JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - Aggrieved by an order of the Trial Court rejecting his application for selling aside the ex-parte decree the defendant has come up in appeal. The main ground of attack being that the order passed on 8-4-1988 was not a conditional order and as such the mere non-payment of costs ought not to have been visited by an order to proceed ex-parte against him even in such an eventuality the defendant could not be denied his right to participate in subsequent proceedings which he was denied as he was never intimated thereafter about the dates fixed in the suit from time to time. He also questioned the correctness of the observation as to his absence on several dates as noticed in the order which was not borne out from the record. 2. The history of the case from die date of its institution on 20th April, 1982 until 8-4-1988 when the ex-parte order was passed makes a very unhappy reading. The facts have been catalogued in die order of the Trial Court and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to mention that it docs give an impression of a consorted effort by the defendant to stall the proceedings for as long as may be possible. This is not to say that the plaintiff was never at fault. In fact some times even the plaintiffs also was guilty of negligence in the conduct of the case. We are, however, not so much concerned about the past history of the case. It is better to look into those facts which are immediately relevant for our purpose. 3. The suit was fixed for final hearing on 20-11-1985. On that date the defendant applied for an adjournment and thereafter for one reason or the other the suit remained pending until 7-11-1987 which was fixed for final hearing. On that dale the defendant was absent and the court directed the suit to proceed ex-parte fixing 17-12-1987. On that date and the subsequent date i.e. 11.1.1988 the Presiding Officer remained on leave. The suit came up on 29-1-1988 but it was adjourned at the instance of the defendant. On the next dale 12-2-1988 the court did not function on account of strike and lire matter was posted for 8th April, 1988 for ex-parte hearing. On that date and the subsequent date i.e. 11.1.1988 the Presiding Officer remained on leave. The suit came up on 29-1-1988 but it was adjourned at the instance of the defendant. On the next dale 12-2-1988 the court did not function on account of strike and lire matter was posted for 8th April, 1988 for ex-parte hearing. On that date defendants application for recall of order dated 7-12-1987 came up for consideration and on hearing the parties the following order was passed: "The case called out. Counsel for the panics are: Heard over 9.C. No objection has been filed. In the interest of justice the application is allowed on payment of Rs. 20/- as costs. The order dated 7-12-1987 is set aside. The entire costs be paid-within 15 days. Fix 28-4-1988 for final hearing." 4. On 28.4.1988 the plaintiff moved an application that the suit be proceeded ex-parte on merits as the defendant had failed to pay the Costs. At that time both the defendant and his counsel were present in Court. There is an endorsement on this application to the effect that due to financial difficulty the costs could not be paid and one month's time may be given to pay up the costs. There is, however, some controversy about this endorsement. The plaintiff respondent contends that this endorsement has been subsequently made on the application for the purposes of setting aside the ex-parte decree while the appellant contends that this endorsement was made on 20-4-1988 itself when the application was moved in the court. We will consider this aspect during the course of our judgment. 5. This application by the plaintiff was allowed the same day with an observation that although the defendant had admittedly not paid the costs which was a condition precedent for setting aside the order to proceed ex-parte even a prayer to extend the term to pay up the costs was not made inspite of a suggestion made by the court that it could be extended. The court in these circumstances directed the suit to proceed ex-parte in terms of its earlier order dated 7-12-1987. 6. The court in these circumstances directed the suit to proceed ex-parte in terms of its earlier order dated 7-12-1987. 6. On the same day of defendant also moved an application to the effect that he had been impleaded in the suit as Mutawalli of the Waqf Properly in dispute and he had since been removal from mutawalliship and hence he had ceased to have any interest in the suit. It was also pointed out that another person had been appointed as mutawalli in his place. The purpose behind this application appears to be that the plaintiff should take steps to implead the new mutawalli also as defendant. This application was allowed by the court. The suit kept drifting even thereafter and ultimately the ex-parte statement was recorded on 4.4.1989 and the decree followed on 19-4-1989. 7. The submission of Sri S.U. Khan for the appellant is that order dated 8-4-1988 was not a conditional order and if there was any non compliance of the terms imposed by the court the only option available to the court was to tax the amount of costs awarded in the decree. The costs could also be adjusted against those costs which had been imposed on the plaintiff and had not been paid by them. The submission of Sri Khan has no merit. It is true that normally the court should not take such drastic action against a defaulting party as to dismiss the suit or strike of the defence and this course should be reserved for very rare cases. Yet, the nature of the controversy in the suit and the conduct of the defendant in the past cannot be totally ignored. It is the duty of every court to see that the orders passed by it are not flouted by the concerned parties. For enforcing its order the court has ample power under Section 151 both for doing justice and for preventing abuse of court's process and it can always resort to such procedure as it may deem proper depending upon the circumstances of each case. 8. It was submitted by Sri Khan that the powers under Section 151 cannot be exercised to strike of the defence or to proceed ex-parte apart from Order 9 of the Code. This submission, however, docs not appear to be correct. 8. It was submitted by Sri Khan that the powers under Section 151 cannot be exercised to strike of the defence or to proceed ex-parte apart from Order 9 of the Code. This submission, however, docs not appear to be correct. Section 151 gives very wide power to the court and in appropriate cases the court may even strike of the defence or to reject the plaint or even order the suit to proceed ex-parte. It is true that such wide powers have to be exercised with caution and in rare cases. In Sharma & Company v. Kedar Nath, I.L.R. 1954 (25) All. 153. a Division Bench of this Court presided over by the then Chief Justice Pad held that: "In a proper case where a court is satisfied that a party to a litigation has been contumacious and has deliberately flouted the order of the court and has been abusing its process, it has jurisdiction to dismiss the suit or to strike off the defence under Order XI, Rule 21 or Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure". The fact that the courts do possess such a power was also reiterated by Gajendragarker-J (as he then was) in Moolchand Samana v. Imus Miya Sheikh and others, A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 245 when he held that: "Striking off the defends for failure of the party to deposit adjournment costs as ordered by the court is an unduly severe adopting such a severe course of conduct as spiking off the defence of a party". The facts of that case, however, were quite different. There on the failure of the party to deposit the adjournment costs the court proceeded to spike off the defence and to order the suit to proceed ex-parte. On an application being made by the defendant the ex-parte decree was set aside but on a further application to recall the order striking off the defence the same was rejected. This was a later order which had come before his Lordship of Bombay High Court. 9. The facts of the present case, however, are entirely different. Here after the court had ordered the suit to proceed ex-parte for failure of the defendant to pay up the costs the court revived the earlier order. Thereafter the defendant did not participate in the proceeding ultimately resulting in an ex-parte decree which was passed after several years. 9. The facts of the present case, however, are entirely different. Here after the court had ordered the suit to proceed ex-parte for failure of the defendant to pay up the costs the court revived the earlier order. Thereafter the defendant did not participate in the proceeding ultimately resulting in an ex-parte decree which was passed after several years. During this entire period the defendant did not take another step to have the order recalled or take part in the proceeding. Sri Khan, however, urged that the defendant was never intimated about the date fixed in the case and, therefore, it was impossible for the defendant to take part in the proceeding. It is, however, forgotten that on the same date the defendant had also intimated the court that he had cease as mutawalli and as such he had left no interest in the suit as someone else had been appointed mutawalli in his place. The court never perverted the defendant from participating in the proceeding. Even the plaintiff who moved the application for impleadment did not strike off the name of the defendant from the array of the defendant but he only prayed for addition of the so-called new mutawalli. All these facts, therefore, clearly distinguish this case form the facts of the case of Bombay High Court, the case referred to above. 10. In the instant case by order dated 8-4-1988 the court had recalled its order dated 7-12-1987 on payment of Rs.20/- as costs which was to be paid within 15 days. It is apparent from this that the order of recall is subject to the condition that the defendant pays up the costs within 15 days. Although it was not a self operating order but the court still had the discretion cither to extend the time or to ensure payment of the costs before proceeding further with the trial of the suit. The order dated 8-4-1988 was in the nature of concession to the defendant and if he wanted to take its advantage it was necessary for him to comply with court's direction. On his failure the court was fully justified in directing the suit to proceed ex-parte. 11. It is urged that such a harsh course should not have been taken as a prayer for extension of time was indeed made as the endorsement on plaintiff's application dated 28-4-1988 will show. On his failure the court was fully justified in directing the suit to proceed ex-parte. 11. It is urged that such a harsh course should not have been taken as a prayer for extension of time was indeed made as the endorsement on plaintiff's application dated 28-4-1988 will show. However, from the court's order on this application it does not appear to be so or else the court would not have used the expression "although the court pointed out that the time may be extended" in that order. Apart from it in the impugned order also the court very specifically mentioned that no prayer for extension of time to pay the costs was made at that time. It is, therefore, difficult to brush aside the observations of the court so lightly. In this state of affairs this order under appeal cannot be said to be illegal. 12. The subsequent conduct of the defendant also shows that he had no real intention to pay the costs. Soon after the order passed on plaintiff's application he himself moved an application that he had ceased to have any interest as Mutawalli of the Waqf as somebody else had been appointed in his place. If the defendant had ceased to have any interest in the waqf property there could be no reason for him to have prayed for time to pay the costs awarded on 8-4-1988. We, therefore, hesitate in accepting the defendant's version that this endorsement was there at the time of disposal of the application. 13. There is one other aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored all together. The conduct of the defendant has not been clean and above board as would be apparent from the following facts. 14. On 28-4-1988 he informed the court that he had ceased to be Mutwalli but in paragraph 2 of his affidavit he had mentioned that there was stay order in his favour and it was vacated only on 4.12.1988. When confronted with this situation he has filed a supplementary affidavit on 11-1-1990 and in para 3 thereof he has stated that the date was wrongly mentioned in para 20 of his earlier affidavit and that the correct date was 4-2-1988. In support he has filed a copy of the order-sheet of the relevant proceedings. 15. When confronted with this situation he has filed a supplementary affidavit on 11-1-1990 and in para 3 thereof he has stated that the date was wrongly mentioned in para 20 of his earlier affidavit and that the correct date was 4-2-1988. In support he has filed a copy of the order-sheet of the relevant proceedings. 15. It may be mentioned here that after he was removed from Mutawalliship by the Central Shia Waqf Board by its order dated 20-2-1988 he challenged the same by filing a reference in the court of Civil Judge and the operation of the order of the Waqf Board was stayed on 23-5-1985. According to the appellant this order remained effective only up to 4-2-1988 when it was dissolved due to dismissal of the reference in default of appearance. On an application being moved to recall the dismissal order the stay order was restored on 17-11-1989. This proceeding was reference No. 120 of 1985 and a copy of the order-sheet of this proceeding is Annexure 1' to the supplementary affidavit. A perusal of the order-sheet goes to show that the reference was dismissed in default on 4-2-1988. It also shows that the application for recall of the dismissal order was made on 11-8-1988..which was subsequently restored on 15-11-1989. 16. A supplementary counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent and it is pointed out that the copy of the order-sheet filed along with the supplementary affidavit was not the complete order-sheet. The respondent has also filed a copy of the order from 12-4-1988 onwards as Annexure 1' to the counter affidavit and according to it the application for recall of dismissal order was dismissed on 12-4-1984 and not on 11-8-1988. This date is significant because it was subsequent to the moving of this application that he had represented in the court that he had ceased to be Mutawalli and somebody else had been appointed in his place. Even in this court it appears that the appellant has not come with clean hands and has tried to suppress material facts from the knowledge of the court. Apart from this some other documents have also been annexed by the respondent showing that throughout the period the reference remained off the record due to dismissal. He had been representing himself as present Mutawalli of the Waqf in various proceedings. Apart from this some other documents have also been annexed by the respondent showing that throughout the period the reference remained off the record due to dismissal. He had been representing himself as present Mutawalli of the Waqf in various proceedings. He even gave out a public notice on 10-3-1989 i.e. much prior to 17-11-1989 when the reference was restored that he was Mutawalli of the waqf in question. Throughout the appellant has been projecting himself as Mutawalli of the waqf and the only exception appears to be when he moved the application in the court on 28-4-1988 that he had ceased to be so. His conduct, therefore, docs not justify any indulgence in favour of the appellant. 17. The reason for the curious conduct of the defendant may be seen in the nature of the dispute between the parties. The suit is for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 12-2-1974 where under suit property was agreed to be sold by the defendant for rupees one lac fifty thousands out of which rupees fifty thousands was received by the defendant as advance at the time of executing the agreement and a further sum of Rs.50,000/-was received by him by 15-2-1976. The defendant duly obtained sanction from the Shia Central Waqf Board to transfer the property to plaintiff but no sale deed could be executed-due to restriction on. registration of document and thereafter due to proceeding under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Ultimately the suit had to be filed on 20-4-1982. A copy of the plaint has been filed as Annexure 1' to the affidavit in support of the stay application. In defence execution of agreement and receipt of rupees one lac is admitted. The only substantial plea is of re-payment of this amount to the plaintiff. The intention of the defendant is obviously i.e. to delay the disposal of the suit by prolonging the proceeding as much as possible and at the same time to take full advantage of the money already pocketed by him. Seen in this background the entire conduct of the defendant becomes clear and it gives an insight into his mercy conduct. It appears to us that in his effort to outsmart the plaintiff, the defendant himself has been entrapped resulting in the ex-parte decree against him. This is the fate which sometimes awaits those who want to be too Smart. 18. It appears to us that in his effort to outsmart the plaintiff, the defendant himself has been entrapped resulting in the ex-parte decree against him. This is the fate which sometimes awaits those who want to be too Smart. 18. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of what we have stated above we are of the view that the court was fully justified in rejecting the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The appellant has not been able to point out any illegality in the order. 19. In the result the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.