Judgment :- K.M. Natarajan, J. This writ petition is filed by one Panchalingam under Art.226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondent (Inspector of Police, C.B. C.I.D., Tiruchirapalli), to produce the body and person of the detenus Elango and Ramasami before court and set them at liberty. The case of the petitioner as disclosed from the affidavit is as follows: The friends of the petitioner, namely, Elango and Ramasami were taken into custody on 16.1 1990 by the respondent and after torture, the detenus were produced before court on 11. 1990. The detenus were not informed of the ground of arrest. The Judicial Magistrate, Tiruchirapalli, mechanically passed an order of remand and no charge-sheet was filed so far. Hence the remand beyond 90 days is illegal and violative of Sec.167(2), Cr.P.C. and Art.21 of the Constitution of India. Hence this petition. 2. In the counter-affidavit by the respondent it is averred as follows: on 211. 1989 at 03.30 hours in the National College Higher Secondary School, the ten feet height bronze statue of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was blasted by a powerful time bomb by some unknown culprits. In respect of the said incident, a case was registered in Trichy Port Police station in Crime No. 1726 of 1989 under Secs.452 and 427, Indian Penal Code read with Sec.3 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1908 and the investigation was taken up by the Inspector. On 211. 1989 on the orders of the Inspector General of Police (Crimes), Madras, the investigation was handed over to C.B. C.I.D., Special Cell, Tiruchirapalli. On Investigation, it was revealed that during October, 1989, the accused Elango and Ramasami along with Lenin and Ilavarasan, who are Naxalites, entered into a criminal conspiracy and in pursuance of the conspiracy all the four accused blasted the statue of Nehru on 211. 1989 by planting a powerful time deviced bomb. Thereupon the accused Elango. was arrested at Tiruchirapalli on 11. 1990 and remanded to judicial custody on 11. 1990. He gave a confessional statement and in pursuance of the same, six ordinary detenators were recovered from him. The accused Ramasami alias Gunasekaran was arrested on 11. 1990 at Koovagam and he was remanded to judicial custody on 11. 1990. A bitchuva was recovered from him. The other two accused Lenin and Ilavarasan were absconding. On 25. 1990. He gave a confessional statement and in pursuance of the same, six ordinary detenators were recovered from him. The accused Ramasami alias Gunasekaran was arrested on 11. 1990 at Koovagam and he was remanded to judicial custody on 11. 1990. A bitchuva was recovered from him. The other two accused Lenin and Ilavarasan were absconding. On 25. 1990 a chargesheet was filed against both the accused under Secs.120-B, 450 and 427, Indian Penal Code and also under Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosives (Substances) Act, 1908 and under Sec.4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. The case was taken on file in P.R.C.No.11 of 1990 on 25. 1990. The accused were committed on 8. 1990 to take their trial before the Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli, by the Magistrate. The Sessions Judge took the case on file in S.C.No.148 of 1990 on 29. 1990 and the same is pending before the I Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli and posted for framing of charges on 310. 1990. 3. It is further averred that the accused Elango is also concerned in Kodaikanal Police Station Crime No.70 of 1988 under Secs.3,4 and 5 of the Indian Explosives Substances Act, 1908 Sec.9(b) of the Indian Explosives Act and under Sec.4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and under Secs.286,427,120-B, 124-A and 153-A, Indian Penal Code. Lastly it is submitted that the accused are not automatically entitled to bail and that their judicial remand is not violative of Art.21 of the Constitution of India or Sec. 167(2), Cr.P.C.. Hence, the respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. The point lor consideration in this writ petition is whether the accused are entitled to be released on bail automatically by virtue of not filing the charge-sheet within 90 days after their arrest in view of Sec. 167(2), Cr.P.C. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of this Court in Judu alias Daswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 T.L.N.J. (Crl.) 1, rendered by Arunachalam, J., while the Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in Sankar alias Gowri Sankar and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.M.P.No. 10755 of 1990, dated 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of this Court in Judu alias Daswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 T.L.N.J. (Crl.) 1, rendered by Arunachalam, J., while the Public Prosecutor relied on the decision in Sankar alias Gowri Sankar and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.M.P.No. 10755 of 1990, dated 19. 1990, rendered by Janarthanam, J. and also the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , and submitted that Arunachalam, J., has not considered the decision of the above quoted decision of the Supreme Court and hence came to a different conclusion and as such the decision rendered by Janarthnam, J. which is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court is in all fours applicable to the facts of the case. 6. The facts which are not in dispute can be stated for proper appreciation of the rival submissions. Admittedly, the accused Elango was arrested at Tiruchirapalli, on 11. 1990 and remanded to judicial custody on 11. 1990. The accused Ramasami alias Gunasekaran was arrested on 11. 1990, and remanded to judicial custody on 11. 1990. The two other accused, namely, Lenin and Ilavarasan were absconding. A chargesheet was filed against both the accused under Secs. 120-B, 450 and 427 and under Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosives (Substances) Act, 1908 and under Sec.4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. The case was taken on file in P.R.C.No.11 of 1990 on 25. 1990 and the learned magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court for trial, on 8. 1990. The Sessions Judge took the case on file in S.C.No.148 of 1990 on 29. 1990 and it is pending before the I Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli. It is not disputed that the case was posted for framing charge before the I Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli on 310. 1990. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since no chargesheet was filed, the remand beyond 90 days is illegal and violative of Sec. 167(2), Cr.P.C. and Art.21 of the Constitution of India. It is not disputed that the case was posted for framing charge before the I Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Tiruchirapalli on 310. 1990. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since no chargesheet was filed, the remand beyond 90 days is illegal and violative of Sec. 167(2), Cr.P.C. and Art.21 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision rendered by Arunachalam, J. in Judu alias Daswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 T.L.N J. (Crl.) 1, in support of his contention while the learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision of Janarthanam, J. in (Sankar alias Gowri Sankar and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.M.P.No.10755 of 1990 dated 19. 1990) After going through the said two decisions and also the other decisions referred to therein, we find that the attention of Arunachalam, J., was not drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman, A.I.R 1983 S.C 439:1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S. C. C. 3 72, and Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Shardulbhai v. State of Gujarat, 1990 Crl. L.J. 1275. On the basis of the decision in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court overruled the decision in Babubhai Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat, 1982 Crl.L.J.. 284. The facts involved in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , are that one Lakshmi Brahman and another were suspected of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life under Sec.302, I.P.C. Both of them were taken into custody on 11. 1974. The Investigating Officer failed to file charge-sheet within 60 days though both of them surrendered before court on 11. 1974. The investigation was then in progress. The Investigating Officer failed to submit the charge-sheet against them within a period of 60 days as contemplated by Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 167, Cr.P.C. of 1973 prior to its amendment by Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1978 which enlarges the period from 60 to 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years. The two accused moved for bail under Sec.439, Cr.P.C. before the High Court to grant bail. The two accused moved for bail under Sec.439, Cr.P.C. before the High Court to grant bail. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction, power or authority to remand the accused to custody after the charge-sheet is submitted and before the commitment order is made and therefore the accused were entitled to be released on bail, on the ground that the proceedings before the magistrate under Chapter XVI of the new Code would not be an enquiry within the meaning of the expression in Sec.2(g) and therefore Sec.209 would not confer power on the Magistrate to commit the accused to custody. As against the said order, the State has filed appeal by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while setting aside the Judgment of the High Court, however approved the view of the High Court that as the accused did not apply for bail 60 days after the date of arrest, their continued detention is not illegal or without authority of law. The Supreme Court also approved the view of the High Court that the jurisdiction To grant bail in case investigation was not completed within the prescribed time limit as incorporated in Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2), Cr.P.C. as it then stood, vests in the Magistrate if the accused applies and is prepared to furnish bail. The Supreme Court also observed that Sec. 167 envisages a stage when a suspect is arrested and the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period. The investigation would come to an end the moment charge-sheet is submitted as required under Sec.170 unless the Magistrate directs further investigation. However, after considering the provisions of Secs. 170,190,204,207 and 209 of the new Code, the Supreme Court held that the dichotomy read by the High Court in Secs.207 and 209 is certainly not borne out by the provisions of the new Code. The Supreme Court observed that Sec.207, as it then stood, made it obligatory for the Magistrate to supply free of costs, copies of the documents set out in the section. The duty cast on the Magistrate by Sec.207 had to be performed in a judicial manner. The Supreme Court observed that Sec.207, as it then stood, made it obligatory for the Magistrate to supply free of costs, copies of the documents set out in the section. The duty cast on the Magistrate by Sec.207 had to be performed in a judicial manner. The Magistrate may proceed to commit the accused to the Court of Session to stand his trial, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the judicial obligations imposed in Secs.207 and 209 have been performed and that the statutory obligation imposed by Sec.207 read with Sec.209 on the Magistrate to furnish copies of documents is a judicial obligation and that it is not an administrative function. The Supreme Court concluded “thus from the time the accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under Sec.170 and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire whether Sec.207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Sec.2(g) of the Code.” The Supreme Court then went on to observe that if the Magistrate is to hold an inquiry obviously Sec.309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.309 provides that if the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement or adjourn any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused, if in custody. The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court committed an error in holding that “the order remanding the respondents to custody, made after cognizance of the offence was taken, cannot be justified under Secs.167(2), 209 and 309 of the Code and no other provision under which the respondents can be remanded to custody at this stage, having been indicated by the learned Government advocate, we feel that it would be proper to accede to the request made by the respondents and to direct that they would be released on bail after furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda.” According to the Supreme Court, the view taken by the High Court introduces a stage of compulsory bail not envisaged by the new Code and, therefore, the above view of the High Court could not be upheld. In the result, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the State of U.P. and set aside the order of the High Court granting bail to the respondents. The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Shardulbhai case, 1990 Crl.L.J. 1275, has considered the Judgment in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , from paragraph 24 and finally in para.29 enunciated the principle as follows: “29. The position of law as it emerges from the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , may be summarised as follows: .(1) Sec.167 of the new Code envisages a stage when a suspect is arrested and the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period. .(2) The investigation would come to an end the moment charge-sheet is submitted as required by Sec.170 unless the Magistrate directs further investigation. .(3) Jurisdiction to grant bail in case investigation is not completed within the prescribed time as incorporated in Proviso (a) to Sec.167(2), vests in the Magistrate, if the accused applies and is prepared to furnish bail. .(4) On submission of charge-sheet the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. .(5) Inquiry within the meaning of Sec.2(g) of the new Code commences on the submission of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance by the Magistrate. .(6) Sec.309 of the new Code enables the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till inquiry to be made is completed. .(4) On submission of charge-sheet the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. .(5) Inquiry within the meaning of Sec.2(g) of the new Code commences on the submission of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance by the Magistrate. .(6) Sec.309 of the new Code enables the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till inquiry to be made is completed. .(7) The new Code does not envisage a stage of compulsory bail. .(8) The accused cannot claim to be released on bail on account of default committed in submitting charge-sheet within prescribed time after submission of the charge-sheet and commencement of the enquiry.” .It is also worthwhile to quote para. 17 of the said judgment wherein the position of law as it emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court in Natabar Parida v. State of Orissa, 1975 Crl.L.J. 1212, is summarised as follows: .(1) Under Sec. 167(2) of the old Code, the Magistrate to whom the accused was forwarded could remand him to police custody or jail custody for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. Even the Magistrate who had jurisdiction to try the case could not remand the accused to any custody beyond the period of 15 days under that provision. .(2) The Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case could remand an accused to jail custody from time to time during the pendency of investigation in exercise of the power under Sec.344 of the old Code. .(3) It would thus appear that though the Magistrate could remand an accused to police custody or jail custody for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole under Sec.167 (2) of the old Code, he could remand an accused to jail custody from time to time during the pendency of investigation under Sec.344 of the old Code. Sec.167(2) and Sec.344 of the old Code had to be read together so far as Magistrate’s power to remand the accused was concerned. .(4) Proviso (a) to Sec.167(2) of the new Code confers power of remand to jail custody during the pendency of investigation only. .(5) Sec.309(2) of the new Code is attracted only after the cognizance of an offence has been taken or commencement of the trial has proceeded. .(4) Proviso (a) to Sec.167(2) of the new Code confers power of remand to jail custody during the pendency of investigation only. .(5) Sec.309(2) of the new Code is attracted only after the cognizance of an offence has been taken or commencement of the trial has proceeded. .(6) The command of the Legislature in Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) of the new Code is that the accused person has got to be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail and cannot be kept in detention beyond the period of 60 days even if the investigation is still proceeding. .(7) Sec.344 of the old Code is applicable to investigations pending immediately before the coming into force of the new Code and in such case the accused cannot claim to be released under Proviso (a) to Sec.l67(2) of the new Code. .(8) The Supreme Court has not said that the command of the Legislature in Proviso (a) to Sec.167(2) travels beyond the stage of investigation.” The Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Shardulbhai’s case, 1990 Cr.L.J. 1275, referred to the decisions in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 149 and Rajnikant v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1990 S.C: 71, and finally held as follows: “(1) Proviso (a) to Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.167, which is in Chapter XII of the new Code which deals with “information to the Police and their powers to investigate” can be invoked only at the stage of investigation. .(2) Jurisdiction to grant bail in case investigation is not completed within the prescribed time limit as provided in Proviso (a) to Sec.167(1), vests in the Magistrate if the accused applies and he is prepared to furnish bail. Sec. 167 envisages a stage when suspect is arrested and the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period. .(3) The expression “Magistrate” in the aforesaid Proviso (a) would mean the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. .(4) The investigation would come to an end the moment charge-sheet is submitted as required by Sec.178 unless the Magistrate directs further investigation. .(5) In case of offence trial by the Sessions Court inquiry within the meaning of Sec.2(g) of the new Code would commence on submission of the charge-sheet. .(6) Once the inquiry commences, Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) has no application. .(5) In case of offence trial by the Sessions Court inquiry within the meaning of Sec.2(g) of the new Code would commence on submission of the charge-sheet. .(6) Once the inquiry commences, Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) has no application. .(7) After commencement of the inquiry the Magistrate has power to remand the accused to jail custody under Sec.309(2) of the new Code. .(8) An order for release on bail made under the Proviso (a) to Sec.167(2) is not defeated by lapse of time, the filing of charge-sheet or by remand to custody under Sec.309(2). The order for release on bail may, however, be cancelled under Secs.437 (5) or 439(2). .(9) When the bail has been granted under the Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) for default of the prosecution is not completing the investigation within the prescribed time limit, after the defect is cured by filing of a charge-sheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit to custody. (10) The accused has absolute right to be released on bail under the Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) of the new Code for the default of the prosecution in not completing the investigation within time limit prescribed thereunder in the sense that he is entitled to be released on bail by showing that the investigation has not been completed or the charge-sheet has not been filed within the prescribed time limit, without anything more. In other words, the accused has not to show that he is entitled to be released on bail on merits. .(11) the accused does not have right to be released on bail under proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) once the investigation comes to an end by filing charge-sheet. .(12) The new Code does not envisage a stage of compulsory bail. .(13) Right of being released oh bail which the accused has under Proviso (a) to Sec.167 (2) of the new Code is not an absolute right in the sense that it could be exercised at any stage. The absolute right of the accused to be released on bail, as understood by the Full Bench of this Court in Babubhai case, 1982 Crl.L.J. 284, would amount to compulsory bail which is not envisaged by the new Code. The absolute right of the accused to be released on bail, as understood by the Full Bench of this Court in Babubhai case, 1982 Crl.L.J. 284, would amount to compulsory bail which is not envisaged by the new Code. .(14) The judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Babubhai case, 1982 Crl.L.J. 284, stands overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 .” It is clear from the above decisions, that Sec. 167, Cr.P.C. is applicable only at a stage when the investigation is not completed within the prescribed period. The investigation comes to an end the moment charge-sheet is filed and the court takes cognizance of the offence and under Sec.190 of the new Code, there is commencement of enquiry. Sec.309 would enable him to remand the accused to custody till the enquiry to be made is complete. It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439:1983 Crl.L.J. 839:(1983)2 S.C.C.372, did not uphold that the accused had an absolute right to be released on bail on account of failure on the part of police to submit charge-sheet within the prescribed time limit. In Rabindra Rai’s case, 1984 Crl.L.J. 1412, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court has observed as follows: “There is an impression in some section that if an accused was entitled to bail under Proviso (a) to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 167 of the Code at one stage, or if for some time his detention was not under a valid order of remand, then he can enforce his right to be released on bail even at a later stage of the proceeding. In my view, this is a misconceived stand. When Proviso (a) to Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 167 says that after expiry of the period of ninety days or sixty days, as the case may be an accused, who is in custody, shall be released on bail, it does not mean to say that, thereafter, his detention in custody is illegal or without an authority of law. If detention of an accused after the statutory period is held to be illegal or without authority of law, then there is no question of his releasing on bail on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the court concerned. If detention of an accused after the statutory period is held to be illegal or without authority of law, then there is no question of his releasing on bail on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the court concerned. He has to be released outright. Does Proviso (a) to Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 167 contemplate release of an accused after the statutory period of detention where the accused concerned fails to furnish security to the satisfaction of this Court? The answer is in negative. This aspect has also been examined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of State of U.P.,A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439:1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , and it has been observed [Para. 5]: "The High Court after examining the scheme of Sec.167(1) and (2) with the Proviso rightly concluded that on the expiry of 60 days from the date of the arrest of the accused, his further detention does not become ipso facto illegal or void, but if the charge sheet is not submitted within the period of 60 days then notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Sec.437(1), the accused would be entitled to an order for being released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail" The said view was subsequently followed in Nawal Sahni’s ease, 1989 Crl.L.J. 733, and the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Shardulbhai’s case, 1990 Crl.L.J. 1275, has approved the same. The principle laid down therein also is that the Proviso to Sec. 167 (2) is not a provision for grant of bail during investigation, but a restriction on the power of the Magistrate to remand an accused during investigation beyond the period prescribed. As such with filing of charge-sheet if an enquiry commences within the meaning of Sec.2(g) of the Code the Magistrate can remand the accused to custody in terms of Sec.309(2) and there is no question of applicability of Sec.167(2) Proviso in that event, the investigation having concluded. As such with filing of charge-sheet if an enquiry commences within the meaning of Sec.2(g) of the Code the Magistrate can remand the accused to custody in terms of Sec.309(2) and there is no question of applicability of Sec.167(2) Proviso in that event, the investigation having concluded. The decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Brahman’s case, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439:1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , was not brought to the notice of Arunachalam, J. while disposing of Judu alias Daswaran case, 1990 T.L.N.J. (Crl) 1, where as Janardhanam, J. has rightly differed from the view taken there, by applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, which has been followed by Full Benches of two High Courts referred to above. Even in Rajnikant Jivanlal v. Intelligence Officer Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi, (1989)3 S.C.C. 532.A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 71, referred to by Arunachalam, J., 1990 T.L.N.J. 1, it has been clearly stated that the accused cannot claim any special right to remain on bail, if the investigation reveals that the accused had committed a serious offence and charge-sheet had been filed. In that contingency, the bail granted under Proviso (a) to Sec.167 (2) could be cancelled." 7. The decision in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 149, is not helpful to the case of the petitioner as in that case the Supreme Court observed on the facts of that case: "That order for release on bail was not an order on merits but was what one may call an order-on-default, an order that could be rectified for special reasons after the defect was cured. The order was made long ago but for one reason or the other, the accused failed to take advantage of the order for several months." The Supreme Court further observed: "Probably for that reason, the prosecuting agency did not move in the matter and seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the order lapsed with the filing of the charge-sheet." In that case, the High Court and following the High Court, the Special Judge held that the order for release on bail came to an end with the passage of time on the filing of the charge-sheet, the Supreme Court observed that that was not a correct view. Applying the ratio laid down in Stute of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 , and in the decision of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Shardulbhai v. State of Gujarat, 1990 Crl.L.J. 1275, to the facts of this case, there is absolutely nothing to show that the accused in this case made an application for release on bail after the expiry of the period of 60 days prior to the filing of the charge-sheet. The moment charge-sheet is submitted, the investigation has come to an end, the enquiry having commenced. The Magistrate who is empowered to commit accused to Sessions should take cognizance of the offence under Sec.190 of the new Code and hold an enquiry and during the enquiry, he was empowered under Sec.309(2) to remand the accused till the enquiry is completed. In this case under Sec.209, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate has committed the accused to the Court of Session and now the accused is facing the trial before the Sessions Court. In the circumstances, the question of invoking the Proviso (a) to Sec. 167(2) by the accused and the question of releasing the accused do not arise and the detention of the accused cannot be said to be unlawful. We hold that the ratio laid down in the decision rendered by Janarthanam, J. Sankar alias Gowri Shankar v. State of Tamil Nadu (Crl.M.P. No.10755 of 1990), is correct. 8. It is well known that even in an application for writ of habeas corpus where challenge on behalf of the accused is that his detention in custody is without any authority of law, that question has to be examined with reference to the date fixed for return of rule. Reference in this connection may be made to one of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Talib Hussain v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 62, where it has been pointed out [Para. 6]: “In regard to the submission that the petitioner was arrested and deprived of his personal liberty long before the order of his arrest and this invalidated his detention, it is sufficient to point out that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of hearing. 6]: “In regard to the submission that the petitioner was arrested and deprived of his personal liberty long before the order of his arrest and this invalidated his detention, it is sufficient to point out that in habeas corpus proceedings the Court has to consider the legality of the detention on the date of hearing. If on the date of hearing it cannot be said that the aggrieved party has been wrongfully deprived of his personal liberty and his detention is contrary to law, a writ of habeas corpus cannot issue.” The same thing has been pointed out in the Full Bench decision of Patna High Court in Babu Nandan Mallah v. The State, 1972 Crl.L.J. 423. Since in the instant case a valid order of remand has been passed by the Magistrate while exercising the jurisdiction under Sec.209, Cr.P.C, it cannot be said that a writ of habeas corpus can be issued. Since the accused has been committed to take his trial and he is taking trial before the Sessions Court and since he is in custody based on a proper order of remand, the application for issue of habeas corpus is to be dismissed. 9. In the result, the writ petition fails and stands dismissed.