Gowri Corporation represented by its Managing Partner, v. Mahadevan VS Alima Bivi
1990-12-10
BELLIE
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : These four appeals arise out of a Common Judgment rendered by the Subordinate Judge, Mayuram in O.S.Nos.40 of 1979, 41 of 1979,149 of 1980 and 150 of 1980. The first suit was filed by four plaintiffs against Dr.V.Gurumurthy for recovery of Rs.9,000 as damages for use and occupation of tenanted property. O.S.No.41 of 1979 was filed by two plaintiffs against Gowri Corporation represented by its Managing Partner, V.Mahadevan for a similar relief viz., for recovery of Rs.18,000 as damages for use and occupation of the tenanted property. O.S.No.149 of 1980 was filed by Dr.V.Gurumurthy, i.e., the defendant in O.S.No.40 of 1979 against ‘Savithri Ammal’s Sama Veda Patasalai, by Trustee, R.Krishnaswami Dikshithar, and the four plaintiffs in O.S.No.40 of 1979 as defendants 2 to 5 for declaration that the plaintiff Dr.V.Gurumurthy is a tenant only under the first defendant and not under the other defendants and they are not entitled to evict him from the premises, and for injunction restraining the defendants 2 to 5 from interfering with his possession as a lessee. O.S.No.150 of 1980 was filed by Gowri Corporation by its sole Proprietor, V.Mahadeva Iyer, i.e., the defendant in O.S.No.41 of 1979 against Savithiriammal Sama Veda Patasalai by Trustee, R.Krishnaswami Dikshithar and the two plaintiffs in O.A.No.41 of 1979 for declaration that the plaintiff-Gowri Corporation is a tenant only under the first defendant and not under the other defendants i.e., the plaintiffs in O.S.No.41 of 1979 and they are not entitled to evict it from the premises, and for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with its possession as a lessee. 2. The trial court recorded common evidence in all the four suits and rendered common Judgment in which he decreed the two suits O.S.No.40 of 1979 and 41 of 1979 as prayed for, and dismissed the other two suits O.S.No.149 of 1980 and 150 of 1980. Aggrieved by this decision Dr.V.Gurumurthy - the defendant in O.S.No.40 of 1979 who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.149 of 1980 has filed appeals respectively A.S.Nos.57 and 56 of 1986, the Gowri Corporation represented by its Managing Partner/Sole Proprietor V.Mahadeva Iyer/defendant in O.S.No.41 of 1979 who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.150 of 1980, has filed appeals respectively A.S.Nos.323 of 1981 and 58 of 1986. .3.
.3. In the suits O.S.Nos.40 of 1979 and 41 of 1979 filed for damages, the first plaintiff is the same person viz., R.Krishnaswami Dikshithar, but in the first suit O.S.No.40 of 1979 there are three other plaintiffs and in the second suit O.S.No.41 of 1979 there is one other plaintiff. It appears that the defendants in these two suits were tenants in respect of two portions of one building and they were inducted into the building by the first plaintiff in both the suits as the owner, and subsequently he sold one portion of the building to plaintiffs 2 to 4 in O.S.No.40 of 1979 in which the defendant therein is in occupation, and he sold the other portion to the second plaintiff in O.S.No.41 of 1979 which the defendant in that suit is in possession. It is also stated in the plaints themselves that the first plaintiff has no objection for the other plaintiffs to receive the rents and for a decree being passed accordingly. 4. In O.S.No.40 of 1979 the plaintiffs have claimed that the rent payable by the defendant was Rs.35 per mensem and the portion of the property in occupation of the defendant would easily fetch a rent of Rs.250 per mensem, and as he is not a tenant he is liable to pay damages at that rate, and from 10. 1975 to 30.9.1978 he has not paid any damages and therefore he is liable to pay a total damage of Rs.9,000. In O.S.No.41 of 1979 the plaintiffs have claimed that the rent payable by the defendant was Rs.100 per mensem and the portion of the property in occupation of the defendant would easily fetch a rent of Rs.500 per mensem, and as it is not a tenant it is liable to pay damages at that rate, and from 10. 1975 to 30.9.1978 it has not paid any damages and therefore it is liable to pay a total damages of Rs.18,000. 5. In both the suits the defendants’ contention was that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the property and the property belongs to Savithiriammal Sama Veda Patasalai and the first plaintiff was only a trustee thereof. As such the first plaintiff had no right to sell the property to the other plaintiffs and hence the other plaintiffs are not the owners, and they have no right to collect rent or damages from the defendants.
As such the first plaintiff had no right to sell the property to the other plaintiffs and hence the other plaintiffs are not the owners, and they have no right to collect rent or damages from the defendants. It is further contended that the defendants are statutory tenants and even after eviction order was passed against them in the eviction proceedings, they continued to be in possession as statutory tenants and also under a stay order of the Court, and therefore they are not liable to pay damages. They also contended that in any event they would be liable to pay damages at the rate of agreed rent and not more then that. 6. In the first two suits the plaintiffs filed reply statements that the defendants have raised the same contentions in the Rent Control proceedings and also in the earlier suits for rent, and both in the Rent Control Proceedings and the earlier suits their contentions were negatived and they have become final and therefore under the principle of res judicata they cannot raise those contentions now. .7. In O.S.Nos.149 of 1980 and 150 of 1980 the plaintiffs there viz., the defendants in O.S.Nos.40 of 1979and41 of 1979 raised the same contentions as they did in the written statements in O.S.Nos.40 of 1979 and 41 of 1979 and they prayed for the reliefs as stated above. 8. For convenience sake, the plaintiffs in O.S.Nos.40 and 41 of 1979 who are the defendants respectively in O.S.Nos. 149 and 150 of 1980 will be hereinafter called as the plaintiffs, and the defendants in O.S.Nos.40and 41 of 1979 who are the plaintiffs in O.S.Nos.149 and 150 of 1980 will be hereinafter called as defendants. 9. The trial court considering the common issues that arose in all the four suits held that it is not in dispute that the defendants were tenants of the plaintiff and therefore they are estopped under Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act from questioning the title of the plaintiffs. It further held that by virtue of the decisions in the Rent Control Proceedings and in the earlier suits O.S.Nos.434 of 1975 and 435 of 1975 wherein similar contentions had been raised by the defendants as in these suits which contentions were negatived, under the rule of res judicata, the defendants are debarred from contesting these suits on the same contentions.
The trial court also held that the damages amount claimed in both the suits are reasonable and the defendants are liable to pay these amounts for damages. On these findings the trial court decreed the suits O.S.Nos.40 and 41 of 1979 as prayed for and dismissed the suits O.S.Nos.149 and 150 of 1980. 10. The above findings of the trial court are assailed now in the appeals. As stated by the trial court, is not disputed that the first plaintiff only inducted the defendants as tenants in the premises and the defendants had been paying rent to him. This being the case under the rule of Estoppel enunciated in Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the tenants during the currency of tenancy, cannot deny title of the plaintiffs. Therefore the defendants’ plea that the first plaintiff was not the owner of the premises and he was only a trustee of Savithiriammal Sama Veda Patasalai cannot be heard. Here it may be relevant to note the Judgment of the Privy Council in Mt.Bilas Kunwar v. Des Raj Ranjit Singh and others, 29 M.L.J. 335: A.I.R 1915 P.C. 96:42 I.A. 292:30 I.C. 299, wherein their Lordships have ruled that “.....a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlord’s title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord.” From this ruling it would appear that even if it is true that Savithiriammal Sama Veda Patasala is the owner of the premises, inasmuch as the defendants have not surrendered possession to their landlords, i.e., the plaintiffs it is not open to them to say that somebody else is the real owner and not the plaintiffs. 11. Earlier, the plaintiffs have instituted Rent Control Proceedings for eviction of the defendants, and eviction was ordered in C.M.ANo.8 of 1971 and that has been confirmed by the High Court in C.R.P.No.2070 of 1976. In that proceeding also the defendants raised all the contentions which they have raised in the present suits and those contentions were negatived on the principle of estoppel under Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act. 12.
In that proceeding also the defendants raised all the contentions which they have raised in the present suits and those contentions were negatived on the principle of estoppel under Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act. 12. Again in the earlier suits O.S.Nos.434 and 435 of 1975 the same contentions were raised, and there too on consideration of the evidence, it was held that the plaintiffs only were the owners of the suit property and not Savithiriammal Sama Veda Patasala, and on this finding and also under the principle of estoppel under Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the defendants’ contentions were rejected. Thus the points at issue between the parties in the present suits have been already decided in two sets of proceedings. One in the Rent Control Proceedings and the other in the earlier suits, and they would operate as res judicata - the rule laid down in Sec.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is argued that the finding rendered in the Rent Control Proceedings which is a summary proceeding will not operate as res judicata, but even then the findings in the earlier suits O.SNos.434 and 435 of 1975 would definitely operate as res-judicata. Thus the very point whether the defendants are debarred by the rule of estoppel under Sec.116 of the Evidence Act from raising a contention that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the suit property had already been decided in the earlier suits and therefore, it is not now open to the defendants to once again argue that the rule of estoppel is not applicable to them. Thus I do not find any merits in these appeals that would warrant interference with the findings of the trial court Both under the rule of estoppel under Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act, and under the principle of res judicata under Sec.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the contentions of the defendants in the present suits cannot be heard. Much reliance was placed on G.O.Ms.No.399, dated 5. 1975, issued by the Government by virtue of which, according to the defendants the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act have been extended to the suit property and therefore the suit property can no longer be said to be a private property, but it belongs to the Sama Veda Patasala Trust.
1975, issued by the Government by virtue of which, according to the defendants the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act have been extended to the suit property and therefore the suit property can no longer be said to be a private property, but it belongs to the Sama Veda Patasala Trust. This very Government Order has been filed in the earlier suits O.S.Nos.434 arid 435 of 1975 and discussed, and inspite of this Government order it was held that the property belonged to Krishnasami Dikshithar - first plaintiff. Hence the rule of res-judicata applies as regards this G.O. also. Further this G.O. will not in any way save the defendants from the rule of estoppel under Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore the defendants cannot make out a case in their favour from this Government Order. 14. It is next argued by Mr.R.Subramaniam, learned counsel for the appellants that the defendants are not contractual tenants coming under the Transfer of Property Act but they are statutory tenants entitled to the protection under the Rent Control Act and therefore during the period of the pendency of the Rent Control proceedings and until the time they are evicted they are liable to pay only the rent or damages at the rate of agreed rent and not more than that, and therefore the present claim of the plaintiffs which are much more than the rate of rent cannot be granted. In answer to this point Mr.Venkataraman Learned counsel for the respondents cites a decision of the Supreme Court in Chander Kali Bai and others v. Jagdish Singh Thakur, A.I.R 1977 S.C. 2262: (1978)1 S.C.R 625 , wherein it has been held that the occupation of the tenant is not wrongful during the rent control proceedings, but from the date of the order of eviction his possession becomes wrongful and he would be liable to pay damages from that date. In our cases, the eviction order was passed on 5. 1976. Damages have been claimed from 10. 1975 for three years till 30.9.1978. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, from 10. 1975 to 5. 1976 no damages can be claimed but amounts as arrears of rent only can be claimed. As regards the remaining period, certainly the defendants are liable to pay damages. 15.
1976. Damages have been claimed from 10. 1975 for three years till 30.9.1978. In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court, from 10. 1975 to 5. 1976 no damages can be claimed but amounts as arrears of rent only can be claimed. As regards the remaining period, certainly the defendants are liable to pay damages. 15. Now, regarding the quantum of damages, no argument was advanced and I find that the Court below has no valid grounds found that the rate of damages claimed is quite reasonable. Therefore I find no reason to interfere with the rate of damages granted. 16. In the result, the judgments and decrees of the trial court in O.S.Nos.40 and 41 of 1979 are modified to the extent that for for the period from 10. 1975 to 5. 1976 the plaintiffs will be entitled to arrears of rent at the contract rate. In other respects the appeals in these two suits viz.,A.S.No.57 of 1986 and A.S.No.323 of 1981 respectively are dismissed. The appeals in A.S.Nos.56 of 1986 and 58 of 1986 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in all the appeals.