Nana Pillai v. Naina Mohamed Beevi — 1990 DIGILAW 1127 (MAD)

ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. The only ground urged in this revision is that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction in this matter. The landlord filed an application for eviction earlier in 1976 on the ground of wilful default. The petitioner herein disputed the title of the landlord. Denial of title was found to be bona fide and the landlord was directed to file a civil suit. The landlord filed a suit for declaration of his title and for recovery of mesne profits. That suit was decreed. Thereafter the present petition for eviction was filed by the landlord. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the only remedy of the landlord was to have asked for eviction in the civil suit itself. Learned Counsel places reliance on the second proviso to Section 10(1) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 2. The Proviso reads as follows: Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. The contention is that under the proviso, the landlord shall sue for eviction in the civil court and get a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the suit notwithstanding that the Court finds that the denial of title does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the denial is unfounded. This language of the section is very significant. It is only an enabling provision. The section merely says 'landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the court may pass a decree for eviction'. This does not mean that the landlord shall sue in the civil court and obtain an order for eviction before the civil court. The jurisdiction is not confined to the civil court. Of course, the landlord should get his title declared in the civil court. 3. This does not mean that the landlord shall sue in the civil court and obtain an order for eviction before the civil court. The jurisdiction is not confined to the civil court. Of course, the landlord should get his title declared in the civil court. 3. In fact, the petitioner was benefited by the procedure adopted by the landlord in this case. The landlord could well have asked for eviction in the civil court itself and got a decree there for much earlier than in this proceeding. But, he chose to file a separate suit for declaration of title and having his title recognised in the civil court came forward with the present petition for eviction under the Act. This has only given another opportunity to the tenant to contest the proceedings for eviction on the merits. There is no substance in the argument advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 4. Learned Counsel places reliance on the judgment of Mr. M.N. Chandurkar, Chief Justice in C.R.P. No. 4664 of 1982, dated 22.8.1986. In that revision petition the tenant denied the title of the landlord claiming that he had put up superstructure. The Rent Controller found against the claim of the tenant on the evidence and ordered eviction. On appeal the Appellate Authority reversed the conclusion of the Rent Controller and dismissed the petition for eviction. As per the order of the Appellate Authority, the superstructure belonged to the tenant. The matter was brought to this Court in revision by the landlord. It was found on facts by this Court that the tenant has miserably failed to prove that the superstructure belonged to him. It was also found that the evidence on record was sufficient to hold that the tenant was a tenant of the superstructure. The order of the Appellate Authority was set aside and the order of the Rent Controller was restored. While dealing with the arguments advanced by counsel on both sides, the learned Chief Justice had occasion to refer to the second proviso to Section 10(1) of the Act. The argument advanced was that the matter should be remanded to the Appellate Authority for a finding on merits as the Appellate Authority had observed that it was not necessary for the Tribunals functioning under the Act to give a definite finding as to whether the demised property was a land or a superstructure. The argument advanced was that the matter should be remanded to the Appellate Authority for a finding on merits as the Appellate Authority had observed that it was not necessary for the Tribunals functioning under the Act to give a definite finding as to whether the demised property was a land or a superstructure. That observation was' made by the Appellate Authority in spite of the finding that the superstructure belonged to the tenant. The learned Chief Justice while repelling the plea for remand observed as follows, after referring to the proviso to Section 10(1). The object of this proviso is that if the Rent Controller finds that denial of the title of the landlord or right of permanent tenancy claimed by the tenant is bona fide, then the landlord should be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court. The contemplation therefore is that in the case of bona fide disputes with regard to the title the correct forum would be the civil court and not the Rent Controller. This direction however has to be read along with the provisions of Section 10(2)(vii). However, if the denial is bona fide, then, the tenant can be evicted only by filing a suit in the civil court as contemplated by the proviso. This was really not a case in which the Appellate Authority was called upon to decide the question of denial of title being bona fide or not. The Rent Controller was therefore bound to record a finding with regard to the ownership of the structure. 5. Even the above passage will show that the observations made by the learned Chief Justice were really obiter and were not necessary for deciding that case. However, I am of the view that the learned Chief Justice did not intend to hold that the civil court would alone have jurisdiction in a case where the tenant had denied title even after the civil court gives a decree declaring the title of the landlord. The question which has arisen before the Rent Controller in this case did not arise before the Chief Justice. He had no occasion to consider that aspect of the matter. The question which has arisen before the Rent Controller in this case did not arise before the Chief Justice. He had no occasion to consider that aspect of the matter. The learned Chief Justice cannot be understood to say that in a case like this, it is only the civil court which will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction and the Rent Controller will have no jurisdiction at all. The said judgment does not in any way support the contention put forward by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. Learned Counsel invited my attention to the judgment of Sathiadev, J., in C.R.P. No. 957 of 1987, dated 25.3.1987, V.S. Rahmathullah v. A. Sivaperumal 1987 R.C.R. 208. In that case the tenant filed a suit three years after the filing of an eviction petition by the landlord under the provisions of the Act. In the suit the tenant prayed for declaration that he was a tenant of the vacant land and he had constructed the superstructure. He claimed that the agreed rent was Rs. 100 per month. Pending the suit he filed an application for grant of the relief which he had prayed for in the main suit. That application was rejected by the trial court but on appeal, the Appellate Court set aside the order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. The trial court ordered the application and on appeal the Appellate Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the petition in view of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVIII of 1960. Against the said order of the Appellate Court a revision petition was filed. Sathiadev, J., dismissed the revision petition holding that the suit as well as the rent control proceedings shall be disposed of by the respective courts on the merits of the matter. The question which is now raised before me by learned Counsel for the petitioner was not raised before Sathiadev, J. He had no occasion to consider the same. Learned Counsel placed reliance on the following observation in the said judgment: Mr. The question which is now raised before me by learned Counsel for the petitioner was not raised before Sathiadev, J. He had no occasion to consider the same. Learned Counsel placed reliance on the following observation in the said judgment: Mr. Raghavan, learned Counsel for plaintiff, had relied upon Sanjeevi Naidu v. Chittibabu Mudaliar (1953) 1 M.L.J. 260 which dealt with Section 7(1) of Act XXV of 1949; and in which it was held that if the controller decides that the denial of title is bona fide and records a finding to that effect, then the landlord will be entitled to sue for eviction of tenant in a Civil Court. The said observation does not in any way help the petitioner herein. The observation only repeats the language found in the second proviso to Section 10(1). 7. In the circumstances, I do not find any merit in the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. No other argument was advanced before me on behalf of the petitioner. Hence the civil revision petition is dismissed with costs.