JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - Having regard to the importance of the question involved in this batch of civil revisions, a learned judge of this Court considered it appropriate that the answer to the controversy should be given by a Division Bench and that is how this batch has come before us. 2. For construction of Engineering Research institute at Pandara, lands located in Mouza Gadakana in Bhubaneswar were acquired by notification dated 8.4-1964 and 20-5-1964 u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The Collector determined the compensation fixing the market value of the land at Rs. 10,000/- per acre. On reference u/s 18 of the Act, the learned Subordinate Judge determined the compensation taking into consideration the market value of the land at Rs. 40,000/- per acre. Appeal was carried to this Court by the State and this Court set aside the awards passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and remanded the matters for fresh disposal in accordance with, the observations made On 23-7-1980 upon remand the learned Subordinate Judge held that compensation would be payable with reference to the market value of one category of land at Rs. 50,000/- per acre and of the second category at the rate of Rs. 43,000/- per acre The State moved this Court again in appeal being aggrieved by the determination as made by the learned Subordinate Judge by his awards dated 23-7-1980. This Court, which heard the various first appeals analogously by judgment dated 25-2-1982 modified the determination of the learned Subordinate Judge and substituted the market value as Rs. 43,000/- and Rs. 40,000/- in place of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 43,000/- as determined by the learned Subordinate Judge for the two categories of land. This Court further directed that the claimants would be entitled to the statutory solatium at 15% and interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of dispossession till payment. In as much as, however, it was brought to its notice that various amounts had been paid to the claimants in the cases, It directed the learned Subordinate Judge to draw up decrees deducting the amounts already paid. On 1-5-1982, the learned subordinate Judge carried out the direction of this Court. In as much as, however, it was brought to its notice that various amounts had been paid to the claimants in the cases, It directed the learned Subordinate Judge to draw up decrees deducting the amounts already paid. On 1-5-1982, the learned subordinate Judge carried out the direction of this Court. On 8-1-1986, the claimants filed applications u/s 151 read with Order 47 Rule I, CPC for payment of enhanced solatium and interest on the basis of the amendments made to Sections 23 and 28 of the Act. The same was rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge holding that the determination had been made by the High Court. At a later stage, the judgment-debtor-State moved the Executing Court for dismissal of the execution cases contending that the awards had been satisfied and the judgment-debtors were not entitled to enhanced solatium and interest under the amendments brought about by Central Act 68 of 1984. The learned Subordinate Judge relying upon a decision of this Court in 61 (1986) C.L.T. 680 Hadu Das v. Collector, Cuttack, negatived the plea of the judgment-debtor-State Hence, this batch of civil revisions. 3. The question involved here in arose before a learned Single Judge of this Court in Hadu Das's case (supra), where the learned Subordinate Judge had held that this Court had final1y disposed of the matters on 25-2-1982 and no determination had been made by him. Relying on Bhag Singh's Case (A.I.R. 1985 S.T 1576) the learned Single Judge held that the matter of determination of compensation was pending before the named Subordinate judge on 30-4-1982. The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was the award and not that of the High Court. 4. It is worthwhile to note here that First Appeal No. 310 of 1980 which gave rise to Hadu Das's case (supra) was one of the appeals heard and disposed of analogously with the first appeals off shoots of which are the present revisions. 5. The decision, in Hadu Das's case based as it is on Bhag Singh's case which has since been over-ruled by the Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., is no longer good law in so far as that adopted the wide interpretation given to the provisions contained in Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter called 'the Amendment Act). Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., is no longer good law in so far as that adopted the wide interpretation given to the provisions contained in Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter called 'the Amendment Act). In Hadu Das's case, it has further been held that the computation of the compensation by the learned Subordinate Judge in accordance with the direction of this Court in the first appeals was the award for the purpose of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. Hence, the claimants were entitled to higher solatium and interest. 6. The question is in the context of the provisions contained in Section 30(2) what is the connotation of the expression 'a ward' therein? 7. The learned Advocate-General has submitted that no award was drawn up by the learned Subordinate Judge. He merely carried out the direction contained in the order of the High Court which determined the compensation payable Mr. B.B. Mohanty the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand has contended that until actual quantification the entitlements of the claimants and the liabilities of the State were indefinite. This Court merely laid down the guidelines. In accordance with the guidelines indicated by this Court, the learned Subordinate Judge passed the awards. 8. Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act, so far as relevant, provides: (2) The provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act, respectively, shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquiasition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act. 9. For an interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 30(2), it would be necessary to know a bit of the history of the enactment. The Parliament desired that the persons whose lands were acquired should receive higher solatium and interest than that was being paid under the Act. Hence, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984 was enacted. 9. For an interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 30(2), it would be necessary to know a bit of the history of the enactment. The Parliament desired that the persons whose lands were acquired should receive higher solatium and interest than that was being paid under the Act. Hence, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984 was enacted. The bill was introduced in the House of People on 30-4-1982. After it was passed by the Parliament, it received the assent of the President on 24-9-1984. Inasmuch as there was quite a gap between the introduction of the bill and the commencement of the Act, the Parliament intended that "the benefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available albeit to a limited degree, even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken" before the commencement of the Act. That intention was effectuated in Section 30(2). 10. The award made by the Collector referred to in Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act is the award made by him u/s 11 of the Act and the award made by the Court is the award made by the principle Civil Court of original jurisdiction u/s 23 of the Act on "aireference made to it by the Collector u/s 19. There was controversy as to if the benefits conferred by Section 30(2) were available to cases where even though the awards had been passed before 30-4-1982, orders in appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court were passed after 30-4-1982 but before 24-9-1984. In Mahindra Singh's and Bhag Singh's cases, it was held that Section 30(2) applied to cases where orders in appeal were passed between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 though the award of the Court or the Collector might not have been passed between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. Inasmuch as a contrary view had been taken in K. Kamalajammanniavaru (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer a larger Bench was constituted in Raghubir Singh's case (supra). The Supreme Court held: ... If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates, if the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal, before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. The Supreme Court observed: What Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. Hence, the making of an award either by the Collector or by the Court between the two dates, referred to above, is the sine qua non for the grant of the benefit u/s 30(2) whether at the stage of the Collector or the Court or at the appellate stage. 11. In this context, it is worthwhile to notice the logic for the aforesaid holding: ... The learned Attorney-General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior Courts extend now to limits which Were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, they could wel1 refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory enhancement.... We can invoke the in pari materia reasoning contained in the aforesaid passage to the cases on hand. We pose the question. Did the parliament intend that section 30(2) would apply to a case where the Court is directed by an appellate order to make some arithmatical calculation and quantify the amount though the awards had been passed long ago, say 20 years before 30-4-1982? Does the mere quantification by the Court pursuant to a direction of the superior Court constitute the award contemplated by Section 23 of the Act? 12. Does the mere quantification by the Court pursuant to a direction of the superior Court constitute the award contemplated by Section 23 of the Act? 12. In our view, the award contemplated by Section 23 is the award which was passed by the Court on reference made to it by the Collector u/s 19 the Act. That award was passed on 2-6-1977. That award was set aside by this Court on 18-1-1980 and a fresh award was passed on 23-7-1980. In the second round this Court determined the market value, determined the solatium and interest that were payable and directed the learned -Subordinate Judge to quantify the amount deducting the amount already received by the claimants, and revise the decree. The determination of the compensation was made by this Court. The learned Subordinate Judge was notcalled upon to make any determination u/s 23. There was no scope for it. No adjudicatory process was involved. The learned Subordinate Judge was directed to revise the decree in each case deducting the amount already received by the claimants. The performance of the Subordinate Judge was mere routine. By order of this Court the award passed by the learned, Subordinate Judge stood modified. We do not agree, with respect, with the view expressed in Hadu Das's Case that the learned Subordinate Judge passed a fresh award following the principles indicated by this Court. We are of the view that no fresh award was intepended or required to be passed. The award stood modified by order of this Court: 13. In the result, we set aside the orders passed. By the learned Subordinate Judge in each of the cases and allow the revision. There would be no order as to costs. K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J. I agree. Revision allowed. Final Result : Allowed