Judgment : The petitioners have come up before this Court challenging the Government Order in G.O.Ms.No.708, Transport Department, dated 7. 1988, under which a declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act has been issued, to acquire the piece of land for the purpose of construction of a bus terminal by the respondent Pallavan Transport Corporation. 2. Originally when the writ petition was taken up for hearing and arguments were heard for some time, it was thought by this Court that it would be better that the Pallavan Transport Corporation also should have been impleaded as party respondent and as such the Pallavan Transport Corporation, Madras is impleaded as a party-respondent as per the order in W.M.P.No. 14268 of 1990 dated 7. 1990. 3. During the course of arguments, it was found that it is necessary to challenge the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act made on 7. 1983 and as such the petitioners herein have raised additional grounds challenging the Notification made under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) itself. However, the respondents are opposing the same by filing the counter-affidavit. 4. The short facts are: The petitioners herein are the joint owners of the property situate at No.114, Karaneeswarar Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600 004. It seems that originally the land was owned by certain persons and the petitioners herein purchased the property on 12. 1985 and on 13. 1986 under two sale deeds. Pursuant to the above sale deeds, mutation in the revenue records was effected. Before the purchase of the land by the petitioners herein, Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act under G.O.Ms.No.793, Transport Department, dated 1. 1983 had been issued stating that the land to the extent of about 9 grounds 1337 sq.ft. is required for the construction of the Pallavan Transport Corporation Bus Terminal. It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act did not mention the names of all the owners whose names are then found in the revenue register, that the Notification under Sec.4(1) mentioned only the name of Mrs.Sayed Meeran and Ram Lakshmi Raman and E.K.Murthy, that pursuant to the sale in favour of the petitioners, notices for Sec.5-A enquiry were issued to them by the second respondent, and that the petitioners had also taken part in that enquiry. During the said enquiry, the petitioners had pointed out that the land in question was a residential area and a bus terminal is a different one from a bus stop or a bus stand and it was also pointed therein that the place is not at all suitable for locating the bus terminal because a Corporation Primary School is located immediately on the Northern side of the above property and that it is surrounded by other primary middle and high/higher secondary schools in the nearby vicinity. It is also stated in the affidavit that the road is very narrow, that if a bus terminal is located there, it will endanger the public life, and traffic congestions would occur and that same will become public nuisance. It is further stated in the affidavit that the third respondent herein, after due verification, has found an alternative site near the Queen Mary’s College as the most suitable and economical for the respondent Corporation. It is also stated that it was pointed out that there are bus terminals. In Foreshore Estate, Mandavalli and Vivekananda House, all within a kilometre distance and it would be a waste of public money to locate a bus terminal at the said property. It is further alleged in the affidavit that the suit property is used for residential purpose, that the petitioners had applied for construction of flats for low income and middle class families, that the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority has already sanctioned the plan for building the said flats. It is further stated in the affidavit that Sec.4(1) Notification was not published in the place in which the land is sought to be acquired and at convenient places as per the procedure prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act and the rules framed thereunder. It is further alleged in the affidavit that it was pointed out that since an alternative site had already been selected and that already five years had elapsed, declaration under Sec.6 of the Act cannot be made as it is barred by limitation. It seems that in spite of the objections raised by the petitioners, declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was issued by the first respondent in G.O.Ms.No.708, Transport Department, dated 7. 1988. 5.. It seems that in spite of the objections raised by the petitioners, declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was issued by the first respondent in G.O.Ms.No.708, Transport Department, dated 7. 1988. 5.. Though the petitioners challenged the declaration made under Sec.6 of the Act technically, in the prayer of the writ petition, the grounds raised in the affidavit by the writ petitioners show that they are almost challenging the Sec.4 Notification itself. The first ground raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition is that the Notification under Sec.4(1) was defective as it was not issued to the persons who are all interested in the land sought to be acquired and that there was no simultaneous publication of the acquisition proposal under Sec.4(1) Notification as contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act and Rules. It is also stated that the Sec.4(1) Notification has been published on 7. 1983 and that the Sec.6 declaration ought to have been issued on or before 27. 1986, that the Sec.6 declaration was published only on 17. 1988 which is beyond the statutory period of three years. It is also stated in the affidavit that acquisition Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act did not say that the compensation for the land will be paid from the public revenue, that it was silent about it and that Part VII procedure required for a Corporation have not been followed, the acquisition is bad in law. It is also stated that the land in question is earmarked by M.M.D.A. for the purpose of middle class dwelling houses and therefore no acquisition could be made against the statutory decision of M.M.D.A. It is also stated in the affidavit that the very fact that the word ‘Bus terminal’ used in the acquisition proceedings makes it very clear that the land is going to be used for industrial purpose like repairing, maintenance, servicing of vehicles, parking etc. It is further alleged in the affidavit, the land required is not at all suitable for locating a bus terminal and that adjoining the land sought to be acquired, there is a Corporation Primary School, and that the location of a bus terminal adjacent to the School would endanger the life of the children. 6. As I have already stated that these are the contentions raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition by the writ petitioners originally. 6. As I have already stated that these are the contentions raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition by the writ petitioners originally. An additional affidavit was filed in W.M.P.No23453 of 1990 raising additional grounds in which it is stated that the mandatory requirement under Sec.4 of the Act has not been complied with. It is also stated in the said petition that the failure to take out individual notices to the owners of the property within the knowledge of the acquiring authority vitiates the acquisition. 7. Two counter-affidavits have been filed by the respondents. One against the main writ petition challenging the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act and the other against the miscellaneous petition filed praying to amend the prayer as well as the contentions raised by the petitioners questioning the Sec.4(1) Notification. It is claimed in the counter-affidavit that admittedly the petitioners are the purchasers subsequent to Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and as such the writ petition is not at all maintainable. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that originally in the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act, the name of Ram. V.Lakshmi Ratnam the Registered holder, Mrs.Syed Meeran, the name of the present owner and E.K.Moorthy, and the name of the interested person have been mentioned. It is further stated that since the name of the registered holder has been wrongly mentioned as Ram. V.Lakshmi Raman, necessary errata was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 212. 1983 correcting the name of the Registered holder as Ram. V.Lakshmi Rathnam, It is stated in the counter-affidavit that notice under Secs.4(1) and 5-A of the Act were published in the locality on 23. 1984, 4. 1984, 4. 1984 and 14. 1984 at Sub Registrar’s Office, Taluk Office, Collector’s Office and Special Deputy Collector’s Office, that during the Sec.5-A enquiry, one J.M.AMohamed Ismail, J.MAFawzia, Tmt.Ruckyal Bibi have filed their objections stating that they are also interested persons having right over the property, that their objections were communicated to the Pallavan Transport Corporation and that after obtaining remarks from the said Transport Corporation the objections were overruled. But before the aforesaid Sec.5-A proceedings, the above mentioned land owners filed a petition before the IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in O.S.No.7069 of 1984 on 19. 1984, and they obtained an interim order in I. A No.16983 of 1984. But before the aforesaid Sec.5-A proceedings, the above mentioned land owners filed a petition before the IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in O.S.No.7069 of 1984 on 19. 1984, and they obtained an interim order in I. A No.16983 of 1984. In the said order, the Court ordered status quo till 29. 1984 and it was extended from time to time and it was closed on 2. 1985. The said suit was dismissed on 7. 1987 for non-prosecution and as such the stay was in force till the disposal of the case on 7. 1987. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that when the remarks offered by the requisitioning body were communicated to the owners of the property, it was brought to the notice of the respondents that they have sold the property to the petitioners, that the petitioners in their letter dated 29. 1987 have represented that they have purchased the property In question from the previous owners and made a request for the withdrawal of the gazette notification. It is further stated that in view of the sudden change of ownership of the property, Sec.5-A enquiry was posted on22.1Q.1987,objections raised by the petitioners were communicated to the requisitioning body again on 11. 1987, remarks were communicated to the petitioners and that final orders were passed in the Sec.5-A enquiry on 12. 1988 and were served on the petitioners on 9. 2.1988 and a draft declaration has been approved on 7. 1988, which is impugned in the writ petition. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that two enquiries under Sec.5-A of the Act were conducted, one attended by the erstwhile owners and the other by the present owners. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners’ contentions alleging that the area is a residential one, that it cannot be put to use for industrial purpose and that the place is not suitable for locating a bus terminal, cannot at all be accepted since the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority itself has located that the site is suitable for locating the bus terminal by letter dated 24. 1983 addressed to the Executive Engineer, Pallavan Transport Corporation, Ma-dras-28. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the contentions of the petitioners that they have already applied for construction of flats for low income middle class families is only an afterthought. 1983 addressed to the Executive Engineer, Pallavan Transport Corporation, Ma-dras-28. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the contentions of the petitioners that they have already applied for construction of flats for low income middle class families is only an afterthought. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the draft declaration under Sec.6 of the act has been issued by the Government after observing all the formalities under the Land Acquisition Act, and as such it is not illegal. It is further stated that it is not correct to state that Sec.6 declaration is barred by limitation, because a suit was pending at that time and it was dismissed only in the year 1987 as stated supra. It is further stated that while the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was issued, the petitioners were not the owners of the property in question, that as per the particulars available in the Taluk records, the names of the Registered holder, the present owner and the receiver of the property have been mentioned in the Sec.4(1) notification dated 27. 1983 and as such the petitioners cannot question the activities which took place when they were not the owners of the property then. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the Notification under Sec.4(1) has been approved by the Government on 7. 1983, that the same has been published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 27. 1983, that the same had been published in the locality on 29. 1983, that the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act ought to have been published before 26. 1986, that the stay obtained by the then owners in O.S.No,7069 of 1984 on 19. 1984 ended in dismissal only on 7. 1987,and that adding the period covered by injunction i.e., 3 years as per the provi-sions of the Land Acquisition Act, the declaration under Sec.6 has been published within the time. It . is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the Transport Corporation, though it is registered under the Companies Act, 1956 is a company fully owned and controlled by the Government of Tamil Nadu, the acquisition of lands for such company cannot therefore be made in accordance with provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and that the correct procedure would be to acquire the lands following the procedure laid down under Part II of the said Act. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that the writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable in view of the fact that Sec.4 (1) Notification has not been challenged in the writ petition. 8.. As I have already stated, another counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents, against the filing of additional grounds by the petitioners. It is further claimed in this counter-affidavit that the two miscellaneous petitions filed by the petitioners are not maintainable, either in law or on facts, that the petitioners have no right to challenge the Sec.4(1) Notification that is after filing of the counter affidavit in the above writ petition, that the said amendment petition has been filed after the writ petition came up for final hearing and after the completion of the arguments on the side of petitioners and as such the miscellaneous petitions are liable to be dismissed as belated and unsustainable. It is further claimed in the counter-affidavit that after the dismissal of the suit, the subsequent purchasers the petitioners herein have sent their objections and that their objections were also heard in an enquiry under Sec.5-A. It is also stated that assuming that the provisions of Sec.4 have not been complied with, the petitioners herein, having received notice under Sec.5-A of the Act and participated in the Sec.5-A enquiry cannot raise those pleas. It is further claimed in the counter affidavit that if the petitioners have pointed out the defects they would have been remedied immediately, that the petitioners have no right to amend the prayer at this stage and seek to quash the Sec.4(1) Notification also along with declaration under Sec.6, that if any amendment is permitted, it can only beconsidered as a fresh relief made on this date and in view of the long lapse of time such a relief cannot be granted. It is further stated that the petitioners cannot come to this Court now to set the whole clock back by 7 years without any valid explanation, that no ban order has been issued by the Government against the establishment of bus terminal by the side of schools, that the land in question was inspected by the Secretaries to Government, Housing and Urban Development and the Transport Department and they have taken a decision to pursue the acquisition proceedings. It is also stated that the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority also had stated that the site is suitable for the establishment of a bus terminal, that the original Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published on 27. 1983, that since the Registered Holder’s name was wrongly published as Ram V. Lakshmi Raman an errata was published on 212. 1983, that in the meanwhile the Land Acquisition Officer’s Office was shifted to Chepauk, Madras-5 and that the change of address was notified in the Gazette on 3. 1984. In Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the counter-affidavit the State explained the dates on which notices under Sec.4(1) of the Act were published and how there is no delay in the publication of Sec.6 declaration. 9.. A reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioners. It is stated that the petitioners have purchased the property from the heirs of one J.M.Abdul Aziz, and that the original owner Lakshmi Rattan sold the property to the said Abdul Aziz about 40 years ago, that notice was not given to all the owners of the property, that individual notices have not been given to all the nine sharers. It is further stated in the reply affidavit that the said Sec.4 (1) Notification does not mention the correct name of the owner, that as bona fide purchasers in possession, the petitioners were made parties by issuing notice and that they participated in the said enquiry. It is further alleged in the reply affidavit that though Sec.4(1) Notification was published in the Gazette on 27. 1983, notices for Secs.4(1) and 5-A were said to be published in the locality between the dates 23. 1984 and 14. 1984, and that there is an inordinate delay in the publication of the notices. It is further stated that the publication of the notice is not simultaneous nor within 30 days or within a reasonable time, that the mandatory provision of Sec.4(1) of the requirement of the substance of Notification being published was not complied with, that the property under acquisition is not at all suitable for locating abus terminal, that the area is a primarily residential zone where a bus terminal can be set up only with the special sanction of the Authority under Act. It is further shown in paragraphs 6 to 8 the reply affidavit the number of schools are situated in that area and how the lives of the children will be in danger. It is also stated in the reply affidavit that the Government itself has given directions that action should not be taken for the acquisition of the lands for bus depots by the side of colleges, schools etc., that it will be arbitrary executive action not to follow the statutory direction, that the M.M.D.A. itself has suggested the minimum extent of one hectare for a bus terminal and that in view of the delay caused the Transport Corporation has already shifted the Dr.Ambedkar Bridge Terminal to Dr.Radhakrishnan Salai and by the side of the I.G.‘s office. It is further stated in the reply affidavit that the very purpose of the acquisition of the petitioners’ property was to shift the bus terminal from Dr.Ambedkar Bridge which is already achieved and a most suitable place near the LG.‘s office on Dr.Radhakrishnan Road is the present, terminal, It is further stated that the mandatory requirement of Sec.4 has not been complied with, that the failure to take up individual notices to the owner of the property within the knowledge of the acquiring authority vitiates the acquisition. It is further stated that the acquisition for locating a bus terminal by the side of the schools will be against the violation of executive directions. 10. Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the substance of notification was not published as required under Sec.4(1) of the Act within a reasonable time. He further contends that the acquisition of the land for the Transport Corporation is bad when the entire revenue comes out of public revenue. The learned senior counsel further points out that the Government issued executive directions not to acquire lands near schools and colleges and that the present acquisition is in violation of executive directions and that the Government should not be allowed to violate the executive directions issued by it. The learned senior counsel further points out the Development Control Rules and contends that this is primarily a residential purpose and that a bus terminal should not be located there. The learned senior counsel also refers to the decision in Kammarapalli Gangaram v. Tahsildar, Metpally, (1983)1 An.W.R. 354, in Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 Writ. The learned senior counsel further points out the Development Control Rules and contends that this is primarily a residential purpose and that a bus terminal should not be located there. The learned senior counsel also refers to the decision in Kammarapalli Gangaram v. Tahsildar, Metpally, (1983)1 An.W.R. 354, in Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 Writ. L.R 164 and in P.Venkatarathinam Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadtu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary, Housing, Madras-9 and others, 1990 T.L.N.J. 264, for the proposition that the delay in, publishing the substance of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act vitiates the acquisition. The learned Senior counsel also points out that the writ petition has been filed immediately after declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. 11. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State points out that originally notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on 27. 1983, that two errata were published on 211. 1983 and on 212. 1983 and that the substance of the notification was published on 23. 1984 and as such it cannot be said that there is delay in the publication of the substance of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. The learned Advocate General has pointed out that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioners and their objections were heard. The learned Advocate General relies upon the decision in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Shanmuga Sundara Nadar, 1985 Writ.L.R. 55, in State of Mysore v. V.K.Kangan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2191 and in Deepak Pahwa and others v. Lt.Governor of Delhi and others, A.I.R. 1984 S. C. 1721: (1984) 4 S. C. C. 308, for the proposition that the delay in publishing the substance of notification in this case will not vitiate the proceedings. The learned Advocate General points out that the petitioners herein were not the owners of the property on the date of publication of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and as such they cannot be said to be aggrieved about the correct compliance of the simultaneous publication of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. He further argues that this Court should not allow the petitioners for amending the prayer, after a period of seven years from the dateof filing of the main writ petition. He further argues that this Court should not allow the petitioners for amending the prayer, after a period of seven years from the dateof filing of the main writ petition. With regard to the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, the learned Advocate General points out that the civil suit was pending till 7. 1987 and declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was made well within the time. He further points out that the acquisition of the land for the purpose of bus terminal can be made under Part II of .the Land Acquisition Act and relies upon the decision in Manubhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 120: (1983)4 S.C.C. 553 , where it has been held that Part VII of the Act need not be followed in such cases. He also refers to the decision in Chin-namnia v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Secretary to Government, Housing and others, 1985 Writ.L.R. 109, for the same proposition. 12.. Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel replying to the arguments of the learned Advocate General contends that Part VII of the Act has to be followed for acquiring the property for companies and relies upon the decision in Valji Bhai v. State of Bombay, A.I.R 1963 S.C. 1890. The learned senior counsel further contends that the subsequent purchasers can maintain the writ petition, relying upon the decision in Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality, A.I.R 1970 S.C. 502 and in V.Pramila and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, Writ Appeal Nos. 1304 to 1306 of 1987 dated 19. 1990. The learned senior counsel further argues that there is no delay in asking for amending the prayer and that the technicality should not stand in the way in such matters,. He further relies upon the decision in Satya Navain v. District Engineer, P.W.D., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1161, that with regard to the substance of publication of notification after four months, there is delay and it is enough to quash the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. He relies upon the decision in Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Rain Jaiswal, (1985)3 S.C.C. 1 for the proposition that the substance of the notification has to be published immediately and it is mandatory. He also refers to the decision in P. Venkatarathinam Na idu v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1990 T.L.N.J. 264. He relies upon the decision in Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Rain Jaiswal, (1985)3 S.C.C. 1 for the proposition that the substance of the notification has to be published immediately and it is mandatory. He also refers to the decision in P. Venkatarathinam Na idu v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1990 T.L.N.J. 264. He further points out that the mere participation in the Sec.5-A enquiry will not take away the right of the petitioners and that the non-publication of Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act vitiates the acquisition proceedings. The learned senior counsel further argues that the executive directions have to be followed strictly and that the state cannot be allowed to act against them. 13.. I have carefully considered the arguments of Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General appearing for the State. With regard to the contention raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the acquisition of the land is bad since the said acquisition has not been done following Part VII of the Land Acquisition Proceedings, I think that this contention has to be rejected summarily in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court which is reported in Manubhat v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1984S.C. 120. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that even where land is acquired for a company, the State Government has the power to acquire land for a public purpose from the revenue of the State. If the declaration 6, which is impugned here is scrutinised, it is clear that the entire amount of compensation has to be paid out of the public revenue. As such, the contention raised by the learned senior counsel that the said acquisition is bad since Part VII of the Land Acquisition Proceedings have not been followed is not correct. 14. However, Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel relies upon an unreported Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in L.M.‘‘Venkatesan v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras and others, W.P.No.10351 of 1982 etc., dated 1. 1988 and contends that in that case the Division Bench has held that in a case of acquisition by Housing Board, Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act should be followed. 1988 and contends that in that case the Division Bench has held that in a case of acquisition by Housing Board, Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act should be followed. In that case, the Division Bench has held that having regard to the express language used in ‘the second proviso of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act, where the acquisition is for the local authority, the entire compensation cannot come out of public revenue. The learned Judges have observed as follows: “... If, in law there is a clear distinction between the revenues of the State as opposed to the revenue of a local authority, it is that which should form part of the declaration in view of the legal requirement under the second proviso to Sec.6(1) of the Act...” The learned Judges referred to Form 5-A, Form 5-C and Form 5-D and held that it is a case of noncompliance of second proviso to Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.6 of the Act. I am of the view, that the case on hand in distinguishable on facts from the case which is mentioned above. As held by the Division Bench of this Court, that was a case of an acquisition for the ‘local authority’. However, in view of the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court referred to supra and in view of the language contained in the impugned declaration before me, I do not see any infirmity on this ground. The decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel in Valji Bhai v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1890 is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In that case, it was held by the Supreme Court that the Acquisition made for the benefit of the Corporation, though for public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of the public revenue and the provisions under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act were not complied with. But here the facts of the case are almost similar to the facts of the case in Manubhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 120. As such, I am of the view that the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has no force on this aspect. 15. But here the facts of the case are almost similar to the facts of the case in Manubhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 120. As such, I am of the view that the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has no force on this aspect. 15. The substantial objection raised by the learned Advocate General, appearing for the State is that the petitioners herein are the subsequent purchasers and as such they cannot maintain the writ petition. It is true that the petitioners have purchased the property only after the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. In my view, this cannot be a uniform rule. It depends upon the facts of each case. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court in V.Pramila and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, Writ Appeal Nos.1304 to 1306 of 1987, dated 19. 1990 was concerned with a case of a petitioner who purchased the lands subsequent to the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and when the earlier writ petition were dismissed on the ground of laches, the Division Bench reversed the order of the learned single Judge and allowed the writ appeals. It seems the decision of the Supreme Court in Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipaliiy, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 802, also supports this view. In the above mentioned decision, the Supreme Court has observed as follow: [at p.805] “...we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after the issue of the notification under Scc.4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands...” So I am not able to agree with the contention of the learned Advocate General that the writ petition has to be dismissed on the ground of laches and the petition for the amendment of the prayer also has to be dismissed. When the petitioners have filed the writ petition, it is seen that though originally they asked for quashing the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, the grounds raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition show that they are attacking the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act only. As such, the objection taken by the learned Advocate General is very technical. As such, the objection taken by the learned Advocate General is very technical. If the facts of the case are considered it cannot be said that the petitioners’ case has to be thrown out on the ground of laches. It is seen that the petitioners have come to this Court, as soon as the declaration under Sec.6 is made and that is the only time under which they could come and it has been done so. Though the petitioners have raised grounds in the affidavit filed in support of the petition attacking the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act, in the prayer, unfortunately they have asked the relies one for setting aside the declaration under Sec.6of the Act. When the said mistake was pointed out during the course of arguments the petitioners have immediately filed a petition to amend the prayer in the writ petitioner, attacking the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. So, considering the facts of the learned Advocate General are well founded on this aspect. It is not a case where this Court is setting back the clock seven years back. The notification under Sec.4(1) has been made in the year 1983 and that the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act has been made only in the year 1988, since a civil suit was pending and as such the petitioners have come before this Court, at the earliest, challenging the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. When the present writ petition was taken up for hearing, during the course of arguments, they chose to amend the prayer challenging the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. In fact, the petitioners could question it now only because admittedly, they are the subsequent purchasers of the property, subsequent to the notification under Sec.4(1)of the Act. 16. It is well settled that the publication of substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act is mandatory. It has to be seen on the facts of this case, whether there is such a delay in publishing the notification. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the delay in publishing the substance of the notification vitiates the acquisition proceedings. It has to be seen on the facts of this case, whether there is such a delay in publishing the notification. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the delay in publishing the substance of the notification vitiates the acquisition proceedings. In Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 Writ.L.R. 164, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the interval between the two acquisition proceedings should not be too long and it should be done simultaneously or at the immediate possible time after the notifica tion under Sec.4(1) of the Act. In that case, the Division Bench has held that an interval of six months between the publication of Gazette and the locality would constitute unjustifiable delay and in such circumstances quashed the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. The judgment of the Division Bench in the above mentioned case has been approved recently by a Division Bench of this Court in V.Pramila and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, Writ Appeal Nos.1304 to 1306 of 1987, dated 19. 1990. Another Division Bench of this Court in P.Venkatarathinam Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 T.L.N.J. 264: W.A.No.38 of 1986, dated 16. 1990 has also affirmed the decision of the Division Bench of this Court stated supra in Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development, Madras-9,1986 Writ L.R. 164. It is seen from the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, stated supra, that it had taken note of the decision in and in Deepak Caur v. Lt.Governor of Delhi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1721, and has held that six months of interval is fatal to the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. ‘On the facts of the case on hand, it has to be seen whether there is delay as contended by Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner or there is no delay as contended by the learned Advocate General. In this case, notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act has been published on 27. 1983. An errata has been published on 212. 1983. According to the learned Advocate General, the substance of the acquisition was published on 23. 1984. In the earlier part of this order, I have given the dates on which the substance of the publication has been published in various offices. 1983. An errata has been published on 212. 1983. According to the learned Advocate General, the substance of the acquisition was published on 23. 1984. In the earlier part of this order, I have given the dates on which the substance of the publication has been published in various offices. As I have already stated the date of Publication in the Gazette is 27. 1983 and as admitted by the learned Advocate General, the date of publication of the substance of the notification is 23. 1984 it is more than six months and as such the dicta laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the above mentioned squarely applies to the facts of the case on hand. Even if the contention of the learned Advocate General that the errata has been published on 212. 1983 is taken into account there is a delay of more than four months. In this case, no explanation has been offered as to why continuance of action was kept of. I do not think the shifting of an office to some other place can be an explanation for not publishing the substance of notification. It is seen that the original notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published in the month of July, 1983 and up to November, 1983, nothing has happened. Then the Government came up with an errata in December, 1983 and the publication is made in March, 1984. If these are taken into account on the facts of the case, I am of the view, the two decisions of the Division Bench of this Court, as mentioned supra, one in Nandakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1986 Writ. L.R. 164 and the other in P. Venkatarathinam Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary, Housing Madras-9 and 2 others, 1990 T.L.N.J. 264, will squarely apply to the facts of the case. Accordingly, I am of the view that the non-publication of the substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) within a reasonable time vitiates the acquisition proceedings. 17.. Further, “what is the effect of publication of an errata” has been considered by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), A.I.R 1990 S.C. 731. Accordingly, I am of the view that the non-publication of the substance of the notification under Sec.4(1) within a reasonable time vitiates the acquisition proceedings. 17.. Further, “what is the effect of publication of an errata” has been considered by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), A.I.R 1990 S.C. 731. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that it cannot be contended always that if the notification is amended, the last one only has to be taken into account. The Supreme Court has further held that the matter has to be considered on matters on terms of relevant notifications. In the above mentioned case, the name of the owner as well as the details of the land were wrongly notified originally and then they were amended later. In such circumstances, in deciding which of the notifications has to be taken into account, the Supreme Court has observed (at p,735) as follows: “...wherever there are notifications under Sec.4 by way of amendments, it cannot be said that it is only the last of them that can be taken as effective notification under Sec.4. Where there is a notification under Sec.4 which purports to be by way of an amendment, the question whether it is really one rectifying certain errors in the earlier one or whether its nature is such as to totally change the entire completion of the matter would have to be considered on the terms of the relevant notifications...” In this case also, it is seen that in the original notification, the names of the original owners did not find a place. In the earlier portion of this order, I have already narrated how the notification has come to be published. From that, it is seen that the names of the original owners were wrongly published in July, 1983. It was later amended by an errata in December, 1983 only. In that errata the names of the persons from whom the petitioners purchased the land appeared. As such, when the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published, originally a totally wrong description of the names of the real owners of the land was made. It was later amended by an errata in December, 1983 only. In that errata the names of the persons from whom the petitioners purchased the land appeared. As such, when the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act was published, originally a totally wrong description of the names of the real owners of the land was made. If the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 731, is taken into consideration, it can be said that it is only the first notification has to be taken into account and not the errata. Even assuming for a moment that the errata has to be taken note of in this case, in my view, there is a delay as I have said earlier, which vitiates the acquisition proceedings. 18.. It is not an answer to say that the petitioners have taken part in Sec.5-A enquiry and as such the notification under Sec.4(1) is not vitiated. This argument has been negatived by the Division Bench of this Court in P. Venkatarathinam Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by its Commissioner and Secretary, Madras-9,1990 T.L.N.J. 264, wherein the Division Bench has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad and another v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985)3 S.C.C. 1 , where it has been held that it cannot be said that where the person against whom acquisition proceedings are prosecuted files his objections, the purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality under Sec.4(a) is achieved and that the failure to give public notice in the locality need not be so treated as fatal to the proceedings, and that it is not also not possible to accept that the person concerned would not suffer any prejudice by the failure of the Government to publish a notice in the locality, if he is able to file detailed objections against the proposed acquisition. 19. The other point which has to be considered is with regard to the directions of the Government regarding the suitability of land for acquisition for the purpose of a construction of a bus terminal. On 11. 19. The other point which has to be considered is with regard to the directions of the Government regarding the suitability of land for acquisition for the purpose of a construction of a bus terminal. On 11. 1987, the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Madras has written a letter to the Collector of Madras, with reference to certain norms to be followed for acquiring the land for the purpose of a bus terminal for State Transport Corporation and it reads as follows: “Copy of letter No.35867/G2/75-19 dated 11. 1977 from the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Madras-9 addressed to the Collector of Madras, Madras-5. Sub: Land Acquisition-Land Acquisition for State Transport undertaking for bus terminals bus depots and workshops - instructions. With reference to a proposal for alienation of land for one of the State Transport undertakings for locating a bus terminal the Government have decided that action should not be taken for acquisition of lands for bus depots by the side of Colleges, Schools, Hospitals, and Courts. I am directed to request that the decision of the Government may be borne in mind while formulating land acquisition proposals for bus terminals depots workshops...” Referring to the letter mentioned above Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner contends that the site is adjoining to a primary school and there are many schools in and around in that area and it is not a proper place for locating a bus terminal. The learned senior counsel further argues that once the Government has prescribed certain norms to be observed for the acquisition, they should not get over those norms and the State Government itself should not violate those norms. The learned senior counsel further refers to the decision in Achhelal Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1980 Pat. 49, in which a Division Bench has held that ignoring of circulars is not justified and if it is ignored",, it has to be held as mala fide. The Division Bench has further observed as follows: [at p.53] "Government Circulars reflecting the need for striking a balance between the injury, annoyance and inconvenience that would be caused to persons whose land is proposed to be acquired and the good it may do to those for whose benefit it is acquired and the cost involved in the acquisition should be followed while selecting land for acquisition. Ignoring of such instructions and insistence on the part of the authorities in acquiring the proposed land without even considering the reports by the officers recommending acquisition of alternative and equally suitable land offered by the persons affected would show mala fides in initiating the proceedings..." 20. Though I am not able to subscribe to the view that acquiring such lands itself is tainted by mala fide, since the Government has prescribed certain norms, in my view, they should be followed their instructions strictly. From the records produced before me, I find a letter of the Deputy Secretary to the Government dated 9,12.1980 wherein the Deputy Secretary to the Government has clearly stated that the sites in S.No.2345/2 and 2345/7 (part) are not suitable for locating the bus terminal. 21.In K.Gangaram v. Tahsildar, Metpally, (1983)1 An.W.R. 354, it has been held as follows: "...Violation of the administrative instructions issued by the Government which constitute a quasi-law on the subject is clearly justiciable and the citizens can obtain redress in a given case if those instructions are disregarded without any justifiable ground." Surely, on the facts and circumstance of the case, I am of the view that the instructions of the Government have been disregarded without any justifiable ground. It is also proved by the records produced before me especially the correspondence exchanged, regarding the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act, between the heads of Departments. 22.. It is seen from a perusal of the records before me, that steps have been taken to locate two bus stands one near the Lady Wellington College, Madras and the other near Light House, Madras. Though this letter has been written subsequent to the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was made, this Court can take note of the fact that there are suitable other sites available for the acquisition and even one of the Secretaries to the State has written to the Managing Director of the Pallavan; Transport Corporation to this effect on 12. l988. Whether the suggestion of the Secretary to the Government has to be accepted or not is a different matter. The fact seems to be that there are other sites which are more suitable than the present one. If this is taken along with the letter dated 17. 1987 prescribing certain norms to select the site for bus terminal, I am of the view that it is vitiated. The fact seems to be that there are other sites which are more suitable than the present one. If this is taken along with the letter dated 17. 1987 prescribing certain norms to select the site for bus terminal, I am of the view that it is vitiated. The Supreme Court in Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1031, while holding that the action of the State Executive must be governed by rule of law and must be informed by reason observed as follows: [at p. 1037] "...The existence of the power of Judicial review however depends upon the nature (of) and the right involved in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, it is well settled that there can be "malice in law" existence of such "malice in law" is part of the dimension of the rule of relevance and reason as well as the rule of fair play in action." It is seen from the records produced before me that there is a difference of opinion between the Departmental Heads with regard to the location of the bus terminal and the suitability of the land, and such, I am of the view the Government has not considered the matter carefully, taking note of the pros and cons in acquiring the particular property of the petitioners for locating the bus terminal. Apart from that, as I have already staled that executive directions, or the Government orders or the department instructions have to be followed strictly by the authorities concerned, and should not ignore them. It is ‘an admitted fact that near the property to be acquired, there is a primary school and there are so many schools in and around that area. So, on the ground that the Government has not followed the norms prescribed by it for acquiring a bus terminal, the acquisition has to go. 23. The view I have taken, I do not think it is necessary to refer to all other decisions referred to by Mr.M.Raghavan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General appearing for the State. 24. In the result, the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act dated 7. 1983 published in the Gazette on 27. 1983 the errata dated 212. 1983 and the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.708, Transport Department dated 7. 24. In the result, the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act dated 7. 1983 published in the Gazette on 27. 1983 the errata dated 212. 1983 and the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.708, Transport Department dated 7. 1988 shall stand quashed and the writ petition will stand allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.