S. R. BHARGAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against revisional order, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Budaun, allowing revision against order u/s. 146 (1) Cr. P. C. and quashing orders u/s. 145 (1) and 146 Cr. P. C. and quashing the entire proceedings. ( 2 ) REVISIONIST Ashfaq Hussain moved application u/s. 145 Cr. P. C. in respect of plot, situate in Kusha Ujhani, District Budaun. On the said plot Ziaratganj Bux, Mosque and Musafir Khana are noted in the record of Sunni Central Waqf Board. SDM Budaun felt satisfied on the police report dated 18/06/1989 that there is dispute between the applecant Ashfaq Hussain and opposite parties of the application Lal Mool Chand. Entram Husain and as a consequence of dispute there is apprehension of breach of peace. Hence on 4/07/1989 he issued preliminary order u/s. 145 (1 ). On 7/07/1989 on being satisfied that there was imminent danger of breach of peace, he issued order for attachment u/s. 146 (1 ). ( 3 ) OPPOSITE party No. 1 to this revison Entram Husain filed revision before the Sessions Judge against aforesaid order u/s. 146 (1 ). This revision was entertained. Municipal Boards, Ujhani (Opp. party No. 3 of this revision) sought permission to address the court. That permission was granted. It appears thee Ehatram Husain filed some documents on the basis of which the Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that litigation was pending on the commencement of the proceedings. Hence, following the law laid down in case of Ganga Singh v. Raj Bahadur Singh (AIR 1958 Allahabad 803) Ram Sumerpuri Mahant v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ) and Sheo Murti Pandey v. Bharti Lal Pandey, (1988 All LJ 123), learned Additional Sessions Judge held that there is no justification in continuing parallel proceedings. The learned Additional Sessions Judge distinguished the case of Ibbe Hasan v. State of U. P. (1989 All LJ 869 ). The learned Additional Sessions Judge further held that the Municipal Board can apply for being impleaded in the suit already pending about the disputed property. With these findings the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed the impugned order. ( 4 ) IN this revision the main point urged before the Court on behalf of the revisionist Ashfaq Husain is that order u/s. 146 (1) Cr. P. C. is interlocutory order. With these findings the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed the impugned order. ( 4 ) IN this revision the main point urged before the Court on behalf of the revisionist Ashfaq Husain is that order u/s. 146 (1) Cr. P. C. is interlocutory order. Hence, revision filed before the Sessions Judge was barred by provisions of S. 397 (2) Cr. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision and the learned Additional Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. On behalf of the revisionist reliance has been placed on the Division Bench case of this Court Indradeo Pandey v. Smt. Bhagwati Devi (1981 All LJ 687), in which cases of Amarnath Chowla v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ), Madhu Limaye v. State of U. P. ( AIR 1978 SC 47 ), V. C. Shukla v. State ( AIR 1980 SC 962 ) and all other cases of this Court, decided earlier, were considered and it was held that the order u/s. 146 (1) Cr. P. C. is of temporary nature and is interlocutory order. Hence revision against such an order is barred by S. 397 (2) Cr. P. C. on behalf of opposite party No. 1 it was argued that his rights have been adjudicated and he has been in possession. Attachment u/s. 146 (1) Cr. P. C. affected his rights. Hence the order in the instant case is not interlocutory. It may be presumed for the sake of argument that opposite party No. 1 Entram Husain was in possession. But for an order not being interlocutory affect on the rights should be substantial. When the effect is only temporary the order is interlocutory. Despite the Division Bench decision in the case of Indradeo the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1relied upon single Judge cases of other High Courts. He went on to argue that the order passed without jurisdiction is revisable and the bar u/s. 397 (2) does not apply to revisions against orders passed without jurisdiction. It was vehemently argued by the counsel for the opposite party No. 1 that the order under S. 146 (1) is not an interlocutory order. The learned counsel, however, could not produce any law of this Court in which the aforesaid case of Indradeo has been dissented or overruled. It was vehemently argued by the counsel for the opposite party No. 1 that the order under S. 146 (1) is not an interlocutory order. The learned counsel, however, could not produce any law of this Court in which the aforesaid case of Indradeo has been dissented or overruled. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 relied upon the aforesaid case of Ram Sumer Mahant v. State of U. P. That case lays down good law that parallel proceedings in criminal court in respect of property for which civil litigation was pending at the time of initiation of proceedings u/s. 145 cannot be allowed to be continued. But even in that case it was not held that order of the Magistrate initiating the proceedings was without jurisdiction. In that case bar of S. 397 (2) Cr. P. C. was not considered. It also does not appear from the judgment at what stage of the proceedings revision was filed. It does not also appear whether revision was against orders under S. 145 (1) or 146 (1) Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 proceeded to argue that there was a revision before the Additional Sessions Judge who had the opportunity to go through the record. He could suo motu exercise revisional power u/ S. 397 and quash the entire proceedings. When revision against order u / S. 146 (1) is barred and there is nothing to show except orders u/ss. 145 (1) and 146 (1), the argument that the Sessions Judge could suo motu exercise powers of revision against the proceedings cannot have substance. An act which cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly also. S. 145 (1) does not at all affect the rights of the parties. It only calls upon the parties to put in their cases about possession. The order u/s. 145 (1) is evidently an interlocutory order. Satisfaction of the Magistrate about apprehension of breach of peace on the basis of police report or otherwise cannot be questioned in revision because that is a subjective satisfaction. The argument of the learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 that the Sessions Judge could exercise sue motu power of revision and quash the proceedings treating the revision to be against the proceedings, in the circumstances of the case, has no force. The argument of the learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 that the Sessions Judge could exercise sue motu power of revision and quash the proceedings treating the revision to be against the proceedings, in the circumstances of the case, has no force. ( 6 ) ON behalf of revisionist reference was made to the case of Jhummamal alias Devan Das v State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1988) 4 SC cases 452 ). In that case it was held that although the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer case has held that a party should not be permitted to litigate before the criminal court when the civil suit is pending in respect of the same subject matter, but that does not mean that a concluded order u/s. 145 Cr. P. C. made by the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction should be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party has approached the civil court. An order made u/ S. 145 Cr. P. C. deals only with the factum of the possession of the party as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed property. The order is subject to the decision of the civil court. The unsuccessful party, therefore, must get relief only in the civil court. The stage of concluded order has not yet arrived and so this ruling has no bearing with the instant revision. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the opposite party No. 1 it was vehemently argued that his rights stand adjudicated and appropriate proceedings are already pending in the competent court. Initiation of proceedings is mala fide and abuse of process of court. Hence, exercising powers u/s. 482 Cr. P. C. this court should not grant any relief to revisionist. It is no doubt true that revisional powers are discretionary. But when the impugned order is without jurisdiction it cannot be upheld by exercise of powers u/ S. 482 Cr. P. C. In Cr. P. C. there is apparent bar of revisions against interlocutory order. As held in Madhu Limayes case when there is specific bar High Court cannot exercise powers u/s. 482 Cr. P. C. Proper course for the revisionist would have been to approach the Magistrate himself for dropping the proceedings and pass consequential orders in the light of adjudication by the civil court. ( 8 ) IN result, this revision has to be allowed. P. C. Proper course for the revisionist would have been to approach the Magistrate himself for dropping the proceedings and pass consequential orders in the light of adjudication by the civil court. ( 8 ) IN result, this revision has to be allowed. Impugned order of additional Sessions Judge has to be set aside. But opposite party No. 1 has also to be ensured of speedy justice. Hence allowing the revision I set aside the impugned order with the direction that opposite party No. 1 shall be at liberty to apply to the Magistrate concerned for dropping of the proceedings on the ground of earlier decision of the civil court and pendency of litigation before competent court. If the opposite party No. 1 moves any such application before the Magistrate concerned the Magistrate shall decide the same within two months and pass consequential orders, if necessary for the property also. Stay order dated 15-1 1-90 is vacated. Revision allowed. .