Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 109 (CAL)

DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED (NO. 1) v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX

1990-03-09

SUSANTA CHATTERJI

body1990
SUSANTA CHATTERJI, J. ( 1 ) THE present writ petition has been filed by Messrs. Dunlop India Limited, an existing public company, challenging 3 (three) impugned orders contained in the letters dated February 16, 1990, written by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-XXI, Calcutta, who is impleaded as respondent No. 1. It is alleged that under Section 220 (3) and/or under Section 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act, a discretionary power has been conferred upon respondent No. 1 either to extend the time for making the payment of tax or to grant stay of realisation of demand till the disposal of the appeals, and the said discretion has to be exercised judicially and it will be apparent that respondent No. 1 has not considered all relevant factors and the impugned orders are illegal, invalid and inoperative. ( 2 ) THE present case has a chequered background indeed. In 1983, the petitioner moved a writ petition challenging the provisions of Section 43b of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and a rule was issued and an interim order was granted. Section 43b was inserted by Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1983, with effect from April 1, 1984. The interim order was modified to the extent that assessment proceedings may be concluded by considering Section 43b and a final order may be passed but the same was not to be communicated to the petitioner nor enforced till the disposal of the rule. However, the rule was finally discharged and all interim orders were vacated. The petitioner preferred an appeal and the appeal court did not pass any interim order. The petitioner, however, filed 3 (three) grounds of appeal for the assessment years 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87. The said appeals are alleged to be pending. The petitioner also made an application before the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi, for waiver of interest under Rule 40 and for a direction to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for treating the assessee as not in default. The appeals are being heard as stated. The petitioner made 3 (three) separate applications for stay of realisation of the demand till the disposal of the appeals and the same were disposed of by the impugned orders passed by respondent No. 1 under Section 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act. The appeals are being heard as stated. The petitioner made 3 (three) separate applications for stay of realisation of the demand till the disposal of the appeals and the same were disposed of by the impugned orders passed by respondent No. 1 under Section 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act. ( 3 ) SECTION 220 (6) envisages, inter alia, that :"where an assessee has presented an appeal under Section 246, the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, and subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose in the circumstances of the case, treat the asses-see as not being in default in respect of the amount in dispute in the appeal, even though the time for payment has expired, as long as such appeal remains undisposed of. " ( 4 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 has passed the impugned orders under the provisions of law. The petitioner alleges that the impugned orders are bad in law inasmuch as the discretion has not been exercised by respondent No. 1 judicially indeed. It is further alleged that in the minutes of the 8th meeting of the informal consultative committee held on May 13, 1969, relating to slay of recovery in certain cases, there was an instruction given by the Board that the Deputy Prime Minister, at the relevant point of time, observed that where the income determined on assessment was substantially higher than the returned income, say twice the latter amount or more, the collection of tax in dispute should be held in abeyance till the decision on the appeals, provided there were no lapses on the part of the assessee. The Board, accordingly, brought to the notice of all the Income-tax Officers that the power of stay of recovery in such cases up to the stage of first appeal may be exercised by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner/commissioner of Income-tax. A copy of the said minutes is annexure "o" to the present writ petition. It is further alleged that this instruction is to be deemed to be a guideline and should be construed as an instruction within the meaning of Section 119 of the Income-tax Act. A copy of the said minutes is annexure "o" to the present writ petition. It is further alleged that this instruction is to be deemed to be a guideline and should be construed as an instruction within the meaning of Section 119 of the Income-tax Act. Section 119 (3) of the Income-tax Act indicates, inter alia, that:"every Income-tax Officer employed in the execution of this Act shall observe and follow such instructions as may be issued to him for his guidance by the Director of Inspection or by the Commissioner or by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner within whose jurisdiction he performs his functions. " ( 5 ) DR. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has strongly argued that, following the guideline, respondent No. 1 ought to have exercised the jurisdiction in staying the recovery of the demand till the disposal of the first appeals filed by the petitioner company against the assessment concerned. The petitioner company should not be penalised for filing a writ petition to challenge the vires of Section 43b of the Income-tax Act. The impugned orders are inherently defective and the orders cannot be sustained in law. He has strongly argued as to the scope of Section 119 as well as Section 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act. He has developed his points of argument that the instructions have the force of law and the interest of the assessee should not be prejudiced. The guideline as given in annexure "o" to the writ petition will have to be construed properly and respondent No. 1 has to pass necessary orders in accordance therewith. ( 6 ) MR. Mukul Prokash Banerjee, learned advocate, has strongly opposed the prayer for interim order as prayed for by the petitioner and he has drawn the attention of the court to the latest Instruction No. 1362 (XXVI/ 1/76--Exercise of discretion under Section 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act-Demands disputed under first appeal pending before Appellate Assistant Commissioners/commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)--Clarification regarding ). It reads thus : "the present instruction is issued as a result of the review of the existing instructions. The instructions contained herein supersede all previous instructions on this subject. " ( 7 ) DR. It reads thus : "the present instruction is issued as a result of the review of the existing instructions. The instructions contained herein supersede all previous instructions on this subject. " ( 7 ) DR. Pal tried to satisfy this court that the latest instruction is only available to the departmental officers and in the latest edition of the Income-tax Act, there is reference to the earlier instructions and in fact there is no suppression of fact. ( 8 ) MR. Sunil Kumar Mitra, learned advocate appearing for the Union of India, has opposed the petitioner's prayers for interim orders submitting, inter alia, that, under its supervisory jurisdiction, this writ court may not interfere in the matter and that huge revenue is pending. The petitioner may deposit the same without prejudice pending the result of the appeal. ( 9 ) HAVING heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties at length, this court has, with all its anxieties, considered the matters in depth. By looking to the impugned orders, copies of which are annexures "k", "l" and "m" to the writ petition, this court finds that respondent No. 1 has applied his mind and granted certain reliefs to the petitioner and the application under Section 226 of the Act has been disposed of by imposing certain conditions. There is neither any summary refusal of the prayer nor is the order arbitrary and capricious. This court is of the clear view that if the Income-tax Officer exercises his jurisdiction in a particular manner which is neither mala fide nor capricious nor for collateral purposes nor has taken matters into consideration which are extraneous to the issue, it is not open to the High Court to interfere in its supervisory jurisdiction. This court is of the clear view further that the guideline as contained in the instruction, copy of which is annexure "o" to the writ petition, does not remain valid in view of the subsequent instructions. It is not disputed that the guidelines and/or the instructions have no impact upon the disposal of the petition under Section 220 (6) of the Act. The principle of law as referred to in a number of decisions cited from the Bar in support of the case of the petitioner is not in dispute. It is not disputed that the guidelines and/or the instructions have no impact upon the disposal of the petition under Section 220 (6) of the Act. The principle of law as referred to in a number of decisions cited from the Bar in support of the case of the petitioner is not in dispute. It is, however, found that the subsequent instructions make it clear that while exercising the discretion under Section 220 (6) of the Income-tax Act, the officer concerned has to consider the various factors. This court has further found that respondent No. 1 has considered the relevant factors and disposed of the applications for stay by giving some reliefs and this writ court cannot substitute the same by its own discretion. This court is not sitting in appeal upon every decision of the statutory authority. This court has to examine the decision-making process as observed in a recent Supreme Court decision in (State of U. P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh ). This court has examined the impugned orders and it does not find that the same are mala fide, capricious or even made arbitrarily. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, this court does not find any merit in the writ petition to interfere in the matter. Consequently the writ petition is rejected. There will be no order as to costs.