments. This petition was filed in this Court sometime in April, 1984. On 25th April, 1984 rule was issued but no interim relief was granted on the assurance of Shri Joshi for the revenue that notice of demand and assessment order will not be served on the petitioner, even if the assessment is completed, till the disposal of the petition. No affidavit in reply has yet been filed by the Department. It, however, appears to be common case that the impugned notice was issued on the basis of the information viz., the market value or the suit property was 1,04,00,000/- and not Rs. 61,00,000/- as was stated in the sale deed. It is stated by Shri Bhujale the learned counsel for the petitioner, that apart from the fact that whether the market value of a particular property is X amount of Y amount is a matter of opinion and not a fact as such, merely on the basis of this information the Income Tax Officer could not have formed reason to believe that the assessee's income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. At best it could be a case of reason to suspect and reason to believe. In particular, he laid emphasis on the fact that in this case there were two valuation reports. As per one valuer the market value of the property was Rs. 1,04,00,000/- whereas the other valuer estimated it at Rs. 93,75,000/-. The third valuer may as well value the property at some other value. The next contention is that assuming this information could provide the basis for formation of belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, it could certainly be not by reason of a failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose full and material facts necessary for the assessment.
The next contention is that assuming this information could provide the basis for formation of belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, it could certainly be not by reason of a failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose full and material facts necessary for the assessment. For this purposes, he relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Income Tax Officer, I Ward, Hindi Circle, Calcutta and other v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. 118 ITR 1, the Calcutta High Court decision in the case of Smt. Tarabati Devi Agarwal v. Income Tax Officer, 162 ITR 606 and Karnataka High Court decision the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kalappa, 167 ITR 22. For the proposition that unless there was some payment by the petitioner under the table the income in the hands of the petitioner could not be said to have escaped assessment, Shri Bhujale made an attempt to derive support from the Supreme Court decision in the case of K. P. Verghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and another, 131 ITR 597. Dr. Balasubramaniam for the Revenue, on the other hand, stated that it will be impossible to expect the department to have any information more than the information as regards the market value at the stage of reopening the assessment. The fact that the market value of a property is substantially higher than the value shown in the deed of conveyance is, according to Dr. Balasubramaniam, a sound and valid reason for formation of belief that income had escaped assessment. As regards the other contention, that the petitioner cannot be blamed for not disclosing full and relevant facts necessary for assessment, Dr. Balasubramaniam stated that when the assessment was taken up originally, there was very little time in hand. The valuation report could not be available. The assessment was completed in the absence thereof so much so that when the valuation report was available, it should be held that the petitioner had not disclosed full particulars of its income. Before proceeding to consider rival contentions, it is desirable to restate that the return in this case was filed on 25th March, 1976 and the assessment was completed under section 143(3) read with section 144B on 18th September, 1978. It is, therefore, not possible to accept Dr.
Before proceeding to consider rival contentions, it is desirable to restate that the return in this case was filed on 25th March, 1976 and the assessment was completed under section 143(3) read with section 144B on 18th September, 1978. It is, therefore, not possible to accept Dr. Balasubramaniam's submission that the Income Tax Officer did not have sufficient time in hand to make proper investigation if he wished to while completing the assessment originally. I am in agreement with Shri Bhujale that the valuation of a property by a valuer on hypothetical basis is a question of opinion. In fact, so far as this case is concerned, it is proved from the fact that the second valuer at the instance of the Department itself valued this property at Rs. 93,75,000/- as against Rs. 10,40,000/- in the first instance. In any event the fact cannot be overlooked that the petitioner in this case is a purchaser of the property. Even if the market value of the property is more, there are some provisions under which the seller of the property can be held liable. However, so far as the purchaser is concerned, unless there is some further material to indicate that not only that the market value of the property is higher but also that the petitioner has paid something more than what is stated in the deed of conveyance, it may not be possible to hold that the mere fact of higher market value will provide a sound basis for the reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. Assuming for the sake of argument the contention of Dr. Balasubramaniam, that such a material will never be available to Income-tax officer at the stage of initiating the proceedings under section 148 is accepted, the fact cannot be disputed that for reopening the assessment under section 147(a) one more condition is required to be fulfilled. That condition is that formation of belief that income has escaped assessment must be by reason of either the assessee's omission to file return of income or disclosure of full and material facts necessary for assessment. There is no suggestion in this case that the return was not filed. Therefore, the only question that requires consideration is whether the petitioner has disclosed full and relevant material necessary for assessment at the time of original assessment.
There is no suggestion in this case that the return was not filed. Therefore, the only question that requires consideration is whether the petitioner has disclosed full and relevant material necessary for assessment at the time of original assessment. In this context, it may be mentioned that the petitioner had produced the sale deed dated 6th December, 1974 during the assessment proceedings. The sale deed did disclose the name of the seller and the purchaser as also the particulars of the property and the sale consideration. There is no dispute that the seller is a genuine person. The only new material is that the market value, according to a valuer, of this property is higher than Rs. 61,00,000/- stated in the sale deed. Investigation could certainly have been made by the Income Tax Officer when he was completing the original assessment. This was not done even though the assessment was made under section 143(3) read with section 144B meaning thereby that the assessment passed through the scrutiny of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner also. On these facts, in my view, the ratios of the Supreme Court decision in 118 ITR 1 (supra) and the Calcutta High Court decision in 162 ITR 606 (supra) is clearly applicable. The petitioner cannot be held guilty for nondisclosure of full and relevant information necessary for assessment. In the result, the condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction under section 148/147(a) is not satisfied. Hence, the petition succeeds. The impugned notice is quashed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). No order as to costs.