Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in this Civil Revision petition, “Association of Lessees of Temple Lands”, a registered society, filed O.S. No. 535 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District Munsifs Court, Erode against the respondent-temple for a permanent injunction, restraining the respondent from interfering with the alleged possession of the suit properties, by a fresh lease auction, or from interfering with the enjoyment of the same by the members of the plaintiff society. In the said suit, the plaintiff peti tioner filed I.A. No. 630 of 1989 for a similar temporary injunction. The said I.A. was dismissed by order dated 15-7-1989 and the subsequent appeal filed by the petitioner in C.M.A 16 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District Judge was also dismissed by order dated 4-8-1989. Aggrieved by it, the plaintiff has preferred this revision petition. 2. Earlier to the institution of the above suit, 22 members of the petitioner-Association took the suit lands belonging to the respondent-temple in a public auction for the year 1985-86. After the expiry of the said year, the respondent-temple sought to lease out the said lands once again in public auction, when the said lessees filed 22 differents suits against the respondent for injunction restraining it from leasing out the said lands. There, the lessees claimed protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The suits ended in a compromise and were dismissed as evidenced by Exs. A40 and A50 and Exs. B1 to B60. The lessees and the respondent filed a joint memos to the effect that they would not claim protection under the cultivating tenants Protection Act, that the lessees would deliver vacant possession of the said lands to the respondent on 30-6-1989 and after 30-6-1989 they have no right to continue in possession thereof. 3. Subsequently, it is stated, the respondent temple has leased out the lands to new tenants on 20-7 1989 and have received lease consideration of about Rs. 76,000 from them. 4. Now, the above said O.S. No. 535 of 1989 has been filed by the above said association which comprises the above said 22 persons as members and the contention is that the Public Trust Act applies and that the lessees’ possession cannot be disturbed. As stated above, its application for temporary injunction was negatived by both the courts below. 5. Now, the above said O.S. No. 535 of 1989 has been filed by the above said association which comprises the above said 22 persons as members and the contention is that the Public Trust Act applies and that the lessees’ possession cannot be disturbed. As stated above, its application for temporary injunction was negatived by both the courts below. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that by signing the above said compromise memos, the above said members of the association have not given any undertaking as such, to the court and that the above said compromise memos were only contracts between the parties with the seal of approval of the court and that such contracts were unlawful in view of the cultivating tenants Protection Act and other enactments giving protection to the said members of the petitioner association as statutory tenants and that there can be no estoppel against such statutes. The learned Counsel cited Murlidhar v. State of U.P. 1 in support of his conterntion In the said case, there was agreement in the lease deed that the parties will never claim benefit of the Rent Control and Eviction Acts and the Court held that it was against public policy and so hit by S. 23 of the Contract Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited the decision in V. Dhanapal v. Yesodai Ammal 2 which held that even if the tenancy under the various States Rent Control Acts, was terminated as per S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the tenant, even after such termination continued to be a tenant unless eviction order is passed under the relevant Rent Control Acts. The learned Counsel also cited Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 3 where it was held under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (whereby a tenant under the said Act is deemed to be a purchaser of a demised land on tillers day) that it could not be contended that the earlier statements of the said tenant in proceedings under Ss. 14 and 29 of the said Act that he was willing to hand over possession would estop him from taking a plea to the contrary. 6. But, for the following reasons these decisions are not applicable to the present case. 14 and 29 of the said Act that he was willing to hand over possession would estop him from taking a plea to the contrary. 6. But, for the following reasons these decisions are not applicable to the present case. As the learned counsel for the respondent submitted, the above said compromise memos amounted to voluntary surrender of respective tenancies and possession of the property and once such compromise memos are presented before the court, inviting the court to pass orders accordingly, and the court passed orders accordingly, there is no landlord and tenant relationship at all thereafter in each case and hence the question of estoppel against statute would not arise. The terms of the above said compromise memos are said to be similar and on going through one such memo, prima facie at least it can be concluded for deciding this Civil Revision Petition arising out of interim order passed in the suit, that the respective tenancies as such came to an end though, under the new arrangements (not creating any fresh tenancy) the ex-tenants can remain in possession till a fresh future dated, namely 30-6-1989. 7. In Muralidhar v. State of U.P. 1 , the facts are different, the agreement in question there, was not presented before court inviting it to pass an order accordingly and the court had not passed an order accordingly. When an agreement is presented before a court in all solemnity inviting the court to pass an order accordingly and the court accordingly passed an order, it will be against public policy, only if any party goes back on it. By such agreements as had been reached in the present case and the consequent orders of the Court, the tenancy as such came to an end in each case and only delivery was postponed till 30 6-1989. The agreements amounted to voluntary surrender of the demised property and only its effective date is postponed to 30-6-1989. So, in view of the tenancy coming to an end the decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal 2 , and Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 3 have no application. No doubt in Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 6 , referred to above, the earlier statement by the tenant that he was willing to hand over possession to the landlord was made in a proceeding before the court. No doubt in Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 6 , referred to above, the earlier statement by the tenant that he was willing to hand over possession to the landlord was made in a proceeding before the court. But, in the present case, it is not a mere case of some statement earlier made before the court, but such a statement was made in an agreement between the parties pending a proceeding before the court and it was solemnly made before the court inviting the court to pass an order accordingly. This certainly stands on a different footing. Therefore also the decision in Amrit Bhikaji v. Kashinath Janardhan 1 , referred to above has no application to the present case. 8. Further in S.N. Kuba v. P.P.I. Vaithyanalhan 2 , in a similar case of jointendorsement made in the suit for the tenantvacating the suit demised property by30-11-1086 and of the consequent decreedated 19-9-1985 passed in terms of the jointendorsement, this court also observed asfollows: “If in a given case the tenant surrenders his tenancy and possession, or surrenders possession after the termination of the tenancy and gets back possession by virtue of a new arrangement, then he can claim to be a tenant only if the new arrangement confers tenancy rights on him or creates the relationship of tenant and landlord between him and the owner. If in such a case, the new arrangement does not confer any right of tenancy on the person in possession, he will not be a tenant as defined by the Act. It is not necessary that there should be an actual surrender of possession and taking back possession after entering into a new arrangement. If by mutual agreement, the prior rights of the tenant were put an end to, and the tenant is permitted to be in possession under a new arrangement, that would be sufficient in law to hold that the ex-tenants possession is not continuous and that the subsequent possession is referable only to the arrangement.” 9. Further, the learned counsel for therespondent rightly submitted that estoppelcannot be pleaded by the plaintiff-association, which is a different party from theactual plaintiffs in the earlier suits, who gavethe above said undertakings. 10. Further, the learned counsel for therespondent rightly submitted that estoppelcannot be pleaded by the plaintiff-association, which is a different party from theactual plaintiffs in the earlier suits, who gavethe above said undertakings. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent also relied on Abdul Hameed, T.M.A. v. S. Radhakrishnan 3 , to state that the abovesaid compromise memo are undertakingsmade to the court and that they cannot bedisobeyed. The learned Judge observed ia the above said case that just because the undertaking was given pursuant to a compromise between the parties, it did not cease to be an undertaking to the court. The court further held that in order to ascertain whether it was an undertaking to court or not, the circumstances, under which it was given and the consequential order passed by the court should be con sidered and that it was only on the basis of the said undertaking, the court passed the decretal order granting time to the tenant till 31-7-1989 to vacate the premises. I think that there is force in this argument also. Though the word “undertaking” is not used in the present case in the compromise memos, yet the expressions used thereia do constitute undertaking. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent also rightly argued that if as stated above, beyond 30-6-1989 the possession of the above said members of the association is wrongful and so there can be no injunction in favour of such persons in wrongful possession and in support of this contention he cited the decision in Alamelu Achi v. Ponniah 4 . Further, the learned counsel for the respondent also pointed out rightly that the petitioner has not come to court with clean hands because in the plaint it has suppressed the above said compromise memos filed. Further, the intention of the plaintiff is only to defeat the decrees earlier obtained against its members. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that an injunction cannot be granted to such plaintiff. In support of his contention, he cited the decisions in Seeni Chettiar v. Santhanathan Chettiar 5 and Durairaju v. Natesan 6 . Further, the intention of the plaintiff is only to defeat the decrees earlier obtained against its members. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that an injunction cannot be granted to such plaintiff. In support of his contention, he cited the decisions in Seeni Chettiar v. Santhanathan Chettiar 5 and Durairaju v. Natesan 6 . In these cases it was held that he who seeks equity must do equity and that the plaintiff who asks for injunction must be able to satisfy the Court that his own acts and dealings in the matter have been fair and free from any taint of fraud or illegality and if in his dealings with the persons against whom he seeks relief or with third parties, he has acted in an unfair or inequitable manner, he cannot have relief. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the plaintiff registered society is a separate entity in the eye oflaw, different from its members, that it hasno cause of action to itself and the cause ofaction of its members, if any, cannot be itscause of action. He cited the following passage in the decision in Mathurai Sadhu Seva Samajam by its Secretary N.A. Nannier v. The Official Assignee of Madras representingthe estate of M.K. Bala Krishnier and Sons 1 . “The Society is a corporate body with a separate juristic personality which is distinct and separate from that of its members.” Therefore, the learned Counsel contended that the suit itself was not maintainable. Anyway I am not deciding this question of maintainability of the suit in this Civil Revision Petition against an interlocutory order. 13. The learned counsel also submittedthat the revisional jurisdiction of this courtunder S. 115, C.P.C. is purely discretionary. In this connection, he cited the followingobservation in Chennichi v. Srinivasan Chettiar 2 “The High Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and even improper, if such interference will produce hardship or injustice. The revisional jurisdiction on the Court is intended to secure and subserve ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it. The revisional jurisdiction on the Court is intended to secure and subserve ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it. If interference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to be without jurisdiction.” Here also I see force in the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent and, therefore, I do not think any interference is called for in the orders concurrently passed by both the Courts below. 14. Therefore, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs.