Judgment : Petitioners in Crl.M.P.No.7665 of 1988 are accused 1 and 2 while petitioner in Crl.M.P.Mo.6665 of 1988 is accused 3 in CGNo3669 of 1988 on the file of the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras. 2. Accused 1 to 3 are the joint owners of the premises situate at Door No.11, Evening Bazaar Road, Park Town, Madras-3. The said premises was being renovated in the year 1988. As part of the renovation work, mosaic flooring was replaced and it was polished with the aid of a polishing machine using electrical energy. The renovation work was attended to by accused 3. The service connection for the said premises stands in the name of accused 1. 3. On 22. 1988, the mosaic polishing operation was effectuated by operating the machine using electrical energy. The operator of the machine tried his level best to take electrical energy for operating the machine in the normal way, but he could not succeed. Consequently what he had done was that he tapped electrical energy by directly having the connection with the main line by-passing the meter. This was done in the immediate presence and knowledge of accused 3. The Assistant Divisional Engineer, O. & M. Chintadripet, M.E.S.(D) Central, Madras inspected the premises and found electrical energy being illegally tapped. Consequently, he lodged a report before the Sub Inspector of Police, C1 Flower Bazaar Police Station, Madras, who in turn, registered the case in Crime No.93 of 1988 for alleged offences under Sec.39(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (for short ‘the Act’). 4. After completing the formalities of the investigation, a final report under Sec,173(2), Cr.P.C. had been laid, which is now pending in the aforesaid Calendar Case against accused 1 to 3 for alleged offence under Sec.39(1) of the Act and under Sec.379 read with Sec.34 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. On receipt of process, petitioners came forward with the present actions invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them. 6. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners would urge the following points: 1. The materials on record do not establish the alleged illegal tapping of electrical energy by any one of the petitioners; and 2. On receipt of process, petitioners came forward with the present actions invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them. 6. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners would urge the following points: 1. The materials on record do not establish the alleged illegal tapping of electrical energy by any one of the petitioners; and 2. In any event, accused 1 and 2, who were not in charge of renovation work and were far away from the scene at the relevant point of time, cannot be stated to be having any sort of connection with the alleged theft of electrical energy that took place in the premises under renovation. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor would, however, repel such a submission. 8. To the submissions of learned counsel for petitioners, I am unable to affix my seal of approval, on the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no pale of controversy that the premises under renovation is being jointly owned by all accused and the service connection, as already stated, stands in the name of accused 1 and accused 3 was in charge of renovation of the building. It is also not in dispute that at the relevant time of inspection by the TNEB officials, there was dishonest abstraction of electrical energy by means not authorised by the licensee. What petitioners would contend is that they were not responsible for such dishonest abstraction of electrical energy; and as they had not done any overt act in such dishonest abstraction of electrical energy, they are not responsible. To put it otherwise, their contention appears to be that the persons responsible for such illegal or dishonest abstraction of electrical energy is none-else than the borrower of the mosaic polishing machine, who alone was liable to be prosecuted. 9. Such a contention cannot at all be countenanced on the face of the salient provision adumbrated under Secs.39 and 2(c) of the Act. Under the second limb of Sec.39, it is made crystal clear that if it is proved that any artificial mean or means not authorised by the licensee exist for the abstraction, consumption, or use of energy by the consumer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that any abstraction, consumption or use of energy has been dishonestly, caused by such consumer. 10. 10. Sec.2(c) defines who, a consumer’ is and is couched in the following terms: “‘Consumer’ means any person who is supplied with energy by a licensee or the Government or by any other person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, and includes any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of receiving energy with the works of a licensee, the Government or such other person, as the case may be.” 11. Under this definition, the phraseology, “and includes any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of receiving energy with the works of a licensee” is of signal importance. The phraseology would include within the term ‘consumer’ owner of the premises, which was given service connection from the works of a licensee. The fact that such a consumer is not using electrical energy by actually residing in the premises is not at all material. Such a person for all practical purposes of this Act is a consumer, falling within the purview of Sec.39 of the Act, answerable for the charge of theft of electrical energy, when there was dishonest abstraction of electrical energy. 12. Once there is dishonest abstraction, then the burden shifts on to the consumer to prove the contrary that there was no such dishonest abstraction of electrical energy. In the case on hand, as already adverted to, there are prima facie materials available on record pointing out the alleged dishonest abstraction of electrical energy. In such state of affairs, the burden will squarely shift on to petitioners, who are none-else than the joint owners of the premises and such a feat could be done only during trial. 13. Learned counsel for petitioners would, however, contend that there are materials available on record, in the shape of Sec. 161, Cr.P.C. statements recorded by the investigating agency pointing out that accused 3 alone was liable and in such a circumstance, there is no need for accused 1 and 2 to stand the ordeal of trial. Of course, true it is that such recorded statement prima facie reveals that accused 3 had undertaken the entire responsibility for the theft of electrical energy. Of course, true it is that such recorded statement prima facie reveals that accused 3 had undertaken the entire responsibility for the theft of electrical energy. The fact that accused 3 had undertaken such responsibility by giving a statement can by no stretch of imagination be construed, in the eye of law, as evidence proving his responsibility, thereby exonerating accused 1 and 2, inasmuch as his statement is after all a statement given to the police, by an accused person during the course of investigation, which is practically inadmissible. The burden cast upon petitioners to prove the contrary can very well be discharged only during the course of trial. 14. For the foregoing reasons, both the petitions deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed.