JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J—This appeal has arisen against the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court dated May 25, 1982, allowing the petition filed under sections 33 read with section 31 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and holding that appellant Nos. 1 and 2 could not have referred the dispute, which had arisen amongst the parties, to the arbitrator in the manner adopted by them. 2. On February 17, 1975, an agreement Annexure R/3, was entered into, amongst appellants 1 and 2 and respondent, for the supply of refrigerators and deep freezers by the respondent to appellant Nos, 1 and 2 on certain terms and conditions. During the subsistence of the agreement, a dispute arose amongst the parties. Appellants 1 and 2 appointed Shri Mohinder Lai, the then Deputy Commissioner, to act as the sole arbitrator in accordance with Clause 18 of the agreement, which reads as under:— "If any question, difference or objection whatsoever shall, arise in any way connected with or arising out of this instrument or the meaning, or operation of any part thereof or the rights, duties or liabilities of either party than save in so far as the decision of any such matter is hereinbefore provided for and has been so decided, every such matter including whether its decision has been otherwise provided for and/or whether it has finally decided accordingly or whether the contract should be terminated or has been rightly terminated in whole or part and as regards the rights and obligations of the parties as the result of such termination shall be referred for arbitration to any officer appointed by Himachal Pradesh Government acting as such at the time of reference and his decision shall be final and binding and where the matter involves a claim the amount, if any, awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the matter so referred." 3. The act of appellant Nos. 1 and 2 in referring the dispute to the sole arbitration of the arbitrator was challenged by the respondent by filing a petition under section 33 read with section 31 of the Act on the ground that there could not be a unilateral reference by them without his consent and the same being bad in law, the authority of the arbitrator deserved to be revoked. The learned single Judge by placing reliance upon ILR 1977 HP 314 Trilok Chand Butail v. The Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. etc. and AIR 1972 Punjab and Haryana 207 Union of India v. Hari Krishan Joshi and others, held that a unilateral arbitration reference was not possible except by proceedings under section 20 of the Act and accordingly the matter could not be referred to the arbitrator in the manner adopted by appellant Nos. 1 and 2. Against this decision, the present appeal has been preferred by appellants No, 1 and 2 making the arbitrator as appellant No. 3. 4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties have also gone through the records. Learned Counsel for the appellants sought support from a decision of the Supreme Court reported as AIR 1985 SC 1003 Banwari Lal Kotiya v. P. C. Aggarwal for the proposition that the arbitration clause contained in the agreement was not a bare arbitration agreement but was clearly an arbitration agreement as defined in section 2 (a) and resort, therefore, to section 20 of the Act was not necessary. 5. In Trilok Chand Butail’s case (supra), decision was arrived at by the court by placing reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1955 SC 468 Thawardas Pherumal and another v. Union of India and ILR (1972) I Delhi 279 (P. C. Agarwal v. Banwari Lal), The Supreme Court in AIR 1985 SC 1003 has overruled the view of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court reported in ILR (1972) 1 Delhi 279, by making the following observations in para 13 of its report :— " The statement that in the absence of either, agreement by both sides about the terms of reference, or an order of the Court under section 20 (4) compelling a reference, the arbitrator is not vested with the necessary exclusive jurisdiction makes it clear that the observations were confined to the references of specific questions of law. Ordinarily, the Court has jurisdiction to set aside an award if an illegality or an error of law appears on the face of it and it is only when a specific question of law has been referred to the arbitrator for adjudication that his decision thereon falls within his exclusive jurisdiction and cannot be interfered with by the Court howsoever erroneous it might be. The true effect of these observations is that even in the case of an arbitration agreement which squarely falls within the definition of that expression as given in section 2 (a) (and which is not a bare arbitration agreement) there would be included in it a consensual actual reference by the parties of all their disputes including questions of law that may arise later but the arbitrators award on such question of law would not be within his exclusive jurisdiction since specific question or questions of law cannot be said to have been referred to him as required by the law of arbitration but though the reference would be valid the award and his decisions on questions of law if erroneous on the face of it would be liable to be set aside by the Court This is far from laying down the wide proposition that there can be no reference to arbitration except through the Court under section 20 unless both the parties join afresh in the actual reference." 6. The report, after explaining the ratio of the decision reported in AIR 1955 SC 468, further says in para 14 as under : ~~ "As we have said above the question whether fresh assent of both the parties for the actual reference is necessary or not must depend upon whether arbitration agreement is a bare agreement of the type indicated earlier or it is an arbitration agreement as defined in section 2 (a) of the Act If it is the latter then clearly the actual reference to arbitration would be consensual and not unilateral and no fresh assent of the parties would be necessary nor will resort to section 20 be necessary. Instead the party desirous of going to arbitration can resort to remedies available to him under Chapter II of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ; and in a case like the instant one he can, as the appellant did, proceed under the relevant Bye-laws," 7. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court in Banwari Lals case (supra), the law laid down by the learned single Judge of this Court in Trilok Chand Butail’s case (supra) (ILR 1977 HP 314) is no more a good law and consequently the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 8. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 8. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. The petition filed under section 33 read with section 31 of the Act by the respondent is dismissed. It has been brought to our notice that Shri Mohinder Lai, arbitrator, is no more the Deputy Commissioner of Simla. We, however, leave it open to the appellants to appoint any other officer as an arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes which have arisen amongst the parties. No costs. Appeal allowed.