R. C. LAHOTI, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff/whose suit for declaration of title, issuance of permanent preventive injunction and for correction of revenue papers in respect of an agricultural holding has been dismissed by the two courts below, has come up in appeal. ( 2 ) THE suit property is land survey No. 451 area 2 Bigha 15 Biswas situated at village Kanuapura of Tehsil Lahar, Distt. Bhind. Undisputedly, the land was custodia legis on the date of the institution of the suit as having been attached by the Sub-divisional Magistrate under S. 145/ 146, Cr. P. C. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the plaintiff, he acquired title with possession in the suit property from one Jairam s/o Ochhe under a registered sale deed 15-7-1967. However, the defendant has got himself entered in to revenue papers on the basis of an ex parte decree passed in C. O. S. 237a/63 which decree relates to survey No. 421 and not 451. Because the defendant has threatened the plaintiff with dispossession in denial of his/title and relying on the wrongful entry in the revenue papers, the plaintiff had to bring the suit. ( 4 ) THE defendant contested the case of the plaintiff by submitting that he was holding the land as subtenant. that the decree in C. O. S. No. 237a/63 in fact related to land survey No. 451 and survey No. 421 was mistakenly stated in the earlier suit; that in view of the defendant's status as subtenant having been enlarged into that of a Bhumiswami, the plaintiff was not entitled to any decree. It was also pleaded that by virtue of decree in C. O. S. 237a/63, the defendant's status as subtenant over the suit property was recognised. ( 5 ) A subsequent event which occurred during the pendency of the suit, not disputed by either party and which is going to have a material bearing on the decision of this appeal, may also be noticed. During the pendency of the suit, proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. came to be decided wherein the defendant was declared to be in possession and the receiver was directed to hand over possession to the defendant. During the pendency of the suit, proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. came to be decided wherein the defendant was declared to be in possession and the receiver was directed to hand over possession to the defendant. 5-A. The trial Court held that the plaintiff rightly acquired the Bhumiswami rights under the sale deed dated 15-7-67; that the defendant was not holding the land as subtenant; that the decree in the earlier suit mentioning survey No. 421 could not be construed to be a decree as to survey No. 451. In spite of answering all the issues for the plaintiff and against the defendant, the trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that the plaintiff though entitled to sue for possession had failed to ask for that relief and hence the suit was not maintainable. ( 6 ) THE appeal preferred by the plaintiff before the Court below has also been dismissed. The learned lower appellate Court has held that the decree in the earlier suit erroneously mentioned survey No. 421 and it did relate to survey No. 451 which was the property in suit. Still, the Court observed that in these proceedings notice of that fact could not be taken unless the decree was amended by the Court passing the same. The learned Additional District Judge also affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the defendant was not holding the land as subtenant. The dismissal of the suit by the trial Court was upheld for failure of the plaintiff to seek relief of possession. The lower appellate Court also refused an opportunity of amendment in the relief clause of the plaint on the ground that the objection as to the maintainability of the suit was taken from the very beginning but the plaintiff did not pray for an amendment earlier. ( 7 ) BOTH the courts below have concurrently held that Jairam, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff was the recorded Bhumiswami of the land and was competent to alienate the same to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has rightly acquired the right, title and interest of Jairam. Both the courts below have held that the defendant was not holding the land as subtenant and hence the question of his acquiring status of a Bhumiswami on the coming into force of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 did not arise. The plaintiff has rightly acquired the right, title and interest of Jairam. Both the courts below have held that the defendant was not holding the land as subtenant and hence the question of his acquiring status of a Bhumiswami on the coming into force of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 did not arise. These findings are all of facts not open to interference in second appeal. This Court having made a general assessment of the evidence has formed an opinion that there is nothing to warrant an interference therewith. Both the findings are upheld. ( 8 ) THE decision of this appeal now hinges upon the following two questions:- (i) whether the decree in C. O. S. No. 237a /63 mentioning survey No. 421 could be construed as decree in respect of survey No. 451 and whether that question could be gone into in the present suit? (ii) whether the plaintiff was bound to pray for relief as to possession and the suit could have been dismissed for failure to make that prayer? ( 9 ) JUDGMENT, decree and order of the courts are too sacrosanct to be tampered with or made subject-matter of interpretation by anyone by resort to evidence aliunde except the Court which passed them for arriving at a conclusion to mean something which they do not convey. Under R. 3 of O. 20 of C. P. C. a judgment once having been signed, it cannot be altered or added to even by the judge who passed it except under S. 152 or on review. Under R. 6, the decree has to agree with the judgment. S. 151 saves the inherent powers of the Court for the ends of justice. Clerical or arithmetical mistake in judgments, decrees or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission which can be corrected by the Court. S. 153 does confer power on the Court to amend any decree or error in any proceedings in a suit. The scheme of the provisions indicates that a decree having been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction it could not have been made subject-matter of such interpretation by another Court before which it came to be tendered in evidence so as to mean something different from what it shows. The scheme of the provisions indicates that a decree having been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction it could not have been made subject-matter of such interpretation by another Court before which it came to be tendered in evidence so as to mean something different from what it shows. If at all the decree erroneously mentioned a number other than what was the subject matter of controversy in that suit or intended by the parties to be so then the only course open to the defendant was to have approached the Court passing the decree for seeking correction of the mistake or the error. ( 10 ) FULL Bench decision in Kamayya v. Pappayya, AIR 1918 Mad 1287 is an authority for the proposition that a decree should be given an effect which is intelligible and it should be presumed to be legally effective for obtaining the relief sought and granted. It has also been held therein that where an order of the Court is drafted in such a way as to fail to give effect to the court's intention, it is the duty of the party to apply to have it corrected. ( 11 ) A Division Bench of the High Court of Patna held in Nanda Gopal v. Baidyanath, AIR 1957 Pat 87 that a decree has to be taken as it stands. ( 12 ) ON the ground of public policy and fair administration of justice also, no evidence can be permitted to be adduced so as to make an effort at finding out the 'real meaning' of a decree or to ascertain the property to which it relates though on the face of it, it is not ambiguous. ( 13 ) IN the opinion of this Court, the courts below should not at all have ventured into entering upon the question whether the decree related to survey No. 451 when it spoke of survey No. 421. ( 14 ) THE two courts below also went wrong in holding the suit to be not maintainable. The objection of the defendant was founded on proviso to S. 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides that no Court shall make a declaration contemplated by S. 34 where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title omits to do so. The objection of the defendant was founded on proviso to S. 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides that no Court shall make a declaration contemplated by S. 34 where the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title omits to do so. Here itself R. 7 of O. 7, C. P. C. , may be noticed. It provides:-"r. 7. Relief to be specifically stated.- Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in the written statement. " ( 15 ) TWO questions arise: Whether the suit was hit by the proviso to S. 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963; and if so whether the Court could notice subsequent event and grant relief to the plaintiff consistently with the subsequent events though the plaintiff had not asked for that relief. ( 16 ) IN so far as the scope of the proviso to S. 34 is concerned, it has been consistently the view of all the courts ever since the decision of Privy Council in Humayun Begum shah Mohd. Khan, AIR 1943 PC 94 that the further relief contemplated by the proviso to S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is relief against the defendant only in Sunderesa lyer v. S. S. V. Nidhi Ltd. , AIR 1939 Mad 853 it was held:"a suit for mere declaration that the plaintiff is the owner of certain property without consequential relief for possession is maintainable if at the time of the institution of suit the property is in possession of the Court pending the decision of the suit and not in the possession of the person against whom the relief is sought. "the Madras view was cited with approval before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Deo Kuer v. Sheo Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 359 . ( 17 ) IN Deo Kuer (supra), the suit property was under attachment under S. 146, Cr. P. C. on the date of the suit their Lordships crystallised the law on the point as under:-". . . . . . . ( 17 ) IN Deo Kuer (supra), the suit property was under attachment under S. 146, Cr. P. C. on the date of the suit their Lordships crystallised the law on the point as under:-". . . . . . . whether in view of the attachment, the appellants could have in their suit asked for the relief for delivery of possession to them. If they could not, the suit would not be hit by the provision to S. 42. The parties seem not to dispute that in the case of an attachment under S. 146 of the Code as it stood before its amendment in 1955, a suit for a simple declaration of title without a prayer for delivery of possession is competent. ""in our view, in a suit for declaration of title to property filed when it stands attached under S. 145 of the Code, it is not necessary to ask for the further relief of delivery of possession. The fact, if it be so, that in the case of such an attachment, the Magistrate holds possession on behalf of the party whom he ultimately finds to have been in possession is, in our opinion, irrelevant. ""the authorities clearly show that where the defendant is not in possession and not in a position to deliver possession to the plaintiff, it is not necessary for the plaintiff in a suit for a declaration of title to property to claim possession. ""there is no doubt that property under attachment under S. 145 of the Code is in custodia legis. These cases clearly establish that it was not necessary for the appellants to have asked for possession. "it may incidentally be noticed that this has also been the consistent view of this Court. In Sakharam v. Tukaram, AIR 1927 Nag 316, the property was under attachment under S. 146, Cr. P. C. on the date of the institution of the suit. In Abid Ali Khan v. Secy. of State, AIR 1951 Nag 327, the property was in possession of Court of Wards on the date of the institution of the suit. In Halkibai v. State, AIR 1957 Madh Pra 93, the property stood seized under S. 524 (1) of Cr. P. C. 1898 on the date of the institution of the suit. of State, AIR 1951 Nag 327, the property was in possession of Court of Wards on the date of the institution of the suit. In Halkibai v. State, AIR 1957 Madh Pra 93, the property stood seized under S. 524 (1) of Cr. P. C. 1898 on the date of the institution of the suit. In all the cases, it was held that a suit for bare declaration was competent and was not hit by the proviso abovesaid. However, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, these authorities have been mentioned only to be noticed. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, in Deo Kuer ( AIR 1966 SC 359 ) (supra), the attachment made had continued till the decision of the suit and no decision had been given terminating the attachment. The question then arises what would be the effect if the attachment determines during the pendency of the suit and the defendant is delivered with possession. In Radha Rani v. Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 216 , the next reversioners had filed a suit for bare declaration without claiming relief as to the possession of the property. During the pendency of the suit, the reversioners became entitled to further relief of possession. Their Lordships held :-"as the reversioners were not entitled to the possession of the property at the time of the institution of the suit, the next reversioner can then sue for a bare declaration. The proviso to S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act will not be a bar to it. The declaratory suit does not become defective because during the pendency of the suit, the reversioners become entitled to further relief. The next reversioner is entitled to continue the declaratory suit; in the absence of an amendment of the plaint, however, a degree for possession of the property cannot be passed in the suit, and if the reversioners are to get any real benefit, they must institute a suit for possession of the property before the expiry of the period of limitation. " ( 19 ) IN Rukhmabai v. Laximinarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335 , their Lordships observed that an objection to the maintainability of the suit based on the proviso abovesaid should be taken at the earliest point of time because in that event, the plaintiff could ask for necessary amendment to comply with the proviso. " ( 19 ) IN Rukhmabai v. Laximinarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335 , their Lordships observed that an objection to the maintainability of the suit based on the proviso abovesaid should be taken at the earliest point of time because in that event, the plaintiff could ask for necessary amendment to comply with the proviso. Their Lordships further observed:-"it is a well-settled rule of practice not to dismiss suits automatically but to allow the plaintiff to make necessary amendment if he seeks to do so. " ( 20 ) THE legal position that flows from the above said authorities is as under :- (i) Further relief than a mere declaration referred to in the proviso to S. 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 contemplates the entitlement of the plaintiff as obtaining on the date of the suit; (ii) Entitlement of the plaintiff enabling seeking further relief based on an event occurring during the pendency of the suit would not render the suit not maintainable; (iii) It is the choice of the plaintiff to rest content by a mere decree for declaration in that suit and then to sue for further relief by bringing an independent suit subject to Law of Limitation or to pray for further relief by making an amendment in the plaint in that suit itself; (iv) Bar enacted by the proviso does not automatically entail dismissal of the suit but the plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity of amending the plaint if so desired; (v) Further relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff without the same having been specifically asked for. ( 21 ) IT has to be stated that during the course of the hearing, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/ appellant did make a prayer for being afforded an opportunity to amend the plaint. In the opinion of this Court, such an opportunity ought not to be denied to the plaintiff. It is, therefore, directed that the plaintiff may move an appropriate application for necessary amendment in the plaint so as to seek the further relief as to possession. A fortnight's time is granted for the purpose. Order accordingly. .