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1990 DIGILAW 111 (GUJ)

PANKAJ BHATRI v. CHAIRMAN OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION

1990-08-09

A.P.RAVANI

body1990
A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IN both these petitions petitioners are children of ONGC employees. They have under- gone special training for wards of ONGC employees imparted by the Commission. The petitioners claim that they have undergone the training for a period of one year and now the Commission is extending the period of training for a further period of one year from 1/01/1990 Orders in this respect have been passed on 6/01/1990 as per Annexure `g and `g-1 to the petition. The petitioners pray that the aforesaid orders be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to consider the petitioners for appointment on regular basis to Class I post of El level or to other lower post equivalent to Class I. In both these petitions the facts are similar and the prayers made are same therefore at the request and with the censent of learned advocates appearing for the parties both these matters are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. ( 2 ) IT is contended that as per first para of the scheme which is produced at Annexure `c to the petition the petitioners have on successful completion of training right to be considered for appointment to the posts in question. According to the petitioners they have undergone the training successfully. They claim that they have in fact appeared in the examination which was held in December 1989 but the result thereof is not declared and instead the period of training is extended. In this background the petitioners claim that the respondents should be directed to give appointment to them. The claim of the petitioners is resisted by the respondent- Commission by filing affidavit-in-reply. ( 3 ) IF one scrutinizes the scheme strictly on legal basis it is doubtful as to whether the scheme can be said to be constitutionally valid. The eligibility criteria inter alia provides as follows :- (III) Must be directly dependent son/daughter including step children of serving employees; or directly dependent son/daughter including step children of deceased employee or of retired employee of ONGC in the preceding two years (e. g. 1986 for the current year selection of special trainees ). OR directly dependent son/daughter including step children of the employee retiring in the year of selection of special trainess. OR directly dependent son/daughter including step children of the employee retiring in the year of selection of special trainess. (iv) Must not be of age more than 30 years on 31st December of the preceding year (e. g. 31- 12-87 for selection in 1988 ). It is however relaxable by 5 years for SC/st candidates. The scheme also provides that the trainee will be paid Rs. 1 500 per month as stipend and also be entitled to allowance while on tour. The trainees will be entitled to 10 days leave during the period of training. ( 4 ) IT cannot be disputed that the O. N. G. C. is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The stale is enjoined with duty to extend equal protection of laws and the state cannot discriminate among citizens except on rational and permissible grounds. To make special provisions for children of its employees for imparting training is one thing and to provide for stipend or remuneration is altogether another thing. Unless it is shown that all the citizens are entitled to the benefits under the scheme and no citizen who would be otherwise eligible to receive the benefit under the scheme is excluded from receiving benefits the scheme cannot be said to be constitutionally valid. The scheme extends to only those citizens who are fortunate to have born to employees of ONGC. On such grounds other citizens cannot be excluded from the benefits flowing from the scheme. Thus prima facie the scheme is not constitutionally valid. Therefore no right whatsoever can be claimed on the basis of such a constitutionally invalid scheme. However it may be noted that in the instant case neither the petitioners nor the respondents contend that the scheme is constitutionally invalid. Therefore it would not be proper for this court to decide the question as to whether the scheme is constitutionally valid or not and as to whether the petitioners can assert their claim under the constitutionally invalid scheme. It is obvious that neither the petitioners nor the respondent Commission would be interested in agitating the question with regard to the constitutionality of the scheme. On the contrary both sides would be interested in seeing that the scheme is legal and valid and ordered to be implemented. It is obvious that neither the petitioners nor the respondent Commission would be interested in agitating the question with regard to the constitutionality of the scheme. On the contrary both sides would be interested in seeing that the scheme is legal and valid and ordered to be implemented. It appears that the attempt is that the scheme which is prima facie constitutionally invalid is soght to be stuck up in the litigation and by proclaiming to the public that the scheme is stuck up in the litigation in the court and therefore the scheme is to be implemented either in its form as desired by the petitioners or in its truncated form as contended by the respondent- Commission. This appears to be the ultimate object of the litigation initiated by the petitioners. It is unfortuate that such a scheme which is prima facie constitutionally invalid is sought to be made an issue in court litigation which is not likely to be decided for a decade or two and thereby continue to confer undue benefits to the children of the ONGC employees. It used to be staled that these are prima faice observations on the basis of the record of the petition. I am not expressing any definite and final opinion about the constitutional validity of the scheme. All that I am trying to emphasise is that the respondent Commission should be little more vigilant in seeing that the schemes which are prima facie not in confirmity with the Constitution are not framed and if framed whenever it is brought to the notice of the Commission they should get the same examined at the appropriate level and discontinue the same at the earliest. Be that as it may. Since the fate of this petition is not required to be decided in the instant case on the aforesaid question I do not wish to elaborately discuss these questions. ( 5 ) THE scheme under which the petitioners claim that they are entitled to be considered for appointment shows that no such right has been conferred upon the petitioners. Since the fate of this petition is not required to be decided in the instant case on the aforesaid question I do not wish to elaborately discuss these questions. ( 5 ) THE scheme under which the petitioners claim that they are entitled to be considered for appointment shows that no such right has been conferred upon the petitioners. In the introductory paragraph of the scheme it is stated that on successful completion of training the trainee will be considered for appointment to E-1 level posts or to lower level posts based on grade obtained during training and merit decided by a selection board at the end of training subject to availability of posts. The object of the scheme is only to finance further educational and training facilities to enhance the knowledge and competence of the wards of the employees of the ONGC including those of retired and deceased employees to enable them to acquire professional competence for employment opportunities. This is so stated in the office memorandum produced at Annexure `c to the petition. Even in the order by which the petitioners and others have been called for interview and selected for the training under the scheme it is specifically stated that the training will not confer any right of employment nor it casts any obligation on the Commission to grant employment. All that the petitioners can claim is that on successful completion of training they would be considered for employment alongwith others. Whether to extend the period of training or not is a matter within the discretion of the Commission. The petitioners cannot say that simply because they have undergone one years training they are entitled to be appointed on the posts in question. It is doubtful whether even at the end of training for a further period of one year the petitioners can claim any right to be appointed under the scheme. The scheme only confers right to be considered alongwith others. Examining this right from the standpoint of constitutional provisions one may say that the scheme does not confer any additional right on the petitioners. Even apart from the scheme if the petitioners are eligible for the posts in question they have a right to be considered along with other citizens. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have been denied considerations alongwith others. Even apart from the scheme if the petitioners are eligible for the posts in question they have a right to be considered along with other citizens. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have been denied considerations alongwith others. The petitioners claim special benefits and additional right under the scheme. No such special benefit or additional right can be culled out from the scheme. If any attempt is made to cull out any special benefit or additional right under the scheme to the wards of ONGC employees the scheme itself would be unconstitutional on that ground also. The scheme cannot be read in that fashion. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of A. P. v. V. Sadanandam reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court page 2060. Therein it is held that the mode of recruitment and the category from which the recruitment to a service should be made are all matters which are exclusively within the domain of the executive. It is no for the court to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the executive in choosing the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment should be made as they are matters of policy decision falling exclusively within the purview of the executive. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Baroda v. R. Nagachaya Devi reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court page 2105. Therein the Supreme Court has hold that anyone who asserts that a particular provision is arbitrary should discharge the burden by giving sufficient particulars that the provision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. These two decisions of the Supreme Court are of no help to the petitioners. As indicated herein above I am not deciding the constitutional validity of the scheme. The petitions are decided on the assumption that the scheme is constitutionally valid. Therefore it is not necessary to deal with the aforesaid two decisions. There is no substance in both the petitions. Hence rejected. Notice discharged. As indicated herein above I am not deciding the constitutional validity of the scheme. The petitions are decided on the assumption that the scheme is constitutionally valid. Therefore it is not necessary to deal with the aforesaid two decisions. There is no substance in both the petitions. Hence rejected. Notice discharged. ( 7 ) AT this stage the learned Counsel for the petitioners requests that the ad interim relief granted earlier by this court be continued for some time so as to enable the petitioners to challenge the legality and validity of the aforesaid order before the superior forum as it may be available to them. In the facts of the case ad interim relief granted earlier is ordered to be continued till 27/08/1990 (NVA) Notice discharged. .