Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, a practising advocate of this court has filed this writ petition, praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the 1st respondent herein not to post any of the matters in which the petitioner appears as a counsel or party-in-person before respondents 2 and 3 herein either in a Bench or sitting single and also to issue an appropriate writ or direction calling upon the first respondent herein to constitute an appropriate Bench for re-hearing the cases in (1) LPASR. No. 54359 and 55640 of 1990 and (2) CMP. No. 9439 of 1990 in W.A. No. 71 of 1990 and also for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the 4th respondent herein to return original copy of an order dated 9.7.1990 passed by Deputy Commissioner, Tirunelveli filed along with Writ Appeal No. 681 of 1990. 2. On an earlier occasion, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this court, praying for the same relief mentioned above, without impleading the 1st respondent herein. When the matter was posted regarding its main tainability, S. Ramalingam, J. in W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 bv order dated 12.9.1990. has held that the petition is not maintainable on the ground that the third respondent in that petition (S. Jayaraman, Additional Regis trar, High Court) is not the prescribed autho rity against whom the relief as prayed for in that petition can be granted During the course of tbe said order, the learned Judge, in para 13 of his order, has observed as follows: “The decisions cited by Mr. Ranka hardly have any relevance because it is not the contention of any one that a writ would not lie against the learned Chief Justice when he issues any administrative orders” That is why the petitioner has filed this writ petition impleading the Honourable Chief Justice of Tamil Nadu, High Court, Madras as the 1st respondent. 3. The real issue to be decided in this case is whether the petitioner can ask for such reliefs, as stated supra, by filing a writ of mandamus. In order to decide the same, I think it is necessary to refer to a few facts. It seems a batch of writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 3. The real issue to be decided in this case is whether the petitioner can ask for such reliefs, as stated supra, by filing a writ of mandamus. In order to decide the same, I think it is necessary to refer to a few facts. It seems a batch of writ petitions in W.P. Nos. 2128 to 2131 of 1990 filed by the petitio ner herein on behalf of five individual differ ent petitioners against Steel Authority of India, was allowed by S. Ramalingam, J. by order dated 17-4-1990. The petitioner entered caveat on behalf of these clients. The Steel Authority of India preferred Writ Appeals and it seems they came up for admission be fore the Division Bench consistine of respon dents 2 and 3 herein. It is alleged in the affi davit filed in support of the writ petition that the writ appeals in W.A. Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990 were admitted by the said Division Bench on 25 6.1990, that the petitioner was not allowed to make any submissions, that two weeks time was granted to file a counter affidavit in the miscellaneous petitions. It is further alleged that the petitioner filed the counter affidavit on 9.7.1990, that he requested the Division Bench to hear and dismiss the C.M.Ps. and that when the counsel appearing for the appellants expressed some difficulty in providing for the amount of discount claimed by the petitioners clients, inspite of the oppositien given by the petitioner, the Division Bench had passed the following order: “We heard both the sides. The common order of the learned Single Judge has worked out the financial burden to be cast on the appellants. The solveney of the Appellants is not certainly in issue. The financial burden would always be discharged towards the respondents if ultimately the verdict in the writ appeals should be in favour of the respondents. If the contrary position is to be countenanced, that may bring in other aspects of controversy. Hence, we grant stay as prayed for, in these applications. At the same time, we are conscious that the controversy in the writ appeals must be settled a the earliest point of time. Considering the burden of this Court in disposing of writ appeals we rind that we could give the date of the earliest only after Dasara holidays. Hence, we grant stay as prayed for, in these applications. At the same time, we are conscious that the controversy in the writ appeals must be settled a the earliest point of time. Considering the burden of this Court in disposing of writ appeals we rind that we could give the date of the earliest only after Dasara holidays. Accordingly, while granting stay, as prayed for, in these applications, we direct the writ appeals themselves to be posted for final hearing on Wednesday, the 3rd October, 1990 at the top of the list, subject to part-heards” It seems the petitioner preferred C.M.P. Nos. 9466 to 9468 of 1990 in the said writ appeals for the advancement of the date of hearing of the writ appeals as well as C.M.P. Nos. 8172 to 8175 of 1990 afresh by any other Division Bench of this Court. The said C.M.P. again came up for orders before tbe same Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein on 23 7-1990 It is further alleged in the affidavit that the petitioner requested the Division Bench to direct the office to place the papers before the first respondent herein, to post before any other Division Betch of this court for the reasons set out in the affidavit filed in support of the civil miscellaneous petitions and that the Division Bench observed that tbe Bench would first advance the date and thereafter the petitioner would be free to move the matter before any other Bench for final hearing of the writ appeals. When the petitioner was asked to suggest a date, he preferred any date during the month of July, 1990. But the Division Bench advanced the date by about two weeks. That was on 23.7.1990. It is alleged by the petitioner that at this stage, the petitioner turned to the first respondent herein to share his anguish arising out of the present crisis of confidence in the Bench, and that he was either prevented by the fourth respondent herein or due to pre-occupation of the Chief Justice, the petitioner could not call on him till 25.7 1990. It is also alleged in the affidavit that the fourth respondent herein, having got an inkling of the petitioner and having (alien into the bad books of a particular Division Bench, arranged to list yet another Writ Appeal No 681 of 1990 before the same Division Bench for admission on 26.7.1990 inspite of the petitioners requests not to post the matter before the Division Bench in question. It is further stated that the said appeal was against a part of the order dated 17.7.1990 passed by S. Ramalingam, J. in W.P. No 10265 of 1990 in which a portion of relief was refused to the petitioner. It is also stated that when the said writ appeal W.A. No. 681 of 1990 was called, the petitioner submitted in the open court that it was the apprehension of his client that he would not get justice before the said Division Bench and requested to delist the appeal and also to direct the office to place the papers before the first respondent herein to post the same for admission before any other Bench. It is further alleged in the affidavit that the said Division Bench had already made up its mind to punish the appellant for having engaged the petitioner as his counsel and that the said writ appeal was accordingly dismissed in-limine on 26.7.1990 It seems by this time, the petitioner had filed C.M.P. No. 9728 of 1990 in W.A.No 604 of 1990 for advancing the date of hearing of the main appeal and civil miscellaneous petitions in C.M.P. Nos. 8172 to 8175 of 1990 afresh by any other Bench. This was on 24.7 1990 It is further alleged in the affidavit that since the petitioner would not meet the first respondent herein in his Chambers, he sought to mention the matter in the open court before the First bench on 26-7-1990 at 1:30 p.m. and that the first respondent herein was pleased to direct the petitioner to file petition in order to enable him to ascertain as to whether the second Bench at that time, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, had indeed consented to delist the betch or writ appeals Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990. The petitioner further alleges that he is still unable to understand about the nature, character and the provision of law under which such a petition could be filed. 601 to 604 of 1990. The petitioner further alleges that he is still unable to understand about the nature, character and the provision of law under which such a petition could be filed. It is also alleged in the affidavit that again the petitioner mentioned the matter before the second Bench consisting of respondent 2 and 3 seeking its permission to move any other Bench in respect of hearing of C M.P. No. 9728 of 1990 in W.A. No. 604 of 1990. According to the petitioner, it was granted. The petitioner obtained a motion letter from the Court Officer and handed over the same to the fourth respondent herein. It is alleged in the affidavit that when the CM.P. No. 9728 of 1990 in W.A. 604 of 1990. did not appear in the list on 31.7.1990 before any Bench, he contacted the fourth respondent herein and that he was made to understand that the 4th respondent had ascertained from the concerned Court officer that the Second Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein did not grant such leave to the petitioner to move any other Bench. It is further alleged in the affidavit that on 1.8.1990, two more items viz.. (i) L.P.A.S.R. No. 54359 of 1990, L.P A.S R. No. 55640 of 1990 (ii) CM.P. No. 9439 of 1990 in W.A. No. 71 of 1990 came up for orders as Item Nos. 5 and 9 before the Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein. It seems the petitioner requested the Bench to adjourn the said item Nos. 5 and 9 and to direct the office to place the papers before the first respondent herein to post all the matters in which the petitioner appeared as a counsel or party in person before any other Bench for he had lost confidence in that Bench. Ultimately, it seems both the petitions were dismissed. At that stage, the petitioner preferred the writ petition W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 without impleading the first respondent herein and that it was dismissed by S. Ramalingam, J. as not maintainable, as stated supra. It is further alleged by the petitioner in the affidavit that the batch of appeals W.A. Nos. Ultimately, it seems both the petitions were dismissed. At that stage, the petitioner preferred the writ petition W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 without impleading the first respondent herein and that it was dismissed by S. Ramalingam, J. as not maintainable, as stated supra. It is further alleged by the petitioner in the affidavit that the batch of appeals W.A. Nos. 601 to 604 of 1990 which were admitted by the Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, in which only stay was granted, were ultimately dismissed by another Division Bench of this court consisting of Mishra, J. and Govindasamy, J. by order dated 9-10-1990. It is alleged in the affidavit that the points involved in this writ petition had been dismissed even before it could be numbered, on technical grounds, that he addressed a letter on 21-9-1990 for return of the un numbered writ petition and that the fourth respondent herein informed the petitioners orally, that the un-numbered writ petition forms part of the Court records and therefore it could not be returned. It is also stated by the petitioner that the said un numbered writ petition W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 was disposed of by S. Ramalingam, J. on 12-9-1990 as mentioned above. The petitioner further alleged that since the facts stated above involved questions of paramount public importance as well as interest to the professional ethics between the Bench and the Bar he is constrained to tile the present writ petition to vindicate the cause of justice. 4. It is stated by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that it needs no emphasis that it is not open to the litigants to select the judges, that the High Court Judges are the repository of the confidence of the people, and that they have to discharge their duties and have to act in a manner which enhances the confidence of the people in the judiciary. The petitioner further stated that the order of stay granted by the Division Bench of this Court, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 on 9-7-1990 passed in C.M.P. Nos. 8172 to 8175 of 1990 cannot be said to be a considered judgment. The petitioner further stated that the order of stay granted by the Division Bench of this Court, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 on 9-7-1990 passed in C.M.P. Nos. 8172 to 8175 of 1990 cannot be said to be a considered judgment. It is also stated that courts of law exist for redressing wrongs, and that the function of the appellate court is to guide the lower court by giving it the benefit of its own erudition and its wisdom. It is further alleged in the affidavit that one of the highly damaging factors which deserves special mention is about the regard in which the citizens should hold the courts, that it is their experience that often the outcome of litigation depends not so much on the merits of the case but on the Bench before which it comes up. It is further alleged in the affidavit that many a litigant have come to look upon the judicial process as a lottery, fhat Senior Lawyer often tells the agrieved party, “File the appeal in any case” Let us hope it will come up before the ‘right’ Bench.” The petitioner further states that a symptom of this sort is something about which not only the litigants but every one who values the Judiciary and who values our Constitution, our way of life, itself must feel concerned. It is further alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the petitioner does not understand the logic behind the postponement of the hearing of the appeals after granting blanket stay to the appellants, when the respondents are willing to argue the matter on the date of admission itself. The petitioner further alleges that when he takes up those matters before another Division Bench, they were dismissed and relies upon that fact for his contentions. The petitioner further alleges that when he takes up those matters before another Division Bench, they were dismissed and relies upon that fact for his contentions. The petitioner further alleges that as a rule, a lawyer does not take personal interest in his cases, that his interest is strictly professional, that he does not directly or indirectly indicate his personal opinion or views, that even in the present writ petition, he has no intention to discuss the merits of any decided case or pending once, and that the art of a lawyer, as an officer of the court and a servant of the public and a champion of the cause of his client, is therefore a combination of diverse qualities brought to bear upon a particular case from its inception to its conclusion He further states that the ability of a counsel is in coextensive with his ability to study bis opponent and the Judge in the correct perspective of the particular case in the light of their perspective rules. It is further alleged that in the instant case, in the absence of any statutory machinery to deal with a situation of antipathy like the one that has cropped up which is fraught with miscarriage of justice, the petitioner has no other option except to file the present writ petition without malice against anyone but for his self preservation in the profession which bristles with difficulties and he carries a big burden He further alleges in the affidavit that in the case of the petitioner, want of integrity or impartiality and antipathy have been the glaring characteristics of respondents 2 and 3 herein The petitioner further alleges that the enormity of injustice does not so much lie in the text of the judgment or order as such and that it is only in the manner of pronouncement thereof without even a pretency of fair play. He further stated that when the petitioner wanted to delist the items mentioned above, the Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 ought to have recorded his objections, overruled the same and then passed orders in the main matters. The petitioner futther states that an act of the Court should not prejudice anybody, that on 1-8-1990 item No. 5 and 9 viz. (i) L.P.A.S.R. No. 54359 of 1990 and 55648 of 1990 and (ii) CMP. The petitioner futther states that an act of the Court should not prejudice anybody, that on 1-8-1990 item No. 5 and 9 viz. (i) L.P.A.S.R. No. 54359 of 1990 and 55648 of 1990 and (ii) CMP. No. 9439 of 1990 in W.A. No. 71 of 1990 have been decided by respondents 2 and 3 without giving a proper opportunity of being beard to the petitioner and as such those matters should be beard again by any other Bench of this court in the interest of Justice under its plenary jurisdiction, equity and fairplay. 5. Mr. M. Ranka, the learned counsel appearing in person, refers me to the allegations made by him in the affidavit filed in support of the petition and also the order of S. Ramalingam, J. passed in W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990 dated 12-9-1990. After referring to the allegations made in the affidavit, the learned counsel contended that the Second Bench of this Court, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, ought to have adjourned the matters, which appeared as item Nos. 5 end 9 on 1-8-1990, when the petitioner wanted them to be delisted on that particular day. He further says that the failure on the part of the Division Bench, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein to adjourn the aforesaid matters made him to file the present wri petition. The learned counsel further contends that though the said applications were opposed by him, a blanket stay was granted and that when he wanted to get on with the said appeals, they were posted for some other day. He further contends that the main appeals were ultimately disposed of by another Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Mishra, J. and Govinoasamy, J. without hearing the petitioner herein. This according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, shows that how a blanket stay was granted by the Division Bench, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, the learned counsel also states that since he has lost confidence with the Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, he approached the first respondent herein and that he could not meet him and that when he made a representation in the open court before the first respondent herein, he was asked to file a petition. 6. I have heard the arguments of Mr. 6. I have heard the arguments of Mr. M. Ranka, who appeared as petitioner-in-parson, and have gone through the detailed affidavit filed by him in support of the case. The learned counsel heavily relies upon the order of S. Ramalingam, J. in W.P.S.R. No. 60735 of 1990, dated 12-9-1990, to show that a writ petition is maintainable against any administrative order passed by the first respondent herein For that purpose, the learned counsel relies upon the judgments reported in Pradyat Kumar v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court 2 , in Pramatha Nath v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High 3 Court , in Himansukumar v. Jothi Prokash 4 in Jothi Prokash v. Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court 5, in K. Prabhakarans. State 6 , and in Gordon Woodroffe and Company (P) Ltd. v. S Venugopa7 1. I find that almost all these cases are the very same cited before S. Ramalingam, J. on the earlier occasion. In Pradyat Kumar v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court 2 , in a case which arose out of disciplinary proceedings wherein the Registrar and Accountant-general of that of that High Court were dismissed. In the above mentioned case, when considering the power of the Chief Justice of the High Court to dismiss a member of the High Court under Arts. 229 and 320(3) of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court observed as follows: (at p. 294) “This would be enough to dispose of the case against the appellant. The learned Judges of the High Court have also dealt at some length with the question as to the maintainability of an application for a writ in a case of this kind and of the availability of any remedy by way of a writ against the action of the Chief Justice, whether administrative orjudicial. Arguments in this behalf have also been strongly urged before us by the learned Advocate General of West Bengal. In the view, however, that we have taken as to the contentions raised before us regarding the validity of the order of dismissal, we do not feel called upon to enter into the discussion relating to the availability of the writ. We express no opinion on the questions so raised. In the view, however, that we have taken as to the contentions raised before us regarding the validity of the order of dismissal, we do not feel called upon to enter into the discussion relating to the availability of the writ. We express no opinion on the questions so raised. We consider it, however, desirable to say that our view that the exercise of power of dismissal of a civil servant is the exercise of administrative power may not necessarily preclude the availability of remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case. That is a question on which we-express no opinion one way or the other in this case.” (emphasis is mine). It can be seen from the above mentioned case, that with regard to disciplinary matters, the Supreme Court has expressed a view in the form as extracted above, that is all. The subject matter of the case in Pramaiha Nath v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court 8 , was an order issued under S. 23A of High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 curtailing and reducing the vacations as fixed and determined by all the Judges of that High Court. I do not think the above mentioned case is helpful to the petitioner before me. The case in Himansu Kumar v. Jyoti Prokash 9 , is also with regard to age of a High Court Judge. The only question which was decided in that case was whether the trial Court can refuse to issue a rule nisi , when the petitioner therein raised triable issues. The question that arose for consideration in that case was against the competence of the Home Minister to determine the question about the correct age of a High Court Judge and the Supreme Court thought that it was a matter of great importance as its decision is vitally connected with the status, dignity and independence of the judiciary of this country I do not see how the above mentioned decision can support the petitioners contention raised before me. In Mr. Jyoti Prokash v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court 10 the case arose wtth regard to the age of a High Court. The said case was against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated 22.5:984. In the above mentioned cases also, I do not see any proposition decided in support of the case of the petitioner. In Mr. Jyoti Prokash v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court 10 the case arose wtth regard to the age of a High Court. The said case was against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated 22.5:984. In the above mentioned cases also, I do not see any proposition decided in support of the case of the petitioner. In K. Prabhakaran v. State 11 a Full Bench of the High Court has held that an order passed on the administrative side by the Chief Justice of High Court can be questioned by filing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In Bhupati Bhusan Dalai v. Registrar of the Original Side 12 though the Chief Justice of the High Court was not arraved as a party, the Calcutta High Court has held that since the Registrar of that High Court has been made up as a party, the validity of the R. 22 of the High Court can be questioned in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision reported in Gordon Woodroffe and Co. (P) Ltd. v. S. Venugopal 13 arose out of an Industrial dispute and I do not see any relevance to the facts and circumstances of this case. 7. Having considered the judgments cited by Mr. M. Ranka, the learned counsel appearing in person, the first question to be decided in this case is whether a writ of mandamus will lie against the first respondent herein, to grant the relief as asked for by the petitioner herein. From the decision cited by the learned counsel appearing in person, it is clear that a mandamus may lie against orders of the Chief Justice of a High Court on the administrative side in the matter of a High Court Judge, transfer of a Judge or termination of service of a High Court Judge or in cases where disciplinary proceedings are taken. See Union of India v. Sankarchand 14 , and Gupta v. President of India 15 , However, the question to be considered in this case is whether a writ of mandamus will lie against a Chief Justice of a High Court, in the matter of assigning cases, in the absence of rules governing the breach thereof. In my view, surely a writ will not lie in such cases. More so on the facts of this case. 8. In my view, surely a writ will not lie in such cases. More so on the facts of this case. 8. The right of the Chief Justice of a High Court to allocate the work has also to be considered now. The learned counsel himself has accepted the position in his affidavit. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Brothers Ltd. 16 , the Supreme Court, while considering the scope of S. 108 of Government of India. Act 1915 read with the corresponding provision in the Government of India Act, 1935 and under Arf. 225 of the Constitution of India has made certain observations. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the rule making power under S. 108 of Government of India Act, 1918 remains unaffected and so the power of the Chief Justice to decide who amongst the Judges be assigned the work as a Judge sitting alone or a Judge sitting in a Division Bench of two or three Judges. Recently, a Full Bench of this Court (to which I am a party) in the Mayavaram Financial Corporation Ltd. Mayiladuthurai v. The Registrar of Chits, Pondicherry 17 , has held as follows: “The Honble Chief Justice has the inherent power to allocate the judicial business of the High Court including who of the Judges should sit alone and who should constitute the Bench of two or more Judges. No litigant shall, upon such constitution of a Bench or allotment of a case to a particular fudge of the Court will have a right to question the jurisdiction of the Judges or the Judge hearing the case. No person can claim as a matter or right that his petition be heard by a single Judge or a Division Bench or a particular single Judge or a particular Division Bench. No Judge or a Bench of Judges will assume jurisdiction unless the case is allotted to him or them under the orders of the Honble the Chief Justice” In view of the decision of the above mentioned judgment of the Full Bench of this Court (to which I am a party) I do not think it is necessary to trace the source of powers of the first respondent herein, in such matters. In view of the categorical decision of the above mentioned Full Bench of this Court, I am of the view that the petitioner has no right at all to obtain a writ of mandamus as prayed for, from this Court. 9. Apart from that, a single Judge of the Bombay High Court in R.J. Metha v. Chief Justice 18 , V.S. Deshpande has held that the assignment of work to Judges by the Chief Justice is not justiciable and cannot be judicially reviewed or controlled under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In the above mentioned case, the learned Judge has observed as follows: (at P. 126) “The assignment of work to the Judges is— subject, of course, to the rules of the High Court— the exclusive right, duty and privilege of the Chief Justice. In a sphere so sensitive and with many a delicate aspect and element entering the field, the norms are best left undefined and best left to the good judgment and discretion of the Chief Justice. A system which has by and large worked well for a country and more is best left undisturbed. Assuming it to bean administrative function, every singular administrative function is not judicially reviewable. Save and except perhaps in a case of a patent and clear breach of the express rules affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, it cannot be held that this function is justiciable and can therefore, be judicially reviewed and controlled. To so hold can only open the flood lights for a virtual stalemate and anarchy in administration” The Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram 19 , had held at Page 1435 as follows. To so hold can only open the flood lights for a virtual stalemate and anarchy in administration” The Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram 19 , had held at Page 1435 as follows. “No party is entitled to get a case transferred from one Bench to the other, unless the Bench is biased or there are some reasonable grounds for the same, but no right to get a case transferred to any other Bench can legitimately be claimed merely because the Judges express opinion on the merits of the case on the conclusion of hearing” In Mahendra v. Dansan 20 , a Special Bench of the Patna High Court has held as follows “The power of the Chief Justice is to designate Judges for cases and to constitute division courts of two or more Judges and if the rules and an appeal shall be heard by a srngle Judge instead of by two Judges, no party can object unless some vested right is affected, it being clearly understood that there is no vested right that an appeal to the High Court must be heard by a particular number of Judges” The question of the power of the Chief Justice of a High Court under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Rules made thereunder came up for consideration before the Allahabad High Court. In Puran Chand v. Abdullah 21 , the Allahabad High Court has upheld the power of the Chief Justice to allocate the work to Judges. A Full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court, reported in Sohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal and others 22 , may also be usefully referred to, with regard to the power of the Chief Justice of a High Court under Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, which is to the following effect: “Once the Chief Justice has determined what Judges of the Court are to sit alone or to constitute the several Division Courts and has allocated the judicial business of the Court amongst them, the power and jurisdiction to take cognizance of the respective classes or categories of cases presented in a formal wav for their decision, according to such determination, is acquired. To put it negatively, the power and jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence to hear specified categories or classes of cases and to adjudicate and exercise any judicial power in respect of them is derived only from the determination made by the Chief Justice in exercise of his constitutional, statutory and inherent powers and from no other source and no case which is not covered by such determination can be entenained, dealt with or decided by the Judges sitting singly or in Division Courts till such determination remains operative” 10. A careful review of the above mentioned cases, clearly shows that no person, as of right can ask for his case to be posted before a particular Bench or a particular Judge sitting singly may be a counsel or a litigant. I am of the view, since the petitioner has no right to ask for the issue of a writ of mandamus, as prayed for, surely a writ will not lie against the respondents herein. 11. At this stage, ir is necessary to consider, on the facts and the peculiar circumstances of the case before me, whether 3 writ of mandamus can be issued, as prayed for by the learned counsel. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. What is relevent is the nature of the duty imposed on the Body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owned by the person or authority to the effected party. If a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied. This is the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukhtha Sathguru S.M.V.J SMS, Trust v. V.R. Rudani 23 . If the question which arises in the present writ petition is examined with the raio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case, I am of the view, that there is no obligation cast upon the first respondent herein to post the cases in which the petitioner before me appears as a counsel or party-in-person to a particular Bench. It cannot at all be said that a duty is cast upon the first respondent herein in the administrative side and as such I do not think a writ as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. 12. Looking at from another angle also, I do not think a writ can be issued as prayed for by the petitioner. It cannot at all be said that a duty is cast upon the first respondent herein in the administrative side and as such I do not think a writ as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. 12. Looking at from another angle also, I do not think a writ can be issued as prayed for by the petitioner. Admittedly, the above mentioned writ appeals, in which only stay was granted by the Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, as well as in two other items which appeared on other dates, as contended by the petitioner before me, were all disposed of by another Division Bench. No case is pending before the Division Bench consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, in which the petitioner appears as a party or as counsel. It is also very clear that the two matters in which admission was sought by the petitioner, were disposed of by another Division Bench of this court. When those two matters were disposed of, I do not see how those two matters can be put up for re-hearing before another Division Bench. Taking the view, that nothing remains to be disposed of [ think that the issuance of a writ will be futile and the writ petition cannot be entertained. When it is settled law that no person in such matters can ask for the posting of his case before a Judge sitting single or before a particular Division Bench as a matter of right, I do not think a mandamus can be issued on the facts and circumstances of the case. Simply because a writ petition is maintainable against the orders made by the first respondent herein on the administrative side, it does not mean that a writ of mandamus can issue as asked for by the petitioner, in such matters. 13. In W.P. SR. No. 60735 of 1990. by order dated 12-9-1990, S. Ramalingam, J. while considering the matter before him regarding its maintainability has observed as follows: “When work is so assigned, it is for the learned Judges to decide whether, for some reasons, they should not hear the cases so assigned to them and if they decide so, they may direct the papers to be placed before My Lord, the Chief Justice for posting such cases before some other Bench. In the extraordinary circumstances, the counsel himself may make a special request that his case may not be heard by a particular Bench and if that request is made bona fide the learned Judges themselves direct the papers to be placed before My Lord, the Chief Justice for orders regarding the posting of the matter before some other Bench. It is also open to a party or a counsel to make a special mention before My Lord the Chief Justice so that the cases pending before one Bench may be posted before another Bench and it is for My Lord the Chief Justice to satisfy about the reasons given for such postings.” I think that the above mentioned procedure is the proper procedure to be followed by the petitioner and the filing of the writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus, in my view, cannot be entertained. Even now, it is open to the petitioner to approach the first respondent herein and make a request in the manner in which S. Ramalingam, J. has observed. I am of the view, that the writ petition itself cannot be maintained for the relief asked for by the petitioner. It is also settled that granting the relief asked for by way of the issue of a writ of mandamus is discretionary and nobody can claim it as a matter of right. See BombayMunicipalityv. Advance Builders 24 , and in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller 25 . In my View, on this ground also, the writ petition has to be dismissed. It is also well settled that the petitioner must show that he has a legal right to the petitioner must show that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty, to obtain a writ of mandamus from this court. In my view, both are absent in this case. On that score also, the writ of mandamus will not lie. 14. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel to return the un-numbered writ petition, in my view, it cannot be done under the Rules, since an order has been passed regarding its maintainability and it forms part of the court records. As such, the prayer asked for by the petitioner to issue a writ against the fourth respondent to direct him to return the un-numbered writ petition also cannot be entertained. 15. As such, the prayer asked for by the petitioner to issue a writ against the fourth respondent to direct him to return the un-numbered writ petition also cannot be entertained. 15. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly it is dismissed. 16. Before parting with the case, considering the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition against the Division Bench of this court, consisting of respondents 2 and 3 herein, I think it is necessary to refer to certain eases on this aspect. In L.D. Jaiswal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 26 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: (at p. 1376) “We have yet to come across a judge who can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other. By the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against one or other of the parties. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. A line has therefore to be drawn somewhere, some day, by some one” When a counsel undertakes his profession, he not only carries greater responsibilities but he should also act as a model to the profession On going through the averments made in the affidavit filed by the petitioner herein, which are highly objectionable, I am of the view, that the petitioner, who is a very senior member of the Bar, should have shown greater responsibility before making such unfounded and uncalled for aspersions. The majesty of law and the dignity of the courts cannot be maintained unless there is mutual respect between the Bench and the Bar and the counsel act in full realisation of their duty to the court alongside their duty to their clients when their pleas and arguments do not find acceptance with the court. I am also of the view that neither rhetoric nor tempestuous arguments can constitute the sine qua non for persuasive arguments. The counsel are expected to keep the sense of detatchment and non-identification with the causes espoused by them. I am also of the view that neither rhetoric nor tempestuous arguments can constitute the sine qua non for persuasive arguments. The counsel are expected to keep the sense of detatchment and non-identification with the causes espoused by them. Lord Reid in Rondel v. Worsley 27 , has succinetly set out the conflicting nature of the duties a counsel has to perform in his own inimitable manner as follows: “Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his clients case. As an officer of the Court concerned in the administration of justice, he has an overriding duty to the Court, to the standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to a conflict with his clients wishes or with what the client thinks are his personal interests. Counsel must not mislead the court, he must not land himself to casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses for which there is no sufficient basis in the information in his possession, he must not withhold authorities or documents which may tell against his clients but which the law or the standards of his profession require him to produce. By so acting he may well incur the displeasure or worry of his client so that if the case is lost, his client would or might seek legal redress if that were open to him” In Rondel v. W. Low Denning, M.R. 28 would say as follows: “It is a mistake to suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants. He must disregard the most specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the court The code which requires a Barrister to do all this is not a code of law. It is a code of honour. If he breaks it he is offending against the rules of the profession and is subject to its discipline” I feel it is worthwhile to refer to another passage from the case in Reginav. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Exparte Blackburn 29, where Lord Denning observed as follows: “Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Exparte Blackburn 29, where Lord Denning observed as follows: “Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do nor fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something for more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a Court of Justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into political controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own indication. Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the occasion requires provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done” It is seen from the above, the faith in the administration of justice is one of the pillars through which democratic institution functions and sustains.