JUDGMENT R B. Mehrotra, J 1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the question which requires consideration is, as to whether on an application for restitution of possession on the ground of setting aside an exparte decree in proceedings under the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the persons claiming to be heirs of the deceased tenant within the meaning of section 3 (1) (a) of the Act are entitled to be put back in possession, without final adjudication of the contention of the respondent-landlord that the persons claiming to be the heirs of the deceased tenant, are not tenant, within the meaning of section 3 (I) (a) of the Act. 2. Necessary facts for the decision of the writ petition are as under :- One Sunit Kumar Das was the tenant of the disputed premises situate at 6-B, Stanley Road, Allahabad. The contesting respondents, namely, Ravindra Sinha and Shivendra Sinha are admittedly the landlord of the premises in dispute The respondent-landlord filed an application under section 21 (I) (a) of the Act seeking eviction of the tenant Sri Sunit Kumar Das on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises in dispute. On the basis of an exparte order, obtaing release of the house in their favour the respondent- landlord tried to take possession of the disputed premises on 7 th July. 1988. There is some dispute regarding the factum of taking possession by the respondent-landlord on the basis of exparte order, but for the purposes of the decision of the present writ petition, the said dispute is not very material. Tenant Sunit Kumar Das filed an application on 12-7-1988 for setting aside the exparte order dated 14-1-1988, and also moved an application for staying, execution of the exparte order, dated 14-1-1988, and delivery of possession to the landlord. The Prescribed Authority stayed the execution of the exparte order on 12-7-1988, and fixed 12-8-1988 for the disposal of the restoration application. 3. The petitioners have contended in their writ petition that during the continuance of the stay order passed on 12-7-1988 by the Prescribed Authority, the respondent-landlord forcibly placed their locks on the disputed premises on 21-7-1988. An application was moved on behalf of Sunit Kumar Das the tenant and the petitioner no. 3. The petitioners have contended in their writ petition that during the continuance of the stay order passed on 12-7-1988 by the Prescribed Authority, the respondent-landlord forcibly placed their locks on the disputed premises on 21-7-1988. An application was moved on behalf of Sunit Kumar Das the tenant and the petitioner no. 1 Smt. Meena Das, the wile of the tenant, on 21-7-1988 to the District Magistrate Allahabad that the landlord with the connivance of the police officials have forcibly dispossessed the tenant and his wife, as such they should be placed back in possession of the disputed premises. On the said application of the tenant and his wife, the District Magistrate deputed Sri 1. P. Gautam, Additional City Magistrate, Allahabad to go on the spot and to get possession restored to the tenant Smt. Sunit Kumar Das. Sri J. P. Gautam went on the spot, made an enquiry and reported that till 21-7-1988, Das couple were residing in the disputed premises. On 21-7-1988, Ravindra Sinha, the respondent landlord, with the help and connivance of the police, had forcibly put his lock in the premises in dispute. The enquiry has further revealed that the luggage of Sri Das is still lying in the house in dispute It was also reported that four armed constables were placed on guard at the disputed premises to continue the forcible possession of Ravindra Sinha. The Additional City Magistrate also reported that despite his orders to put Sri Das and his wife back in possession, the Sub-Inspector of police expressed his inability to comply with the order and told the Addl. City Magistrate that he is going to obtain orders from the higher police authorities in this connection and only then he will restore back the possession to the tenant. 4. The District Magistrate, on the basis of the aforesaid report of the Addl. City Magistrate, by his letter dated 22-7-5988 informed the Prescribed Authority that the respondent-landlord has forcibly turned out Das's family from the disputed house and placed their lock in the premises and the goods of the tenant are locked in the house in dispute. The Addl. City Magistrate was deputed to make an enquiry on the complaint and he found the complaint to be correct. The conduct of the police including the Senior Supdt. of Police is suspicious and fishy. The Addl. City Magistrate was deputed to make an enquiry on the complaint and he found the complaint to be correct. The conduct of the police including the Senior Supdt. of Police is suspicious and fishy. Thereafter on 24-7-1988, an Advocate Commissioner was deputed to make an enquiry regarding possession. The Advocate Commissioner went on the spot and unlocked the lock put in the premises taking the keys from the respondent-landlord but due to objections raised by the petitioner no. I the inspection could not be done. He put in his own lock and sealed the premises and submitted a report to the Prescribed Authority stating therein that the earlier lock put by him was changed and in view of the objections by the parties, it was not possible to make any spot inspection. On 10-8-1988 the respondent-landlord filed a Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15407 of 1988 in this Court. This Court dismissed the writ petition of the landlord, vide its order, dated 28-10-1988 observing that since the question of possession is disputed between the parties, it is not possible to decide the same. This Court, however, directed the prescribed Authority to expeditiously decide the restoration application moved by the tenant within two months from the date of the order of the High Court. The Prescribed Authority, vide its order, dated 19-3-1989, allowed the restoration application of the petitioners and set aside the exparte order passed in favour of the respondent landlord on 14-1-1988. This order of setting aside the exparte order passed in fovour of the respondent landlord has become final between the parties and has not been challenged before any court. Shri Sunit Kumar Das the tenant died during the pendency of the application for setting aside the exparte order. An application was moved on behalf of the petitioners, who are wife and son of the deceased tenant for being substituted in place of the tenant for prosecuting the application for setting aside the exparte decree. The respondent landlord objected to the said substitution application on the ground that since the present petitioners, who are the wife and son of the deceased-tenant, were not normally residing with the tenant in the premises in dispute but were residing at Panipat, tney are not entitled to be substituted as heirs of the deceased- tenant Sunit Kumar Das. This objection was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. This objection was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority while disposing of the aforesaid objection took a view that the dispute regarding question of tenancy right will be decided at the time of the decision of the main case itself on merits and allowed the substitution application with the aforesaid observation. Subsequent thereto, the respondent landlord moved an application on 8-8-1988 offering a part of the house to the petitioners and seeking release of the rest of the premises on the ground that the need of the petitioners can be satisfied if they retained only a part of the premises in dispute. The portion of the premises in dispute whicn was to be retained by the petitioners was detailed in the said application. The present petitioners, however, did not agree to the said suggestion of the respondent-landlord 5. The Prescribed Authority, vide its order, dated 2-12-1989 rejected the petitioners' application for restitution and directed that it is necessary in the interest of justice that the application of the landlord respondent under section 21 (lj (a) may be decided first on merits instead of putting back the petitioners in possession of the disputed premises. The main reasoning of the Prescribed Authority in rejecting the petitioners' application for restitution is that if the petitioners are put back in possession of the premises in dispute, unnecessary delay will be caused at the instance of the tenant in getting the matter decided. 6. The petitioners have challenged the validity of the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority by means of the present writ petition and have sought for quashing the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority, dated 2-12-1989. The main contention made on behalf of the counsel for the petitioners is that on the basis of the principles incorporated under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioners were entitled to be put back in possession of the disputed premises, in their restitution application, as a consequence of exparte decree having been set aside. The petitioners also submitted that the exparte decree passed in favour of the respondent-landlord having been set aside, the respondent-landlord does not get any right to get back possession of the premises in dispute unless there is a specific order passed by the Prescribed Authority releasing the premises in dispute in their favour. The petitioners also submitted that the exparte decree passed in favour of the respondent-landlord having been set aside, the respondent-landlord does not get any right to get back possession of the premises in dispute unless there is a specific order passed by the Prescribed Authority releasing the premises in dispute in their favour. It has been further contended that there is no justification for continuing to deprive the petitioners from getting back possession of the premises in disputs as the petitioners are residing in the verandah of the disputed premises due to the high-hindedness of the respondent-landlord with the aid and connivance of the police authorities. The counsil has contended that in the circumstances of the case, the interest of justice also require a direction for putting the petitioners back in possession of the premises in dispute, 7. The counsel for the respondent-landlord has submitted that since the very question as to whether the petitioners are tenants of the premises in dispute is still undecided, the petitioners have no right to get back possession on the restitution application. The right of restitution vests in a person who has been dispossessed on the basis of any order of the court, if such an order has been set aside, but some other person, who claims himself to be the heir of the deceased-tenant is not entitled to get back possession, in a restitution application if his locus standi itself is disputed. The counsel for the respondent-landlord has submitted that unless the court decides the question as to whether the present petitioners are tenant within the meaning of section 3 (i) (a) of the Act, the present petitioners are not entitled to be put back in possession of the premises in dispute. The counsel for the respondent-landlord next submitted that the impugned order is only an interim arrangement till the main application of the respondent-landlord is decided and if the Prescribed Authority thought it fit, in the interest of justice not to put back the petitioners in possession, in particular circumstance of this case, there is no justification for this Court to interfere with such an order. 8. I have given careful consideration of the submissions made on behalf of both the parties. 8. I have given careful consideration of the submissions made on behalf of both the parties. It has not been disputed before me that even though section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure as such has not been made applicable to rent control proceedings in Uttar Pradesh but the principles enunciated in the said section apply to the rent control proceedings. It has been held in a Fall Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ganga Dhar v. Raghubar Dayal, 1974 ALJ 751 that even in cases where the provisions of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable, the court has a duty to place the parties in position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order, the court should exercise its Jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 22 (f) of the Rules framed under the Act, the powers referred to sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure to make and order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned has been conferred on the authorities under the Act. The Prescribed Authority in fact was exercising its jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In exercise of the said power, the Prescribed Authority was entitled to pass any order which he thought fit for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. The controversy stands concluded by several decisions of this Court, the last one brought to my notice is, the case of Smt. Harnam Kaur v. Prescribed Authority, 1986 ALJ 973. The impugned order of the Prescribed Authority directing the application of the respondent-landlord to be decided on merits instead of putting back the petitioners in possession of the disputed premises, shows complete non-application of mind as to the powers conferred on the Prescribed Authority for deciding the restitution application. On the principles contained in section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court has mandatory duty to put back the parties in a situation which was existing before passing of an order which has been set aside subsequently. In the present case admittedly the exparte order passed against the husband of the petitioner no. 1 has been set aside at the instance of the petitioners. In the present case admittedly the exparte order passed against the husband of the petitioner no. 1 has been set aside at the instance of the petitioners. Prima face, the petitioners have been substituted for prosecuting the application for setting aside the exparte order and at the instance of the petitioners, the application for setting aside the exparte order has been allowed as a consequence of which the petitioners are entitled to contest the release application of the respondent-landlord on merits. The contention of the respondent-landlord that the present petitioners are not the tenant within the meaning of section 3 (1) (a) of the Act has not yet been decided. The question, however, of deciding a release application in favour of the respondent-landlord is to be determined within the four corners of section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and the first requirement for allowing the said application is that the need of the respondent landlord should be found to be bona fide. Unless the Prescribed Authority records a finding in favour of the respondent landlord that the need of the respondent landlord is bora fide, the premises in dispute cannot be released in favour of the landlord. 9. The question as to whether the present petitioners have become the tenant of the disputed premises after the death of Sunit Kumar Das is to be decided in separate proceedings under which if it is found that the present petitioners were not residing with the deceased-tenant Sunit Kumar Das, the premises may be decaled vacant under section 12 of the Act. The said question cannot be adjudicated in an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act In that view of the matter, the Prescribed Authority should have applied its mind only to the question as to whether the petitioners are entitled to get back possession of the premises in dispute in pursuance of the setting aside the exparte order. The Prescribed Authority was swayed away by extraneous considerations in dismissing the petitioners' application on the ground that if the petitioners are allowed to be put back in possession of the premises in dispute, it will cause unnecessary delay in disposal of the application for release. If this ground is accepted to be legally sound ground then no application for restitution will be allowed. If this ground is accepted to be legally sound ground then no application for restitution will be allowed. No general principles can be laid down that if a tenant is put back in possession in pursuance of setting aside an exparte order, the decision on the release application will be delayed. The impugned order is thus based on extraneous consideration, the uncalled for assumption of causing delay at the instance of the sitting tenant, cannot be a ground, for rejecting the restitution application. 10. Another consideration which has prevailed with the Prescribed Authority is that an offer of the landlord to permit the petitioners to live in a part of the premises in dispute has not been accepted by the petitioners, but merely by the fact that the petitioners have not agreed to reside in a part of the premises in dispute also cannot be a ground for refusing the restitution application of the petitioners. In the aforesaid circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that even though the question as to whether the present petitioners are tenant of the premises in dispute have not been decided by a competent authority or a court, since the petitioners' substitution application for prosecuting the application for setting aside the exparte order has been allowed, prima facie the petitioners are entitled to be put back in possession of the premises in dispute unless a competent court finds that the petitioners have not become tenant within the meaning of section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. However, I clarify that restitution of possession of the premises in dispute to the petitioners does not amount to be a decision of the petitioners' entitlement to be held tenant. If competent authority finds in appropriate procerdings that the petitioners are not the tenants, of the premises in dispute, the petitioners may be evicted from the premises in accordance with law. I also clarify that in the circumstances of the present case, the landlord's application for the release of the premises should be expeditiously decided within four months. 11. Accordingly, I allow the writ petition with costs, set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, dated 2nd December, 1989 and direct the Prescribed Authority to decide afresh the restitution application of the petitioners, within one month, in the light of observations made in this judgment. 12. 11. Accordingly, I allow the writ petition with costs, set aside the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, dated 2nd December, 1989 and direct the Prescribed Authority to decide afresh the restitution application of the petitioners, within one month, in the light of observations made in this judgment. 12. The period for deciding the applications as indicated above will commence from the date the certified copy of this Court's order is produced before the Prescribed Authority by any of the parties. In the facts of the present case, I quantify the costs to Rs. 1,000/-. Petition allowed.