Judgment : These two petitions are filed under section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1988 on the file of the Ist Addl. Chief Judge & Spl. Judge for S.R. and ACs Cases, Hyderabad. 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of these two petitions are : The petitioner is a permanent government servant in the cadre of Assistant Director, Animal Husbandry and during the period from 1-10-1977 to 30-9-79 he went on deputation to Leather Industrial Development Corporation of A.P. (hereinafter referred to as LIDCAP) as a Technical Officer. After the deputation period was over, he went back to his parent Department. While so, on 14-5-1981 the Government issued a memo keeping him under suspention without assigning any reason and has been continuing him so till today. While it was so on 1-7-1988 the petitioner received summons in the above two cases enclosing thereto the FIRs C.C. No. 13/88 is filed under section 420, IPC and S. 5(2) r/w S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging that while on deputation to LIDCAP he misused the Jeep of the LIDCAP for his personal purpose during May, 1979 and to give a colour that it was for official purpose he had shown the journey to different places and drew D.A., for such days of journey and thus by corrupt and illegal means and by abusing his position as a public servant obtained a pecuniary advantage at least to a tune of Rs. 228/-and cheated the LIDCAP to that extent. The other case, C.C. 14/88, is filed under sections 409, 465, 466, 467, 471 and 477-A, IPC and S. 5(1)(c) r/w 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging that during the period of his deputation to LIDCAP from 1-10-1977 to 30-9-1979 he had dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted for his own use a total sum of Rs. 7117.64 paise (as many as twelve break-up figures are shown in the charge-sheet to arrive at this total sum). 7117.64 paise (as many as twelve break-up figures are shown in the charge-sheet to arrive at this total sum). The complaint of the petitioner is that for an alleged offence that took place sometime during 1-10-1977 to 30-9-79, he has to face the prosecution in 1990 besides undergoing the punishment of suspension from service right from 14-5-1981 till to date and that this unduly delayed trial has caused him great prejudice apart from violating his fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India to have speedy trial recognised there under. 3. To appreciate the above pleadings of the petitioner, it is very much necessary to have a few dates, admitted by both sides, in regard to certain crucial events. The period of offence in both the calendar cases is some time during 1-10-1977 to 30-9-1979. It was on and from 14-5-1981 that the petitioner is undergoing the punishment of suspension from service till to-date. It was on 19-1-1981 that the FIRs, were registered and on 27-6-1988 that the charge-sheets were filed. The Court framed the charges against the petitioner on 24-1-1989. Thereafter while two P.Ws., were examined In C.C. 13/88 one PW, was examined In C.C. 14/88 during 1990. Thus, after more than seven years after registration of the FIRs, the charge-sheets were filed and during a period of more than two years after filing of the charge-sheets, one witness in one case and two in the other could be examined in chief and the matters are still pending for examination of the prosecution witness. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that non-completion of the trial in a criminal case even after a lapse of eleven years from the date of alleged offence is resulting in miscarriage of justice since some of the defence witnesses, whom he wants to examine, died, some retired and whereabouts of some more are very difficult to gather at this point of time. He also submitted that speedy trial is one of the recognised fundamental rights under Art. 21 of the Constitution and the same having been violated due to lone delay in completion of the trial, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. He also submitted that speedy trial is one of the recognised fundamental rights under Art. 21 of the Constitution and the same having been violated due to lone delay in completion of the trial, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the petitioner was being continued under suspension since 1981 consequent upon registration of the two criminal cases against the petitioner and this has caused him mental agony, financial loss and degradation in his official life among his co-officers leading to great prejudice to the liberty of the petitioner. 5. The standing counsel for the ACB and SPE cases, on the other hand, contended that there is no delay on the part of the prosecuting agency and that soon after sanction was granted on 7-3-88 the charge sheets were filed. He submitted that the investigation into the crimes registered on 19-1-81 was completed by 30-11-81 and that final report was submitted by the ACE authorities on 1-3-82 to the Government for issuance of sanction order to prosecute the petitioner which was issued only on 7-8-88 after several reminders and that immediately thereafter on 29-6-88 the charge-sheets were filed. Whatever it is, from the dates furnished it is clear that for the offences alleged to have been committed during 1977-79 the charge sheets were filed on 29-6-1988 and till to-day only one P.W., in one case and two P.Ws., in the other could be examined in chief. 6. In view of the rival contentions noted, the only question that arises for consideration is, whether the petitioners Fundamental right to have speedy trial guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India is violated and if so, whether the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 7. For the first time, the Supreme Court considered the concept of speedy trial in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036) wherein it observed (para 5) : "...... It is a sad reflection on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough : how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7or 10 years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough : how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7or 10 years. Speedy trial is the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice." So observing, the Supreme Court made a reference to the Constitution of United States and stated : "It is interesting to note that in the United States speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is Implicit In the broad sweep and content of Art. 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 597 . We have held in that case that Art. 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty. Thus, right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Art. 21 and thus it is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution. 8. It is incidentally relevant to make a reference to the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of United States. The amendment there provided that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. 8. It is incidentally relevant to make a reference to the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of United States. The amendment there provided that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Interpreting this constitutional provision the Supreme Court of the United States in Barkar v. Wingo (1972) 407 US 514, 33 L Ed 2d 101 held : "(1) the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived, (2) while a defendants assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of such a right, the primary burden remains on the courts and the prosecutors assure that cases are speedily brought to trial, (3) ........" While holding that A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, the Supreme Court there identified some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. The factors so identified are : (i) length of delay (ii) the reason for the delay, (iii) the defendants assertion of his right and (iv) prejudice to the defendant. Referring to the (iv)th factor, in para 34 at page 118, the United States Supreme Court held : "Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests : (i) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defence will be impaired." Out of the three interests identified as quoted, the Supreme Court held that the most serious is the last one viz. to limit the possibility that the defence will be impaired, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. It also gave an example, viz., if witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. to limit the possibility that the defence will be impaired, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. It also gave an example, viz., if witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defence witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. White, J., with whom Brennan, J. joined, concurred in the judgment and opinion of the court, but added that one of the major purposes of the speedy-trial provision is to guard against inordinate delay between public charge and trial, which wholly aside (sic) from possible prejudice to a defence on the merits, may seriously interfere with a defendants liberty and other rights, and that unreasonable delay cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the States criminal justice system are limited and that each case must await its own turn. In that case lack of serious prejudice to the accused and the fact that he did not want a speedy trial as disclosed by the record outweighed the opposing considerations and therefore it was concluded that the accused there was not deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial. However, denial of the right to speedy trial, as such, has been held as a proposition of law to entitle an accused person to the dismissal missal of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. Strunk v. United States, (1973) 37 Law Ed 2d 56 is yet another instructive case on this point. In this case also, the Supreme Court held, in deciding the question whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial, the Court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. One more case in foreign jurisdictions is the one in Bell v. DPP of Jamaica (1985) 2 All ER 585. There the appellant applied to the Supreme Court of Jamaica for a declaration that his right under section 20(1) of the Constitution of Jamica to "a fair hearing within a reasonable time" had been infringed. The Supreme Court dismissed his application and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica affirmed that decision. There the appellant applied to the Supreme Court of Jamaica for a declaration that his right under section 20(1) of the Constitution of Jamica to "a fair hearing within a reasonable time" had been infringed. The Supreme Court dismissed his application and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica affirmed that decision. Hence the further appeal before the Privy Council. One of the contentions on behalf of the Crown was that the Constitution of Jamaica conferred no rights on an individual which were not enjoyed before the Constitution came into force and therefore could not confer a right to a speedy trial when there was no such right at common law. The Privy Council held that regardless of the position at common law, the express words of S. 20(1) of the Constitution of Jamaica plainly sufficed to confer on an accused he right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. It also held that the accused need not show any specific prejudice before being entitled to have charges against him being dismissed because of unreasonable delay in bringing him to trial. Further the Privy Council also laid down some guiding factors in determining whether the accused had been deprived of a fair trial by reason of unreasonable delay, viz. length of delay, reasons given by the prosecution to justify the delay, the efforts made by the accused to assert his rights and the prejudice to the accused. 9. In State of Maharashtra. Champalal, AIR 1981 SC 1675 :(1981 Cri LJ 1273), the Supreme Court considering the concept of speedy trial hold that a fair trial implies a speedy trial and that in deciding whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial the Court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. 10. 10. In Sheela Barse v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1773 : (1986 Cri LJ 1736) the Supreme Court considering the case of a child accused held that where a complaint is filed or first information report is lodged against a child below the age of 16 years for an offence punishable with imprisonment of not more than seven years, the investigation shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of filing of the complaint or lodging of the first information report and if the investigation is not completed within this time the case against the child must be treated as closed. 11. The decision in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149 (1987 Crj LJ 157) is yet another one wherein the scope and depth of the concept of speedy trial is considered by the Supreme Court. It is held in para 9 : "9. The constitutional position is now well settled that the right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution." After referring to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972-407 US. 514) and Strunk v. United States (1973-37 Law Ed 2d 56) and of the Privy Council in Bell v. DPP of Jamaica, (1985-2 All ER 585) as also of its own in State of Maharashtra v. Champalal, (1981 Cri LJ 1273), the Supreme Court has in this decision identified some of the factors which the Courts should assess in determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to speedy trial. The factors identified are. "Was there delay ? How long was the delay ? Was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances ? Was the delay unreasonable ? Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency ? Was any part of the delay caused by the tactics of the defence ? Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies ? Did the accused have the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial ? Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence ? Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies ? Did the accused have the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial ? Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence ? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his defence was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused ?" 12. Now, turning to the decisions of this Court, in Balchand Varma v. State of A.P. (1985) 2 Andh LT 433 this Court held : "The continuance of the three criminal cases from 1979 onwards for a period of over six years without the prosecution examining a single witness is a clear abuse of the process of law and has resulted in manifest injustice to the petitioner." So, holding the proceedings against the accused therein were quashed. 13. Sivakumar v. State of A.P. (1990) 2 Andh LT 1 88 is another decision of his Court. There the Criminal Cases were pending for over 14 years without any progress in trial, except examining only one witness. In that background of the delay, my learned brother N. D. Patnaik, J. held : "To make the accused still to face prosecution amounts to harassment and abuse of process of Court." Accordingly the proceedings therein against the accused were quashed. 14. The decision in Rama Krishna v. State of A.P. rendered by me in Cr.M.P. 650/89 D/-27-12-1989 is another one similar to Sivakumar v. State of A.P. (1990-2 Andh LT 188) wherein also the proceedings against the accused were quashed. 15. This Court in Pavithran v. State of A.P. (1988) 2 Andh LT 855 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 113) was to consider the question of inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing investigation. There against a complaint filed in 1981, the FIR, was registered in 1983 and the investigation was not complete even by 1988. That was a case arising under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In view of the abnormal delay in the conduct of investigation, this Court quashed the very FIR. This decision was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court by the State. That was a case arising under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In view of the abnormal delay in the conduct of investigation, this Court quashed the very FIR. This decision was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court by the State. The Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Pavithran, AIR 1999 SC 1266 : (1990 Cri LJ 1306) while confirming the order of quashing made by this Court observed : "......... Therefore, it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy Investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which the investigation in a criminal case should be completed." It also laid down that no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that whenever there is in ordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay, ipso facto, would provide ground for quashing the First Information Report or the proceedings arising therefrom. 16. In the light of the guiding factors identified in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1987 Cri LJ 157) (SC), I am to find that these are petitions wherein the delay in holding the trial against the petitioner is over eleven years from the date of offence and that the delay is not inevitable particularly in the light of the counter affidavit that the investigation into the crimes was completed by 30-1 1-1981. Consequently the delay is nothing but unreasonable in its character. In so far as any contribution of the petitioner to the delay is concerned there does not appear to be any such thing because as per the very counter affidavit for over 28 adjournments, the petitioner happened to be absent on 5 occasions. As regards the prejudice caused to the accused-petitioner, it is specifically submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the non-completion of the trial even after a lapse of eleven years is resulting in not only miscarriage of justice but also causing great prejudice to the petitioner inasmuch as some of the defence witnesses died, some retired and whereabouts of some are difficult to be traced. Apart from this prejudice in the conduct of his defence, the inordinate delay in prosecuting him is rendering much hardship to his service, inasmuch as he is being continued under suspension from as long back as on 14-5-1981. Apart from this prejudice in the conduct of his defence, the inordinate delay in prosecuting him is rendering much hardship to his service, inasmuch as he is being continued under suspension from as long back as on 14-5-1981. This, as submitted, naturally causes him great mental agony and financial distress. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is also due to retire in 199 i. At this juncture, it needs to be made specific that I am conscious of the observation of the Supreme Court made in Pavithrans case (1990 Cri LJ 1306) supra, viz., the inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency, ipso facto, does not constitute a ground for quashing the proceedings, and also the fact that the present proceedings are running the course of trial and that such proceedings shall not, normally, be quashed. However, it only in the light of the other decision of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singhs case (1987 Cri LJ 157) supra and for the exceptional reasons fitting within the identified factors therein, it is to be held that the petitioner has been deprived of his right to speedy trial, one of the dimensions of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. The proceedings in the calendar cases, consequently are liable to be quashed. 17. One more crucial aspect of the matter worthy of being noticed at this stage is that besides the charges under the I.P.C., the petitioner was also charged of the offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The vires of this Act were questioned before the Supreme Court in Asgarali Nazaralli v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 503 : (1957 Cri LJ 605). Considering that question, the Supreme Court held (para 19) "Bribery and corruption having been rampant and the need for weeding them out having been urgently felt, it was necessary to enact measures for the purpose of eliminating all possible delay in bringing the offenders to book, it was with that end in view that provisions were enacted in the impugned Act for speedier trial of the said offences by the appointment of Special Judges who were invested with exclusive jurisdiction to try the same and were also empowered to take cognizance thereof without the accused being committed to them for trial ....... All these provisions had the necessary effect of bringing about a speedier trial of these offences and it cannot be denied that this intelligible differentia had rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act." The Prevention of Corruption Act, thus, is a special legislation brought-in with the main object of bringing about a speedier trial of the offenders thereunder. When this is so, the pace of speed expected of in the matter of trial of the petitioner for the offences charged with shall have to be more in its acceleration. This, therefore, is a case of afortiorari nature in the matter of speedy trial of the petitioner. 18. In the result, the proceedings in C.C. Nos. 13 and 14 of 1988 on the file of the Ist Addl. Special Judge for SPE & ACE Cases, Hyderabad, are quashed and the petitions allowed. Petitions allowed.