JUDGMENT Bbawani Singh, J.—This appeal arises out of the acquittal of the accused by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Simla, in Case No. 96/2 of 1983 decided on 26-6-1986. It is a case under sections 41/42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and sections 379/411, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case, briefly, is that : on 2-6-1982, Inspector Jeet Singh (PW 7) of Enforcement Branch, conducted a raid at Railway Station Shogi. Sub-Inspector Prem Prakash Sethi (PW-9), Forest Block Officer Narain Singh (PW 6) and Forest Guard Chander Mani (PW 8) were also with him at that time. During this raid, forty scants of Kail wood of different sizes were found lying in the yard of Railway Station, Shogi. They bore C. T. khudan mark and no export hammer and property mark was affixed on these scants. During investigation, it was found that this khudan mark was allotted to the accused, who had been given various export permits by Divisional Forest Officer, Simla for the transport of timber. The case, therefore, is that the accused transported these forty scants of forest produce to Railway Station, Shogi without affixing necessary property mark and export hammer and committed the breach of provisions of Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 framed under sections 41, 42 of the Indian Forest Act. Since the accused failed to account for the timber in question, offence also fell under section 379, Indian Penal Code or in the alternative, section .421, " Indian Penal Code. 2. These scants were seized on the spot through memo. Ex. P. 9 and were given on Spurdari to Shri Baldev Verma through Memo. Ext. PP On the basis of Ruqa (Ext. PA) by Inspector Jeet Singh to Police Station Enforcement, Simla, First Information Report (Ext. PB) was recorded in the case. On completion of investigation, the accused was prosecuted for the aforesaid offences in the trial Court, where he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, 3. The explanation of the accused under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code is that he was forest lessee at the material time and had number of permits subsisting during the year 1982-83. On completion of investigation, the accused was prosecuted for the aforesaid offences in the trial Court, where he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, 3. The explanation of the accused under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code is that he was forest lessee at the material time and had number of permits subsisting during the year 1982-83. He transported timber to Railway Station, Shogi on the basis of these permits and his Khudan mark was C. X and property mark was C T. B But, it has been denied by the accused that the timber in dispute belonged to him or that it was transported by him to Shogi Railway Station. He has also stated that whatever timber was transported by him to Shogi Railway Station, it was given property mark and export hammer and no timber without property mark and export hammer was transported by him. 4 After recording the prosecution evidence and hearing the parties to the case, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the charge against the accused and the result was that the accused was acquitted of all the charges, hence this appeal by the State. 5. After going through the record of this case, I am of the opinion that the acquittal of the accused in this case is quite justified. The prosecution case suffers from various infirmities. It is in evidence that the raid was conducted by Inspector Jeet Singh on the basis of secret information. However, the accused should have been associated during this time. The timber was lying in an open place and the accused was not represented either personally or through someone on his behalf Then comes a question, whether the timber can be connected with the accused ? The efforts of the prosecution have been that the timber belonged to the accused, since khudan mark C. T. had been allotted to him. This is not enough. The prosecution should have proved quite convincingly that his khudan mark was only allotted to the accused and none other in any other Forest Division. There is some dispute as to the allotment and use of khudan mark to be used to each scant of forest produce. Rule 5 of Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 deals with registration of property mark and its use. It reads as under: "5. There is some dispute as to the allotment and use of khudan mark to be used to each scant of forest produce. Rule 5 of Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 deals with registration of property mark and its use. It reads as under: "5. No person shall transport or cause to be transported any forest produce that does not bear the imprint of the registered mark." Thereafter, relevant rule is Rule 6 which deals with the registration of property, relevant part of which is as under i "All persons willing to transport forest produce by land routes shall register at the office of the Divisional Forest Officer the mark or marks which indicate their proprietary rights in such forest produce. " 6. Both these Rules talk about property mark which in this case is C. JT. B. and no Rule has been pointed out by either of the learned counsel for the parties which talks of khudan mark. 7. Thereafter, Rule 10 says that no pass shall be issued for any unmarked timber or for such timber as bears the marks not registered as hereinafter provided. Sub-parts (i) and (ii) of this Rule are as under: "(i) The Divisional Forest Officer may refuse to issue a pass for export or transport if he has reasons to believe or for any other valid reasons that the forest produce has not been legally obtained by the applicant. However, the refusal to issue a pass shall be made in the shape of self-speaking written order. - (ii) The person who has been refused the issue of pass may within fifteen days of the date of refusal prefer an appeal to the Conservator of Forest incharge of the area concerned and his orders on appeal shall be final.” 8. Rule 11 envisages that no person shall transport or cause to be transported any forest produce except kuth by laud routes, without obtaining a pass (Annexure A) from the concerned Divisional Forest Officer or sny other Officer so authorised. Sub-rule (3) or Rule 11 prohibits any person from transporting or causing the transport of any timber except fire-wood, pulp-wood and bamboos, unless the timber is properly affixed with one export hammer mark by the Forest Officer authorised by the Conservator of Forest concerned. Sub-rule (3) or Rule 11 prohibits any person from transporting or causing the transport of any timber except fire-wood, pulp-wood and bamboos, unless the timber is properly affixed with one export hammer mark by the Forest Officer authorised by the Conservator of Forest concerned. Sub-rule (4) (a) authorises the pass issuing authority to prescribe a route by which alone the Forest produce may be transported for export outside Himachal Pradesh in such a manner that the forest produce crosses through one of the barriers established by the Excise and Taxation Department. This authority will also prescribe the check post(s) where the forest produce shall be compulsorily checked enroute. Under sub-rule (4) (b) of Rule 11, the authority issuing the pass shall prescribe the route by which alone the forest produce may be transported and shall also determine the check post(s) where it shall be compulsorily checked, in case the forest produce is not to be transported outside the territory of Himachal Pradesh. The authority will also determine other conditions subject to .which the pass has to be operated. 9. Rule 12 deals with the issuance of challans to be issued by the person in whose favour pass has been issued or his authorised Agent (Annexure ‘B) to accompany the forest produce. Then, there is Rule 18 to the following effect: "18. No person shall offer any forest produce for export by rail on any railway station within Himachal Pradesh unless it is covered by a pass issued under these rules. Nor will the railway authorities accept any forest produce for transport by rail unless accompanied by a valid pass." 10. Finally, Rule 20 deals with the penalty for breach of the rules. 11. No rule, therefore, has been brought to my notice which specifically deals with the use of khudan mark. Therefore, it cannot be said that use of khudan mark is necessary. Without expressing any final opinion on this aspect, the timber in the present case cannot be connected with the accused simply because of khudan mark C. T. there is also the evidence that the accused had subsisting valid permit in his possession for the transport of timber. He could have very well used the property mark and the export hammer mark for the timber in question in addition to khudan mark. He could have very well used the property mark and the export hammer mark for the timber in question in addition to khudan mark. There can be no reason for the accused to have used only khudan mark and not property mark and export hammer mark on the disputed timber. There is evidence of Bali Ram (PW 3) that same khudan mark can be allotted to different persons in different forest divisions atone and the same time. 12. Again, the prosecution has failed to show that the timber was brought by the accused through particular check posts before it was left at Shogi Railway Station. Cogent and convincing evidence could have been collected to connect the accused with the timber in question. But, there is complete want of evidence on this aspect of the matter. Even regarding the use of khudan mark C. T. on the disputed timber, h is possible that it may have been done by some-one else, since the prosecution has failed to produce and prove the facsimile of the khudan mark of the accused with those found on the seized scants. The impugned decision has been examined. The trial Court has dealt with the matter quite seriously and exhaustively before ordering the acquittal of the accused. The conclusions arrived at are absolutely correct and in tune with the evidence on the record of this case. Moreover, this is an appeal against acquittal. Unless the approach of the trial Court is grossly unreasonable or perverse, order of acquittal is not to be lightly set-aside. The impugned decision does not suffer from any of these infirmities. 13. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.