Judgment : This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the 1st respondent in appeal (who died subsequent to the filing of the appeal) for permanent injunction restraining the defendants and the villagers of Eluvankottai Serkai from interfering with the worshipping as the first person and receiving thiruneeru and theertham on the days of Maduyeduppu and the eye opening ceremony for mud horses on the Kuthiraiyeduppu day when the said festivals are conducted for Vadakkuvasal Chellayee Amman Koil and Poduru Ayyanar Koil alias Sevugu Perumal Ayyanar Koil in Eluvankottai and Poduvayal revenue village. .2. The plaint ran as follows: In the villages commonly known as ‘Pananthope Serkai’, the plaintiff was entitled to certain preferential rights in temples and certain honours in Pananthope and Eluvankottai Serkais, which were exercised by the plaintiff and his ancestors from time immemorial. Eluvankottai Serkai Village consisted of Eluvankottai Maduvikottai, Perivayal and Maruthani and Pahadi villages. In the village of Eluvankottai, there is a temple known as Vadakuvasal Chelliamman koil and another temple by name PoduvudiarAyyanar Koil alias Sovuga Perumal Ayyanar Koil in Perivayal. Festivals like Maduyeduppu and Kuthiraiyeduppu are being conducted from time immemorial during intervals of two years by the villagers of Eluvankottai and Pananthope Serkai jointly with the donations collected in the two groups. On the day of Maduyeduppu and at the time of eye opening function in the Kuthiraiyeduppu festival, the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of ancestral right to worship the Gods as the first person and receive the usual thiruneeru and theer-tham at that time. The mode of worship has been exercised by the plaintiff’s ancestors and the plaintiff and he acquired a prescriptive right to the same. The right was also recognised by a judicial decision as early as in 1818 in suit number 58 of 1818 on the file of the Taluk District Munsif’s Court, Sivaganga at Madurai. A certified copy of the judgment is filed with the plaint. A decree was passed on 27. 1818 against the defendants in that suit directing them not to interfere with the rights of the plaintiff’s ancestors. The suit was filed against Madaiyan Siravali and others of Eluvankottai villages when they tried to interfere with the rights of the plaintiff’s ancestors. A certified copy of the judgment is filed with the plaint. A decree was passed on 27. 1818 against the defendants in that suit directing them not to interfere with the rights of the plaintiff’s ancestors. The suit was filed against Madaiyan Siravali and others of Eluvankottai villages when they tried to interfere with the rights of the plaintiff’s ancestors. In 1955, in the month of Ani, when the festivals were being conducted, the villagers of Eluvankottai Serkai attempted to interfere with the plaintiffs mode of worship and he filed an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer under Secs. 144 and 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was ordered that the plaintiff should worship first as usual. In 1966 when the festivals were conducted, the plaintiff had the usual customary worship first. The festivals are due to commence in June, 1977 and it is being given out by the defendants that they would not allow the plaintiff to exercise the right of first worship, as they are inimically disposed towards him. Hence, the suit is filed for injunction. The suit has been filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure impleading the defendants for themselves and as representatives of the village Eluvankottai Serkai. .3. The defendants filed a written statement denying the claim made in the plaint. It is stated in the written statement thus: In Thenneervayal, there are Pillaiyar, Amman and Ayyanar Temples and the villagers of Thenneervayal have the exclusive right to conduct festivals relating to the temples including Kuthiraiyeduppu and cattle race (Manjuvirattu). They collect funds for the festival and for conducting a drama. Eluvankottai Serkai villagers have no right to make any claim to any joint or preferential right in respect of the said temple festivities or other connected celebrations. The plaintiff is not the chief Ambalagar of Panan-thoppu Serkai as claimed by him. He never enjoyed or exercised any rights or preferential favours or honours in the temples. The claim that his ancestors were enjoying the honours, is false. It is false to claim that donations are jointly collected by the two groups. The plaintiff is not entitled as a matter of ancestral right or otherwise to claim the right of first worship and the first person to receive thiruneeru or theertham or any other honour. The claim that his ancestors were enjoying the honours, is false. It is false to claim that donations are jointly collected by the two groups. The plaintiff is not entitled as a matter of ancestral right or otherwise to claim the right of first worship and the first person to receive thiruneeru or theertham or any other honour. It is denied that the plaintiff in O.S.No.58 of 1818 was the great great grandfather of the plaintiff. The parties to the said action have nothing to do with the defendants or their ancestors. The defendants have no connection with the defendants in the said suit or their relations. The defendants in the said suit belonged to the same family as the plaintiff therein. The judgment in the said suit cannot be relied on as it was not one interparties and it is not admissible in evidence. The Judgment was not on merits, but appears to be based on some kind of horrible oath taken by one or other of the members of a certain family unconnected with Eluvankottai Serkai villagers. The claim made by the plaintiff is not a civil right and it will not fall within the scope of Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The claim for customary worship is unsustainable and untenable besides being untrue. The plaintiff does not hold any office in the temple and as such, is not entitled to enforce the claim made by him in the present suit. The right to honours as claimed by the plaintiff are discountenanced and not encouraged by law or by decisions of Courts. Hence, the suit should be dismissed. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff is not a trustee of Eluvankottai Serkai temples and he is not entitled to the honours claimed by him in the plaint. The Trial Court also held that the right claimed in the suit is not a civil right within the meaning of Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any of reliefs prayed for. 5. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, reversed the conclusion of the Trial Court and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for by him. 5. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, reversed the conclusion of the Trial Court and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for by him. The Appellate Judge held that the defendants are bound by the judgment in O.S.No.58 of 1818 on the file of the Taluk Munsif, Sivaganga and the plaintiff has established his claim that he has been receiving the honours in the first instance before anybody else was shown the honours as an ancestral right. The Appellate Judge also negatived the contention of the defendants that the right claimed in the suit is not a civil right. The learned Judge held that the subject-matter in dispute is only a mode of worship and the right to worship being a civil right, it can be enforced certainly in a Court of Law. 6. The aggrieved defendants have preferred the second appeal. As stated earlier, the plaintiff who, was the only respondent in the appeal, died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal representatives have been brought on record. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, it was brought to my notice that appellants 1 to 3 are no more and their legal representatives are not brought on record. But, this suit being a representative suit as against the defendants and the appellants were only representing the entire villagers, it does not matter, if the legal representatives of appellants 1 to 3 have not been brought on record. Appellants 4 and 5 are there to represent the entire villagers. Hence, there is no impediment to proceed with the hearing of the appeal. 7. It is argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the suit is not maintainable as the right put forward in the suit is not a civil right within the meaning of Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, it is contended that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 will bar the present suit. Thirdly, it is argued that on the merits, the plaintiff has not established his claim and the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is vitiated, as it has failed to take note of the relevant and material evidence on record. Thirdly, it is argued that on the merits, the plaintiff has not established his claim and the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is vitiated, as it has failed to take note of the relevant and material evidence on record. 8.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the finding of the lower appellate Court on the merits is one of fact based on acceptable evidence and it cannot be disturbed by this Court in second appeal. It was argued that the right put forward is one relating to a mode of worship as it is a civil right within the meaning of Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thirdly, it is contended that the plaintiff is not claiming any honours to be shown by the temple as such, but he is only claiming a right of precedence as against the defendants and therefore, Sec.63 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable. Endowments Act will not govern the subject-matter of the suit, with the result Sec. 108 will not bar the present suit. 9. I would prefer to consider the merits of the case before taking up the questions of law argued before me. The evidence relied on by the plaintiff comprises of Exs.A-1 to A-3 and his oral evidence besides that of two witnesses. On the side of the defendants, it is only the oral evidence of defendants 1,3,4 and 5 and no document has been filed by them. Ex.A-1 is a certified copy of a decision called “Theermanam” in Tamil given by the Taluk Munsif of Sivaganga in Madurai District on 27. 1818 in suit number 58 of 1818. The plaintiff in that suit was one Kaliappan, son of Mali Vaira-van Ambalakarar. The defendants are Mottayan, Sondyan, Seravili, Muthu Chellappa and Gopalan. A perusal of the document shows that the right claimed by the plaintiff therein was upheld. The contention of the defendants that it was not a conclusion on merits, but it was only based upon some oath taken at that time, is not correct. There is a reference to oath taken by one of the parties, but that was taken on a previous occasion in accordance with the custom prevailing at that time and on the strength of the result of the said oath, the parties conceded the right of the plaintiff on the earlier occasion. There is a reference to oath taken by one of the parties, but that was taken on a previous occasion in accordance with the custom prevailing at that time and on the strength of the result of the said oath, the parties conceded the right of the plaintiff on the earlier occasion. That was referred to in the order and the order itself is not based upon any oath taken at that time. The document is a certified copy issued on 13. 1949. The appellate Judge has come to the conclusion that the said decision is binding on the defendants on the footing that the ancestors of the respective parties were parties to the said proceeding. There is absolutely no evidence excepting the ipse dixit of the plaintiff that the plaintiff in the said proceeding was his great great grandfather. Even that evidence is lacking with reference to the defendants in the suit. There is no evidence whatever on record to the effect that the predecessors of the present defendant or the representatives of the villagers were parties to the said proceeding. On the other hand, plaintiff admits in his evidence that the defendants in the proceeding were only the next pangalis of the plaintiff. This admission has been overlooked by the Lower Appellate Court. As regards the plaintiff in that suit, in chief examination, the present plaintiff stated that Kaliap-pan’s son was Abathan Ambalam; his son was Karutha Kalai; his son was Peria Karuppan Ambalam, who was the father of the plaintiff herein. The plaintiff admitted that there is no document to prove the said geneology. In the cross-examination, he stated that the only record available with him is Ex.A-1. He admitted that he did not know the name of Vairavan Ambalam’s father. He stated that Vairavan and Abathan were brothers. That goes against his version in the chief examination that Abathan Ambalam was the son of Kaliappan. He adds in cross-examination that he read Ex.A-1 before 1941 and he did not read it thereafter. This is a very significant statement made by P.W.1. Unfortunately, the Lower Appellate Court has overlooked this statement. The version of P.W.I that he read Ex.A-1 before 1941 is clearly false as ExA-1 was issued only on 143.1949. He adds in cross-examination that he read Ex.A-1 before 1941 and he did not read it thereafter. This is a very significant statement made by P.W.1. Unfortunately, the Lower Appellate Court has overlooked this statement. The version of P.W.I that he read Ex.A-1 before 1941 is clearly false as ExA-1 was issued only on 143.1949. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the witness meant only another certified copy of the judgment of the Taluk Munsif in O.S.No.58 of 1818 and not Ex.A-1. I cannot accept this contention as the statement of the witness is very clear. In fact, he has stated that Ex.A-1 has been in his possession for quite a long time! There is one other statement of P.W.1 which is relevant. He stated that he could not say who was the plaintiff and who were the defendants in the said suit O.S.No.58 of 1818 without reading Ex.A-1 and that he did not remember them. If according to him, he had already read the document and he was having the document in his custody for quite a number of years, he would certainly have been familiar with the names of the parties mentioned in Ex.A-1. Atleast when he filed the suit making a claim that Ex.A-1 is binding on the parties to this suit, he would have taken care to ascertain as to who were the parties in O.S.No.58 of 1818. Thus, the evidence of P.W.1 does not make out that the parties to the proceedings in Ex.A-1 are the ancestors or predecessors in title of the parties to the present suit. The other two witnesses, P.Ws.2 and 3 do not speak anything about Ex.A-1. Therefore, the lower Appellate Court is clearly in error in holding that the decision of Taluk Munsif in O.S.N6.58 of 1818 as evidenced by Ex.A-1 is binding on the parties to the present proceeding. One of the reasons given by the learned Appellate Judge is quite strange. It is observed by the Appellate Judge that possession of Ex.A-1 itself will strengthen the case of the plaintiff. Even learned counsel appearing for the respondents could not support the said observation made by the learned appellate Judge. That observation itself shows, how the view of the appellate Judge was vitiated. I have no hesitation to hold that the finding of the appellate Judge as regards Ex.A-1 is perverse. Even learned counsel appearing for the respondents could not support the said observation made by the learned appellate Judge. That observation itself shows, how the view of the appellate Judge was vitiated. I have no hesitation to hold that the finding of the appellate Judge as regards Ex.A-1 is perverse. The contention that Ex.A-1 should be considered as proof of an instance where the plaintiff’s ancestors exercised the right of precedence at the time of festivals cannot be accepted as the plaintiff has failed to prove his relationship with the plaintiff in Ex.A-1 proceeding. 10. Ex.A-2 is a copy of a petition dated 17. 1955 given by the plaintiff to the Revenue Divisional Officer complaining against the threatened interference by the defendants with the exercise of his rights in the temples in question. Ex.A-2 does not by itself prove anything excepting to show that the plaintiff made such a complaint to the Revenue Divisional Officer and requested him to provide adequate bandobust to the plaintiff by taking action under Sec.107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The endorsement in Ex.A-2 shows that the Revenue Divisional Officer forwarded the petition of the plaintiff to the Sub Inspector of Police, Devakottai Taluk Police Station for urgent inquiry and report. Ex.A-3 contains the report of the Sub Inspector of Police and the arrangement entered into between the parties at that time. The relevant portion of Ex.A-3 reads as follows: “The petitioner Karuppiah Ambalam gave a statement that he would worship first on 13.755 between 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. and the CPs. agreed that they were prepared to worship after 10 p.m. On 17. 1955 the petitioner’s party agreed to worship 1st in the morning and the CPs. have agreed to worship in the evening and their willingness has been taken in writing. Accordingly the petitioner worshipped on 17. 1955 - 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. and the CPs. worshipped afterwards and on 17. 1955 the petitioner’s party did not worship as per their agreement before the S.I. The CPs. celebrated on the afternoon of 17. 1955 and got him 1st honour in the Kudhiraiyeduppu festival, etc. Inspector of Police, Devakottai with sufficient number of men posted for bandobust duty and the festival went on peacefully and both parties were allowed to worship. 1955 the petitioner’s party did not worship as per their agreement before the S.I. The CPs. celebrated on the afternoon of 17. 1955 and got him 1st honour in the Kudhiraiyeduppu festival, etc. Inspector of Police, Devakottai with sufficient number of men posted for bandobust duty and the festival went on peacefully and both parties were allowed to worship. On enquiries it was ascertained that there was a festival eight years ago in which there was same dispute right honour and was amicably settled among themselves. After seven years only the festival was celebrated. The CPs. have no record to show any right to receive the honours first and the petitioner produced a copy of the order passed by the Court among their family who should get the 1st honour. It is purely a civil nature and both the parties may be directed to seek their grievances in the Civil Court. The petition was presented only after the petitioner agreed before the S.I. that he would worship on 17. 1955 and 17. 1955 separately and did not want to ruin with them (the CPs.). This year festival was celebrated peacefully. The statements dated 17. 1955 from both the parties and the statements of the CPs. dated 17. 1955 and the statement of the petitioner dated 9. 1955 are herewith attached for perusal (Signed) N.V.Sankaran, S.I.9. 1955, Devakottai Taluk resubmitted to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Devakottai. I visited the village on the day of the festival. There was nothing. The festival went on smoothly.” 11. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that Ex.A-3 proves that the defendants admitted the claim made by the plaintiff in 1955.I do not agree. The extract from Ex.A-3 found above will clearly show that there was only a compromise for the purpose of conducting the festival peacefully in that year and there was no concession or admission of rights claimed by the plaintiff. Far from supporting the claim of the plaintiff, the contents of Ex.A-3 would to some extent go against the case put forward by the plaintiff. It is seen therefrom that on 17. 1955, the plaintiff did not turn up for receiving the honours which according to him, he was entitled to. On that day, the defendants as usual participated in the festival in the afternoon, but the plaintiff who was to come in the morning, did not attend the festival at all. It is seen therefrom that on 17. 1955, the plaintiff did not turn up for receiving the honours which according to him, he was entitled to. On that day, the defendants as usual participated in the festival in the afternoon, but the plaintiff who was to come in the morning, did not attend the festival at all. 12.The oral evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 is absolutely worthless to prove that the plaintiff had been enjoying the honours in the temples from time immemorial. Apart from the aforesaid evidence, there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff had ever exercised the right claimed by him in the festivals. Hence, I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff has not made out the claim put forward in the plaint that he is entitled to the right of first honours in the temples during the two festivals referred to in the plaint. It is not necessary for me to refer to the evidence of defendant’s witnesses. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the evidence of D.W.2 and submitted that he admitted the claim made by the plaintiff. The relevant portion of the evidence of D.W.2 refers only to the arrangement between the parties in 1955. He has only stated that the defendants permitted the plaintiff to worship the deities first. That would not amount to an admission on the part of the 3rd defendant. Learned counsel stresses on the sentence found in the evidence of the 3rd respondents as D.W.2. This sentence must be read along with the prior sentences. In the context in which it appears, it is clear that the 3rd defendant was only making reference to what happened in 1955 and it would not constitute an admission on the pap of the 3rd defendant of the right claimed by the plaintiff. 13. In the circumstances, the finding of the Appellate Judge on the merits of the claim made by the plaintiff is set aside and I hold that the plaintiff has not made out his case put forward in the plaint. 14. The next question to be considered is whether the right, claimed by the plaintiff is a civil right under Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question has been considered in several cases and the principles of law are by now well settled. 14. The next question to be considered is whether the right, claimed by the plaintiff is a civil right under Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question has been considered in several cases and the principles of law are by now well settled. In Vathiar Venkatachariar v. Ponnappa Aiyangar, 7 L.W.614, a Division Bench of this Court held that a claim which refers merely to a religious honour which consists of receiving theertham and prasadam in a Hindu Temple in a certain order is prima facie not one of a civil nature and unless such honour is attached as an emolument to a religious office, a claim therefor will not be cognisable by a Civil Court. It was also held by the Bench that in order to show the maintainability of such claim in a civil Court, the plaintiff must prove (i) the existence of the office to which the emoluments claimed are attached and (ii) the connection between the officer and the honour, dignities and perquisites claimed. Admittedly, the plaintiff is not holding any office of any kind in the temples in question. The honours claimed by him are not connected with any office in the temple. Hence, the right put forward is not a civil right. What is contended by learned counsel for the respondents is that the plaintiff has been claiming the right ex officio as the Chief Ambalakarar of the community. Further, it is contended by learned counsel that the plaintiff is a Government Official being a head man and as such, he is entitled to preferential rights in the temple. This argument cannot be accepted as the plaintiff is not holding any office in the temple. Unless there is such an office and the honours are attached to that office, the plaintiff, is not entitled to claim the same in a civil Court. 15. In Thathachariar v. Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar, (1938)1 M.L.J. 174 , another Division Bench of this Court held that the right to perform a festival could not be regarded as a right to an office and- even assuming that the right to recover Theertham, Thulasi and to have the Sri Satari placed on one’s head was a necessary concomitant of worship, it did not follow, the precedence or the order in which those things were done, was a civil right. The dictum of the Bench will directly apply to the present case. The plaintiff is claiming a right of precedence that he is entitled to stand as first among the worshippers in the festivals and receive honours. That right of precedence is not a civil right as held by the Bench. 16. In Sinha Ramanuja v. Ranga Ramanuja, A.I.R 1961 S.C. 1720, the principle of law has been declared as follows: “For convenience of reference we may summarise the law on the subject thus: (1) A suit for a declaration of religious honours and privileges simpliciter will not lie in a. civil court. (2) But a suit to establish one’s right to an office in a temple and to honours and privileges attached to the said office as its remuneration or perquisites is maintainable in a civil court. (3) The essential condition for the existence of an office is that the holder of the alleged office shall be under a legal obligation to discharge the duties attached to the said office and for the non-observance of which he may be visited with penalties. (4) So judged, there cannot be an independent office of theerthakar, for a theerthakar has no obligatory duties to perform, nor can there be an office of arulapad; the said word only connotes that the names of the theerthakars are called out by the archaka in a certain order. (5) Even if theertham is given or other honours are shown in a particular order to a person holding an office, it does not necessarily follow that the said honours are part of the remuneration attached to the office, but it is a question of fact to be ascertained on the evidence whether the said honours are attached to the office as part of its perquisites in the sense that they have become an integral part of the ritual to be performed by the recipient as the office-holder or are only shown to him as a mark of respect on the occasion of his visit to the temple.” Thus, the law of the land having been settled by the Apex Court in this country, there is no doubt that the right claimed by the plaintiff is not a civil right and he cannot enforce it in a civil Court. 17. 17. Even assuming that the plaintiff has been enjoying the right of precedence in the temples for quite a long time, that would not enable him to enforce it in a Civil Court. This position in law has been declared clearly by this Court in Ramaswami Gounder v. Lakshmana Reddi, (1939)2M.L.J. 420, and Suryanarayanamurthi v. Rama Rao, (1953)1 M.L.J. 154 . Therefore, I hold that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable in the Civil Court as the right claimed by him is not a civil right. 18. Turning to Sec.63 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, it is provided in Clause (e) of the said section that a dispute whether any person is entitled by custom or otherwise to any honour, emolument or perquisite in any religious institution and what is the established usage of a religious institution in regard to any other matter, shall be inquired into and decided by the Deputy Commissioner. Under Sec.108 of the Act, no suit or legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in the Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act. If the matter falls under Sec.63(e), the suit will be barred by the provisions of Sec.108. 19. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the plaintiff is not claiming any honour to be conferred on him by the temple, but he is only putting forward a right of precedence inter se himself and the defendants representing the villagers. Learned counsel repeatedly argued that the temple is not made a party to the suit, as the plaintiff is not having a claim as against the temple. It is the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the Court is entitled to decide as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the villagers on the other as to who is entitled to stand first among the worshippers during the two festivals to receive the usual theertham and thiruneeru and not any special honours. It is the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the Court is entitled to decide as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the villagers on the other as to who is entitled to stand first among the worshippers during the two festivals to receive the usual theertham and thiruneeru and not any special honours. According to learned counsel, as the plaintiff is not claiming any special honours and is only claiming a right to receive theertham and thiruneeru which are being given usually to every worshipper, this matter will not fall under Sec.63(e). There is a fallacy in the argument of learned counsel. If the plaintiff merely claims that he is entitled to receive theertham and thiruneeru or any prasadam in the temples during the festivals just as any other worshipper, there will be no difficulty to enforce such a right through a civil Court, because that will be only a claim of right to worship. But, the plaintiff is claiming a right to receive the theertham and other prasadams by standing first among the worshippers. This is nothing but claiming a right to first water as was being done by theerthakars in certain temples. It is well known in this country that there is a service by Theerthakars who will be entitled to receive the theertham first as a recognition of their services in temples and as honours conferred on them. Such a right pertains to the office of Theerthakars. But, here the plaintiff does not claim to hold any office in the temple. He claims that the honours must be given to him first among the worshippers. Even though the plaintiff has not chosen to implead the temple as such, the 1st defendant in the suit is a gurukkal who represents the temple. The suit is filed against the entire villagers and the defendants are representing the entire villagers. It is admitted that the villagers comprise of the trustees of the temple also. Hence, it is futile to contend that the temple is not made a party nominee and therefore, the plaintiff is not claiming any right as against the temple. I am unable to understand the contention that the plaintiff is claiming only a right of precedence inter se himself and the defendants without any reference to the temple. Hence, it is futile to contend that the temple is not made a party nominee and therefore, the plaintiff is not claiming any right as against the temple. I am unable to understand the contention that the plaintiff is claiming only a right of precedence inter se himself and the defendants without any reference to the temple. The right claimed by the plaintiff undoubtedly refers to certain honours, in the temples during the festivals. The matter is considered by putting a question to the plaintiff, whether he can enforce the decree between him and the defendants as against the temples, and is it possible for him to compel the Authorities of the temple to give him theertham and thiruneeru first even if somebody else had reached the temple before him. The answer will certainly be in the negative and the plaintiffs decree will be a futile one. Applying that test, it is clear that the plaintiff is claiming only honours in the temple. Thus, the matter falls within the four corners of Sec.63(e) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act There is no dispute that if the matter falls under Sec63(e), the suit will be barred by the provisions of Sec.108 of the Act. 20. However, learned counsel invited my attention to several decisions of this Court which I have listed below and also a decision of the Supreme Court in order to contend that what is claimed by the plaintiff is only a part of a right to worship or a particular mode of worship and it is not governed by sec.63(e) of the Act. The decisions relied on by him are as follows: C.Mooppan v. M.Mooppan, (1966)1 M.L.J. 361 , Rangayya Gounder v. Karuppa Naicker, (1971)1 M.L.J. 358 , Ugam Singh v. Kesrimal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2540, Muniandi Kone v. Arulmigu Mangalanathaswami Temple, A.I.R. 1982 Mad. 170, Swami Ayya v. Karuppaiah Ambalam, 96 L.W. 428, Sri Thulukka Choodamani Mariamman Temple v. Subramania Pandaram, 99L.W. 606, and The Executive Officer, Arulmigu Kallalagar Devasthanam etc. v. P.R. . Seetharaman, (1990)1 L.W. 110 . 21. I do not consider it necessary to refer to each one of them and point out that the facts of the case are entirety different. v. P.R. . Seetharaman, (1990)1 L.W. 110 . 21. I do not consider it necessary to refer to each one of them and point out that the facts of the case are entirety different. The decisions referred to above do not have any bearing on the present case, as on the facts, I have no doubt that what is claimed by the plaintiff is only an honour in the temple based on an ancient custom. In fact, in paragraph No.3 of the plaint, it is stated that the plaintiff is claiming certain honours as Chief Ambalakarar of Pananthope Serkai. 22. In the result, I hold that the suit is not maintainable both because of the provisions of Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Sec.108 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. The second appeal has to be allowed. 23. Before parting with the case, I think it necessary to place on record my doubts about the genuineness of Ex.A-1 in the case though I have decided the appeal on the footing that it is genuine. Though the document was referred to and relied on by the plaintiff even in the plaint, the defendants never questioned the truth of it. Even in the second appeal, no argument was advanced against its genuineness. When I perused the document, I got a doubt whether there was any Taluk Munsif Court in 1818 at Madurai. I expressed the same to counsels on both sides before delivering judgment. Neither of the counsel could throw any light on the matter. I went through the available books in the library such as Nelson’s Manual, Mcleans Manual, Fifth Report on East India Company. Affairs, Selection of Papers from the Records at The East India House, An Analytical Digest of all the Reported cases in the Courts of the Hon.East India Company and Tamil Nadu District Gazetteers for Ramanathapuram and Madurai. I could not find any reference in any of them to Taluk Munsif Court. On the available information, it is seen that from 1816, District Munsif’s and and village Munsifs were appointed in the Districts. The Village Munsifs were the heads of the Villagers and had powers to try and determine all suits for money or other personal property not exceeding Rs.10 in value. They were assisted by the Karnams who conducted and recorded the court proceedings. The Village Munsifs were the heads of the Villagers and had powers to try and determine all suits for money or other personal property not exceeding Rs.10 in value. They were assisted by the Karnams who conducted and recorded the court proceedings. The Village Munsif was also empowered to assemble village Panchayats for the adjudication of civil suits of any amount within the limits of the village Munsifs. The decisions of such Panchayats were made final. The District Munsifs tried suits involving land and personal property upto Rs.200 and his decisions were made final in suits involving amounts upto Rs.20. In suits of value more than Rs.20, an appeal was available to the Zillah Court. The decision of the Zillah Court was final. The District Munsif also enjoyed the power to assemble the Village Panchayat and to act as an arbitrator in suits voluntarily referred to him. For the first time, District Munsif’s Courts were established in the District of Madurai in 1816. There was one Court in Paramagudi which exercised jurisdiction over the region which now forms part of Ramanathapuram District excluding the Taluks of Sattur and Srivilliputhur. There was no Court as Taluk Munsif Court. Sivaganga was of course part of Madurai District at that time, but it was Zamindari. 24. It is not possible to clearly decide from the rubber stamp on Ex.A-1 the Authority which issued the certified copy. It is possible to read it as District Court of Ramnad. Though strong suspicion has arisen in my mind with regard to the genuineness of Ex.A-1, I have not rested my conclusion in the appeal on the same in view of the fact that the defendants ‘never raised the question. 25. For the reasons already set out, the second appeal is allowed. The decree and judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, in AS.No.8 of 1979 are set aside. The decree and judgment of the District Munsif of Devakottai dismissing the suit, O.S.No.206 of 1988 are restored. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout. If the defendants have paid costs to the plaintiff, they are entitled to restitution thereof.