Judgment :- 1. On a preliminary point to the hear ing of a review petition by a Division Bench that interms of Order 47. R. 5 of the C.P.C. where the Judge or Judges, or any one of the Judges, who passed the dec ree or made the order, a review of which is applied for, continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for a review is presented and is not or are not precluded by absence of other cause for a period of six months next after the appli cation from considering the decree or order to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same, a Bench comprising of two of us refer red the matter to the Honble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench, and the case has accordingly been brought before us. 2. The petitioner moved this Court in a Writ Petition No. 4015 of 1986 under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a Writ of Mandamus or any other writ or direction in the nature of writ to forbear the respondent from demanding or collecting any additional fee under S. 6 of the Pondicherry Chit Fund Act of 1966. The petition was heard by Nainar Sundaram, J. who passed the order dated 23 1-1901 dismissing the same. The petitioner preferred an appeal in W.A. No. 613 of 1982 2 . The said appeal was heard by a Bench consisting of Mohan, J. as he then was and Bakthavat, salam, J. who dismissed the appeal by an order dated 27-9-1988 saying? “After hearing Mr. K. Chandra Mouli, learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader, Pondicherry, we are of the view that excepting to clarify the following points, we do not think of interfering with the judgment. The clarification is: Should the appellant prove that the subscribers have not been paid the first instalment, there is no necessity to follow the procedure set out under Ss, 20 and 21 of the Pondicherry Chit Funds Act of 196b, This is because in law he becomes a subscriber only on payment of the first instalment. The writ appeal is dismissed, No costs.” 3. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant review petition on 27-10-1988. The writ appeal is dismissed, No costs.” 3. Petitioner thereafter filed the instant review petition on 27-10-1988. By the time, however, the review petition was made ready after its representation by the petitioner on 12-1-1989 and thereafter for being listed before the appropriate Bench for hearing for admission/order, Mohan, J. ceased to be a Judge of this Court. The review petition however was listed for admission before Bakthavat salam, J, who on 3-1-1990 ordered for notice of motion. Office of the Court however placed the records of the case before the Honble Chief Justice on for constituting a Bench for hearing of the review petition after notice. The Honble Chief Justice on 17-8-1990 ordered for placing the review petition before a Division Bench of which Bakthavatsalam, J, who had constituted the Division Bench with Mohan, J. in hearing the writ appeal, was a member and accordingly the review petition came up before the Division Bench, consisting of Mishra, and Bakthavatsalam, JJ. on 27-8-1990. 4. A preliminary objection whether the Bench was competent to hear the review petition his thus come up before this Bench. 5. The history of the creation of this Court goes to the period of King George III of Great Britain when under the Letters Patent dated 26-12 1818 a Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras was established followed by its revocation under the Letters Patent dated 26.6.1862 under which the High Court of Judicature for the Presidency ot Madras was created, soon to be re-constituted by the Letters Patent dated 28-12-1865. Ever-since its establishment under the Letters Patent dated 28-12-1865 of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom, it has exercised its such civil, criminal, admirality, Vice-Ad-mirality, testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, original and appellate and all such powers and authorities for and in relation to the administration of Justice as are conferred upon it under the said Letters Patent and/or amendment thereto. The Letters Patent in Cl. 15 gives to this Court appellate jurisdiction. The Letters Patent in Cl. 15 gives to this Court appellate jurisdiction. Subject to the provision in the Constitution of India and as substituted by Order in Council dated 3-11-1927, this clause reads: “And we do farther ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from the judgment passed in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provision of S. 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to S. 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything therein before provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to S. 108 of the Government of India Act made (on or after the first day of February, 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs of Successors in Our or their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.” The appellate jurisdiction is accordingly created with respect to matters, civil and criminal not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of S. 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one one Judge of the High Court on one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to S. 108 of the Government of India Act. The last part of the clause wherein appeal to the Privy Council is preserved, however stands repealed by the Constitution of India. The last part of the clause wherein appeal to the Privy Council is preserved, however stands repealed by the Constitution of India. S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, which has been continued, as we shall presently see, even after the repeal of 1915 Act by promulgation of Government of India Act, 1935 and by the Constitution of India, reads: “(1) Each high court may by its own rules provide, as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more judges, or by division courts constituted by two or more judges, of the high court, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the court. (2) The Chief Justice of each high court shall determine what judge in each case is to sit alone and what judge of the court, whether with or with out the chief justice, are to constitute the several division courts.” In other words, if rules framed by the court provide that one or the other original or appellate jurisdiction of the Court would vest in one or more judges, that would determine whether a certain case would be listed before a single Judge or before a Division Bench of two or more judges. The Chief Justice shall determine what judge in each case is to sit alone and what Judges of the Court, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several division courts. 6. Cls. 37 and 38 of Letters Patent respectively provide for regulation of proceed, ings in civil and criminal cases. Cl. 37 reads. “Regulation of Proceedings— And we do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from time to time to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings’ in its Admiralty, Vice Admiralty, testamentary, Intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively: Provided always, that the said High Court shall be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of th e Code of Civil Procedure, being an act passed by the Government-General-in Council, and being Act No. VIII of 1859, nnd the provisions of any law which has been made, amending or altering the same, by competent legislative authority for India.” Cl. 38 reads, “Regulation of proceedings— And we do further ordain that the proceedings in all criminal cases which shall be brought before the said High Court of Judicature at Madras, in the exercise of its ordinary criminal jurisdiction, and also in all other Criminal cases over which the said High Court had jurisdiction immediately before the Publication of these presents, shall be regulated by the procedure and practice which was in use in the said High Court immediately before such publication, subject to any law which has been or may be made in relation thereto by competent legislative authority for India; and that the proceedings in all other criminal cases passed by the Governor-General in Council and being Act No. XXV of 1861 or by such further or other laws in relation to criminal procedure as may have been or may be made by such authority as aforesaid.” Thus as provided under Cl. 37 in its Letters Patent, this Court has been given the power to make rules and orders provided that the Court would be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended or altered by the competent legislative authority in India, In criminal cases, however, it is required to conform to the procedure or laws made by the Legislature. 7. The Constitution of India has created the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 and in Art. 225 thereof provided. 7. The Constitution of India has created the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 and in Art. 225 thereof provided. “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relaion to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution; Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commancement of this Constitution shall be no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction.” This has not only saved the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court but also the Letters Patent including the incorporation of S. 108 of the Government ot India Act, 1915 in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent afore-quoted as also the rules framed by the High Court as provided under S. 108 (1) of the said 1915 Act until such time when the appropriate Legislature by virtue of powers conferred by the Constitution made any law on the subject. 8. In National Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Cnadwick and Bros. Ltd 3 . a question had arisen whether after the Constitution, any judgment of a learned single Judge was subject to appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court or not; the Supreme Court has made certain observations which are profitable to understand the dispute raised before us. The Supreme Court has said after quoting sub-S.(1) of S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915: “The section is an enabling enactment and confers power on the High Courts of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by single Judges or by division courts. The Supreme Court has said after quoting sub-S.(1) of S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915: “The section is an enabling enactment and confers power on the High Courts of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by single Judges or by division courts. The power conferred by the section is not circumscribed in any manner whatever and the nature of the power is such that it had to be conferred by :hc use of words of the widest amplitude. There could be no particular purpose or object while conferring the power in limiting its qua the jurisdiction already possessed by the High Court, wh ea in the other provisions of the Government of India Act it was contemplated that the existing jurisdiction was subject to the legislature power of the Governor-General and the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court was liable to be enlarged, modified and curtailed by the legislature from time to time. It is thus difficult to accept the argument that the power vested in High Court under sub-S.(1) of S. 108 was a limited one, and eoud only be exercised in respect to such jurisdiction as the High Court possessed on the date when the Act of 1915 came into force. The words of the sub-section “vested in the court” cannot be read as meaning “now vested in the court”. It in a well-known rule of construction that whoa a power is conferred by a statute that power may be exercised from time to time when occasion arises unless a contrary intention appears. This rule has been given statutory recognition in S. 32 of the Interpretation Act, The purpose of the reference to S 108 in CI. 15 of the Letters Patent wa s to incorporate that power in the charter of the court itself, and not to make it moribund at that stage and make it rigid and inflexible. We are therefore of the opinion that S.|08 of the Government of India Act, 1915, conferred power on the High Court whieh that court could exercise from time to time with reference to its jurisdiction whether existing at the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1915 or whether conferred on it by any subsequent legislation. We are therefore of the opinion that S.|08 of the Government of India Act, 1915, conferred power on the High Court whieh that court could exercise from time to time with reference to its jurisdiction whether existing at the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1915 or whether conferred on it by any subsequent legislation. It was argued that simultaneously with the repeal of S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and of the enactment of its provisions in S. 223 of tbe Government of India Act of 1935 and later on in Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, there had not been any corresponding amendment of Cl 15 of the Letters Patent and the reference to S. 108 in CI 15 of the Letters Patent could not therefore be taken as relating to those provisions, and, that being so the High Court had no power to make rules in 1940 when the Trade Marks Act was enacted under the repealed section and the decision of Mr. Justice Shah therefore could not be said to have been given pursuant to S 108 This objection also in our opinion is not well-founded as it overlooks the fact that the power that was conferred on the High Court by S. 108 still subsists, and it has not been affected in any manner whatever either by the Government of India Act, 1935, or by the new Constitution, On the otherhand it has been kept alive and reaffirmed with great vigour by these statutes. The High Courts still enjoy the same unfettered power as they enjoyed under S. 108 of the Govern, ment of India Act, 1915, of making rules and providing whether an appeal has to be heard by one Judge or more Judges or by Division Courts consisting of two or more Judges of the High Court. It is immaterial by what label or nomenclature that power is described in the different statutes or in the Letters Patent. The power is there and continues to be there and can be exercised in the same manner as it could be exercised when it was originally conferred, As a matter of history the power was not conferred for the first time by S 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It has already been conferred by S. 13 of the Indian High Court Act of 1861. It has already been conferred by S. 13 of the Indian High Court Act of 1861. We are further of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view that reference in Cl. 15 to S. 108 should be read as a reference to the correrponding provisions of the 1935 Act and the Constitution, The canon of construction of statutes enunciated in S, 38 of the Interpretation Act and reiterated with some modifications in S 8 of the General Clauses Act is one of general application where statutes or Acts have to be construed and there is no reasonable ground for holding that the rule of Construction should not be applied in construing the eharters of the different High Courts These charters were granted under statutory pewers and are subject to the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature. Assuming however, but not conceding, that strictiy speaking the provisions of the Interpretation Act and the General Clauses Act do not for any reason apply, we see no jurisdiction for holding that the principles of construction enunciate d in those provisions have no application for construing these charters. For the reason) given above we hold that the High Court was perfectly justified in overruling the preliminary objection and in holding that an appeal was competent from the judgment of Mr. Justice Shah under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.” The Supreme Court overruled a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Indian Electric Works v. Registrar of Trade Marks 4 and commented, “On the line of thought adopted in the Calcutta decision the learned Judges were forced to the conclusion which seems somewhat strange that the jurisdiction conferred by the Letters Patent on the Calcutta High Court is much more limited and restricted than has been conferred on some of the new High Courts in India, by their Letters Patent” It is thus clear from the judgment of the Supreme Courts rule making power under S. 108 of Government of India Act, 1913 read with the corresponding provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 and under Art 225 of the Constitution of India remained unaffected and so is the power of the Honble the Chief Justice to decide who amongst the Judges be assigned the work as a Judge sitting alone or a Judge sitting in a Division Bench of two or three Judges. Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. This extract is taken from Mayavaram financial Corporation Limited v. Registrar of Chits, (1991) 2 LW 80 , at page 88 : 9. Code of Civil Procedure, however, in Part IX Ss. 117 and 120 besides some other provisions therein, indicates which provisions of the Code are applied to the High Courts not being the’ Court of Judicial Commissioner and which provisions of the Code are not applied to them. S. 141 of the Code, however, reads. “The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. (Explanation: In this section, the expression “proceedings” includes proceedings under O. 9. but does not include any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution). We have seen already that the application of the rules of procedure in the Code to the proceedings under the Letters Patent jurisdiction of the High Court is subject to the rules of procedure of the High Court under its Letters Patent power. Before however the special provisions in Art. 226 of the Constitution come to give to the High Courts power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari and quo|warranto, the High Courts in India enjoyed power to issue writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus with prescriptions therefor in the Code of Criminal Procedure and some times the special statutes framed by the competent Legislature. Thus a classication existed in the matter of issuing writs with reference to the nature of the proceedings, and while applications for writs with reference to the nature of Habeas Corpus were classified as civil proceedings, other types of writ applications were classified as civil proceedings. This classification has remained in existence and has continued to be invoked although the High Court exercises the same power in dealing with a petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus or a writ in the nature of mandamus, certiorari or quo warranto. Proceedings in the petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus thus have been regulated as provided under Cl. 38 of the Letters Patent and proceedings in the other writ petitions have been regulated as provided under Cl. 37 of the Letters Patent. Proceedings in the petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus thus have been regulated as provided under Cl. 38 of the Letters Patent and proceedings in the other writ petitions have been regulated as provided under Cl. 37 of the Letters Patent. The High Court therefore allowed such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which were not in conflict with the rules and orders made for the said purpose by the High Court, to the writ petitions other than, a petition for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus and never agitated in permitting the petitioners to appeal against a judgment of the single Judge before a Division Bench, which is in short, writ appeal against a judgment or order in a writ petition under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent (excluding Habeas Corpus) as under the rules of this Court. A writ petition is ordinarily heard by one Judge constituting the Court and his decision thus is treated as a decision falling under appeal in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. 10. A question as to whether the power to review as envisaged under the Code of Civil Proceedure can be entertained in appeals under Cl. 15 of the Letters Parent or not has been however a question not new to this Court A Division Bench of this Court in Attyam Venkalasubbarayadu v. Sri Rajah Velugoti Govinda Krishna Yachendrulu 5, on a preliminary objection that the High Court cannot entertain a review in appeals preferred under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent held: “S 44 of the Letters Patent says that the provisions are subject to the Legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council. As at present advised we are in agreement with Mr. Subramania Aiyar that this provision would not enable courts, by implication, to supplement the Letters Patent importing into them all acts, ejesdem generis , passed by the Governor-General in Council and that the provision is only intended to empower the Governor-General in Council to legislate with a view to supplement omissions in the Letters Patent. Even in this view, we think that by S. 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) the Governor-General in Council did incorporate into the Letters Patent the provisions relating to review. Even in this view, we think that by S. 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) the Governor-General in Council did incorporate into the Letters Patent the provisions relating to review. It was then argued that the review S. 114 of the Code (Act V of 1908) cannot apply as it provides only for the review of decrees or orders passed under the Code of Civil Procedure. We are not impressed by this argument. In the first place, decrees are passed in appeals heard under the Letters Patent only under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the second place Cl (B) of S. 114 does not require that orders and decrees should have been passed under the Code. Further, the word decree or order includes a judgment Krishnan Dayal v. Irshad Ali 6 . Mr. Subramaniya Aiyar relies on Sabapathi Chetty v. Narayanaswamy Chetty 7 for the proposition thpt S. 15 of the Letters Patent is not controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure. All that was decined in that case was that as S. 15 had given an unlimited power of appeal against every judgment of a single Judge, the Governor-General in Council should not be understood to have taken away by implication that power of the litigant by making S. 540 of the Code (Act XIV of 1882) applicable to chartered High Courts. This does not contravene the principle that it is competent to the Governor-General in Council to supplement the remedy of appeal by giving an additional remedy by way of review to the litigant. The decisions in Babaji Bin Patloji v. Babaji Bin Mahadu 8 . Lala Prayag Lal v. Jai Narain Singh 9 , and Nana Bin Aba v. Sheku Bin Andu 10 , only lay down that a self-contained-act should not be added to by the provsions of the Code of Civil Procedure. This does not affect the present question. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has referred us to two reported cases and to an unreported decision in which reviews under similar circumstances were entertained. Apparently the practice of this High Court has been in favour of allowing reviews to be filed in appeals under the Letters Patent. This does not affect the present question. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar has referred us to two reported cases and to an unreported decision in which reviews under similar circumstances were entertained. Apparently the practice of this High Court has been in favour of allowing reviews to be filed in appeals under the Letters Patent. It was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Ravi Veeragavelu v. Venkuta Narashima Naidu Bahadur 11, that even though a strict construction of the law may not permit of the entertainment of appeals, a long standing practice of the court should not be lightly departed from in that respect. Wnat relates to appeals applies mutatis mutandis to reviews also. We must therefore overrule the preliminary objection.” 11. The law as stated in the above case with regard to review in Letters Patent appeals and application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure was reiterated and followed by the Bombay High Court in Ratanchand v. Damji 12 . It said: “As regards the first objection Mr. Malla, who has appeared in support of the rule on behalf of the defendants, contenes that the provisions of the Code contained in S.U4 and the rules in O 47 would not apply to a review in appeals preferred under the Letters Patent. He has, however fairly drawn my attention to the case of Venkatasubbarayadu v. Krishna Yachendrulu 13 , where it has been held that the provisions of the Code apply to review applications even in appeals under the Letters Patent. But he has not been able to advance any argument to show that the view taken by the Madras High Court is not justified by ths provisions of the Letters Patent and the Civil Procedure Code. It is clear that in view of S. 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions of S. 114, and the rules under 0.47 would apply to an application for review of a decree in any appeal under t he Letters Patent, as they would undoubtedly apply to a review in any appeal under the Code. There is no provision to the contrary under the Letters Patent, and having regard to the terms of Cl. 44 of the Letters Patent, the provisions of the Code are applicable to such applications. It may be noted that the word by the Code used in S. 114 (a) are not repended in 0.47. There is no provision to the contrary under the Letters Patent, and having regard to the terms of Cl. 44 of the Letters Patent, the provisions of the Code are applicable to such applications. It may be noted that the word by the Code used in S. 114 (a) are not repended in 0.47. R. 1, sub-R (1), Cl (a).” The Bombay High Court also rejected the argument that the Courts inherent power can be invoked in disregard to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. The above judgment of our Court was challenged before the Privy Council in Ravi Veeraraghavalu v. Ve kata Narasimha Naidu Bahadur 14, on the question of the main tainability of the appeal under the Letters Patent. The Privy Council noticed that perhaps there was no appeal prescribed under the law, yet there has been a long standing practice of entertaining appeals and the Privy Council declined to interfere on this ground. In the words of the Privy Council. “The point that a second appeal lies to the High Court in cases arising under Act VIII of 1895, has been expressly decided in Veerasamy v. Manager, Pittapur Estate 15 and the practice appears to have been ever since the passing of the Act for such appeals to be preferred to the High Court. Their Lordships would not be disposed to interfere with such a long-standing practice, even if they thought there was an implied rule against second appeals lying from the decisions of the District Judge with respect to adjudications under the Act by the Collector. Their Lordships must, therefore, overrule the first objection.” 13. We need not investigate this aspect of the case any further and proceed on the basis that a review petition is maintainable. The question however raised is, whether in review proceedings this Court invariably followed the rule that as final order or judgment should be reviewed only in exceptional cases and by the Judge or the Judges, who had heard the petition or appeal under review. 14. One of the earliest cases in which S. 623 C.P.C.. 1882 and CMS of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court were examined, is a case reported in Aubhoy Churn Mohunt v. Shamont Lochun Morunt 16 . That was a case in which Mr. Justice wilson and Mr. Justice Beverley had decided the second appeal in favour of the respondent. 1882 and CMS of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court were examined, is a case reported in Aubhoy Churn Mohunt v. Shamont Lochun Morunt 16 . That was a case in which Mr. Justice wilson and Mr. Justice Beverley had decided the second appeal in favour of the respondent. The plaintiff being dissatisfied with that decision, presented an application for review of judgment. The case however could not be listed before the Bench, which had disposed of the second appeal as one or the other Judge was not avilable for the reason of being away from India. The review petition was however listed before Mr. Justice Beverly, sitting alone and an objection was raised based on the principle that unless both the Judges who had disposed of the second appeal, and one or the other or both of them were precluded by absence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the matter, were alone competent to hear the application as a Bench sitting together and no other Judge or Judges could hear the review petition. Beverly, J., noticed the fact that first he was not available and when he resumed his seat in Court after the vacation, Wilson, J. was absent and then referred to some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure including S. 623. 624 and 626 of 1882 Code and concluded. “It seems to me that under the spirit of the section referred to. I and I alone, am bound to hear this rule. The section is apparently intended to refer to a High Court which is specially excepted from the rule laid down in S. 624S. 627 imposes a very reasonable and proper restriction, and that restriction is this, that when the Judges, or any one of them who made the decree, can hear the application, within six months after its presentation, they or he, and they or he only, shall hear it.” A Letters Patent appeal was preferred against the review order by Beverley, J. The Bench which heard the Letters Patent Appeal on the jurisdiction of Beverley, J., to hear the review petition, held in the words of the Honble Petheram, C.J. “The present contention of the appellant is that that procedure was wrong, and either the matter ought to have stood ever until Mr. Justice Wilson returned, or else that an application ought to have been made to me as Chief Justice to appoint another Judge to lit with Mr. Justice Beverley to form a Peach to hear it. I do not think that it could be necessary for ths matter to stand over, and I do not think that, if an application had been made to me, I should have had jurisdiction to hear it, and for this reason. The latter part of S. 627 of the Code provides that no other Judge or Judges of the Court, excepting the Judge or Judges who was or were parties to the original Judgment, shall hear the application for review if the Judge or Judges or any one of them is still attached to the Court; so that it seems to me th at although the Chief Justice of this Court has in general the duty cast upon him of appointing the Judges who are to constitute particular Benches for particular business, in these cases the Constitution of the Bench is taken out of his hands, and is provided for by the Code; for the Code says that these applications shall be heard by the Judge or Judges remaining attached to the Court by whom the original decree was given.” 15. The Calcutta High Court reiterated this rule in a subsequent judgment in Maksud Mahi v. Secretary of State 17 . A learned single Judge of this Court in In re: Chenna Reddi , following the Calcutta High Courts view, overruled an objection that the review application could be heard only by a Bench as it related to a first appeal saying, the point is directly covered by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Aubhoy Churn Mohunt v. Shamont Lochun Mohunt 18 , and Maksud Mahi v. Secretary of State 19 , and added. “This is in accordance with the invariable practice of this Court. Even in first appeals the application for review is heard and decided only by the Judges who heard the appeal or where one of them is absent by the other Judge sitting alone. Appeal No. 196 of 1928 was decided by Really and Burn, JJ. C.M.P. No. 516 of 1934 was filed for review of that decree. Burn, J. ordered notice and directed that the review application should be posted before a Bencn. Appeal No. 196 of 1928 was decided by Really and Burn, JJ. C.M.P. No. 516 of 1934 was filed for review of that decree. Burn, J. ordered notice and directed that the review application should be posted before a Bencn. It was accordingly posted before Burn and Mockett JJ. Apparently, it was then discovered that even after notice, the review petitition should be disposed of by Burn, J. alone. Then this order was passed on 7th December 1939: Adjourn this to some day next year when I have time to deal with it myself. This is not yet a matter for a Bench. Thereafter it was heard by Burn J, alone and disposed of finally on 30th January, 1940. The application was dismissed on the merits. I hold that this application can be heard by me. On the merits, I hold that there are no grounds for granting the review asked for. The petition is accordingly dismissed.” 16. A question however arose in the case of Anthony v. Francis R, Anthony 20 , whether an order of reference to a Full Bench made by the Travancore Cochin High Court before the States Reorganisation Act after transfer of the case to Madras High Court as a result of the reorganisation was required to be heard by a Full Bench of this Court or any other Bench could be constituted to hear the case. A learned single Judge of this Court after taking notice of the various authorities on the subject, held that the procedure of this Court in the matter of reference to a Full Bench is not governed by any statutory provisions, but by its prevailing practice and it is not permissible to any litigant to claim as a matter of right, in the absence of a statutory provision to have his case decided by any particular Judge or Judges of the Court. This conclusion was reached after taking notice of the scheme of the Letters Patent of the Court and other relevant provisions and the fact that there is an essential distinction between a substantive right of appeal and the procedure prescribed for disposing of that appeal The same thing can undoubtedly be said with respect to the right to make a review application and the procedure for disposing of the same. 17. 17. The law that we have noticed with respect to review has been expressed under the Code of Civil Procedure as in O. 47, R. 5, which states: “Where the Judge or Junges or anyone of the Judges, who passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for continues or continue attached to the Court at the time when the application for review is presenten, and is not or not precluded by a isence or other cause for a period of six months next after the application from considering the decree or order to which the application refers, such Judge or Judges or any of them shall hear the application, and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same.” As per the practice of this Court and if the Code of Civil Procedure applies perforce to the law to a review petition has to be heard by a Judge or Judges or any of them, who had passed the decree or made the order, a review of which is applied for and no other Judge or Judges of the Court shall hear the same. However, in the case of Pitambar Mallik v. Ramchandra Prasad 21 an objection was taken to the hearing of the review petition by a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court. The objection was raised on the ground that the application for review was placed for admission before R.K. Chondhary, J., who had issued notice, but the Honourable Chief Justice administratively ordered for placing the review petition for final hearing before Tarkeshwar Nath, J. Facts in short, which formed the basis of the said objection were that the application for review was presented before Ahmad, J., (as he then was), but by the time the application became ready to be put up for admission, Ahmad, J., was no more a Judge of the Patna High Court. The Office took the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice as to before which Bench the application for review should be put up for admission. There was an order to place it before R.K. Choudhary, J., for admission and it was then duly admitted by R.K.. Choudhary, J., on the 5th April, 1966. The Office took the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice as to before which Bench the application for review should be put up for admission. There was an order to place it before R.K. Choudhary, J., for admission and it was then duly admitted by R.K.. Choudhary, J., on the 5th April, 1966. Subsequently when the application became ready for hearing, the Office sought for instructions from the Honble the Chief Justice as to before which Bench the review application should be put up for hearing. The Honble the Chief Justice directed that the review application should be put up before Tarkeshwar Nath, J., for hearing. The objection taken was that R.K. Choudhary was still a member of the Bench of the High Court and as such the provisions of O. 47, R. 5, Code of Civil Procedure were applicable to the facts and circumstances of Civil Review. The preliminary objection was however overruled in these words: “This application had to be put up for admission first and for limited purpose, meaning thereby that for purposes of admission it was placed before R K. Choudhary, J. The question of hearing this application finally at that stage did not and could not arise inasmuch as the application could have even been dismissed. The question of hearing it finally arose only after it was admitted. For the purpose of hearing this application, there is a separate order, as indicated above and in compliance with that order the office has placed this application before me for hearing. It will not thus be right to say, as has been urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that this application ought to have been placed before R.K. Choudhary, J. [ have thus no hesitation in overruling the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners about my hearing this application for review.” 18. In Pramalha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar 22 , on a limited question whe ther a Division Bench of the Court could refer the case to the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench or not, the Supreme Court has held that the constitution of a Bench is a matter for the Chief Justice and that it was open to the Chief Justice on a reference by the Division Bench to constitute a larger Bench to consider the criminal revision. In the minority judgment of S K. Das, J., in the said case, on this question, agreement is expressed to the majority judgment in which a very apt; phraseology was used to express about the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice in such matters. In the words of S.K. Das, J.: “I am also in agreement with the view expressed by the Special Bench that the absence of a proviso to R. 9 in Chapter II corresponding to the proviso to R. 1 does not take away the inherent power of the Chief Justice to refer any matter to a Bench of three Judges I further think that the Chief Justice must have the inherent power to constitute a larger Bench in special circumstances. Take, for instance, a case where one Judge of the Division Bench feels, for a sufficient and good reason, that he should not hear the case. It is obvious that in such a case the matter must be referred back to the Chief Justice for the constitution of another Bench The Chief Justice, I think must possess such an inherent power in the matter of constitution of Benches and in the exercise thereof he can surely constitute a larger Bench in a case of importance where the Division Bench hearing it considers that a question of the correctness or otherwise of earlier Division Bench decisions of the same court will fall for cons ideration in the case.” 19. In a later decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Narayan 23 . also there are similar observations in these words: “The Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from the provisions contained in sub-S.(3) of S. S1 of the Act, but inheres in him in the very nature of things.” 20. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sohanlal v. State 24 , has con sidered what significantly was a question raised in a writ appeal. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sohanlal v. State 24 , has con sidered what significantly was a question raised in a writ appeal. The appellant before the said Court bad filed a writ petition for quashing the criminal proceeding which bad been taken up against him in respect of an alleged offence under S. 380 I.P.C. Initially there was an interim order made operative for a period of two weeks, but ultimately a rule was issued in the writ petition filed on his behalf and interim relief was granted in these words: “Interim order already passed will continue till the disposal of the Rule with liberty to the respondents to apply for vacating and or varying the interim order upon notice to the petitioner.” The respondent in the said writ petition appeared and filed an application for recalling/setting aside and/or any further order or orders. The said applicatiod was listed and reached hearing before Bhagbati Prasad Banerjee, J. on 6-4-1989 on which day he was not in a regular Bench or on which day writ petitions were not allocated to him. Bhagbati Prasad Banerjee, J. ordered: “In my view the case of the three different writ petitioners was against Chitpur P.S. Case No. 94 dated 23rd April, 1986 and the grounds of challenge were the same and that contradictory orders were passed because of the fact that the three writ petitions were moved separately on different dates and it was not pointed out before this court that the other writ petition against the said P.S. case was pending. If the existence of the other writ applications and the interim orders had been pointed out to th is Court, in that event it |was the duty of the Court to see that no conflicting orders arc passed in these matters. There were three cases by three different writ application, and the different interim orders, relating to the same police station case, have been passed. Therefore, the interim orders should be recalled and should be made uniform so that there is no conflict in the interim orders. There were three cases by three different writ application, and the different interim orders, relating to the same police station case, have been passed. Therefore, the interim orders should be recalled and should be made uniform so that there is no conflict in the interim orders. When this Court passed an interim order in C.R. 12852 (W) of 1987 whereby the police authorities were given liberty to proceed with the criminal case, but they were restrained from filing any final report without leave of this Court the same interim order should be deemed to have been passed by this Court in this writ application as also in the C.R. 10656 (W) of 1987. I make it clear that the police authorities would be at liberty to proceed with Chitpur P.S. Case No 94, dated 23rd April, 1986 in accordance with law subject to the condition that in case any charge-sheet has to be submitted the same should not be submitted without obtaining leave of this Court. This order I am passing considering the fact this Court has passed inconsistent interim orders in the same matters overlooking the order passed in the other cases and that unless interim order is modified, the interim order passed in other cases should not be given effect to. As because this Court has passed these conflicting orders, it is the duty of this court to recall those orders and pass uniform orders. As this Bench is not a regular Bench and cannot take up the main matters, that is why I am passing this order giving liberty to the respondents to apply for vacating or varying of the interim order passed by this court before the appropriate Bench. I make it clear that this order is passed without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties.” In the Letters Patent Appeal against the said order, the contention raised was, when Bhagbati Prasad Banerjee, J. had no jurisdiction to pass the order since on the day in question, he was assigned the work of hearing part-heard and contempt matters and that since the writ petition was not a part-heard case, it would not have been listed before him and could not have been heard by him on that day. 21. 21. The order in appeal concluded the matter as follows: “We have looked at the original record of the writ petition out of which the present appeal arises and do not find any discretion in the order sheet that the case was to be treated as Part heard. It is therefore, difficult to appreciate how the case could have been listed before the learned Judge and how the impugned order modifying the interim relief previously granted could have been passed by him on that day. Besides the terms in which the interim relief war granted at the stage of the issue of rule in the present case have been quoted earlier. Liberty was thereunder reserved to the respondents in the writ petition to apply for vacating and or varying the interim order upon notice to the writ pet tioner. The proper remedy for the party aggrieved by such interim order was to move the appropriate Bench which was dealing with the said category of cases under the extent determination w ith an application to modify or vacate the said order. There was no question of recalling the said order and socalled application for recalling the order was thoroughly misconceived. The learned Judge, therefore, could not have entertained the application as such and determined the subject matter in contraversy between the parties and passed judicial order granting relief in any form in the said proceeding” We think, we should remind ourselves that the jurisdiction of the Court may be qualied or restricted by a variety of circumstances. The power of the Court may be exer cised within such limits and in such manner that it ensures a fair hearing, unbiased determination of the dispute and no Judge should be in a hurry or be concerned with any particular case because, as observed in the judgment of the Calcutta High Court (supra), “The cardinal position cannot be overlooked that before jurisdiction over the subject matter is exercised, the case must be legally brought before the concerned Court for the hearing and determination and that a judgment pronounced by court without investment of jurisdiction is void.” 22. We have thus seen that this Courts Original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction created under the Letters Patent are to tome extent free from the general application of the Code of Civil Precedure. We have thus seen that this Courts Original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction created under the Letters Patent are to tome extent free from the general application of the Code of Civil Precedure. In respect of civil proceedings on the Original Side of this Court, rules framed under the Letters Patent may provide for the procedure which may not be the same as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. S. 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure has recognised this as a special rule making power of the Court stating. “Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court not being the Court of a Judicial Commissioner may make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent or Order or other law establishing it to regular its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.” The rules framed as to its original civil jurisdiction to that extent shall govern the proceedings in appeal also as it is well-settled that an appeal is the continuation of the original proceeding and the appellate Court exercises the same power as the original Court in connection with the proceeding before it. In fact the appellate Courts powers are not confined to reversal or affirmation of a decree by it but even more as if would deal with the case in certain circumstances ignoring the findings of the trial Court. In fact the appellate Courts powers are not confined to reversal or affirmation of a decree by it but even more as if would deal with the case in certain circumstances ignoring the findings of the trial Court. O. 41, R. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure has recognised this power in a civil proceeding in these words: “The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection (and may, where there have been decess in c ross-cross suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees;) Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under S. 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. Thus the Appellates Court to power to decide a dispute effectively and finally in a civil proceeding is such that was required to be exercised by the trial Court except with respect to orders in the nature of compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences, a matter covered by S. 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure A statement of law in the authorities aforementioned as well as in the scheme of the Letters Patent of this Court read with Art. 225 ot the Con stitution of India leaves no manner of doubt that what matters should be placed before a particular Judge of this Court, who should sit alone ana who should constitute a Division Bench has been preserved for and vested in the Honble the Chief Justice. No Judge of this Court would exercise jurisdiction with respect to any case, which does not fall in the class or type of cases, which are alloted to him and which case has not been earmarked or listed before him. Two questions however arise, which require a little deeper examination viz., (1) In the absence of any specific provision in the rules framed by this Court with respect to its procedure, whether a review petition will be processed in accordance with O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or not and particularly R. 5 thereof, if the requirements thereof appear to exist would exclude the jurisdiction of the Honble the Chief Justice in the matter and the case will have to be listed before the remaining Judge or Judges, whose order is sought to be reviewed; (2) Whether the rule in O 47 particularly 5 thereof will apply to a review of an order passed in exercise of the power under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or not including the order passed in the appeal arising out of a writ proceeding ? 23. We have already noticed the express exclusion of the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The Explanation of the provision in S. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure introduced by Amendment Act, 1976 has only recognised the law iudicially stated by the Courts including the Supreme Court that a writ proceeding being an extra ordinary proceeding was neither a civil proceeding as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure nor a criminal proceeding at contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Explanation in particular therefore says, “In this section, the expression “proceedings” include proceedings under O. 9, but does not include any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution.” Yet. Courts in India have recognised for their guidance that in the matters that appear to be akin to civil proceeding, the procedural law as found in the Code of Civil Procedure may be constructively applied and similarly in the petitions seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus, the provisions as in the Code of Criminal Procedure may be constructively applied. Courts in India have recognised for their guidance that in the matters that appear to be akin to civil proceeding, the procedural law as found in the Code of Civil Procedure may be constructively applied and similarly in the petitions seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus, the provisions as in the Code of Criminal Procedure may be constructively applied. No party to a writ proceeding however can insist that the proceeding must conform to the procedure or prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure at the case may be in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not possible to recognise that while the original proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution need not conform to the rule of procedure in the Code, but in case of an appeal arising eut of such a proceeding in this Court under its Letters Patent, will as a rule, be subjected to the provisions under the Code. If this be recognised as a rule of procedure, the result will be that the original proceeding under Art. 226 will be free from any inhibition of the rules in the Code, but the appeal arising out of such a proceeding will be inhibited by the rules of procedure in the Code. The appeal being a continuation of the original proceeding, the rule of procedure which is applied to the original proceeding has to be continued and applied to the proceeding in the appeal also except such special provisions, which are made specifically applicable to appeal proceedings. A glance to the rule in 6.47 is enough to convince that the review provisions therein do not make any distinction in the matter of review of an order of the court of original jurisdiction and the court of appeal. A glance to the rule in 6.47 is enough to convince that the review provisions therein do not make any distinction in the matter of review of an order of the court of original jurisdiction and the court of appeal. Any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which no appeal had been preferred, or by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of iudgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. This right to make an application for review has been recognised besides what is stated in 0.47 of the Code as the inherent right in a party to a proceeding and similarly a right to grant a review has been recognised as the inherent power of the Court. In the matter of review of an order passed in an appeal arising out of a writ proceeding, therefore, it can be safely said, that no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure can be claimed to apply as a matter of course. Likewise, in a civil proceeding as well, no person can claim that his matter should be heard by a single Judge much less a particular Judge or a particuiar Division Bench of the Court. The business of the Court will be determined by the Honble the Chief Justice alone, who in his discretion may decide what Judge is to sit alone and what Judges are to constitute different benches and allotted business of the Court. The Letters Patent aforequoted recognises this power of the Honble the Chief Justice of the Court and as held by the Supreme Court, even in the absence of a specific provision, this is an inherent power of the Honble the Chief Justice. 24. The Letters Patent aforequoted recognises this power of the Honble the Chief Justice of the Court and as held by the Supreme Court, even in the absence of a specific provision, this is an inherent power of the Honble the Chief Justice. 24. Review of judgment or order has to be made by the Court, which passed the decree or made by the Court, which passed the decree made the order. If a Division two or more Judges passed the decree or made the order, the review should invariably be made by the Bench of two or more Judges, who passed the decree or made the order. There is no need to specify this in any rule of procedure for review of a judgment or order the Court, which passed the decree or made the order must in the con-ext of a Court consisting of more than one Judge mean the Judge or Judges, who passed the decree or made the order. This is significant because in case a Judge decided the matter against which appeal could be filed before a Superior Court and no appeal was filed but a review was sought for and the review petition was placed before another Judge of the same Court, who though otherwise on the merits of the case than the view expressed by the Judge, who passed the decree or made the order, he may grant a review which under the rule followed hither to will be undesirable. That is why it is said that a review of a Bench order (as provided in R. 6 of O 47 of the Code) has to be allowed only in a case of a majority opinion in favour of the review and in the case of a Bench of equal strength, in the event of equal division, the application for review must be rejected. This rule of prudence has been followed more as a practice than as a command of the Legislature in almost every Court in India and constructively applied to the writ proceeding as well. But it will still not be open to any party to insist that his case must be heard by the Judge or Judges, who had passed the decree or made the order. But it will still not be open to any party to insist that his case must be heard by the Judge or Judges, who had passed the decree or made the order. There may be cases where after passing the decree or making the order, one or all of the Judges constituting the Bench may feel embarased in hearing the review petition. They may in such a situation, order for the case being placed before some other Judge. They need not for this purpose make an open pronouncement except indicating their disinclination to hear the matter to the Honble the Chief Justice* What would be done in such in such a case if the Honble the Chief Justice did not exercised his inherent power to constitute a new Bench to hear the review petition; There may be many other circumstances and situations in which the Honble the Chief Justice exercising his inherent power, may not think it desirable to place the review petition before the Bench, which passed the decree or made the order. As this is a rule of procedure and not a substantive right, it is not for the litigant to suggest who should hear the review petition. A prudent exercise of discretion by the Honble the Chief Justice in this matter, and since this power has been held to inhere and vest with the Honble the Chief Justice, in our view, by itself is a sufficient safe guard to ensure its prudentinl exercise, should be more than enough for the parties to accept the constitution of the Bench or allotment of the case to a Judge or Judges for the hearing of the review petition. 24. There shall be nothing wrong if in a situation like one contemplated in R. 5 of 0.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the review application is listed before such Judge or Judges or any of them, who are available and who had passed the decree or made the order. There shall also be nothing wrong if the case is listed before a Bench of equal strength, which passed the decree or made the order underre view provided the remaining Judgeor Judges of the original Bench except the rudge or Judges who are no more available, are members of the new Bench. There shall also be nothing wrong if the case is listed before a Bench of equal strength, which passed the decree or made the order underre view provided the remaining Judgeor Judges of the original Bench except the rudge or Judges who are no more available, are members of the new Bench. In exceptional case, there shall also be no infringement of any vested right of any party if the review petition is not placed before any of the Judges of the original Bench but instead placed before a Bench but instead placed before a Bench constituted by the Honble the Chief Justice for the said purpose. 25. In the instant case, Mohan, J. has ceased to be a Judge of this Court. The review petition was placed before the remaining Judge, viz., Bakthavatsalam, J. who issued notice of motion. Bakthavatsalam, J. was a member of a Division Bench constituted to hear the review petition with Mishra, J. and accordingly the case was listed before them under the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice who has the inherent power to make such an order. 26. To sum up: (1) Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a writ proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Courts, however, sometimes constructively apply certain basic principles enshrined therein to the writ proceedings, on grounds of public policy or dictates of reason or necessity whenever it is found to be essentia] for the effective administration of justice. (2) A writ appeal is the continuation of the writ petition. Merely because it is an appeal under the letters patent of the Court, it does not change its character from being a writ proceeding to an ordinary civil proceeding. (3) The Honble the Chief Justice has the inherent power to allocate the judicial business of the High Court including who of the Judges should sit alone and who should constitute the Bench of two or more Judges. No litigant shall, upon such constitution of a Bench or allotment of a case to a particular Judge of the Court will have a right to question the jurisdiction cf the Judges or the Judge hearing the case. No person can claim as a matter of right that this petition be heard by a single Judge or a Division Bench or a particular single Judge or a particular Division Bench. No person can claim as a matter of right that this petition be heard by a single Judge or a Division Bench or a particular single Judge or a particular Division Bench. No Judge or a Bench of Judges will assume jurisdiction unless the case is allotted to him or them under the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice. (4) A Judge or the Judges constituting the Bench will not decida whether to entertain a review petition or not unless the same is placed before him or them under the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice. (5) Unless it is on account of exceptional circumstances or to meet an extra-ordinary situation the Honble the Chief Justice decides to allot the work to some other Judge or Judges, as the case may be, we consider it to be prudent as well as desirable that the Judge or Judges who passed the judgment/decree or made the order sought to be renewed, hear the review petition and in the case of the judgment decree or order of a bench the Judge or the Judges who are available are associated as members of the Bench. 27. The question referred to this Bench is answered accordingly. The review petition can now be listed before the appropriate Bench for disposal.