Judgment : The Inspector of Police, Tiruchengode, the second respondent herein, laid a report in Crime No.867 of 1987 on 211. 1987 before the Executive First Class Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Officer, Sankari that the feelings between T.S. Arthanari and seven others in ‘A’ Party (third respondent) and S.A. Natesan and seven others in ‘B’ Party (petitioner) of the Communist Party of India, Tiruchengode Town, are highly strained and they were creating troubles and threatening each other at present due to scramble for possession of the party office situate at Door No. 15, Sannithi Street, Tiruchengode Town. 2. On receipt of the report, the Executive Magistrate tookit on file as M.C.No.165/87-Dand after deriving subjective satisfaction, on perusal of the report that there was likelihood of breach of peace between them, passed a preliminary order on 12. 1987 requiring the parties to attend his Court in person or with pleader on 12. 1987 at the office of the Tahsildar, Tiruchengode and put in written statement of their respective claim in respect of the facts relating to the actual or factual possession of the said property. 3. On the same day, he along with the Taluk Tahsildar, Village Administrative Officer and Revenue Inspector, Tiruchengode inspected the party office with both the parties, heard their versions and obtained their statements. From the situation prevailing then, he formed an opinion that both the parties would involve in violence to take possession of the disputed property, which may lead to blood-shed and likely to cause breach of peace and therefore, in order to maintain law and order and to avert bloodshed, he passed an order under Sec.146(1), Cr.P.C, preventing both of them to enter into the office, besides passing an order for locking and sealing the office and accordingly, he locked and sealed the office of the Communist Party of India in the presence of both the parties, Taluk Tahsildar, Village Administrative Officer and Revenue Inspector, Tiruchengode and the general public. 4. It appears that ‘B’ party filed O.S.No.762 of 1987 before the District Munsif, Tiruchengode for a bare injunction and also filed I.A.No. 187 of 1987 praying for the relief of interim injunction. In fact, ad interim injunction was passed on 28. 1987 and notice was ordered returnable by 9. 1987. Injunction so ordered from time and again was extended till upto 12. 1987 and thereafter, there was no extension. In fact, ad interim injunction was passed on 28. 1987 and notice was ordered returnable by 9. 1987. Injunction so ordered from time and again was extended till upto 12. 1987 and thereafter, there was no extension. It is in such a situation the ‘B1’ party resorted to the present action invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to set aside the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would urge the following points for consideration: 1. On the date when learned Executive Magistrate, passed the preliminary order, a competent Civil Court was seized of the matter and passed an interim injunction and in such state of affairs, the proceedings under Sec.145, Cr.P.C, is not sustainable; and 2. The passing of an order under Sec.146(1), Cr.P.C, is not tenable unless and until the proceedings under Sec. 145 reached the state of Sec.145(4), Cr.P.C. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent would however repel such submissions, ably supported by learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for respondents 1 and 2. 7. To both the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, I am unable to affix my seal of approval, on the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. Sec.146, Cr.P.C, deals with the power to attach the subject matter of dispute and to appoint a Receiver. Such a power is exercisable under the following three circumstances: 1. If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under Sub-sec(1) of Sec. 145, considers the case to be one of emergency; or 2. If he decided that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in Sec.145; or 3. If he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in possession of the subject of dispute. 9. The three clauses are joined by a disjunctive conjunction ‘or’ thereby pointing out that each of the three clauses stand independently by itself. To put it otherwise, if the Magistrate is satisfied that anyone of the three circumstances as adumbrated in the section is there, then he can very well resort to attach the subject matter of dispute and appoint a Receiver. To put it otherwise, if the Magistrate is satisfied that anyone of the three circumstances as adumbrated in the section is there, then he can very well resort to attach the subject matter of dispute and appoint a Receiver. For the exercise of power under the first clause as contemplated in this section, there must be a preliminary order passed under Sec. 145(1), Cr.P.C. Once there is an existence of such an order, then it is open to the Magistrate to pass an order under this clause ‘at any time’. To put it otherwise, if there is no preliminary order under Sec.145(1), Cr.P.C, the power of the Magistrate under Clause (1) cannot at all be exercised. 10. In the case on hand, there is admittedly a preliminary order passed under Sec. 145 (1), Cr.P.C On 12. 1987. Only after passing this order, learned Executive Magistrate, as already indicated, went to the spot, heard both the parties, recorded their statements, assessed the situation and came to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the case, an order under Sec.146(1), Cr.P.C, is to be passed, in order to avoid breach of peace and bloodshed between the rival factions, in the process of grabbing the party office. 11. Auseful reference may be made to the decision in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarilal, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 242, where their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 4 as follows: "Quite obviously, Secs.145 and 146 of the Cr.P.C, together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If Sec. 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of Sec. 145, it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But Sec.146, cannot be so separated from Sec.145. It can only be read in the context of Sec.145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead. That is one of the first principles of construction. Let us therefore, look at Sec.145 and consider Sec.146 in that context. But Sec.146, cannot be so separated from Sec.145. It can only be read in the context of Sec.145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead. That is one of the first principles of construction. Let us therefore, look at Sec.145 and consider Sec.146 in that context. Sec.145 contemplates, first, the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or their boundaries, and, next, the issuance of an order known to lawyers practising in the Criminal Courts as a Preliminary Order, stating the grounds of his satisfaction and requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court and put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. A preliminary order is considered so basic to a proceeding under Sec.145 that a failure to draw up a preliminary order has been held by several High Courts to vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. It is by making a preliminary order that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to proceed under Secs.145 and 146. In fact, the first of the situations in which an attachment may be effected under Sec.146 of the 1973 Code has to be “at any time after making the order under Sub-sec(1) of Sec.145” while the other two situations have, necessarily, to be at the final stage of the proceeding initiated by the preliminary order. Now, the preliminary order is required to enjoin the parties not only to appear before the Magistrate on a specified date but also to put in their written statements. Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.145 prescribes the mode of service of the preliminary order on the parties. Sub-sec.(4) casts a duty on the Magistrate to peruse the written statements of the parties, to receive the evidence adduced by them, to take further evidence, if necessary and, if possible, to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was in possession, he is to make a final order in the manner provided by Sub-sec.(6). If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was in possession, he is to make a final order in the manner provided by Sub-sec.(6). Provision for the two situations where the Magistrate is unable to decide which of the parties was in possession or where he is of the view that neither of them was in possession is made in Sec.146 under which he may attach the subject of dispute until the determination of the rights of parties by a competent Court. The scheme of Secs.145 and 146 is that the Magistrate, on being satisfied about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, issues a preliminary order stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements. Then he proceeds to peruse the statements, to receive and to take evidence and to decide which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order. On the other hand, if he is unable to decide who was in such possession or if he is of the view that none of the parties was in such possession, he may say so. If he decides that one of the parties was in possession, he declares the possession of such party. In the other two situations he attaches the property. Thus, a proceeding begun with a preliminary order must be followed up by an enquiry and end with the Magistrate deciding in one of the three ways and making consequential orders. There is no half way house, there is no question of stopping in the middle and leaving the parties to go to the Civil Court. Proceeding may however be stopped at any time if one or other of the parties satisfies the Magistrate that there has never been or there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. If there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the foundation for the jurisdiction of the Magistrate disappears. The Magistrate then cancels the preliminary order. This is provided by Sec.145, Sub-sec.(5). Except for the reason that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and as provided by Sec.145(5), a proceeding initiated by a preliminary order under Sec.145(1) must run its full course. The Magistrate then cancels the preliminary order. This is provided by Sec.145, Sub-sec.(5). Except for the reason that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and as provided by Sec.145(5), a proceeding initiated by a preliminary order under Sec.145(1) must run its full course. Now, in a case of emergency a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order. This is the first of the situations provided in Sec.146(1) in which an attachment may be effected. There is no express stipulation in Sec.146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachments. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by Sec.145, Sub-sec.(4) is against any such implication. Suppose a Magistrate draws up a preliminary order under Sec. 145(1) and immediately follows it up with an attachment under Sec.146(1), the whole exercise of stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to appear before him and submit their written statements becomes futile if he is to have no further jurisdiction in the matter. And yet he cannot make an order of attachment under Sec.146(1) on the ground of emergency without first making a preliminary order in the manner prescribed by Sec.145(1). There is no reason why we should adopt a construction which will lead to such inevitable contradictions. We mentioned a little earlier that the only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in Sec.145(5) and it can only be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of Sec.146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace." The observations, as extracted above, are applicable on all fours to the case on hand. 12. Even the circumstances of seizing of the subject matter of dispute by a competent civil forum is of no consequence, in the circumstances of the case. As stated earlier, even the interim injunction passed was not extended beyond 12. 1987, and as such, it cannot be stated that there is any adjudication of the rights of the parties by a competent civil forum on 12. As stated earlier, even the interim injunction passed was not extended beyond 12. 1987, and as such, it cannot be stated that there is any adjudication of the rights of the parties by a competent civil forum on 12. 1987, the date when learned Executive Magistrate passed the impugned order.