JUDGMENT V. N. Khare, J. - The above second Appeal filed on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants and the cross objection, filed on behalf of defendants-respondents-objectors, arise out of the judgment and decree passed by Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar on 13th of July, 1979 in Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1978, and, therefore, both are being disposed of by a common judgement. 2. Asha Ram, the plaintiff, filed Suit No. 45 of 1977 for issue of permanent injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from interfering, in any way, with his possession over the land in dispute. According to the plaint allegations the plaintiff-appellant (Asha Ram was the Bhumidhar in possession over plot No. 355 measuring 16 Biswas situate in village Dinkarpur Pargana Shikarpur district Muzaffarnagar, along with Mitter Sen and others. The land has been shown by letters A B C D in the site plan attached to the plaint. It was alleged that there stood trees of mango, Neem, Pipal, Guava and Shisham etc. on the said land and there also existed Kachha Kothri and a fodder cutting machine on the said land. Alternatively, the plaintiff (Asha Ram) alleged that the land was settled with him under Section 9 of the U. P. Zemindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 and the defendants respondents have got no concern with the said land. Since they wanted to take forcible possession of the land and to demolish the constructions standing thereon, he filed suit for permanent injunction. 3. The defendants respondents contested the suit and filed written statement. In the written statement it was alleged that the defendants-respondents Ghasita and Ali Jan were owners in possession of the said land and the trees, cattle through hand pipes, Kotha and the fodder cutting machine on the said land belonged to Ali Jan and Gasita. It was also alleged that Ali Jan and Ghasita were in possession of the land in suit since long time and it has been settled in their favour under Section 9 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951. They alleged that the defendants Ali Jan and Ghasita were coming down in possession of the land for about 10 years before the Zamindari Abolition and the suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. 4. They alleged that the defendants Ali Jan and Ghasita were coming down in possession of the land for about 10 years before the Zamindari Abolition and the suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. 4. The learned Munsif Muzaffarnagar held that the plaintiff-appellant not was Bhumidhar of the disputed plot but defendants were in possession over the said plot of land. Learned Munsif held that Since the relief for deliver of possession had not been claimed the suit for permanent injunction was not maintainable, he, therefore, dismissed the suit by judgement and order dated 16th October 1978. The plaintiff appellant (Asha Ram) filed an appeal against the) aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned Munsif dismissing the suit. A cross-objection was filed by the defendants against the finding of the learned Munsif holding the plaintiff-appellant to be Bhumidhar of the said plot of land. The Civil Judge by Judgment and order dated 13th July, 1979 dismissed both appeal and the cross objection filed by the plaintiff and the defendants respectively. The learned Civil Judge in his judgment affirmed the findings of the learned Munsif and the view taken by his for dismissing the plaintiff appellant's suit. It is against this judgement and decree that the present second appeal and cross objection have been filed. 5. While admitting this Second Appeal this Court framed two questions of law : one, whether the lower appellate Court was justified in its view of law that the suit of the plaintiff-appellant was not maintainable under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act as the plaintiff was out of possession : Second, whether the lower appellant court having found that the plaintiff was the owner of the land in dispute, it should have moulded the relief by granting a degree for possession, even though it had not been asked for in the plaint. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants pressed these two points before me, and argued that the plaintiff appellant having been found by both the courts as Bhumidhar of the land in dispute, the suit for injunction could not have been dismissed as not maintainable. He argued that there was no equally efficacious relief which could have been obtained both the plaintiff-appellants by any other usual mode or proceedings. 7. He argued that there was no equally efficacious relief which could have been obtained both the plaintiff-appellants by any other usual mode or proceedings. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents argued that the appellants having been found out of possession, the relief for possession was asked for in the plaint and, therefore, the suit had been rightly dismissed. 8. The question that arises for consideration is whether the relief for delivery of possession is not equally efficacious relief which he can obtain by any other usual mode of proceedings and suit for permanent injunction would be maintainable when the plaintiff is out of possession. On this question there are ample authorities of this court as well as of various other High Courts. The earliest case brought to may notice is Bhramar Lal v. Nand Lal (AIR 1915 Col. 23). The question in that case was whether a suit was maintainable by a plaintiff who was out of possession and who sought relief for injunction only. The Bench of the Calcutta High Court relying on certain English cases laid down when the plaintiff was out of possession unless there was some privity between the parties. 9. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee, Amritsar (AIR 1938 Lah. 369) held that where a suit was filed on behalf of the Mohammadan Community which could have sued for possession of a mosque in possession of non-Muslims even though the individual of that community could not sue for such relief but the relief asked for was for a mere declaration and injunction and the suit was not maintainable. It was observed that it was well established that when it was open to a person to sue for possession, he cannot be granted any relief in the shape of a mere injunction. 10. In the case of Hashmat Husain and others v. Inayatullah and others (AIR 1958 Alld. 706) it was held that where the defendant is sued as a trespasser, relief can be obtained by the usual proceeding in ejectment and Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act which provides for exceptional relief by injunction would come in the way of granting a decree for mere injunction. 11. 706) it was held that where the defendant is sued as a trespasser, relief can be obtained by the usual proceeding in ejectment and Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act which provides for exceptional relief by injunction would come in the way of granting a decree for mere injunction. 11. In view of these decision it can be held that suit for ejectment or delivery of possession is equally efficacious remedy under clause (h) of Section 41 of Specific Relief Act 1963 and where relief for delivery of possession or judgment, of defendant is not asked for or prayed for, mere relief for injunction which is a discretionary relief, cannot be granted. Such a suit for mere grant of permanent injunction is not maintainable. Both the courts have rightly held that even if the plaintiff-appellant is Bhumidhar of the disputed plot, the relief for injunction cannot be granted to him in the absence of any relief for delivery of possession. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants then argued that when the appellant was found Bhumidhar of the disputed plot the court below ought to have awarded the relief by granting a decree for possession even though it had not been asked for in the plaint. In support of his argument the learned counsel relied upon a decision of this court in Food Corporation of India v. Mahabir Prasad Bhartiya (1988 A. W. C. 594). The argument has no merit. The relief which will be granted to plaintiff is dependent upon the course of action shown in the plaint. Where the plaintiff has not pleaded that he is out of possession and it is the defendant who is in possession, the court cannot grant relief of delivery of possession to the plaintiff. In fact in the plaint it has to be alleged when the plaintiff was dispossessed from the disputed land, who dispossessed him and from what part of land he was dispossessed. Unless there is a complete cause of action pleaded in the plaint the relief for delivery of possession cannot be granted to the plaintiff as such relief depended upon the course of action shown in the plaint. In the present case the plaintiff appellant has not set out cause of action for relief of delivery of possession over the disputed land. In the present case the plaintiff appellant has not set out cause of action for relief of delivery of possession over the disputed land. Where complete cause of action has been set out in the plaint the court may in appropriate case permit a plaintiff to amend relief set out in the plaint. The decision in the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) relief upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no help to his case. In this case it was held that provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act are not exhaustive. In case any relief is claimed otherwise when a declaration as to any legal character or any right, to any property, in that event the general provisions of order 7 Rule 7 and Section 9 of the code would apply. In other words, in case the relief falls outside the purview of Section 34 of the Act in that case the courts have power to grant such a decree under the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in continuity of the requirement of the section. Since relief of delivery of possession could not have been granted without a complete cause of action being set out in the plaint, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the court ought to have awarded the relief by granting a decree for possession, though it had not been asked for, must be rejected. 13. So far as Cross objection is concerned both the courts have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the plaintiff appellant is Bhumidhar of the disputed plot. This finding is based on appraisal of evidence on record and this has not been shown to me to suffer from any legal infirmity. 14. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the second Appeal as well as in Cross objection and both are dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.