Judgment :- DR. A.S. Anand, C.J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 6048 of 1987, decided on 24-2-1989. The appellant was the writ petitioner while both the respondents were the respondents in the writ petition. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the parties by the same nomenclature by which they have been referred to by the learned single Judge. 2. According to the petitioner, elections for trusteeship to the Abiraman Peria Pallivasal Trust, Abiraman, Ramanathapuram District, took place on 21-12-1986 The Jamathdars of the Trust are comprised in six wards and two trustees are elected from each ward. The tenure of the trustees is three years. The petitioner claims that he and his party-men were returned at the elections. The second respondent, who was impleaded by order of the Court dated 17-11-1988, filed an application under S. 15 read with S. 44 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act), Wakf Application No. 26 of 1986 seeking a declaration that the election of the petitioner and his party-men was illegal and void for various reasons set out therein Wakf Application No. 26 of 1986 was taken up on the file of the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board and proceedings commenced, when the petitioner raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the application and the jurisdiction of the Wakf Board to go into the dispute raised in the application or to make any orders concerning the election at any interim stage. It was maintained that the jurisdiction to deal with the matter contained in Wakf Application No. 26 of 1986 vested only with a civil Court and not with the Wakf Board under the Act. The preliminary objection was, however, over-ruled and Wakf Application No. 26 of 1986 was posted for enquiry on merits after holding that Board had the jurisdiction to decide the application. The petitioner challenged the proceedings of the first respondent through a writ petition and Mohan, J., (as his Lordship then was), vide order dated 19-6-1987, dismissed the writ petition in limine holding that the petitioner had no justification to approach the Court, at that stage, and that the question regarding lack of jurisdiction could be raised before the Board itself. The petitioner challenged the proceedings of the first respondent through a writ petition and Mohan, J., (as his Lordship then was), vide order dated 19-6-1987, dismissed the writ petition in limine holding that the petitioner had no justification to approach the Court, at that stage, and that the question regarding lack of jurisdiction could be raised before the Board itself. Writ Appeal No. 1113 of 1987 was preferred by the petitioner and a Division Bench of this Court, by an order dated 3-5-1988, allowed the writ appeal and setting aside the order of Mohan, J., directed the writ petition to be heard on merits and disposed of. Consequently, writ Petition No. 6048 of 1987 was heard on merits and dismissed by a learned single Judge, vide judgment dated 24-2-1989, which is the subject-matter of this appeal. 3. There is no dispute that the Abiraman Peria Pallivasal Trust is a public Wakf, which is managed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the Jamat of the said Mosque, according to the by-laws existing since 1953. Under the by-laws of the Trust, the Jamatdhars comprise of six wards in the village and each of the wards elects two trustees for a term of three years. The last elections took place on 21-12-1986 where, according to the petitioner, he and his party-men won the election. The second respondent was defeated in the election. He filed wakf Application No. 26 of 1986 questioning the election on various grounds set out in the application. The petitioner objected to the jurisdiction of the wakf Board to deal with the matter and asserted that the relief, sought for by the second respondent could only be granted by a civil Court and not by the Wakf Board. The plea failed before the Board as well as before the single Judge, who held that the Board had the jurisdiction to deal with matter and grant appropriate relief. 4. The plea failed before the Board as well as before the single Judge, who held that the Board had the jurisdiction to deal with matter and grant appropriate relief. 4. The meaningful question of law which requires determination at our hands is, “Whether the Wakf Board has the power under the Act to decide, questions relating to ‘election’ of trustees and whether the Board can set aside the ‘election’ or pass any interim orders and incidentally, whether the Board can allow the trustees who have vacated office by lapse of time, or otherwise on being defeated in the ‘election’, to continue in office or whether the matter has to be adjudicated by a civil Court under S. 9 of the C.P.C.? With a view to answer this question, reference to certain provisions of the Act is necessary. The relevant provisions of the Act are hereunder extracted: “3 (f) ‘Mutawalli’ means any persons appointed either verbally or under any deed or instrument by which a wakf has been created or by a competent authority to be the mutawalli of a wakf and includes any naib mutawalli, khadim, mujawar, sajjadanashin, amin or other parson appointed by a mutawalli to perform the duties of a mutawalli and save is otherwise provided in this tot, any person or Committee for the time being managing or administering any wakf property as such;” “15. (2) without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the functions of the Board shall be— (g) to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (o) Generally do all such acts as may be necessary for the due control, maintenance and administration of wakfs;” “42. Power to appoint Mutawallis in certain cases . When there is a vacancy in the office of the mutavalli of a wakf and there is no one to be appointed under the terms of the deed of the wakf, or where the right of any person to act as mutawallis is disputed, the Board may appoint any person to act as mutawalli for such period and on such conditions as it may think fit.” “43. Removal of mutawallis .—(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or the deed of wakf, the Board may remove a mutawalli from his office if such mutawalli— (a) has been convicted more than once of an offence punishable under S. 41; or (b) has been convicted of an offence of criminal breach of trust or any other offence involving moral turpitude, and such conviction has not been reversed and he has not been granted full pardon with respect to such offence; or (c) (d) is of unsound mind or is suffering from other mental or physical defect or infirmity which would reader him unfit to perform the functions and discharge the duties of a mutawalli, or (e) (f) is an undischarged insolvent; or (g) is proved to be addicted to drinking liquor or other spirituous preparations, or is addicted to the taking of any narcotic drugs; or (h) is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of, or against, the wakf; or (i) has failed, without reasonable excuse, to maintain regular accounts for two consecutive years or has failed to submit, in two consecutive years, the yearly statement of accounts, as-required by sub- S. (2) of S. 32; or (j) is interested, directly or indirectly, in a subsisting lease in respect of any wakf property, or in any contract made with, or in any work being done for, the wakf or is in arrears in respect of any sum due by him to such wakf; or (k) continuously neglects his duties or commits misfeasance, malfeasance, misapplication of funds or breach of trust in relation to the wakf or in respect of any money or other wakf property; or (1) wilfully and persistently disobeys the lawful orders made by the Central Government, State Government, Board or Wakf Commissioner under any provisions of this Act or Rule or Order made thereunder. (2) (3) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the removal of a person from the office of the mutawalli shall not affect his personal rights, if any, in respect of the wakf property either as a beneficiary or in any other capacity or his rights, if any, as a sajjadanashin. (2) (3) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the removal of a person from the office of the mutawalli shall not affect his personal rights, if any, in respect of the wakf property either as a beneficiary or in any other capacity or his rights, if any, as a sajjadanashin. (4) No action shall be taken by the Board under sub-S. (1) unless it has held an inquiry into the matter in the prescribed manner and the decision has been taken by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Board. (4-A) A mutawalli who is aggrieved by an order passed under any of the clauses (d) to (1) of sub-S. (1), may, within one month from the date of the receipt by him of the order, appeal against the order to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal on such appeal shall be final. (4-B) Where any inquiry under sub.S. (4) is proposed, or commenced, against any mutawalli, the Board may, if it is of the opinion that it is necessary so to do in the interests of the wakf, by an order suspend such mutawalli until the conclusion of the inquiry: Provided that no suspension for a period exceeding ten days shall be made except after giving the mutawalli a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the proposed action. (4-C) Where any appeal is filed by the muttawalli to the Tribunal under sub-S. (4-A), the Wakf Commissioner may make ah application to the Tribunal for the appointment of a receiver to manage the wakf pending the decision of the appeal, and where such an application is made, the Tribunal shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (5 of 1908) appoint a suitable person as receiver to manage the wakf and direct the receiver so appointed to ensure that the customary or religious rights of the mutawalli and of the wakf are safeguarded. (5) Where a mutawalli has been removed from his office under sub-S. (1), the Board may, by order, direct the mutawalli to deliver possession of the wakf property to the Board or any officer thereof duly authorised in this behalf or to any person or committee appointed to act as the mutawalli of the wakf property: and the order of the Board shah be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and shall be executed by the civil court as if it had passed the decree. (6) A mutawalli of a wakf removed from his office under this section shall not be eligible for appointment as a mutawalli of that wakf for a period of five years from the date of such removal.” “44. Application for Enquiry .— Any person interested in a wakf may make an application to the Board supported by an affidavit to institute an inquiry relating to the administration of the wakf and if the Board is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the affairs of the wakf are being mismanaged, it shall take such action thereon as it thinks fit.” 5. It is the interpretation and play of the above provisions of the Act, which would assist us to answer the question. 6. Before proceeding further, we must clear one confusion. What has been considered to be “election” by the petitioner is, in fact, the appointment of a mutawalli by the wakf Board of the elected trustees. The election takes place under the deed creating the wakf and the relevant by-laws framed for that purpose. The Board comes into picture at the time of appointment of the elected trustees as mutawallis who can function in that capacity only on being so appointed by the Board. The dispute between the parties actually centres round the appointment of mutawallis after the election held on 21-12-1986, pursuant to the resolution of the retiring Board of Trustees. The second respondent sought the removal of the mutawallis alleging irregularities in the matter of their election on 21-12-1986 on various grounds. The main prayer in the application is “to declare the election held by the trustees of the Abiraman Peria Pallivasal Trust on 21-12-1986 as illegal and void” and thus, it is the continuance in office of the mutawallis which has been put in issue. Interim relief regarding their functioning as such was also sought. The main prayer in the application is “to declare the election held by the trustees of the Abiraman Peria Pallivasal Trust on 21-12-1986 as illegal and void” and thus, it is the continuance in office of the mutawallis which has been put in issue. Interim relief regarding their functioning as such was also sought. According to the petitioner, the authorises under the Act do not have any jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to the elected trustees and that it is only the civil Court which has the jurisdiction to determine that question exclusively in terms of S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. S. 15(2)(g) of the Act (supra) grants the Board, the power to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of the Act and vide sub-Cl. (o) of S. 15(2), the Board also has the powers generally to do all such acts as may be necessary for the due control, maintenance and administration of wakfs. There is no dispute about the fact that the procedure for appointment of mutawallis was followed by the Board, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the scheme framed when the mutawallis were appointed. Besides, S. 43 of the Act, which starts with a non-obstante clause, confers power on the Board specifically in the matter of removal of the mutawallis. The Act is a complete code with regard to the matters dealt with in the Act itself and, in our opinion, where the Act provides for matters to be dealt with under the Act by the Board, it has the jurisdiction to deal with not only that matters but also matters which are incidental and ancillary to the main matter. Thus, matters not only relating to the appointment but also1 the removal of the mutawallis has to be dealt with by the Board by virtue of the specific powers vested under S. 15(2)(g), S. 42 and S. 43 of the Act. It is the substance and not the form in which the dispute is raised which is relevant and a bare perusal of the prayer in the application, which has been extracted in the earlier portion of this judgment, shows that the petitioner objected to the continuance of the trustees as mutawallis. 8. It is the substance and not the form in which the dispute is raised which is relevant and a bare perusal of the prayer in the application, which has been extracted in the earlier portion of this judgment, shows that the petitioner objected to the continuance of the trustees as mutawallis. 8. In Syed Akbar Sha v. The Tamil Nadu Wakf Board 1 , a Division Bench while considering the competency of a mutawalli to hold office as mutawalli and the powers of the Board to deal with the question when the competence was challenged, held that S. 42 of the Act was divisible into two compartments. Under the first part, the Board has the jurisdiction to appoint a person to act as mutawalli for such period and on such conditions as it may think fit, if there is a vacancy in the office of mutawalli, of a wakf and no one has been appointed as per the terms of the instrument of the wakf . The second part of the section relates to a contingency where the right of a person in occupation of the office is disputed by others. S. 42, thus, enables independently and separately, the Wakf Board to act and exercise its jurisdiction statutorily conferred on it to appoint mutawallis. The Bench further went on to hold that if there is a dispute regarding the right of any person to act as mutawalli, then, it gives rise to a cause of action, which the Board has the power to enquire into and if it comes to the conclusion that the person occupying the office of mutawalli has to be removed, it has the power to remove him under S. 15(2)(g) of the Act and appoint any other person to act as mutawalli for such period and on such terms and conditions as it may think fit. The Bench specifically repelled the contention that the Wakf Board did not have the requisite statutory power to enquire into a dispute relating to appointment or removal of a mutawalli. 9. In Khadar Shariff v. Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board 2 , the question before the Bench was, whether the Wakf Board had the power to appoint either a committee or an executive officer to manage the wakf, when a mutawalli is in charge of the management and administration of the wakf . 9. In Khadar Shariff v. Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board 2 , the question before the Bench was, whether the Wakf Board had the power to appoint either a committee or an executive officer to manage the wakf, when a mutawalli is in charge of the management and administration of the wakf . The Bench held that the Board has no such power to interfere with the management of a mutawalli, as long as there are no proceedings pending against the mutawalli . The Bench went on to hold that there is no express provision authorising the Board to appoint an executive officer or a committee, to manage a wakf and opined that the Act contains provisions to take proceedings against the erring mutawallis as well as to “remove and appoint mutavallis”. Both these judgments, undoubtedly, support the view taken by the learned single Judge that the Board was competent to deal with the matter including the question of grant of interim relief and that it had the necessar y jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in Kerala Wakf Board v. Alam Aboobacker Sait 1 to urge that the view taken by the wakf Board and the learned single Judge was erroneous. The question which was debated before the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court related to an allegation made to the wakf Board by the respondents in the original petition against the appointment made by the Board of Trustees. It was argued that the appointment was not proper and that the second respondent in the original petition should have been appointed as the mutawalli in accordance with the terms and intention of the wakf in preference to the appointed mutawalli. Enquiry was conducted by the Wakf Board which held that as between the contesting parties, it was the second respondent in the original petition, viz.. Abdul Kareem Abdul Sathar Sait, who was eligible and enti led to be appointed as a managing trustee-mutawalli and that the appointment made by the Board of Trustees, under the circumstances, was not legal and proper. Abdul Kareem Abdul Sathar Sait, who was eligible and enti led to be appointed as a managing trustee-mutawalli and that the appointment made by the Board of Trustees, under the circumstances, was not legal and proper. The single Judge in the Kerala case had taken the view that the power to appoint mutawallis of a wakf could only be traced to S. 42 of the Act and that the said provision did not confer any power on the Wakf Board to decide the dispute, when there was contest between the rival parties for being appointed as mutawalli, and that the power of appointment in the event of a dispute could not be exercised under S. 42 of the Act unless there was a vacancy. On behalf of the appellant, it was argued before the Division Bench that the Wakf Board had been conferred the powers by S. 15 of the Act and under S. 15(2)(g), it had the power to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of the Act. After referring to S. 42 and S. 3(f) of the Act, the Division Bench opined that the expression “mutawalli” includes any person appointed in accordance with the wakf deed and also includes any person, for the time being managing or administering any wakf property as such. On the basis of that interpretation and by reference to S. 42, the Bench agreed with the view taken by the single Judge that the power of appointment conferred by S. 42 could only be exercised when there is a vacancy and that it did not empower the Board to appoint a mutawalli, unless there was a vacancy. The Bench, therefore, held that as there was no vacancy in that case and since the trustees had already appointed a person who was functioning as a managing mutawalli, the Board could not exercise its powers of appointment under S. 42 of the Act, since there was no vacancy to be filled up. This judgment, in our opinion, does not support the case of the appellant. The question debated before us was not under consideration by the Division Bench in the Kerala Judgment. The interpretation of S. 42 of the Act is not in question in the present case. This judgment, in our opinion, does not support the case of the appellant. The question debated before us was not under consideration by the Division Bench in the Kerala Judgment. The interpretation of S. 42 of the Act is not in question in the present case. The question whether the right to hold the office of mutavalli can be questioned before the Board or only in a civil Court is the only question before us. A conjoint reading of S. 15(2)(g) and S. 43 of the Act unmistakably shows that the Board has the power to remove a mutawalli not only under S. 43 of the Act but also under S. 15(2)(g). Since the power of appointment vests in the Board, it is axiomatic that the power of removal also would vest in the Board even in the absence of a specific power of removal, though in the instant case, we find that the Act itself confers the power of removal on the Board both under S. 15(2)(g) and S. 43 also. Since the Board has the power of removal, any question relating thereto or incidental or ancillary to the main question would have to be decided by the Board itself, We are not impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that since there is no exclusion of the civil Courts jurisdiction under the Act, the dispute of the type raised before the Board could only be raised before the civil Court. As already noticed, the Wakf Board is a specifically constituted tribunal which has the statutory jurisdiction to decide disputes relating to appointment and continuance of the mutawallis in office as well as in respect of all matters incidental or ancillary thereto. The Board, therefore, is obliged when a question is raised before it, to determine whether the mutawalli, whose appointment has been questioned, is lawfully holding the officer of the mutawalli or not and such a question can be decided by the Board which is a special tribunal for the purpose of dealing with such matters as are dealt with under the Act. Indeed, it is open to the wakf Board in a given case, to refer the parties to a civil Court for adjudication of the dispute, if it finds that it is not competent enough to deal with the question but that does not imply any lack of jurisdiction in the Board to deal with the matter. Since we find that the wakf Board is competent to decide whether a person is holding the office of mutawalli lawfully or not, the objection which was raised before the Board as regards its jurisdiction to deal with the matter was rightly repelled and no fault can be found with that finding of the Board. 11. The Board has under the Act, the duty to exercise its powers, so as to ensure that the wakfs under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered, and tint duty unmistakably casts upon it an obligation to examine the question, whether the mutawallis holding the office are lawfully holding the office or not whenever a question with regard to their continuance as mutawallis is raised before it. The wakf Board has the power to settle the scheme of management for the wakfs and to appoint and remove mutawallis in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The learned single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was perfectly justified in holding that the Wakf Board had the requisite jurisdiction to decide the question raised before it. The learned single Judge rightly declined to interfere with the order of the Board holding that it had the jurisdiction to decide the quest ons raised before it. We do not find any error, much less, an error apparent in the order of the Board and have also not been persuaded to take a view different than the one taken by the learned single Judge. The answer to the first part of the question raised in the earlier part of this judgment is in the affirmative. 12. In the view that we have taken, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to whether, in the absence of exclusion of the civil Courts jurisdiction, a party can also approach the civil Court or not, for having a matter, which could be decided by the civil Court and leave that question to be decided in an appropriate case. Since the Board has, as yet, to deal with the merits of the controversy between the parties, we refrain from expressing any opinion on merits, as any such expression may prejudice the case of either of the parties. 13. Thus, for what we have said above, we find no merit in this writ appeal, which fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.