This revision petition arises from an order of Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur made on 25.11.83 in Criminal Motion No. 3 (1) of 198$ setting aside an order of the Executive Magistrate, Dhemaji passed in Case No. 14 M of 1982 under section 145, Cr. P. C. 2. Facts,-The petitioner is the first party and the respondents are the second party in a proceeding under section 145, Cr.P.C. before the Executive Magistrate, Dhemaji. The first party filed an application for drawing up of the proceedings under section 145, Cr.P.C. on 23.12.81 before the Executive Magistrate alleging that the first party was forcibly dispossessed by the second party on 15.12.81."On 16.3.82, the Magistrate drew up the proceedings by passing preliminary order under sub-section (1) of section 145, Cr.P C. The learned Magistrate after enquiry declared the possession of the disputed land in favour of the first party with a direction that the first party would remain in possession of the disputed land until evicted in due course of law. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate, the second party filed the Criminal Revision in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur. The learned Sessions Judge set the order aside. Hence this petition. 3. The learned Sessions Judge has held that the preliminary order does not indicate the existence of a breach of the peace. The existence of the breach of the peace must be on the date of passing of the prelimi­nary order. The application dated 23.12.81 for drawing up of the proceedings does not reveal much about the apprehension of the breach of the peace except that of the dispossession by the second party. Even if the dispossession is considered to be apprehension of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate ought to have drawn up the proceedings on the date itself. Moreover, dispossession had already been completed three months before the drawing up the proceedings and, therefore, the jurisdi­ction of the Magistrate to proceed with the proceedings had been ousted. 4. In the present case, the alleged dispossession was on 15.12.81, the application was filed on 23.12.81 and the preliminary order was drawn up on 16.3.82. Therefore, the preliminary order was drawn up after about three months of the receipt of the application or information by the Magistrate. 4. In the present case, the alleged dispossession was on 15.12.81, the application was filed on 23.12.81 and the preliminary order was drawn up on 16.3.82. Therefore, the preliminary order was drawn up after about three months of the receipt of the application or information by the Magistrate. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge is that the preliminary order was drawn up by the Magistrate after about three months of the application made by the petitioner and in the absence of the reoccurrence of breach of the peace at the time of the passing of the preliminary order, the Magistrate could not justifiably take the view that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace, on the date of the preliminary order made under sub-section (1) of section 145, Cr.P.C. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge is not correct in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.H. Bhutani's Case ( AIR 1968 SC 1444 ) in which it has been held that it would not be correct to say that there would be no existing dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace where a party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed and, by the time he files his application and the Magistrate passes his order, the dispossession would be complete. 5. In respect of the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the preliminary order does not indicate the existence of the breach of the peace. Sub-section (l)of section 145 provides that an Executive Magistrate shall, if he is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, make any order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied. Therefore, sub-section (1) of section 145 requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied before initiation of the proceedings that a dispute regarding land or water or boundaries thereof exists and that such a dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace. Once he is satisfied of these two conditions the section requires the Magistrate to pass preliminary order under sub section (1) of section 145 in writing stating the grounds of the satisfaction. Once he is satisfied of these two conditions the section requires the Magistrate to pass preliminary order under sub section (1) of section 145 in writing stating the grounds of the satisfaction. The question which arises for consideration is whether the omission to state in the preliminary order the existence of likelihood of a breach of the peace will vitiate the preliminary order and the proceedings. The object of section 145, Cr.P.C. is for the prevention of breach of the peace where dispute relates to possession of immovable property, and to provide a speedy remedy by a short and summary process to bring an end of the dispute quickly. Therefore, if it is said that the omission to record existence of the breach of the peace in the preliminary order would vitiate the order, it would be giving too much importance to the form of the order rather than preventing the breach of the peace if there is material on record to infer the existence of a breach of the peace. However, where there is no such material on record to indicate the existence of likelihood of a breach of the peace, the proceedings shall he vitiated as the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is the foundation for the jurisdiction of the Magistrate proceedings under section 145. 6. The question then is -Whether there is any material to infer existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace under sub­section (1) of section 145 ? As already stated, the Magistrate passing the preliminary order must be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the p ace exists. The word "likely" used under section 145 does not mean that the breach of the peace complained of must be imminent or likelihood to happen immediately It merely signifies that there will be a probability of a breach of the peace. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge is that the application does not reveal much about apprehension of the breach of the peace except that of dispossession of the second party. Therefore, the present proceedings is visited for want of materials to infer the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. 7. The finding of the learned Sessions Judge is that the application does not reveal much about apprehension of the breach of the peace except that of dispossession of the second party. Therefore, the present proceedings is visited for want of materials to infer the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. 7. As regards dispossession, the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 1 5, Cr.P.C provides that, if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date, of his order under sub-section (I) of section 145, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). Therefore, under the proviso the dispossession must be within the period of two months next before the date on which the police report or the other information was received by the Magistrate, viz, the period of two months is to be counted backwards from the date of receipt of the report of the police or other information. The relief under the proviso can also be granted if the dispossession is taken place, within two months between the date of the receipt of the report or informa­tion and the date of passing of the preliminary order. But power under proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145 is discretionary depending upon the circumstances of each case. 8. The proviso further indicates that the dispossession must be forcible and wrongful. In other words, mere dispossess on does not attract the proviso unless the party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. In the instant case, it is not the case of the first party that he has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. Therefore, the proviso is not applicable to the present case. In such a situation, the petition must fail. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.