JUDGMENT M.P. Singh, J. - The present writ petition arises out of the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The dispute relates to a shop situate in Kasba Bilsi, District Budaun, of which the petitioner is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 5 per month. Opposite party No. 3 is the landlord. 3. Case set up by the landlord in the release application was that he was an employee of Nagarpalika District Khiri Lakhimpur. He had resigned from service in the year 1970 and since then he is unemployed. He had no sufficient means to live. 4. It was further asserted by him that he wanted to live independently away from his sons and for that purpose he wanted to start his own business in the said shop. The need of the appellant was bonafide and genuine. 5. The petitioner contested the said application alleging that the need of the landlord was neither bonafide nor genuine. The application was filed with mala fide intention of evicting the petitioner from the said shop. The landlord was about 75 years of age and he would not be physically fit to start his own business independently. He lives comfortably with his sons away from Bilsi. He has installed two big machines, one flour machine and the other oil expeller, which cannot be fitted in any other shop available in Bilsi. He has earned good-will on account of his business for the last 25 years. The Nagarpalika shops are too small for this business. In case the shop was released he will be put to irreparable loss and injury. 6. Though the Prescribed Authority has rejected the application for release but the appeal filed by the landlord has been allowed. The shop has been ordered to be released. 7. Admittedly the landlords has resigned from service and is more than 65 years of age. He wanted to run general marchandise business with the help of his nephew to earn his own independent livelihood. He did not want to live with his sons. It appears he had a feeling that he was a burden on his sons. He expressed his desire to live respectfully and independently. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that an old man more than 65 years of age cannot live separately from children. He did not want to live with his sons. It appears he had a feeling that he was a burden on his sons. He expressed his desire to live respectfully and independently. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that an old man more than 65 years of age cannot live separately from children. I do not agree with this contention. 9. There is nothing wrong in the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that an old retired person cannot be forced to live as parasite upon his children if he feels he can live respectfully by doing his independent business. 10. Another point which needs consideration, is whether the landlord be compelled to construct another shop in the Khandhars owned by him as held by the Prescribed Authority. But the view taken by the Appellate Authority that the landlord cannot be compelled to construct new shops and start his business there, is correct and I endorse the same. He has given good reasons for recording a finding that need of the landlord was bonafide and genuine. The finding of comparative hardship also does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of record. 11. In the case reported in Mst. Bega Begum & others v. Abdul Ahad Khan & others, 1986 SCFBRC 48 (SC) it has been held :- "The Act is a piece of social legislation aimed at easing the problem of accommodation, protecting the tenants from evictions inspired by profit hunting motives and providing certain safeguards for the tenants and saving them from great expense, inconvenience and trouble. But the Act does not completely overlook the interest of the landlord and has under certain conditions granted a clear right to the landlord to seek eviction on proof of the grounds mentioned in Section 11 of the Act. Thus, the Act appears to have struck a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and great inconvenience and trouble of the tenant on the other." 12. Thus, the Act appears to have struck a just balance between the genuine need of the landlord on the one hand and great inconvenience and trouble of the tenant on the other." 12. While considering the question of comparative hardship, Hon'ble the Supreme Court took the view :- "It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen, whenever a decree for eviction is passed, was fully in contemplation of the Legislature when Section 1(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act." 13. In the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Supreme Court further took a view that "Being the owners of the house they cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to live below poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business at the cost of the appellants." 14. Applying the ratio of the above-mentioned case, the landlord, who desires to live independently and set up his business, has a valid right to do the same. He cannot be compelled to live on the earnings of his sons, if he is physically fit to run the business. In the instant case nothing has been shown by the petitioner that the landlord was suffering from any ailment or was unable to start his own business. The finding recorded by the Appellate Authority, that need of the landlord was bonafide and genuine, and greater hardship would be caused to the landlord in case the shop was not released, suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Both the findings are findings of the fact and cannot be interfered with by this Court in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court while exercising powers under this provision, is not exercising appellate powers but exercising supervisory power only as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1978 SC 29 : 1981 ARC 470 (SC), Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others. 15. I find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed in limine. 16. However, in the interest of justice, the petitioner is granted three months' time to vacate the premises. He will vacate the same on or before 4th May, 1990 provided he deposits three months' rent by 19th February, 1990.