RDJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india calling in question the correctness and validity of an order made in election Misc. No. 8/87 on the file of the Munsiff at Arasikere, ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this petition are as follows : the petitioner and respondents 1,3 and 4 contested an election held on 20th of January, 1987. The petitioner was declared to have been elected having secured the highest number of votes in the said election. That election was called in question by filing a petition under Section 14 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishads, taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), Thebasis on which that petition was filed was that the petitioner was holding an office of profit in kalyadi Copper Mines, which is a unit of Hatti Gold Mining Company Ltd. , which is a public-sector undertaking of the State Government and he had incurred the disqualification as provided under Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act. The 1st respondent also claimed in the petition for a declaration that if the petitioner is disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Panchayat his election was void and he be declared as a duly elected candidate in the election. ( 3 ) TWO questions as under fell forconsideration in the said petitional- though several issues have been raised in the case: (1) Whether the petitioner holds an office of profit under an authority subject to the control of the State government as provided under Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act and is his election therefore void if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative? (2) Whether respondent No. 1 was entitled to be declared to have been duly elected as a successful candidate? ( 4 ) ON the first question the learnedmunsiff relied upon Ext. P-10, which is an endorsement issued by the mine Manager of the Hatti Gold Mines company Ltd. Kalyadi Copper Unit stating that Hatti Gold Mines and its unit Kalyadi Copper Mines is an undertaking of the Karnataka State. Material was also placed before the learned munsiff to show that the petitioner was working as a Hoist Driver at the relevant time in the Kalyadi Copper mines and he had been employed since 1-12-1976. Material was also placed before the learned munsiff to show that the petitioner was working as a Hoist Driver at the relevant time in the Kalyadi Copper mines and he had been employed since 1-12-1976. The trial Court also took into consideration the oral evidence placed before it. It took the view that the petitioner was holding an office of profit under an authority subject to the control of the Government covered by section 11 (1) (j) of the Act. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for thepetitioner contends that the petitioner does not hold an office of profit under an authority subject to the control of the State as provided in Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act and hence this finding is incorrect while the learned counsel for the contesting respondent supported this finding of the learned munsiff. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the rivalcontentions it is necessary to set out the relevant position of Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act :" A person shall be disqulified for being chosen or nominated and for being a member of a Mandal Panchayat : if he holds "any office of profit under the Government of India or the government of Karnataka of any other State in India or any local or other authority subject to the control of any of the said Governments other than such off ices as are declared by rules made under this Act not to disqualify the holder' (emphasis supplied) the purport of this Sectiona is that: (i) if a person holds an office; (ii) that office carries any remuneration; and (in) that office is under an authority subject to the control of any of the Governments attracts the the provisions of this Section. An office of profit involves two elements, namely, that there should be an office and that should carry some remuneration and one more element could be added in the context of the provisions with which ,we are dealing now that such office could be held under the authority subject to the control of a State or Central Government. It has to be seen whether these ingredients are satisfied in the present case or not. ( 7 ) I shall take up for considerationwhether Kalyadi Copper Mines which is a unit of Hatti Gold Mines limited is an authority subject to the control of the State Government. The certificate Ext. It has to be seen whether these ingredients are satisfied in the present case or not. ( 7 ) I shall take up for considerationwhether Kalyadi Copper Mines which is a unit of Hatti Gold Mines limited is an authority subject to the control of the State Government. The certificate Ext. P-10 indicates that kalyadi Copper Mines is a unit of hatti Gold Mines, which is wholly owned by the Government of Karnataka, where the petitioner is employed. Even a Company will be an authority under the control of the Government if it is an instrumentality of the State. In determining whether a Corporation or a Government Company is an instrumentality of a State several tests have been applied such as the degree of control of the Government over it, their composition, extent of dependency on the Government for financial needs and above all whether the body is discharging any important Governmental function or some activities, which is optional from the point of view of the Government and alt such characterstics may change with reference to its different functions. This position has been elaborately explained by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1571 (Central Inland Water transport Corporation Ltd. and another v Brojo Nath Ganguly and another) at paragraphs 62 to 65. Similarly this position is explained in A. I. R. 1984 s. C. 385 (Biharilal Dobray v Roshanlal dobiay) at paragraph 21. Neither party in the present case has made any effort to place material before the learned munsiff in the shape of the memorandum of association or articles of association or any other material to indicate that composition of the body with which we are concerned carries on the activities or the manner in which it is done under control of government or as to its monopolistic character or otherwise. There is also paucity or evidence as to whether the company is mere trading Company or carrying on activities of public character, interest or concern as should be by a modern welfare State. Equally so there is lack of material as to why this company (ailing under the definition of Section 617 of the Companies Act could not be treated as alter ego of the government. Equally so there is lack of material as to why this company (ailing under the definition of Section 617 of the Companies Act could not be treated as alter ego of the government. Therefore when there is clear indication that when the parties have not joined issues on this question either here or before learned Munsiff but proceeded on the basis that the company being a public sector undertaking is an authority under the control of the State, it is reasonable to take the view that it is so and consider the other contentions in that light. ( 8 ) THE next question is whetherthe petitioner holds an office of profit. In Biharilal's case Supreme Court laid down that an office of profit involves r. 49 two elements, namely, that there should be an office and that should carry some remuneration. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the petitioner holds an office coverandd by Section 11 (1) (j) of the act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that merely because the petitioner is employed by an authority it does not necessarily mean that he holds an office unless he discharges functions of public character, thus drawing to my attention the distinction between the expression "an office" and "an employment". Controverting these contentions the learned Counsel for respondent-1 replied that every employment which carries duties must be considered to be an office whether such duties are private or public particularly in view of the enlarged scope of Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act and the developing concepts on the instrumentality of State which is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. ( 9 ) THE form and style of the contentions advanced by the learnedcounsel though interesting need not veer me away from the crux of the matter on hand. A word or an expression used in an enactment has many meanings in etymological sense, but it always takes its colour, as often said, from the text and the context. In dictionaries the word 'office' is created as a synonym of 'post, appointment, situation, place or position'. In this context the celebrated observations of Rowlatt J. in Great Western railway Co. v Baler (1922) 8 Tax cases 231 are relevant. In dictionaries the word 'office' is created as a synonym of 'post, appointment, situation, place or position'. In this context the celebrated observations of Rowlatt J. in Great Western railway Co. v Baler (1922) 8 Tax cases 231 are relevant. Tney are quoted with approval in Kantha Kathuria v manikchand A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 694 at 696 and the same is extracted :"now it is argued, and to my mind argued most forcibly, that that shows that what those who use the language of the Act of 1942 meant, when they spoke of an office or employment which was a subsisting, permanent, subtantive position which had an existence independent from the person who filled it, which went on and was filled in succession by successive holders, and if you merely had any man who was engaged on whatever terms, to do duties which were assigned to him, his employment to do those duties did not create an office to which those duties were attached. He hereby was employed to do certain things and that is an end of it, and if there was no office or employment existing in the case as a thing, the so called office or employment was merely an aggregate of the activities of the particular man for the time being. " ( 10 ) THE object and purpose ofsection 11 (1 ) (j) of the Act is that an elected member of the Panchayat must be a free agent and there should be no conflict of his interest between his employment and duties as a member of the Panchayat. Even an employee of the Company will have interest of his company at his heart which gives him bread and therefore may not like to act adverse to his interest. ( 11 ) THE employment of the petitioner as a 'workman'from 1976 firstlyin the Engineering Department and later as a filter and still later for over three years as a Hoist Driver is available on record and he receives wages for the work done by him, ( 12 ) SUCH employment thoughoriginated in contract ended up with status being continuous, controlled by statutory standing orders, subject to industrial law in respect of all conditions of service with fixity of tenure and security of employment. Hence, bearing in mind trend of law in understanding that an Office is a permanent position with assigned duty the employment of the petitioner though not an office in a traditional sense is so for purpose of Section 11 (1) (j) of the act. Thus, I must hold that the petitioner holds an Office under the authority subject to the control of the State or central Government for purpose of section 11 (1) (j ). ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel for thepetitioner contended that the petitioner even if holding an office under the authority subject th control of the State, that he does not hold an office of profit. Relying upona decision of the Supreme Court in A. I R. 1975 S C. 575 (Karbhari Bhimaji rohamare v shanker Rao Genuji Kolhe and others) he submitted that when a person receives only daily wages it is only sufficient to meet his daily expenses and is not a source of profit and therefore dose not come within the expression of holding an office of profit. In that decision the supreme Court was concerned with a member of the Wage Board who received honorarium paid to him not as a source of profit, but only to meet his daily expenses of travel and that is not the position here at all. The material on record clearly shows that the petitioner earns his wages as fixed under the law. Therefore, what is paid to him is not by way of honorarium or compensatory allowance covered by the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Indeed this aspect was in great detail considered in Biharilal's case referred to earlier where the supreme Court clearly stated that If an office carries some remuneration it is enough to conclude that a person holds an office of Profit, In that decision the entire case law on the point had been discussed upto dateand therefore it is not necessary to refer to any other decision on the point. Thus, the conclusion to be reached on the first point is that the petitioner's employment is an office held under an authoritycontrolled by the State falling within the purview of Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act and therefore he stood disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Panchayat. Thus, the conclusion to be reached on the first point is that the petitioner's employment is an office held under an authoritycontrolled by the State falling within the purview of Section 11 (1) (j) of the Act and therefore he stood disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Panchayat. The conclusion reached by the learned munsiff on this aspect of the matter must be upheld. ( 14 ) NOW I have to examine as towhether the learned Munsiff in making the declaration of the first respondent under Section 19 (1) (a) of the Act as duly elected candidate is correct or not. There is no allegation of corrupt practices in this case. Hence, Section 19 (1) (b) is not attracted to this caseat all. The question there is whether respondent No. 1 had received a majority of valid votes as provided in Sect ion 19 (1) (a) of the Act so as tobe declared elected after avoiding the election of the petitioner void. ( 15 ) THERE is no principle of lawto the effect that votes obtained by a returned candidate whose election has been treated void cannot be treated ag valid and thus be excluded from counting simply because election has not stood on account of disqualification of the returned candidate. The concept of 'thrown away' votes available under the English Law is not applied in India except where there are only two candidates and the election is on the basis of single non-transferable vote. This aspect of the matter has been in great detail considered by the Supreme court in Vishwanatha Reddy v Konappa rudrappa Nadgouda and another (AIR 1969 5. C. 604) and further explained in Thiru John and another v The Returning officer and others (A. I. R. 1977 S C. 1724} in paras 58 and 59 Thus, it is clear that where there are more than two candidates in en election as in the present case resulting in a multicornered contest and the returned candidate is found wanting in qualifications the candidate securing next highest number of votes is not entitled be seated and there will be merely a fresh election. The contention advanced to the contrary by the learned counsel for respondent 1 is plainly inconsistent with the two decisions referred to above and. therefore untenable. The contention advanced to the contrary by the learned counsel for respondent 1 is plainly inconsistent with the two decisions referred to above and. therefore untenable. However, learned Counsel for respondent-1 wants to place reliance upon yet another decision of the supreme Court in A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1200 (Jabar Singh v Genda Lal ). In that case Supreme Court was not concerned with a case where a returned candidate is found to have incurred a disqualification provided under the act and as to what should happen to the votes cast in his favour, but with a situation when a seat is claimed by the election petitiener for himself or any other candidate and the returned candidate has failed to file a recrimination petition and in this case we are not concerned with such a situation at all. ( 16 ) IT is not the claim of respondent-1that the votes cast in favour of the returned candidate are invalid. The claim for decleration that respondent 1 be declared to de elected can be based only on Section 19 (1) (a) of the act, which provides that he should swear that he has secured the majority of valid votes. When the votes cast in favour of returned candidate whose election is held void on ground of disqualification are not treated as invalid must be held to be validly cast votes. If that is so, respondent-1 cannot claim to be declared to be duly elected for he does not get the majority of valid votes as provided in section 19 (1) (a) of the Act. Hence, i have no hesitation to reject this contention advanced on behalf of the first respondent. ( 17 ) IN the result, this petition ispartly allowed in the following terms: (I) The declaration by the learned munsiff that the petitioner's election is void is upheld. (ii) The declaration that respondent No 1 is duly elected is quashed. (iii) As parties have succeeded only in part they shall each pay and bear the respective costs throughout. Rule made absolute accordingly. Writ petition partly allowed. --- *** --- .