JUDGMENT -HALBE A.A., J.:—In this revision petition, the important point, which crops up for consideration is whether the coparcener governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law is entitled to his share in the coparcenary property in the family of his birth even after his adoption in other family, whether his undivided interest in the said property would continue to vest in him even after adoption by reason of the proviso (b) to section 12 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The verdict essentially rests on the interpretation of the above proviso. However, before adjudicating upon the same, a brief reference to few relevant facts of the case appear to be necessary. 2. Arundas Shivrao Kanegaonkar, was born in the family of Anantrao Devidasrao Deshmukh. He was given in adoption in the family of Kanegaonkar under the deed of adoption, dated 6-6-1964. In a Suit No. 40/84 filed by one of the sons of Anantrao Deshmukh, in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nanded, against other coparceners, Arundas made an application, Ex. 39, permitting him to join as one of the defendants in the suit to claim his share in the family property, which had vested in him before his adoption. Both the plaintiff and defendants in that suit resisted this application, inter alia, contending that on adoptions, Arundas has served his ties with the family of his birth and that no property of his natural family had vested in him on the eve of his adoption, as the same was unascertained and thus the adopted son has no right to seek partition of his undivided share in the coparcenary property of his natural family. 3. The trial Court, on consideration of dicta in the case of (Yarlagadda Naiyudarama v. Government of Andhra Pradesh)1, reported in A.I.R. 1981 A.P. 19, allowed this application and permitted Arundas to implied himself as one of the defendants in the above suit of petition and possession. Being aggrieved by this permission, the present petitioner/original plaintiff has preferred this Civil Revision Application, inter alia, contending that on adoption the adopted son is divested of his all rights in the property of natural family and he could not claim any right in the family property. Being aggrieved by this permission, the present petitioner/original plaintiff has preferred this Civil Revision Application, inter alia, contending that on adoption the adopted son is divested of his all rights in the property of natural family and he could not claim any right in the family property. It is also further suggested that there did not exist any right in the undivided interest in the family property because there was no defined share of adopted son in the coparcenary property, which is liable to be enlarged on death and diminished on births in the family. Undoubtedly, the parties are governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and claim is set by one coparcener against the other coparcener in the suit. 4. Before probing into the arguments canvassed on behalf of the petitioner, it would be proper to reproduce relevant provisions of section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (only relevant part is reproduced). "....Adoption child shall be deemed to be child of his or her adopting father or mother for all purposes will effect from the date of adoption and from such date of, all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be served and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adopted family: Provided that; A) ........................ B) Any property which vested in the adopted child before adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation for maintaining relatives of the family of his or her birth. C) ........................" 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner/plaintiff had raised the following queries and has urged that these queries are not adequately answered in the view expressed by the Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above ruling and that the same needs reconsideration. It is urged that it should be laid down by his Hon'ble Court that the adopted child forfeits all his rights in the family property of his natural family sequel to his adoption. He has broadly urged the following points : i) Under section 12, proviso (b) of the Act, it is provided that only that property which is vested in favour of the adopted child prior to adoption shall continue to vest in him. He has broadly urged the following points : i) Under section 12, proviso (b) of the Act, it is provided that only that property which is vested in favour of the adopted child prior to adoption shall continue to vest in him. This should be construed as vesting of full ownership rights in the property and not vesting in limited sense. In the case, in absence of defined share there cannot be vesting of ownership in the property. There is vesting of ownership rights only on actual succession of inheritance to the estate but the same cannot be extended to undivided share in the coparcenary, since the property is not defined for allotment to the share of the coparceners. ii) In case of adoption of sole surviving coparceners, if this analogy is applied the entire family property would go with the adopted member and that the order claimants to that property shall be without remedy and such a situation cannot be contemplated not must have been envisaged by the Parliament while enacting the statute. iii) The illustration under proviso (b) to section 12 under Mulla's Treatise on Hindu Law and Raghvachariar's Treatise on Hindu Law indicate just the contrary to what has been held by Their Lordships of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above case (supra) and those illustrations support the arguments of the petitioner rather than the view point propagated in the above ruling. In order to reach the answer to these queries, it is necessary to analyse the nature of coparcenary property and the mode of devolution thereof. In the Commentary of Hindu Law of Mulla, it is observed that, coparcenary property may consist of ancestral property or of joint acquisitions or property drawn in common stock and ascertions to such property. A coparcener acquires interest in the property by birth and such a property is called an 'unobstructed heritage'. In the Commentary of Hindu Law of Mulla, it is observed that, coparcenary property may consist of ancestral property or of joint acquisitions or property drawn in common stock and ascertions to such property. A coparcener acquires interest in the property by birth and such a property is called an 'unobstructed heritage'. The Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1523, in the case of (Gowli Buddanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore)2, observed that : "A Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the joint family it includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property, these being the sons, grandsons and great grandsons of the holder of the joint property for the time being." This would, therefore, show that the Hindu coparcenary comprises a small body of the holder and his lineal discedants. It would not include all the members including the females. 6. In A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1330, in the case of (State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram)3, the Supreme Court enunciated elaborately the rights coparceners on the coparcenary property as follows: "A coparcenary under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son becomes a coparcener with his adoptive father as regards ancestral properties of latter. The incidents of coparcenership under the Mitakshara law are : first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person, secondly, that such descendants can at any time work out of their rights by asking for partition, thirdly, that till partition, each member has got ownership extending over the entire property, conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors." 7. In A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2069, in the case of (Controller of Estate Duty, Madras v. Alladi Kuppuswamy)4, Supreme Court has highlighted distinction between the rights of a coparcener and that of a Hindu widow over the coparcenary property. In A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2069, in the case of (Controller of Estate Duty, Madras v. Alladi Kuppuswamy)4, Supreme Court has highlighted distinction between the rights of a coparcener and that of a Hindu widow over the coparcenary property. The Court observed that: "By virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, a Hindu widow possesses a coparcenary interest as contemplated by section 7(1) and she is also a member of a Hindu Coparcenary as envisaged by section 7(2)............. A Hindu widow who has been introduced into a coparcenary by virtue of the Act of 1937 possesses all the necessary indicia of a coparcenary interest, except acquisition of interest by birth." This observation would clearly indicate that so far as the coparcener is concerned, his right accrues on his birth; whereas in case of a Hindu Woman such right accrues only after the marriage and her entry into the family. This is a clear distinction in regard to the vesting of property. 8. Briefly stated, the rights of coparcener to his joint possession and enjoyment, to seek partition, to question alienations and to ask for accounts of the joint family property, are the clear manifestations of the full ownership rights in favour of a coparcener and on no reckoning such rights can be said to be short of rights of a full owner, such rights devolve on the coparcener by birth and crystallise into a definite share on actual partition. However, they do not remain dormant or unenforceable till actual partition. There is thus clear vesting of title in the coparcener even before partition. In every coparcenary, therefore, the son, the grandson or great grandson obtains an interest by birth in the coparcenary property so as to be able to control and restrain improper dealings with the property by another coparcener. 9. With the enactment of section 30 and Explanation of the Hindu Succession Act, the right of testamentary disposition of the undivided share of the coparcener has been recognised which was hitherto barred with the commencement of Hindu Law by reason of the fact that at the moment of death, the right of survivorship of other coparceners is in conflict with the right by device. The title of survivorship being the prior title takes precedence to the exclusion of that by device. The title of survivorship being the prior title takes precedence to the exclusion of that by device. With the enactment of Explanation to section 30, this Rule of Mitakshara Law is now abrogated and it is laid down in explicit terms that such interest is to be deemed to be the property capable of being disposed of by Will notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act or any other law for the time being in force. This provision would, therefore, clearly show that undivided share of coparcener can be disposed of by testamentary disposition and this is one of the aspects leading to the conclusion that the right of the coparcener in the undivided share is a right of the owner. This legal sanction has thus strengthened the concept of the undivided share of a coparcener being vested in him as the full owner on birth. Such vesting is not divorced or deferred by any contingency or event. Birth and vesting are simultaneous processes and integrally connected, and nothing can intervene in that process so as to indicate that vesting has been postponed. Never a situation can arise when the vesting is shown to unhesitatingly follows that a coparcener is vested with the undivided interest in the coparcenary property. He is entitled to that share in the property that is vested in him on the eve of partition. 10. Coming back to the arguments of the learned Advocates for the petitioner, they can be restated as follows: i) The learned Advocate has urged that vesting of the property in case of a coparcener prior to partition is of a limited character and cannot be equated with the rights of a full owner. There are restrictions on alienation of property. He has relied on a decision reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 344, in the case of the (Fruit and Vegetable Merchants' Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust)5, in which it is observed that: "That the word 'vest' is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian Statutes. For example, under section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920), the property vests in the Receiver for the purposes of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. For example, under section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920), the property vests in the Receiver for the purposes of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the Receiver not for all purposes but for the purposes of the Insolvency Act and the Receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act I of 1984), provide that the property so acquired upon the happening of certain events, shall "vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". In the cases contemplated by sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The Legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration." The learned Advocate has contended that the word "vest" has been construed by the Supreme Court in various contexts of meanings. Vesting may be vesting of possession, vesting in a limited sense of dealing with the property or vesting of full ownership. Since the coparcener is unable to enjoy the property absolutely and he has several restriction, there cannot be vesting of ownership as contemplated in the proviso of the Act. In the above case, the Supreme Court considered the parameters of word "vest" with reference to certain statutes. However, in this case, the above discussion need not detain us any longer, because under proviso (b) to section 12 of the Act, there is a clear reference of vesting of ownership, proviso (b) reads that: "(b) the property, which is vested in the adopted child shall continue to vest after adoption subject to the obligations, if any, attached to the ownership of such property.............." This would, therefore, show that the vesting is in respect of ownership, which is subject to the obligations to maintain other relatives. Wherein there is limited vesting. Hindu Law has indicated in that behalf. That would be seen in the case of widow's rights prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Even in cases of other family members or heirs, the question of a limited right has been well enunciated. In that context, therefore, there is complete vesting of ownership. Wherein there is limited vesting. Hindu Law has indicated in that behalf. That would be seen in the case of widow's rights prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Even in cases of other family members or heirs, the question of a limited right has been well enunciated. In that context, therefore, there is complete vesting of ownership. The observations of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1330, in the case of State Bank, illustrates this point completely and the query raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner stands well answered in the same. ii) As regards the adoption of the sole surviving, heir, it is defined in the above proviso that the estate of the sole surviving heir shall continue to vest in him even after adoption. However, proviso clearly lays down that the dependant members shall have right over that property and the ownership vests in the sole surviving heir subject to the rights of other dependants. In the Hindu Law by Gupte (3rd Edition) on page 1155, it is clearly commented that the property held by the sole surviving coparcener shall continue to vest in him even after adoption. This is a situation which is inevitable and which cannot be construed in a manner inconsistent with the interpretation made by the Supreme Court in regard to the coparcenary property. iii) As regard the illustrations in the Treatise of Mulla's Hindu Law and Treatise of Raghavachariar's Hindu Law, it will have to be stated that they are not illustrations which are part and parcel of the original statute and are not relevant in the construction of the text of the section, so as to invite the comments of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 847, in the case of (Jumma Masjid v. Deviah)6, that they should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section or that they cannot have effect of modifying the language of this section or that they cannot have effect of modifying the language of the section or that they cannot curtail or extend the ambit of the section, which alone forms the enactment as suggested in A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 404, in the case of (Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer)7. It would be, therefore, enough to observe that those illustrations cannot be considered for interpretation of the Statute. It would be, therefore, enough to observe that those illustrations cannot be considered for interpretation of the Statute. They are the illustrations cited by the learned authors to illustrate their point of view. All the same, they may be scrutinized in brief and it should be ascertained as to whether they are consistent with the interpretation indicated above. 11. In Illustration 'A' on page 1108 of Hindu Law by Mulla, it is stated that a son given in adoption is entitled to a share in the property left by the deceased mother, but not to the share of the living father in the coparcenary property. This seems to be very clear because the father is alive at the time adoption and his share cannot be crystallized so as to be claimed by the adopted son. However, the mother has died before adoption. The adopted child gets share in the property left by her. This illustration is not contrary to the interpretation above. 12. Another illustration, where it is stated that brothers and sons constitute a coparcenary and on adoption of one son, the coparcenary diminished by one member and that the adopted coparcener loses his right as a coparcener. This illustration may appear to be in conflict with the discussion above. In the book of Hindu Law by Gupte, at page 1155, it is clearly observed : "In short on adoption not only the property belonging to an adopted child in the natural family such as his or her self-acquired property, property inherited by him or her from other persons including his or her father or other ancestor and property held as a sole surviving coparcener in a Mitakshara property, but even the undivided interest of a male child in a Mitakshara coparcenary would pass with him as if he had separated from the coparcenary." 13. The other illustrations in the Commentaries of Hindu Law by Mulla and by Raghavachariar have really on bearing on the interpretation indicated above. 14. There is a clear purpose in the enactment of proviso (b) to section 12 of the Act, because before the enactment of that provision under text of Hindu Law the adopted son lost all his rights in the coparcenary property of the natural family. 14. There is a clear purpose in the enactment of proviso (b) to section 12 of the Act, because before the enactment of that provision under text of Hindu Law the adopted son lost all his rights in the coparcenary property of the natural family. There are also conflicts of opinions amongst various High Courts in regard to the vesting of right of an adopted son in the property of the family of his birth. Whereas some of the High Courts took the view that adoption did not divest the vested right of adopted son, some took the contrary view. The details in that behalf may not be dilated here. It must be mentioned that under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law, adoption did not divest any property which had vested in the adopted son by inheritance, gift or self-acquisition. It is clearly seen that with the proviso (b) to section 12 of the Act, this entire controversy has been set at rest. 15. It can be, therefore, concluded that the undivided interest in the coparcenary property continues to vest in the adopted son even after the adoption. Section 12 read along with proviso (b) also clearly lays down that on adoption, there is virtually a severance of the adopted child from the coparcenary. There is thus a partition between the adopted son and other members. 16. This being the legal position, the Rule is discharged and the Civil Revision Application is hereby dismissed. However, in the circumstances of this case, parties shall bear their own costs. Application dismissed. -----