ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. This revision arises out of an application for 'setting aside the sale held' in Court auction under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. The sale was held on 24.3.1982. The petitioner herein purchased the property for a sum of Rs. 12,250. The property comprises of S. Nos. 149/9 and 149/10 of a total extent of 4 acres 18 cents. It is stated that one acre of land is a garden land and the rest are dry lands. 2. The only ground on which the sale was sought to be set aside as stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. is that the proclamation was not published in a proper manner before the sale and the value of the property in the estimate of the Court was not mentioned and that the property had been sold for a very low price. The affidavit filed in support of the application is bereft of any details. Excepting setting out the above matters in one sentence, the affidavit does not set out how the sale was vitiated by irregularities, or illegalities in the matter of publication and conduct of sale. 3. The trial Court dismissed the petition. But the appellate Court has allowed the same and set aside the sale. The finding of the appellate Court is that the proclamation was not properly published at the place where the land was situated. The appellate Judge has taken the view that R.W. 2 the person who effected tom-tom had deposed that he was accompanied only by the Amin when he went to effect tom-tom and R.W. 1 the Amin had deposed that the endorsement found in the proclamation with regard to the effecting of publication was made by one Gunapalan, another Amin employed in the same Court, who had come to that place, for another work. The learned Judge has taken the view that the evidence of R.W. 1 is contrary to that of R.W.2. For that purpose, he relies on one sentence found in the deposition of R.W. 2 that the Amin was the only person who had accompanied him when he went to effect tom-tom. The inference drawn by the learned appellate Judge is not warranted. For that purpose, he relies on one sentence found in the deposition of R.W. 2 that the Amin was the only person who had accompanied him when he went to effect tom-tom. The inference drawn by the learned appellate Judge is not warranted. The evidence of R.W. 1 does not mean that Gunapalan, the other Amin, accompanied him from the Court house to the place where the properly is situated. The evidence of R.W. 2 is only to the effect that the endorsement was made by Gunapalan who had come to the spot for doing another work. Gunapalan might have gone to the spot without accompanying R.W. 1. Hence the factual inference that was sought to be drawn by the appellate Judge is unwarranted. Apart from that, the finding of the appellate Judge is again to the effect that there was no proper publication of the proclamation and that there was irregularity in the publication of the proclamation. He goes one step further and holds that all the records were prepared in Namakkal itself where the Court is situated. I do not find any justification for such a finding. There is no doubt a suggestion to R.W. 1 to the effect that he did not go to Pazhayapalayam where the property is situated and he did everything only at Namakkal. But that suggestion has been denied by R.W.I. In the absence of any specific evidence to the effect that everything was prepared only in Namakkal, the learned Judge was clearly in error in drawing such an inference from the evidence on record. His finding is wholly unsustainable. 4. Even assuming that there was irregularity in the publication of the proclamation, it would not mean that there was no publication at all. The proclamation has to be published in three places as per the rules. The finding of the learned Judge relates only to the irregularity in publishing the proclamation at the place where the land is situated. That would not tantamount to holding that there was no publication at all. 5. On the question whether there is any substantial injury caused to the judgment-debtor, the lower, appellate Court has taken the view that the property was purchased by the judgment-debtor about 15 years previously for a sum of Rs. 8,500 and therefore at the time of the sale it would certainly have fetched more value and the sale for Rs. 5. On the question whether there is any substantial injury caused to the judgment-debtor, the lower, appellate Court has taken the view that the property was purchased by the judgment-debtor about 15 years previously for a sum of Rs. 8,500 and therefore at the time of the sale it would certainly have fetched more value and the sale for Rs. 12,250 was unsustainable. The learned Judge has merely made a guess work on the basis of the oral evidence given by the vendor of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor has not chosen to let in any documentary evidence to prove the value of the property at the time of sale. He has given evidence as P.W. 3. His vendor has given evidence as P.W. 2 and a neighbour has given evidence as P.W. 1. According to P.W. 1, the land is sold at not less than Rs. 15,000 per acre and that the land has got facility of irrigation by use of motor pump sets. His ipse dixit is not sufficient to hold that the land was very valuable. He admits in cross-examination that there are about 40 or 50 Harijans who had encroached upon the land and who were living on the land for about 10 years. When there were encroachments by several third parties who had been in occupation for 10 years, one cannot expect the land to be sold for market price. The admission of P.W. 1 is sufficient to destroy the case of the judgment-debtor that the value of the property was much more than it had fetched at the Court auction sale. 6. P.W. 2, the vendor of the judgment-debtor deposed that he sold the land for Rs. 10,500 per acre about 15 years prior to his deposition. But later, in the cross-examination, he admitted that the price mentioned in the sale deed was only Rs. 8,500 for the entire property. Hence his evidence is wholly unacceptable. Even otherwise his evidence does not make out that the land was worth much more than what it had fetched in the Court auction sale. P.W.3 the judgment-debtor himself admits in cross-examination that there were several Harijans occupying the land in question. He stated that there are only 15 persons and not 40 or 50 persons as deposed by P.W. 1. There is however a clinching piece of admission made by P.W. 3. P.W.3 the judgment-debtor himself admits in cross-examination that there were several Harijans occupying the land in question. He stated that there are only 15 persons and not 40 or 50 persons as deposed by P.W. 1. There is however a clinching piece of admission made by P.W. 3. He has stated that he had let out the land for Rs. 500 per annum on lease. If the land fetched only Rs. 500 per annum, it would not be more valuable than the price that fetched in the Court auction. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the finding of the appellate Judge that there was substantial injury to the judgment-debtor because of the sale is wholly unsustainable. If the finding is not supported by any evidence whatever on record, that finding cannot be treated as a finding of fact. Hence both the findings given by the learned appellate Judge are unsustainable and they are set aside. 7. Learned Counsel for the first respondent drew my attention to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Venkatasubbaraya Chetti v. Zamindar of Karvetinagar I.L.R. 20 Mad. 159. It was held in that case that where a material irregularity was proved to have occurred in the conduct of a court sale and it was shown that the price realised was much below the true value, it would ordinarily be inferred that the low price was a consequence of the irregularity even though the manner in which the irregularity produced the low price be not definitely made out. The judgment related only to the inference to be drawn with regard to the connection between the irregularity and the low price. In that case, there was no dispute with regard to the fact that what was fetched in the Court auction was a low price. That judgment had no bearing on the present case. In Marudanayagam v. Manickavasakam (1945) 1 M.L.J. 229 : I.L.R. 1945 Mad. 601 : 221 I.C. 501 : A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 67, it was laid down that Order 21, Rule 66, C.P.C. imposed upon the Court the duty of causing a proclamation of the intended sale to be made and required that such proclamation must specify, as fairly and accurately as possible, amongst other things, any encumbrance to which the property was liable. It was held on the facts of that case that there was misstatement as to the sale value of the property by the decree-holder in the sale proclamation and that led to the low value of the sale price. Therefore, it was held that the sale was vitiated. It was observed that if the decree-holder knew the true value of the property but deliberately undervalued it in the sale proclamation and himself purchased the property at a low figure which he knew to be a very low price based on the upset price accepted by the Court owing to his own initial misrepresentation and subsequent suppression of material facts, his conduct would amount to fraud on the Court and he would not be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud whatever the conduct of the judgment-debtor might have been. The facts of the case are entirely different and the ruling of the Privy Council has no bearing on the present case. 8. Another judgment of the Privy Council in the same volume is found in Naganna v. Venkatrayulu (1945) 2 M.L.J. 259.I.L.R. 1946 Mad. 379 : AIR. 1945 P.C. 178. It was held that in order to set aside a sale under Order 21, Rule 90, C.P.C. it should be proved that there was material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale and that the applicant had sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. The Privy Council pointed out that the burden could be discharged not only by direct evidence connecting the material irregularity or fraud with the substantial injury, but also by circumstantial evidence, that is evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the substantial injury was the result of the material irregularity of fraud. There again the question was only with reference to the link between the irregularity and the substantial injury. 9. In Annamalai Chetti v. Chinnaswami Reddy 20 L.W. 406, the Court held that where the injury is not the obvious result of the irregularity, actual evidence must be adduced to connect the one with the other and the burden of adducing such evidence is on the person seeking to set aside the sale. 9. In Annamalai Chetti v. Chinnaswami Reddy 20 L.W. 406, the Court held that where the injury is not the obvious result of the irregularity, actual evidence must be adduced to connect the one with the other and the burden of adducing such evidence is on the person seeking to set aside the sale. It was further observed that where the irregularity is an understatement of the probable price of the property, the connection is so near that it is difficult to adduce evidence showing that injury had resulted from the irregularity. There again the Court was concerned only with the connection between the injury and the irregularity. It had nothing to do with the question whether the price fetched in the Court auction was low or proper In Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kanwar , it was held that where substantial injury was alleged to be implicit in the material irregularity set out in the application, it would be too technical to hold that the application should be dismissed on the preliminary ground that no specific or express averment had been made as to substantial injury suffered by the applicant. The Court was concerned only with the pleading and the Court did not dispense with the evidence, which should be necessary to prove the substantial injury. In Annamalai Chettiar v. Chellamai Achi (1937) 2 M.L.J. 935 : 175 I.C. 493 : A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 174, Abdul Rahman, J. held that there was no necessity to prove by direct evidence that the inadequate price was caused by reason of the alleged irregularity in the conduct of the sale and that it can be proved by circumstantial evidence. That case also refers only to the connection between the irregularity and substantial injury. 10. Learned Counsel for the first respondent contends that this is a case in which there was no publication of the proclamation and the sale itself is illegal. He places reliance on the judgment of Raja mannar, C.J., in Chinna Venkatanarayana v. Pannapati Elias . The learned Judge held that if there was no publication of the proclamation at all, the sale was null and void. In this case, I have already found that there was a publication, but there was an irregularity and this is not a case of complete absence of publication. Hence the judgment does not apply. 11. The learned Judge held that if there was no publication of the proclamation at all, the sale was null and void. In this case, I have already found that there was a publication, but there was an irregularity and this is not a case of complete absence of publication. Hence the judgment does not apply. 11. Learned Counsel next submitted that the Court has not fixed the upset price for the property and therefore the sale is vitiated. After the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code by Act 104 of 1976, there is no necessity for the court to fix the upset price. Under Clause (e) of the Rule 66(2), the Court is only to mention in the sale proclamation everything which the court considers material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property. That does not mean that the Court is bound to fix the upset price. 12. My attention is drawn to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in A.U. Natarajan v. Indian Bank, Madras , and the judgment of Chandurkar, C.J. in Elumalai Naicker v. Kishtambal Animal 1987 T.L.N.J. 220. Neither of the judgments takes the view that it is compulsory on the part of the Court to fix the upset price before holding the sale. The Division Bench has only pointed out that the power of the Court to fix upset price or to set out its own estimate of the value of the property has no} been taken away by Central Amendment Act 104 of 1976. Hence I do not accept the contention put forward by learned Counsel for the first respondent. 13. It is next contended by learned Counsel that evidence has been let by the judgment-debtor and his witnesses as to the value of the property and there is no rebuttal evidence on the value by the decree-holder. This contention cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the evidence adduced by the judgment-debtor and his witnesses is wholly unsustainable on the face of it. I have already referred to the evidence and pointed out that there is no evidence on record to show that the judgment-debtor suffered substantial injury by reason of the sale. The burden is clearly on the judgment-debtor and he has failed to discharge the same. 14. In the circumstances, the civil revision petition is allowed. I have already referred to the evidence and pointed out that there is no evidence on record to show that the judgment-debtor suffered substantial injury by reason of the sale. The burden is clearly on the judgment-debtor and he has failed to discharge the same. 14. In the circumstances, the civil revision petition is allowed. The order of the Subordinate Judge, Namakkal in C.M.A. No. 14 of 1983 is set aside. The order of the District Munsif, Namakkal in R.E.A. No. 1101 of 1982 in R.E.P. No. 262 of 1981 is restored. The parties will bear their respective costs.