ORDER S. Ramalingam, J. 1. The petitioner is a manufacturer of bearings (Auto parts). These were classified under Tariff Item 34-A and the petitioner was called upon to pay central excise duty. The petitioner challenged the validity of that claim for payment of duty by filing appeals and revisions but ultimately paid. 2. On 25.9.1978, a Tariff Advice was issued clarifying that bearings having thickness of more than 3.65 mm. are classifiable as thick walled bearings and consequently are not excisable. Soon thereafter, the petitioner filed applications for refund for the clearances effected between January 1971 and December, 1978. Apart from the factory at Madras, the petitioner has also a factory at Vellore. In respect of the clearances from that factory for the period from 21.4.1977 to 30.11.1978, the petitioner filed applications for refund. The applications for refund for the period prior to December, 1978 were rejected on the ground that under Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, they are barred by time. For the period beyond December, 1978, the petitioner was called upon to furnish details of clearances. But apparently because there were no clearances, the petitioner did not furnish any details and hence, the applications for the period beyond 1.12.1978 were also rejected. In challenging the validity of these three orders, two relating to the period prior after December, 1978, these three writ petitions have been filed. 3. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that there cannot be a demand or collection of excise duty when in law there is no liability to pay the duty and consequently any such illegal collection should be ordered to be refunded irrespective of the periods specified under Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules. He would submit that Rule 11 is only for the departmental authorities and not for the Courts. He would also submit that merely because in the appeals and revisions filed by the petitioner it has been held by the departmental hierarchy that the petitioner is liable to pay excise duty it would not take away the jurisdiction of this Court to order refund when the collection of excise duty was found to be not correct. It is contended that the clarification issued on 25.9.1978 is only declaratory in character and would be operative retrospectively also. 4. It is contended that the clarification issued on 25.9.1978 is only declaratory in character and would be operative retrospectively also. 4. In answer to these submissions, the learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel would submit that as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vyankatlal which has been followed by this Court in Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and Asst. Collector v. Madras Fertilizers Limited and also the decisions in Beema Manufacturers Private Limited and Best & Crompton Engineering Limited [W.A. Nos.445 and 446 of 1982--Judgment dated 5.10.1988] reported in [1993] 41 ECC 142 (Mad), the petitioner would not be entitled to any order of refund because the excise duty being an indirect tax had been passed on to the customer and any order of refund would result in unjust enrichment because the petitioner has no obligation to pass on the benefit to the ultimate consumer. In the judgment in W.A. Nos.445 and 446 of 1982 reported in [1993] 41 ECC 142 (Mad), a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows: It is well-settled in law that refund cannot be ordered as a matter of course. It is subject to an important qualification based on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, in that, the manufacturer had not passed on the excise duty to the consuming public. This is the law, as settled by the three decisions cited supra. Therefore, unless and until it is established that the respondents had not passed on the excise duty to the consuming public, they cannot claim refund. Should refund be ordered in such cases, it would amount to unjust enrichment. 5. The law having thus been so clearly declared, it is seen that if the petitioner were to be given the benefit of an order of refund, it would result in unjust enrichment to the petitioner because the benefit would not reach the ultimate consumer. Hence all these three writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.