Judgment :- Mishra, J. The two petitioners have separately moved this Court for a writ of mandamus seeking interference by this Court in the matter of any detention order they may be made against them by the respondents in the respective petitions under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). 2. That such a pre-detention petition is maintainable is no longer in doubt. Art.226(1) of the Constitution of India like Art.32 which empowers the Supreme Court with respect to the enforcement of fundamental rights, empowers the High Courts throughout the territories in relation to which they exercise their respective jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any government within these territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. It also empowers the High Courts to make interim orders, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner in such a proceeding. Arts.21 and 22 which fall in Part HI of the Constitution provide for protection of life and personal liberty. They also provide that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 3. In S.M.D. Kiran Pasha v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1990)1 S.C.C. 328 , it has been categorically stated that for enforcement of one’s right to life and personal liberty resort to Art.226(1) has thus been provided for and this can be resorted to pre-violation. In the said case, the Supreme Court has observed. "Resort to Art.226 after the right to personal liberty is already violated is different from the pre-violation protection. Post-violation resort to Art.226 is for remedy against violation and for restoration of the right, while pre-violation protection is by compelling observance of the obligation or compulsion under law not to infringe the right by all these who are so obligated or compelled. To surrender and apply for a writ of habeas corpus is a post-violation remedy for restoration of the right which is not the same as restraining potential violators in case of threatened violation of the right. The question may arise what precisely may amount to threat or imminence of violation. To surrender and apply for a writ of habeas corpus is a post-violation remedy for restoration of the right which is not the same as restraining potential violators in case of threatened violation of the right. The question may arise what precisely may amount to threat or imminence of violation. Law surely cannot take action for internal thoughts but can act only after overt acts. If overt acts towards violation have already been done and the same has come to the knowledge of the person threatened with that violation and he approaches the court under Art.226 giving sufficient particulars of proximate actions as would imminently lead to violation of right, should not the court call upon those alleged to have taken those steps to appear and show cause why they should not be restrained from violating that right? Instead of doing so should it be the proper course to be adopted to tell the petitioner that the court cannot take any action towards preventive justice until his right is actually violated where after alone he could petition for a writ of habeas corpus?........The difference of the two situations, as we have seen, have different legal significance. If a threatened invasion of a right is removed by restraining the potential violator from taking any steps towards violation, the rights remain protected and the compulsion against its violation is enforced. If the right has already been violated, what is left is the remedy against such violation and for restoration of the right.” Considering the effect of the law as stated by the Supreme Court, one of us in the order in W.P.No.6610 of 1989 dated 38. 1990 (M.M.K. Mohamed Ibrahim v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Secretary to Government, Public (S.C.) Department) has said, “To come to the said conclusion the Supreme Court took stock of the scope and ambit of the provisions of Art.21 of the Constitution of India as well as Art.226(1) and indicated the care which the court must take in entertaining an application to interfere and thereafter interfering with any imminent violation of the right under Art.21 of the Constitution of India. Before this Court can take cognizance of any threatened violation of the fundamental right under Art.21 of the Constitution, it must be shown that there has been some overt act towards violation of the said right and that such violation came to the knowledge of the petitioner and sufficient particulars of proximate actions as would imminently lead to violation of right are disclosed by him.” At another place in the same order, this Court has said, “All judicial authorities are unanimous in laying down the law that the Court should not interfere with the State’s action to detain some one in accordance with the provisions of the law of Preventive Detention unless it is found that they intend to arrest without adequate and reasonable grounds or on non est or irrelevant grounds.” 4. Thus, while it is well settled that there can be a pre-detention writ to restrain the detaining authorities in cases of any threatened potential violation of the right under Art.21 of the Constitution of India, the question invariably in every case will be as to what precisely is the alleged threat or imminence of violation. The Supreme Court has clarified and said that law surely cannot take action for internal thoughts but can act only after overt acts. Thus, if it is seen that overt acts towards violation have already been done, and respondents when called upon to show cause failed to demonstrate that they have not resorted to any overt act but have acted strictly in accordance with law, the Court may issue necessary order/direction to restrain, otherwise not. Thus, fortified by the law when we look to the case of V.Selvakumar, petitioner in W.P.No.9383 of 1988, we came to the conclusion that this Court should interfere. But on an examination of the facts of the case of Varadarajan, petitioner in W.P.No. 11006 of 1989, we find that any interference pre-detention is not warranted. We may here take stock of the facts of the two cases. 5. Selvakumar (petitioner in W.P.No.9383 of 1988) in his affidavit before this Court has stated as follows: “The petitioner is a resident of Tuticorin and has been carrying on business under the name and style of Rasi Exports. The petitioner has been exporting marine products to several foreign countries principally to Ceylon. The petitioner has been licensed to carry on the business as an exported by the Government of India. The petitioner has been exporting marine products to several foreign countries principally to Ceylon. The petitioner has been licensed to carry on the business as an exported by the Government of India. The petitioner is also assessed to Income-Tax. The petitioner had urgently to go to Madras. With that in view he came to Tuticorin bus stop at about 10 p.m. on 12. 1988. At that time tourist bus brokers accosted him and asked him if he would take a taxi to Madras by paying a fare of Rs. 150 only. The petitioner was further assured that only 5 people would travel and that the car would reach Madras very much earlier and he could also travel in comfort. The petitioner agreed to the same and travelled in the said car bearing Regn.No. TMK 9757. The car had 4 other passengers including the driver. When the car was coming near Madurantakam it was stopped by certain plain clothes persons near the market. The driver stopped the car immediately. The petitioner was under the impression that the persons, who have stopped the car were from Civil Supplies Department officials. All the passengers got out of the car but two of the persons, who have travelled in the car got out of the car and mingled with market crowd and they were not to be seen. The car and the petitioner were searched but nothing incriminating was found. This had happened at about 11.30 A.M., on 12. 1988. A Nil Mahazar was drawn and the petitioner was also asked to sign the same. However, the petitioner and two other persons in the car were directed to come along with the car to the Office of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in T.Nagar, Madras.17. The petitioner was coerced after keeping him locked for nearly 64 hours to write out an involuntary statement. The petitioner challenged the action of the respondent and filed a writ petition that the statement should not be attributed to the petitioner, being involuntary and obtained by threat and coercion and hence the same should not be used for any purpose. The said writ petition in W.P.No.1952 of 1983 was admitted by this Hon’ble High Court. The petitioner challenged the action of the respondent and filed a writ petition that the statement should not be attributed to the petitioner, being involuntary and obtained by threat and coercion and hence the same should not be used for any purpose. The said writ petition in W.P.No.1952 of 1983 was admitted by this Hon’ble High Court. On being prima facie satisfied, an order of injunction restraining the respondent from in any way using the statement obtained from the petitioner herein on 19/20th February, 1989 for any prosecution under the Customs Act or for any other purposes under any Act or Acts has been granted. The order was granted in W.M.P.No.2958 of 1988 dated 3. 1988. After hearing the respondent, the said order has also been made absolute." The petitioner has further stated, "The petitioner along with 2 others were taken to the office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and was locked in a room in the ground floor. There were 4 persons in the room who also locked themselves inside guarding the petitioner. The petitioner was in this State from the moment of his arrival at about 1.30 P.M. on 12. 1988 at the Office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence uptill 9.30 P.M. when he was taken to a house at the outskirts of Madras City and remanded to jail on the evening of 20.2.1988. Thus the statement from the petitioner herein had been recorded in the above state of things when the petitioner was a virtual prisoner with every one of his freedom brutally snuffed out by the respondent." The petitioner has then added, "The petitioner now understands that the other 2 persons who were also brought in the car were similarly locked up in separate room in the upstairs portion for a similar duration and remanded to custody on the afternoon of 20.2.1988." On 12. 1988, according to the petitioner, after about 8 P.M. the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (names of the Officers are not known to the petitioner) came to the room where he was locked and began to coerce him to write a statement that they had recovered certain gold bars from the petrol tank of the car and that he is the person responsible for the same. The petitioner resisted and protested; but they threatened him saying that unless he gave the statement, his relatives and wife would be implicated. The petitioner has then added, "They also brought to my room Vellathurai, one of the persons who travelled in the car and his shirt was removed and I could find throughout his bare back the terrible signs of violence. They told me that similar fate awaits me if I resist. Unable to bear the psychological and physical torture, I wrote whatever that was dictated by the Officers. It was late in the midnight the officers and I became tired due to lack of proper food or proper ventilation. The Officers told me to continue giving the statement on the following morning. I distinctly recollect that the statement itself was so written and it has been stated that it has become very late in the night the statement will be continued on the following morning. On 20th February, the statement was again written as dictated by the authorities. It is only thereafter I was given some food. They also rubbed certain oil to make the contusion subside. I was later remanded to custody in the night." 6. It appears that in the writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioner, that is to say, W.P.No.1952 of 1983, the respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit and made a prayer for vacating the injunction that had been granted earlier. The petitioner has asserted that from the counter affidavit filed in the said case it can be gathered that the petitioner had been kept under illegal custody for more than 24 hours after his arrest and after his freedom of movement was taken away and stated "Thus there has been an admission on the part of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence that Art.22(1) of the Constitution has been grossly violated. Secondly it can be further seen from the Counter affidavit that the statement had been recorded beyond the office hours and a statement had been recorded other than in the form of questions and answers. 7. As a cause for moving this Court for a pre-detention restraint order, the petitioner has stated that on 18. Secondly it can be further seen from the Counter affidavit that the statement had been recorded beyond the office hours and a statement had been recorded other than in the form of questions and answers. 7. As a cause for moving this Court for a pre-detention restraint order, the petitioner has stated that on 18. 1988 the police authorities accompanied by the Customs Officers said to belong to the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence came to the petitioner’s place and wanted to arrest him and detain him under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. 8. He has filed a supplementary affidavit to state, "The main thrust of allegations in the Writ Petition has been that this Honourable Court had granted injunction in favour of myself and one V.Vellathurai, who had also travelled in the Ambassador car, and that their statements-recorded on 19/20th February, 1988 shall not be used for any purposes, whatsoever under any Act or Acts, as they were produced by oppressive treatment and duress and by adopting method not sanctioned by law. This Honourable Court had granted interim injunction as prayed for both in respect of the petitioner herein (V.Selva Kumar) and the said V.Vellathurai on 3. 1988. As regards the petitioner the said Order was also made absolute by an order dated 24. 1988, after hearing the counsel for the respondent-State. While so, in violation of the order of injunction, the respondent had passed an order of detention under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act directing the detention of myself and the said Vellathurai by Order dated 18. 1988. Thus, the detention order had been passed on the same set of facts and on the same materials against the petitioner (V.Selvakumar) and the said V.Vellathurai. This detention order had been passed when the order of injunction was current, subsisting and in force." A copy of the detention order passed against V.Vellathurai had been brought on the record as an annexure and it is stated that the detention order passed against Vellathurai had been challenged by filing a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No. 14161 of 1988. It had been allowed by a Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 3. 1989. 9. It had been allowed by a Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 3. 1989. 9. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority, the detaining authority states nothing beyond raising the plea that a writ petition seeking issue of a writ of mandamus for forbearing the respondent from arresting or detaining the petitioner under the provisions of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act is not maintainable in law and stating, "I state that this respondent has passed an order dated 18. 1988 under Sec.3(1) of COFEPOSA Act, 1974, with a view to prevent the petitioner from transporting, concealing and keeping smuggled goods on its subjective satisfaction. The order of detention has not yet been served on the petitioner since he is absconding. I further submit that at this stage it may not be necessary to disclose the grounds of detention. The same will be disclosed to the petitioner at the appropriate time. I therefore submit that the petitioner with a view to avoid detention pursuant to the above order of detention has come forward with the above writ petition which will in effect be, challenging the order of detention which he is not entitled to before this Honourable Court. I submit that it will be totally unnecessary to go into the grounds of detention at this stage. It will be to the petitioner as and when he is served with the grounds of detention to seek appropriate reliefs." It is, however, stated in the counter affidavit of the first respondent that the second respondent has filed a detailed counter and the same is adopted by the first respondent with regard to the allegations made by the petitioner in the main writ petition. 10. The second respondent has stated in his counter affidavit that at the time of interception on 12. 1988 at about 12.30 P.M., the car TMK 9757 was being driven by the petitioner and he was accompanied by Vellathurai and Mariappan. Denying the allegation that the petitioner was locked up for nearly 64 hours and was coerced to write out an involuntary statement, the counter affidavit adds, "The petitioner has in his affidavit stated that the car in which he was travelling was intercepted at 11.30 AM. on 12. 1988 and brought to office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence at Madras at 1.30 P.M. on 12. on 12. 1988 and brought to office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence at Madras at 1.30 P.M. on 12. 1988 and that he was remanded to jail in the evening of 20.2.1988 are not correct. It may be stated that the petitioner had also signed the seizure Mahazar dated 12. 1988 wherein the search of the car in the presence of the petitioner was noted. At that time, the petitioner had voluntarily given the statement in his own hand which is referred to by the petitioner was coerced to write the said statement is therefore not correct and is purposely made to gain the sympathy of this Hon’ble Court. During the period of the search, the petitioner was personally present and witnessed the same. The averment to the contrary is not correct. It may be stated that no statement was recorded from the petitioner on 20.2.1988" and "in regard to the averment contained in para 8 of the affidavit of the petitioner that he was locked up in a room in the ground floor of the office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, that his co-passengers Velladurai and Mariappan were locked upstairs and four others also locked themselves in the room upstairs and the petitioner was in that State from the moment of his arrival at 1.30 P.M. on 12. 1988 upto the time he was taken to a house in the outskirts of the city and remanded to jail on 20.2.1988 are false and as such denied". It is said in the counter affidavit that the petitioner was taken not to any house at the outskirts of Madras City before his remand but was taken to the residence of the Magistrate after arrest as 20.2.1988 was a holiday. 11. While it is not denied that the car was apprehended as alleged by the petitioner on 12. 1988 at about 12.30 P.M. as also the fact that the petitioner was interrogated by the Customs officials, it is, however, stated in the counter affidavit, "In regard to the averment contained in para 12 of the affidavit of the petitioner that he was not produced before the Magistrate before 24 hours of his arrest it is submitted that he was arrested at 22.00 hours on 12. 1988 and produced before the Magistrate at 3.30 P.M. on 20.2.1988. 1988 and produced before the Magistrate at 3.30 P.M. on 20.2.1988. Inasmuch as the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate at 3.30 P.M. on 20.2.1988 well within 24 hours of his arrest, there has been no violation of Art.22(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, as the statement was recorded immediately after the seizure mahazar was completed at 14.00 hours on 12. 88 the decision of this Hon’ble Court in W.A.No.1015 of 1987 P.Mansoor Mohamed Ali Jinnah v. The Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, Madras-6 and in W.P.No.5794 of 1987, dated 2. 1988 have no application to the facts of the present case." The fact that this Court in W.M.P.No.2958 of 1988 in W.P.No.1952 of 1983 on 3. 1988 granted injunction restraining any action on the confessional statement of the petitioner has not been denied. But it is added, "it is respectfully submitted that the order of injunction does not prevent any detention orders being passed." The most significant statement, however, is made in paragraphs 17 and 18 of this counter affidavit. It is stated there, "In regard to para 15 it is submitted that the second respondent is not aware of the grounds on which detention has been ordered and it is for the first respondent to justify the order. However, it is pertinent to state that as the order of detention has not been served on the petitioner and he is not aware of the grounds of detention, the allegations are based on assumptions and surmises and will not entitle him to file the above writ petition. In regard to para 16 of the affidavit of the petitioner that apart from the statement attributed the petitioner and Shri Vellathurai, there is no other material on which any subjective satisfaction can be arrived at, it is submitted that as the decision to detain is that of the Tamil Nadu Government, who is the first respondent in the above writ petition, it is for that Government to meet the above contention. In regard to the averment of the petitioner, that it is only after a lapse of 64 hours that the gold pieces in question have been recovered from a tourist taxi which had been used in the operation, it is submitted that the same is not correct as complete recovery of the gold had been effected at 10 AM. on 12. on 12. 1988, i.e., after the expiry of about 21 1/2 hours from the time of interception at 12.30 hours on 12. 1988. It is reiterated that it is not correct to say that apart from the confessional statement of the petitioner and that of Vellathurai there is not even an iota of material to connect the petitioner with the alleged occurrence. It will be seen from the seizure Mahazar dated 12. 1988 which has been signed by the petitioner, witnesses and others that the gold in question belonged only to the petitioner. While on this it may be stated that when the petitioner who realised that the game was up, had himself admitted that the gold could be recovered from the oil sump by removing a bolt and it is this admission of the petitioner that led to the recovery of gold.” 12. We have been informe’d at the Bar, however that this Court’s order of injunction in W.M.P.No.2958 of 1988 in W.P.No.1952 of 1988 dated 3. 1988 has been stayed in C.M.P.No. 16426 of 1988 in W.A.No.1607 by order dated 112. 1988. From the facts brought on the record, what transpires is clear like a crystal, namely, .(i) The petitioner travelled in the car bearing Registration No.TKM 9757 with some other passengers on 12. 1988: .(ii) The car was apprehended by the customs officers at Madurantakam on 12. 1988 at about 11.30 A.M./12.30 P.M. and the petitioner was apprehended along with two other passengers: (iii) The petitioner made a confessional statement - according to the petitioner ‘involuntary’, according to the respondents “voluntary” while he was in the custody of the Customs Officers: (iv) The petitioner was shown under arrest at 22.00 hours on 12. 1988 and was produced before the Magistrate on 20.2.1988 at 3.30 P.M. He was, therefore, forwarded to jail custody. 13. After the above, the petitioner moved for bail first before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.1), Madras, and then before the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The Principal Judge, Civil City Court, Madras, granted bail to him on 22. 1988 in Crl.M.P.No.944 of 1988. The petitioner filed W.P.No.1952 of 1988 asking for a mandamus forbearing the respondents from in any way using the confessional statement obtained from him on 19/20.2.1988 for any purpose under any other Act or Acts. On 3. 1988, this Court granted interim injunction. 1988 in Crl.M.P.No.944 of 1988. The petitioner filed W.P.No.1952 of 1988 asking for a mandamus forbearing the respondents from in any way using the confessional statement obtained from him on 19/20.2.1988 for any purpose under any other Act or Acts. On 3. 1988, this Court granted interim injunction. The first respondent moved a petition for vacating the interim injunction while the second respondent moved a petition for cancellation of the bail. Both these petitions were dismissed in due course. It appears, however, that Vellathurai filed a separate writ petition in W.P.No.3089 of 1988. V.Vellathurai v. Director Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Madras. 17, and got an order of interim injunction on the same terms as in the case of the petitioner in W.M.P.No.2958 of 1988 in W. P.No. 1952 of 1988 on 23. 1988. Notwithstanding, however, the order of injunction, Vellathurai was detained under the Act on 18. 1988, It appears that a similar detention order was passed against the petitioner and when the authorities approached to arrest the petitioner (V.Selvakumar), the petitioner decided to move the instant petition. .14. We have already noticed that Vellathurai questioned the order of detention by filing a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.14161 of 1988 and the same has been allowed. The detention order passed against him was quashed and he has been set at liberty. The petitioner asserted that the main ground on which this Court found fault with the order of detention in the case of Vellathurai was that the alleged confessional statement with respect to which this Court had issued an order of interim injunction in W.M.P.No.4581 of 1988 in W.P.No.3089 of 1988 had been used by the respondents. The petitioner has, accordingly, alleged that he has no reason to think that in his case there could be any material other than the confessional statement upon which the respondents proposed to detain him. We have also taken notice of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. They have no doubt maintained that since the grounds of detention have not yet been served upon the petitioner, the allegation that the respondents proposed to detain him on the basis of the confessional statement was based only on assumptions and surmises. We have also taken notice of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. They have no doubt maintained that since the grounds of detention have not yet been served upon the petitioner, the allegation that the respondents proposed to detain him on the basis of the confessional statement was based only on assumptions and surmises. But, in the counter affidavit, the relevant portions of which have been extracted above, it is clearly stated while talking of the materials upon which the detention order had been passed“It will be seen from the seizure Mahazar dated 12. 1988 which has been signed by the petitioner, Witnesses and others that the gold in question belonged only to the petitioner. While on this it may be stated that when the petitioner who realised that the game was up, had himself admitted that the gold could be recovered from the oil sump by removing a bolt and it is this admission of the petitioner that led to the recovery of gold,“ .15. Proceeding on the pleadings, having already noticed that a pre-detention writ petition is maintainable for a writ of mandamus, we would have straightway taken notice of the admission made in the counter of the second respondent that the main basis to detain the petitioner is the confessional statement leading to the recovery of gold. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, has taken as through the grounds and shown to the Court how the respondents decided to pass an order of detention. His submissions based on the records are that the detaining authority was aware of the order of injunction passed by this Court and thus excluded the confessional statement altogether and since otherwise the grounds have not been assailed before this Court, it is not necessary for this Court to examine the grounds. In short, his submission before this Court is that once it is demonstrated that the confessional statement has not been used for the purpose of defaming the petitioner, this court should reject the prayer for a writ of mandamus. In short, his submission before this Court is that once it is demonstrated that the confessional statement has not been used for the purpose of defaming the petitioner, this court should reject the prayer for a writ of mandamus. We would have given due weight to this submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor the way such submissions deserved had we not taken, notice of the stand of the respondents in the counter affidavit that the order of injunction passed by this Court is no bar to the use of the confessional statement for the purpose of making an order of detention and the above quoted statement in the counter affidavit in which it is clearly stated that the gold itself was recovered on the basis of the confessional statement of the petitioner. But for the confessional statement, it is obvious, there is no other material to connect the petitioner with the smuggled gold, if it is presumed for the purpose of this case that the gold found in the car had been smuggled to India. Apart from the above, the intrinsic evidence in this case is more eloquent in favour of the petitioner than in favour of the respondents. It is admitted before us that the car did not belong to the petitioner. The recovery of the gold was not from the possession of the petitioner but was found concealed in one of the chambers of the car. In Vellathurai’s case, the respondents could not find any ground except the alleged confessional statement for passing the detention order. Now then they could say that they could find any other ground for the petitioner (V.Selvakumar) in the Mahazar and the alleged recovery? Were they not available as the ground or basis for detaining Vellathurai who too was one of the occupants of the car besides the petitioner? Why then in the case of the petitioner it is said that his confessional statement is not used but in the case of Vellathurai as found by this Court he was detained mainly on the basis of his confessional statement? .16. The petitioner alleged by filing a Contempt Application (Contempt Application No.339 of 1988) that the respondents used his confessional statement for the purpose of issuing the detention order. This Court found truth in the contention of the petitioner and recorded in the order dated 14. 1989. .16. The petitioner alleged by filing a Contempt Application (Contempt Application No.339 of 1988) that the respondents used his confessional statement for the purpose of issuing the detention order. This Court found truth in the contention of the petitioner and recorded in the order dated 14. 1989. .“It is stated by Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that though it is naively stated that the said confessional statement is not being taken into consideration for making an order of detention under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, reliance is admittedly being placed on other documents, such as the mahazar and remand application wherein there is specific reference to the confessional statement of the petitioner. My attention has been drawn to the contents of the said mahazar and remand application. On a perusal of the same, I am convinced that there is a reference and reliance on the confessional statement of the petitioner. This conduct on the part of the respondent herein cannot be commended and may be held to be reprehensible. But at the same time, it may be said that there is a misconception on the part of the respondent herein with regard to the scope of the order passed. I am of the view that it would serve the purpose of the petitioner if the position is made clear and direction is given, restraining the respondent herein from implementing the order of detention passed under the Act on 18. 1988, and further restraining the respondent herein from in any manner using the mahazar or the remand application or any other document wherein the confessional statement of the petitioner is being referred to or relied on until the respondent herein, who is the second respondent in W.P.No. 1952 of 1988 gets clear through the controversy in the writ petition once and for all." .17. The above is enough for the irresistible conclusion that once the confessional statement of the petitioner is moved from consideration, the respondents are left with no other material to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence. The respondents have conceded that the petitioner is sought to be detained in connection with the aforementioned offence. The above is enough for the irresistible conclusion that once the confessional statement of the petitioner is moved from consideration, the respondents are left with no other material to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence. The respondents have conceded that the petitioner is sought to be detained in connection with the aforementioned offence. All that they possess in their hands go to show that the petitioner was either the driver of the vehicle or one of the passengers not enough to link the petitioner with the smuggling of the gold bars found concealed in one of the chambers of the car. There is, however, sufficient evidence to show that the petitioner was kept under some sort of pre-arrest detention by the Customs Officials before whom, it is alleged, he made the confessional statement. The petitioner has alleged that his statement was ‘involuntary’. The detaining authority, thus, would be obliged to consider the petitioner’s retraction from the alleged confession and then to determine whether on other materials it can be said that he indulged in such activities which warranted his detention under the COFEPOSA. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor endeavored before us to show that independent of the confessional statement, based only upon the mahazar and the alleged recovery of the gold if detention is ordered its validity or otherwise may be examined in a writ of habeas corpus but not in a petition in the nature of writ of ‘mandamus’. It is difficult to accept that there is any material independent of the confessional statement to link the petitioner with the alleged offence. The confessional statement cannot be used against the petitioner for the reason of the order of injunction made by this Court in W.M.P.No.2958 of 1988 in W.P.No.1952 of 1988 on 3. 1988. It is true that the said order of injunction has been stayed by order dated 112. 1988 made in C.M.P.No.16426 of 1988 in W.A.No.1607 of 1988. But if is admitted that the detention order was prepared when the injunction order was operative. .18. We have already taken notice of the law as stated by the Supreme Court as well as by this court in M.M.K. Mohamed Ibrahim v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Secretary to Government, Public (S.C.) Department, W.P.No.6610 of 1989, dated 38. But if is admitted that the detention order was prepared when the injunction order was operative. .18. We have already taken notice of the law as stated by the Supreme Court as well as by this court in M.M.K. Mohamed Ibrahim v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Secretary to Government, Public (S.C.) Department, W.P.No.6610 of 1989, dated 38. 1990, that a pre-detention writ of mandamus will be maintainable to examine whether there are any materials against the petitioner or material of any probative value and whether the respondents have shown sufficient overt acts which, in the eye of law, would constitute a threat of violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art.21 of the Constitution of India or not. On the facts aforementioned we have to conclude that there are sufficient overt acts pointing to the violation of the petitioner’s fundamental right particularly because the respondents have unwittingly relied upon the confessional statement of the petitioner to connect him with the alleged crime. 19. V.Varadarajan, (petitioner in W.P.No.11006 of 1989), however, has come to the court stating that he is a repatriate from Burmah. His elder brother V.K. Ramanujam is having a business of vending article and merchandise in the Burma Bazaar at Trichy. He was apprehended for the alleged smuggling of 9 packages of contraband articles. He has got, however, his own story about it as, according to him, when he landed at Trichy on 15. 1988 from Singapore, he discharged all legal obligations by declaring the goods and paying customs duty of Rs.8,400 and thus removing the goods after paying duty. After 20 days, according to him, he was apprehended on 6. 1988 at about 3.30 P.M. and taken to the Customs Office where he was coerced to make a statement, kept in custody for more than 24 hours and produced before a Magistrate only on 6. 1988, nearly 3 days after his original apprehension. He has come forward accordingly with the case that the packages for which he is sought to be implicated did not belong to him and that his confessional statement which had been obtained under coercion and duress is not admissible. We have already noticed the law on the subject. 1988, nearly 3 days after his original apprehension. He has come forward accordingly with the case that the packages for which he is sought to be implicated did not belong to him and that his confessional statement which had been obtained under coercion and duress is not admissible. We have already noticed the law on the subject. It will not be proper for this Court to embark upon an enquiry as to whether confessional statements are admissible or not or whether the detention in the instant case is sought to be based only upon the confessional statement or not. Circumstances in this case go to show that the respondents have acted in accordance with law and that his (Varadarajan’s) pre-arrest custody by the Customs Officers in which he made his alleged confessional statement may not be comparable with the case of V.Selvakumar, petitioner in W.P.No.9383 of 1988. This is a case, in our opinion, in which this Court should give to the respondents due credit without, however, adjudicating upon the question whether there is any truth in the allegations of the petitioner or not that he has been implicated in the alleged smuggling on the basis of the involuntary confessional statement. The law as stated by the Supreme Court to be applied in such a case is that the Court should make exception only when there are such overt acts as would show that there is any violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner or that there is any threat or imminence of violation of such fundamental right. The case of the petitioner Varadarajan is similar to the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.6610 of 1989. His is a case of detention, if at all contemplated, in accordance with law and not a case where this Court would find that there is any attempt to arrest the petitioner without adequate and reasonable grounds or on non est or irrelevant grounds. Thus, in our opinion, the writ petition filed by Varadarajan (W.P.No.11006 of 1989) deserves dismissal. 20. In the result, W.P.No.9383 of 1988 is allowed. The respondents therein are directed to forbear from detaining V.Selvakumar (petitioner in W.P.No.9383 of 1988) in connection with the alleged smuggling of gold in the car bearing Registration No.TMK 9757 (vide recovery dated 12. 1988 W.P.No.11006 of 1989 in which V.Varadarajan is the petitioner is dismissed.