Judgment :- The petitioner is a public limited company carrying on business in the manufacture of Steel Ingots falling under Tariff Item No. 26 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 2.In the counter-affidavit by the respondents, the following further facts have been disclosed :- Against the order of the Appellate Authority dated 21-12-1981, the petitioner filed a writ petition, W.P. No. 12960 of 1982 in the Karnataka High Court at Bangalore. The order of the CEGAT, dated 24-2-1987 is actually the order on the revision application filed by the petitioner to the Central Government. The said revision application had been transferred to the CEGAT, South Regional Bench at Madras. The Karnataka High Court has since passed the order on 23-6-1989. The operative portion of the order is as follows :- "In the result, the petition is allowed and the orders made by respondents 1 and 2, Annexures B and E, are quashed and I order issue of aMandamusto respondent-1 to reconsider the claim of the petitioner in the light of the clarification of the Board on 20-9-1980." * Therefore, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents, that the petitioner-company can seek remedy before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise on the basis of the said order of the High Court, Karnataka. 3.Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, argues that the claim for refund under the Act is, no doubt, barred by limitation. But the fact remains that the collection of duty is totally illegal. This is all the more so because the Government have subsequently issued a clarification that the stock of steel ingots manufactured prior to 9-4-1979 are eligible for full exemption. It is contended that at least from the date of the Government's classification in October, 1980, it must be deemed that the collection of duty is illegal and, therefore, within a period of three years from October, 1980, the illegal collection should be refunded to the petitioner. The argument of the petitioner is, no doubt, attractive and is also supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court inMadras Rubber Factory Ltd.v. Union of India and Others 1976 (5) CTR 208, 1976 AIR(SC) 638, 1985 ECR 2298, 1983 (13) ELT 1579 , 1976 (2) SCC 255 , 1976 (2) SCR 864 , 1976 UJ 91 (SC)] and Salonah Tea Co. Ltd. & Othersv. Supdt. Ltd. & Othersv. Supdt. of Taxes, Nowgong 1990 AIR(SC) 772, 1988 (2) CompLJ 25, 1988 (173) ITR 42, 1987 (4) JT 714 , 1988 (69) STC 290, 1987 (2) Scale 1435 , 1988 (1) SCC 401 , 1988 (2) SCR 474 , 1988 (67) CTR 45, 1988 (3) SCR 474, 1988 (33) ELT 249 , 1990 (77) AIR(SC) 772, 1988 SCC(Tax) 99, 1988 (1) SCC(page) 401 (SC) 1990 AIR(SC) 772, 1988 (2) CompLJ 25, 1988 (173) ITR 42, 1987 (4) JT 714 , 1988 (69) STC 290, 1987 (2) Scale 1435 , 1988 (1) SCC 401 , 1988 (2) SCR 474 , 1988 (67) CTR 45, 1988 (3) SCR 474, 1988 (33) ELT 249 , 1990 (77) AIR(SC) 772, 1988 SCC(Tax) 99, 1988 (1) SCC(page) 401)].The following passage in the last mentioned case is opposite :- "Courts have made a distinction between those cases where a claimant approaches a High Court seeking relief of obtaining refund only and those where refund is sought as a consequential relief after striking down of the order of assessment etc. Normally speaking, in a society governed by rule of law, taxes should be paid by citizen as soon as they are due in accordance with law. Equally, as a corollary of the said statement of law, it follows that taxes collected without the authority of law, as in this case from a citizen, should be refunded because no State has the right to receive or to retain taxes or monies realised from citizens without the authority of law." Again, the Supreme Court observes as follows :- " A petition solely praying for the issue of a writ ofmandamusdirecting the State to refund the money alleged to have been illegally collected by the State as tax was not ordinarily maintainable for the simple reason that a claim for such a refund can always be made in a suit against the authority which had illegally collected the money as a tax and in such a suit it was open to the State to raise all possible defences to the claim, defences which cannot in most cases, be appropriately raised and considered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. It appears that Sec. 23 of the Act deals with refund. In the facts of this case, the case did not come within Sec. 23 of the Act. It appears that Sec. 23 of the Act deals with refund. In the facts of this case, the case did not come within Sec. 23 of the Act. But in the instant appeal, it is clear as the High Court found in our opinion rightly that the claim for refund was a consequential relief." * 4.Learned Counsel for the respondents relies on the Division Bench judgment of this Court inMadras Aluminium Co. Ltd. and Anotherv. Union of India 1981 (8) ELT 478 (Mad.)]. The following passage is very relevant for the purpose of this case : "It is true, this Court can in its discretion direct refund of the excise duty illegally collected from the petitioners. But in the circumstances of this case, where the petitioners cannot in their turn refund the excise dutypro ratato the actual consumers, such a refund will result in their unjust enrichment to the extent of the amount directed to be refunded and the Court will be justified in refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to direct the refund of the excise duty collected from the petitioners." * In the case, this very aspect has been referred in the counter-affidavit of the respondents. It is stated as follows :- "The petitioner who has initially paid the excise duty has passed on the duty burden to their consumers and therefore the petitioners have not suffered any loss or injury. In these circumstances, if refund is ordered to the petitioners, it will result in unjust enrichment of the petitioner." * This averment in the counter-affidavit has not been denied anywhere by the petitioner. No reply to the counter-affidavit has also been filed. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the respondents also relies on a very recent judgment of S. Ramalingam, J. in Writ Petition, W.P. No. 805 of 1983, dated 19-11-1990, where the learned Judge had relegated the parties to a Civil Court. In this case, I am convinced that it is open to the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to direct the refund of tax or excise duty collected illegally from a party. But where a claim is based on the principles of Section 23 or Section 72 of the Contract Act, certain other factual questions also arise for consideration. But where a claim is based on the principles of Section 23 or Section 72 of the Contract Act, certain other factual questions also arise for consideration. For instance, in this case, it has been contended by the respondents that the petitioner-company has passed on the duty to the consumers and it will not be justified in asking for refund which will amount to unjust enrichment. This is an aspect on which I strongly feel that the claim for refund has to be rejected in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5.Accordingly, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. It is, however, open to the petitioner-company to put forth its claim before the Assistant Collector on the basis of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 12960 of 1982, dated 23-6-1989. There will be no order as to costs.