Judgment :- Viswanatha Iyer, J. The Kerala University Act, 17 of 1974, (the Act) was enacted to re organise the University of Kerala with a view to establishing a teaching, residential and affiliating University for the southern districts of the State of Kerala. Under S.3, the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Pro-Vice Chancellor, if any, and the members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council for the time being, shall constitute a body corporate by the name of the University of Kerala. S.7 of the Act provides that the Governor of Kerala shall, by virtue of his office, be the Chancellor of the University. 2. S.8 provides that the Minister for the time being administering the subject of education in the State shall be the Pro-Chancellor of the University. In the absence of the Chancellor or during his inability to act, the Pro-Chancellor shall exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Chancellor. 3. S.17 specifies the constitution of the Senate of the University. It shall consist of the fifteen categories of ex-officio members (including the Chancellor), the twelve classes of elected members, the life members and the three groups of "other members". Since this original petition concerns group (2) among other members; we shall extract the relevant portions of S.17:- "17. senate. the Senate shall consist of the following members, namely-Ex-Officio Members (4) The Chancellor XXX XXX XXX XXX Elected Members XXX XXX XXX XXX Life Members XXX XXX XXX XXX Other Members XXX XXX XXX XXX (2) Not more than nine members nominated by the Chancellor representing (i) recognised research institutions; (ii) recognised cultural associations; (iii) chambers of commerce; (iv) industries; (v) authors; (vi) journalists; (vii) lawyers; (viii) sports; and (ix) linguistic minorities. XXX XXX XXX XXX" 4. The controversy in this case relates to the nomination made by the first respondent, Chancellor of the University of Kerala, of respondents 4 to 10 as members of the Senate of the University by the proceedings Ext.P1. The said nomination relates to group(2) "other members" of the Senate, provided for in S.17. The petitioner who is a working journalist, is himself a member so nominated by the Chancellor by the proceedings Ext.P1, as representing journalists. There is no controversy raised by him in relation to his nomination, or to the nomination of one P.K Venukuttan Nair, representing "recognised cultural associations". The petitioner who is a working journalist, is himself a member so nominated by the Chancellor by the proceedings Ext.P1, as representing journalists. There is no controversy raised by him in relation to his nomination, or to the nomination of one P.K Venukuttan Nair, representing "recognised cultural associations". The dispute is only in relation to the nomination of the other seven, namely respondents 4 to 10, representing the other seven categories, namely (i), (iii) to (v) and (vii) to (ix) enumerated above. 5. The controversy arises this way. According to the petitioner, the nominations have been made by the Chancellor, acting on her own, "without the advice of her Council of Ministers. The Cabinet had advised the nomination of nine persons, chosen by it, but the Chancellor nominated only two from out of this list of nine" (namely the petitioner and P.K. Venukuttan Nair). The other seven, namely respondents 4 to 10 were nominated by her without the advice of the Cabinet. The petitioner points out that the Governor of Kerala is by virtue of her office, the Chancellor of the University. Article 163 of the Constitution therefore obliges her to act only in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Chancellor had no right to disregard the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, or act against it, and make nomination of persons of her own choice. Thereby the constitutional mandate of the Governor acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is violated and therefore, Ext.P1 to the extent it nominates respondents 4 to 10 to the Senate of the University of Kerala is unconstitutional, null and void. 6. It is also stated that these respondents are persons "recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I) " with a view to further their own interests. They were "nominated solely for the reason that their names were furnished by the leaders of the Congress (I). Their nomination was made to advance the political interest of the State Congress (I). Therefore the Chancellor has abused her discretionary power and acted male fide in nominating respondents 4 to 10". 7. The petitioner therefore seeks a declaration that the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 to the Senate of the University of Kerala is "invalid and illegal" and that they are not entitled to hold the said office. 8. Therefore the Chancellor has abused her discretionary power and acted male fide in nominating respondents 4 to 10". 7. The petitioner therefore seeks a declaration that the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 to the Senate of the University of Kerala is "invalid and illegal" and that they are not entitled to hold the said office. 8. The Chancellor's stand in relation to Ext.P1 has been explained in the counter affidavit, which has been filed on her behalf. It is stated that the powers, functions and duties of the Governor are constitutional, while those of the Chancellor are statutory. The powers, functions and duties of the Chancellor are specifically laid down in the Act. She exercises various functions. The Act makes a clear and definite distinction between the Chancellor and the Governor so that the Chancellor is not bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, while exercising her powers as Chancellor under the Act. 9. The allegation that the names of respondents 4 to 10 were recommended to the Chancellor by the leaders of the State Congress (I) is specifically denied in the counter, affidavit. 10. There is a short counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Kerala. This is filed in another writ petition O.P.No.1973 of 1989, but the Government Pleader has filed a memo praying that it may be treated as the counter affidavit in this original petition. But it must be stated that the counter affidavit has not at all chosen to deal with or traverse any of the factual matters, and therefore hardly serves any purpose as part of the pleadings in the case. The so called counter affidavit is only a brief dissertation on the law, asserting the Chancellor's obligation to follow the advice of the Council of Ministers. 11. The following facts emerge from the file produced before us by the counsel for the Chancellor. The Registrar of the University of Kerala addressed the Secretary to the Chancellor on July 11,1988 pointing out that the Senate of the University had to be reconstituted by July 30,1988, that the Chancellor has to nominate nine members in the category of "other members", and therefore the question of making such nomination may be submitted before the Chancellor for orders. The Chancellor's Secretariat thereupon sought the Government's advice by letter dated August 4,1988. The Chancellor's Secretariat thereupon sought the Government's advice by letter dated August 4,1988. There was no reply forthcoming from Government which led to a personal contact on September 23, 1988 by the Secretary to the Chancellor with the Commissioner and Secretary to the Higher Education Department of the Government. The latter thereafter wrote to the Secretary to the Chancellor on September 30, 1988 stating that the panel of names for consideration by the Chancellor, for nomination to the Senates of the Universities of Kerala and Calicut, was under consideration, and that it will be sent up as soon as it was finalised. A letter dated October 14/25,1988 from the Commissioner and Secretary to Government was thereafter received in the Chancellor's Secretariat, suggesting the names of three lawyers (to represent lawyers), one from the Kerala University Law Department and Research Centre (to represent recognised research institutions), two to represent recognised cultural associations, one to represent sports, one to represent the linguistic minorities and one (namely the petitioner) to represent journalists. The list did not contain any one to represent Chambers of Commerce, industries, or authors. 12. The Chancellor made her note on this list on 18-11-1988 pointing out that the list was not exhaustive as envisaged in the Act. All the categories mentioned in S.17 - other members - had not been given due representation; certain categories were over-represented. There did not seem to be any justification for departing from what was specifically provided in the Act. The Chancellor was not happy about the suggestion regarding "recognised research institutions" and noted that the desirability of giving representation to a University department under this category required to be examined, as the intention of the Act appeared to be to provide representation to "the various other recognised research institutions available in this part of the country". The Chancellor therefore directed that an exhaustive list of names may be prepared and forwarded for consideration for nomination to the Senate. No fresh list was however submitted. The Government file produced before us by the Government Pleader does not disclose that there was any consideration of the matter thereafter by Government. Government has also no case that any fresh list was forwarded for the consideration of the Chancellor in compliance with the directions contained in her note. No fresh list was however submitted. The Government file produced before us by the Government Pleader does not disclose that there was any consideration of the matter thereafter by Government. Government has also no case that any fresh list was forwarded for the consideration of the Chancellor in compliance with the directions contained in her note. But we Find in the Chancellor's file_ a note dated November 23,1988 made by the Minister of Education and Law stating that there was no departure from what was specifically provided in the Act. According to him, it was not specifically stated in S.17, that "one member each should represent one category". It was only necessary that the total number shall not exceed nine, and that the nine shall not be from any category, other than those mentioned. There was therefore no question of over representation. So far as the desirability of giving representation to a University department in the category of "recognised research institutions", was concerned, the Minister stated that the nominee suggested by the Government represented research in the Kerala University Law Department and Research Centre, Trivandrum. He therefore stated that the Chancellor may "be pleased to approve for issue". 13. The Chancellor then went ahead, and made nine nominations as per Ext.P1, representing the nine different categories provided among "other members" in S.17. The nominations which comprised the petitioner, P.K. Venukuttan Nair and respondents 4 to 10 were made on January 12,1989. The petitioner challenges the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 for the reasons noted in paragraphs 5 and 6 supra. 14. We shall first deal with the allegation of mala fides. This finds reflection in paragraph 6 of the original petition, where it is stated that from the investigation conducted by the journalists working under the petitioner, he had come to know that respondents 4 to 10 were nominated by the Chancellor without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and that they were persons recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I). This allegation has been specifically denied by the Chancellor. Though the petitioner is a journalist, apart from making an assertion that the names had been recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I), he has not chosen to give the names of those leaders, who are alleged to have made the recommendation. This allegation has been specifically denied by the Chancellor. Though the petitioner is a journalist, apart from making an assertion that the names had been recommended by the leaders of the State Congress (I), he has not chosen to give the names of those leaders, who are alleged to have made the recommendation. In fact, petitioner claims that he has got his own independent machinery to investigate and collect information, in which case it should have been possible for him to disclose the materials which he gathered, the 'persons from whom they were gathered and the like. An allegation of mala fides has to be founded on facts and supported by materials, and cannot be based on scanty foundation. If the petitioner had really any materials with him in support of his allegations, he should have been bold enough to disclose them in the original petition, instead of confining himself to vague allegations of information and investigation. It is not possible to found a plea of mala fides on such tenuous and shaky foundation. 15. There is absolutely no material before this court to come to the conclusion that the State Congress (I) leaders had anything to do with the nomination. Everything that the court does should be based on material and be supported by reason. Both are lacking on the side of the petitioner. This contention of the petitioner has only therefore to be stated to be rejected. 16. Coming to the main points argued in the case, based on Art.163 of the Constitution, we are unable to agree with the petitioner's contention that the Chancellor of the University functioning under the Kerala University Act is bound to act solely on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This proposition is not warranted either by the relevant provisions of the Constitution or the provisions of the Act. 17. Petitioner's case is that under Art.163 of the Constitution, there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head, to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. 17. Petitioner's case is that under Art.163 of the Constitution, there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head, to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Sub article (2) says that if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of any such thing done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. Sub article (3) states that the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by the Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court. The petitioner's contention is that every action of the Governor, whether under the Constitution or otherwise, should be only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except where the Constitution requires any function to be done by the Governor in his discretion. The Governor is ex-officio the Chancellor of the University. Therefore, whatever the Chancellor does, is an act of the Governor, which should be done only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, Chancellor means the Governor, which, in turn, means the Government - so goes the equation. The Chancellor's functions are therefore, the functions of the Governor, governed by Article 163. Anything done without, or contrary to, the advice of the Council of Ministers is therefore, void. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 S.C. 2192. 18. We must here observe that the Governor's functions are not purely those which are vested in him by or under the Constitution. He also exercises functions which are vested in him by statute. In our opinion, Article 163 is limited to those functions which the Governor exercises by virtue of his position as such, in respect of matters required to be done by him by or under the Constitution, and hot otherwise. He also exercises functions which are vested in him by statute. In our opinion, Article 163 is limited to those functions which the Governor exercises by virtue of his position as such, in respect of matters required to be done by him by or under the Constitution, and hot otherwise. Where a power is conferred on the Governor under a statute, her is equally bound by the statute, and is bound to exercise those powers in accordance with the provisions of the statute in question. If the statute requires that the Governor shall act either in his discretion or in a particular manner, he shall have to act accordingly. None can thereafter contend that the Governor who has performed his functions in accordance with the statute or its mandate has nevertheless acted unconstitutionally for not acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163. It is only those functions which are vested in the Governor, or which the Governor is required to do by virtue of his position as such, under the Constitution, that are attracted by Article 163 and it is only in relation to these functions that the Governor is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers - for instance, the executive functions of the Governor under Article 154. Statutory functions which the Governor is empowered or bound to do under a particular enactment are beyond the purview of Article 163. 19. The Kerala University Act has itself not equated the Chancellor with the Government. This is evident from an examination of the various provisions of the Act to which we shall presently refer. 20. S.2(6) defines the Chancellor as the Chancellor of the University. S.3 describes the University as being a body corporate by the name of the University of Kerala constituted Of the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Pro-Vice Chancellor if any, and the members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council. 21. Chapter III provides for the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor and officers of the University. Sub-section (1) ofS.7 states that the Governor of Kerala shall by virtue of Ms office be the Chancellor of the University. Under S.8, the Ministers for the time being administering the subject of education in the State shall be the Pro-Chancellor. 21. Chapter III provides for the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor and officers of the University. Sub-section (1) ofS.7 states that the Governor of Kerala shall by virtue of Ms office be the Chancellor of the University. Under S.8, the Ministers for the time being administering the subject of education in the State shall be the Pro-Chancellor. In the absence of the Chancellor, or during his inability to act, the Pro-Chancellor shall exercise all the powers and perform all the functions of the Chancellor. 22. The Chancellor is the head of the University and shall when present, preside at the meeting of the Senate and at any convocation of the University. He may by order in writing annul any proceeding of any of the authorities of the University which is not in conformity with the Act, the statutes, the ordinances, the regulations, the rules or the bye-laws. The Chancellor shall, when an emergency arises, have the right to suspend or dismiss any of the authorities of the University or to take measure for its interim administration. Every proposal for the conferment of an honorary degree shall be subject to confirmation by the Chancellor. An appeal lies to the Chancellor against any order of dismissal passed by the Syndicate or Vice Chancellor against any person in the service of the University. Before passing any order on the appeal, the Chancellor may refer the matter for advice to a tribunal appointed by him for the purpose. The Chancellor has the power to remove the Vice Chancellor or the Pro-Vice Chancellor from office by an order in writing on charges of misappropriation or mismanagement of funds or misbehaviour. He may also exercise such other powers as may be conferred on him by the Act or the statutes. 23. The Chancellor is thus made the head of the University with various powers vested in him as delineated above. The provisions of the Act make a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the government. We shall refer to some of them. S.5 deals with powers of the University. Sub-section (xiii) of the section speaks of the University's power to regulate emoluments, pattern and conditions of service of teachers and non-teaching staff in private colleges. But this power of regulation is to be exercised with the previous sanction of government. Similar provision for previous sanction of government appears in sub-section (xxvii) dealing with borrowals by the University. Sub-section (xiii) of the section speaks of the University's power to regulate emoluments, pattern and conditions of service of teachers and non-teaching staff in private colleges. But this power of regulation is to be exercised with the previous sanction of government. Similar provision for previous sanction of government appears in sub-section (xxvii) dealing with borrowals by the University. Sub-sections (8) and (9) of S.17 provide that the Secretary to Government or Additional Secretary, General Education Department to be nominated by the Government, and the Secretary to Government or Additional Secretary to Government, Higher Education Department to be nominated by the Government, shall be ex-officio members of the Senate. S.35(8) stipulates that no statute providing for the conditions for or procedure relating to affiliation of private colleges shall be passed by the Senate without the previous approval of the Government. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of this section are significant and bring in sharp focus the distinction which the Act makes between the Chancellor and the Government. Sub-section (5) provides that where any statute has been passed by the Senate, it shall be submitted to the Chancellor, who may refer the statute back to the Senate for further consideration, or assent thereto or withhold his assent. Sub-section (6) states that no statute passed by the Senate shall be valid or come into force until it is assented to by the Chancellor. In other words, this section makes a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the government, vesting certain powers in the Chancellor and certain others in the government. If really the Chancellor is the same as Governor, and therefore, the government, as the petitioner contends, every action of the Chancellor has to be informed by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, ie. the government. If so, there was no necessity for making this dichotomy between the Chancellor and the government in various sub-sections of the very same section. 24. S.45, which deals with the University fund, again speaks of State Government. Sub-section (2) says that all moneys of the University fund shall be lodged in the government treasury or with the approval of the government in the State Bank of India or its subsidiaries upto such limits as may be fixed by the Government. 24. S.45, which deals with the University fund, again speaks of State Government. Sub-section (2) says that all moneys of the University fund shall be lodged in the government treasury or with the approval of the government in the State Bank of India or its subsidiaries upto such limits as may be fixed by the Government. S.48 inter alia, requires that the annual accounts together with the audit report published by the Syndicate shall be placed before the Senate and submitted to Government. S.50 requires the government to appoint auditors to audit the accounts of the University with further powers for government on various matters. S.52 which appears in Chapter VIII relating to private colleges and their affiliation requires a unitary management, to constitute a governing body consisting inter alia, of a person nominated by government. S.53 similarly requires a corporate management to constitute a managing council consisting, among others, of a person nominated by government. S.64 vests the government with certain powers in the matter of transfer of teachers to other University areas. S.77 is important. It states that if any question arises regarding the interpretation of any provision in the Act or of any statute, ordinances, regulation, bye-law or order as to whether a person has been duly elected, or appointed as, or is entitled to be a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter may be referred to the Chancellor, and the Chancellor shall, after taking such advice as he deems necessary, decide the question, and that such decision shall be final. There are various other provisions in the Act which confer powers on the government to deal with one or other of the matters specified therein, but we are not referring to them in detail. 25. A conspectus of these provisions makes it evident that the statute has made a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the government. Each one has got specific roles and functions to perform. Whenever the Chancellor is required to exercise a particular function, it is so specified. Whenever any powers or functions are vested on the government, they are also specifically delineated. There is thus a clear specification of the functions to be exercised by the respective authorities, namely the Chancellor and the government. The Chancellor is part of the University while the government is not. Whenever any powers or functions are vested on the government, they are also specifically delineated. There is thus a clear specification of the functions to be exercised by the respective authorities, namely the Chancellor and the government. The Chancellor is part of the University while the government is not. Whatever function the Chancellor exercises or does is by virtue of his position as a constituent part of the University, and not as Governor of the State. It is true that the Governor is ex-officio the Chancellor, but that is not to say that the position of the Chancellor is the same as that of the Governor. While the functions of the Governor are constitutional, the functions of the Chancellor are statutory, and are to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statute. He is not acting as part of the executive government in exercising such functions, but as a statutory functionary forming a part and parcel of the University itself. 26. Such an independent exalted position for the Chancellor is in accord with the object of academic excellence which a statutory body like the University is intended to achieve. That position is not liable to be diluted by considerations of his acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Such dilution will reduce the University from a high level academic body to one subservient to Government, liable to act on its dictates, thereby destablising academic freedom and affecting academic excellence. University autonomy lies principally in three fields, namely selection of students, appointment and promotion of teachers and the determination of courses of study, methods of teaching and the selection of arrears and problems of research. The University should be governed by one over-riding consideration, namely commitment to excellence in all fields of its activity. Effective pursuit of this objective is possible only if the University is immune from extraneous pressures and influences. 27. The committee constituted by the Inter University Board on University Autonomy, which consisted of eminent personalities like Dr.C.P. Ramaswamy Iyer, Dr.AL. Mudaliar, Dr.C.D.Deshmukh, Dr.K.L.Shrimali and Dr.B. Mullick to review the provisions in the various University Acts and to suggest ways and means, inter alia, to establish cordial relations with Government pointed out that Universities are the keys to social and economic progress. Therefore it is important that they should be helped to grow and develop their personalities unhindered by extraneous pressures. Mudaliar, Dr.C.D.Deshmukh, Dr.K.L.Shrimali and Dr.B. Mullick to review the provisions in the various University Acts and to suggest ways and means, inter alia, to establish cordial relations with Government pointed out that Universities are the keys to social and economic progress. Therefore it is important that they should be helped to grow and develop their personalities unhindered by extraneous pressures. The fullest possible measure of autonomy is indispensable for their proper functioning and growth in the interests of the country's advancement. The committee therefore, recommended, inter alia, that the practice of having State Governors as Chancellors of Universities in their States has much in its favour, but only if the Chancellors functioned in their individual capacity consulting the State Government, only when they considered it necessary. (The committee's statement is extracted in paragraph 28 of the judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. in Kiran Babu v. Government of AP., AIR 1986 A.P. 275). 28. It is thus imperative that the Chancellor, in exercising his powers and functions under the law governing the University, should act on his own discretion, unhampered by, without the necessity of, seeking or following, the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. This view of ours is supported by certain observations of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh's case (AIR 1974 S. C. 2192). The Supreme Court stated thus in paragraph 25: "The executive power of the Union is vested in the President under Article 53(1). The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor under Article 154(1). The expression "Union" and "State" occur in Article 53(1) and 154(1) respectively to bring about the federal principles embodied in the Constitution. Any action taken in the exercise of the executive power of the Union vested in the President under Article 53(1) is taken by the Government of India in the name of President as will appear in Article 77(1). Similarly, any action taken in the exercise of the executive power of the State vested in the Governor under Article 154(1) is taken by the Government of the State in the name of the Governor as will appear in Article 166(1)". 29. What the Supreme Court states is that the President and the Governor should act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising their executive functions under the Constitution. 30. 29. What the Supreme Court states is that the President and the Governor should act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising their executive functions under the Constitution. 30. We may now refer to a few decisions, which have taken the view we have taken. There are two early decisions which dealt with the matter. The first one is that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in S.C. Barat v. Hari Vinayak, AIR 1962 M.P. 73. 31. In that case the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of the Jabalpur University by the Chancellor of that University was challenged. A preliminary objection was raised that Article 361 of the Constitution barred the jurisdiction of the come to entertain the proceedings under Article 226 because the Governor of the State was the Chancellor of the University. The court overruled the plea holding that Article 361 gave absolute personal immunity to the Governor for all his public acts, not only in respect of his powers and duties under the Constitution, but also for any act done by him as Governor in exercise of those powers and duties conferred on him by any Act or statutory Rules. But the immunity did not extend to the exercise or performance of the powers and duties conferred on the Governor under any Act, not in his capacity as Governor, but in a different capacity held by him by virtue of his office as Governor. The powers and duties so conferred are not powers and duties of the office of the Governor, but they are the powers and duties of a different office which the Governor holds by virtue of his office as Governor. The preliminary objection was accordingly overruled. 32. It is true that in paragraph 10 of the judgment a distinction is made between two modes of appointment of Chancellor, namely where the Governor as Governor of the State is the Chancellor, and cases where he is ex-officio the Chancellor. It is unnecessary for us to go into this distinction as we are of the opinion that the functions of the Chancellor under the Kerala University Act stand apart from his functions as Governor under the Constitution for the purposes of Article 163(1). 33. It is unnecessary for us to go into this distinction as we are of the opinion that the functions of the Chancellor under the Kerala University Act stand apart from his functions as Governor under the Constitution for the purposes of Article 163(1). 33. In Joti Prasad v. Kalka Prasad, (AIR 1962 Allahabad 128) the question relating to the functioning of Governor as Chancellor of the Agra University arose incidentally in an election petition. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dealt with the matter as follows: "When the Governor exercises the executive power of the State, we may equate him with the State Government; but not when he exercises other powers. As already discussed above, while exercising the powers as Chancellor of the Agra University, the Governor exercises the power of the Chancellor, and not of the State Government, and while functioning as Chancellor he cannot be deemed to be exercising the executive power of the State, whether as Governor or the State Government. In other words, when the Governor, as Chancellor of the University, appoints a Vice-Chancellor, he does not exercise the executive power of the State and the appointment made by him cannot be deemed to have been made by the State Government. The office of the Vice-Chancellor may be said to be under the Chancellor, but not under the Governor or the State Government". 34. The matter recently came up for exhaustive review by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.. The matter related to the appointment of the Vice Chancellor of the Venkiteswara University where the chancellor exercised his own option in the matter de hors the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The question was dealt with by a Division Bench consisting of Raghuvir, J. and Seetharama Reddy, J. They differed in their opinion. Raghuvir, J. held on the basis of the decision inSamsher Singh's case that the Governor was bound to act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Seetharama Reddy, J. differed to hold that while functioning as the Chancellor, Governor was not bound by such advice, and that he was entitled to act on his own. The matter was referred to a third judge, Jeevan Reddy, J. All the three judgments are reported as Kiran Babuv. Govt. Seetharama Reddy, J. differed to hold that while functioning as the Chancellor, Governor was not bound by such advice, and that he was entitled to act on his own. The matter was referred to a third judge, Jeevan Reddy, J. All the three judgments are reported as Kiran Babuv. Govt. of A.P.,1986(1) Andhra Law Times, 37., The judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. alone is reported in AIR 1986 A.P. 275. JeevanReddy, J. dealt with the matter exhaustively with reference to the decisions of the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Allahabad referred to above, the Kothari Commission Report and others, and agreed with the view of Seetharama Reddy, J. He observed: "It is true that, according to S.10, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh is to be the Chancellor by virtue of his office; but it is not possible to say that, while acting as the Chancellor, he acts as the Governor. The context of the Act does not permit such an interpretation. According to S.9, Chancellor is one of the officers of the University. He has to preside at the meeting of the Senate and Convocations of the University, and exercise many other powers as Chancellor. It is difficult to envisage how he can act upon the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister, while presiding at the meeting of the Senate. Indeed, the Act refers to 'Governor' only once, i.e. in S.10; at all other places it refers to the 'Chancellor', and it confers several powers upon the Chancellor as such. As pointed out in S.(E)(i) of this judgment, the Act throughout makes a clear distinction between the Chancellor and the State Government, and confers distinct and separate powers upon them. In many cases, the very same Section, or the sub-section, as the case may be, refers to both the 'Chancellor' and the 'State Government' separately, for exercising identical powers, e.g. nominations to the Senate and Academic Council. In the face of this fact, I do not see any warrant to read the Chancellor as Governor, which in turn means' State Government'. The autonomy of the University and the interest of higher education demand that there should be no political interference in the governance of the Universities, as also in the appointments of Vice-Chancellors. In the face of this fact, I do not see any warrant to read the Chancellor as Governor, which in turn means' State Government'. The autonomy of the University and the interest of higher education demand that there should be no political interference in the governance of the Universities, as also in the appointments of Vice-Chancellors. The Kothari Commission Report, and in particular the recommendations of the Committee of the Inter-University Board, composed of very eminent educationists of this country, clearly says that the appointment of Vice-Chancellor should be made by the Chancellor in his individual judgment, and not by the State Government. It would be consistent with the spirit of the enactment to hold that, while appointing the Vice-Chancellor, the Chancellor should act in his individual discretion. While exercising the power under S.12(1)fa), the Chancellor does not act as the Governor, and if so, the very question of aid and advice of the Council of Ministers becomes irrelevant". 35. We may now refer to the Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations which dealt with the matter in Chapter IV, paragraphs 11.32 to 11.39. The subject discussed was the role of the Governor as Chancellor of a University. After formulating the question and referring to the cases referred to earlier by us, and other relevant opinions on the subject, by the Attorney General of India, the Administrative Reforms Commission and of some States (which had expressed differing opinions), the Commission expressed itself as follows: "4.11.36. The powers and duties conferred on the Governor by a statute fall in two distinct categories. Those conferred on the Governor in his capacity as Governor constitute one such category. Such functions pertain to the office of the Governor, as provided for in Article 154(1) and are to be exercised by him on ministerial advice in accordance with Article 163(1). Further, by virtue of Article 361(1), the Governor enjoys personal immunity from answerability to any court for the exercise by him of such functions. 4.11.37. The other category of functions are those which a statute may confer on the Governor, not in his capacity as Governor but in a different capacity, such as, for instance, the Chancellor of a University. Further, by virtue of Article 361(1), the Governor enjoys personal immunity from answerability to any court for the exercise by him of such functions. 4.11.37. The other category of functions are those which a statute may confer on the Governor, not in his capacity as Governor but in a different capacity, such as, for instance, the Chancellor of a University. Here, the Governor functions in pursuance of a statute in relation to the affairs of the University--not as Governor but as Chancellor, notwithstanding that he holds the office in the University in an ex-officio capacity. Even though the Governor is the Chancellor by virtue of his office and would cease to be the Chancellor on ceasing to be Governor, it does not necessarily follow that the functions assigned to him as Chancellor of the University are to be performed by him in his capacity as the Governor. In fact, University Acts generally confer certain powers on the State Government which are distinct and separate from those conferred on the Chancellor. It has been held (S.C.Baraty. Hari Nayak: AIR 1962 m.p. 73 (V49C31) that the immunity given to the Governor under Art.361(1) does not extend to the exercise of powers and duties falling under this category. The statutory functions of the Chancellor do not fall within the purview of Article 154(1) and cannot be regarded as 'business of the Government of the State' under Art. 166(3), the reason being that the office of Chancellor is distinct from that of the Governor. 4.11.38, In relation to exercise of executive power of a State, the word 'Governor' can normally be equated with the State Government. However, the office of Chancellor, even though held by the Governor under a statute in an ex-officio capacity cannot be so equated. The former, being an officer of the University, is not obliged to seek the advice of the State Government in the matter of exercise of his functions such as the appointment of Vice-Chancellor. The same view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court inM.KiranBabu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. (M. Kiran Babu v. The State of Andhra Pradesh etc. (AIR 1986 A.P. 275). 4.11.39. The same view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court inM.KiranBabu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh. (M. Kiran Babu v. The State of Andhra Pradesh etc. (AIR 1986 A.P. 275). 4.11.39. Although there is no obligation on the Governor always to act on ministerial advice under Article 163(1), there is an obvious advantage in the Governor consulting the Chief Minister or other Ministers concerned, but he would have to form his own individual judgment. The Governor, in his capacity as Chancellor of a University, may possibly be required by the University's statute (e.g. the Calcutta and the Bardwan University acts ) to consult a Minister mentioned in such statute on specified matters. In such cases, the Governor may be well advised to consult the Minister on other important matters also. In either case, there is no legal obligation for him to necessarily act on any advice received by him". 36. The Commission has incidentally traced the matter with reference to the opinion of the Attorney General as follows: "4.11.33. The question first arose when the Governor of Bombay had to nominate members of the Senate of the University of Poona in consultation with the Vice-Chancellor. The Attorney-General for India reportedly held that, as Chancellor, the Governor was not bound to act on the aid and advice of his Ministers. The position was later accepted by Pandit G.B. Pant as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh when a question arose about the role of the Governor as Chancellor of Universities in that States. (23). Munshi K.M.: Pilgrimage to Freedom", Vol.1: Pages 271 and 272. 37. This accords with the view which we have taken about the powers and functions VINU the Governor while functioning ex-officio as the Chancellor of the University of Kerala. 38. The advice which the then Attorney General of India Sri. M.C. Setalved tendered to Sri. C.M. Trivedi, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on 21-1-1954 on a similar matter is quoted in the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kiran Babu's case cited supra. The question arose in relation to the Andhra University Act. Sri. M.C. Setalvad rendered the following opinion, which supports the view we have taken: "(3) No doubt, the Governor is the Chancellor of the University by virtue of his office as the Governor of Andhra S.10(1). The question arose in relation to the Andhra University Act. Sri. M.C. Setalvad rendered the following opinion, which supports the view we have taken: "(3) No doubt, the Governor is the Chancellor of the University by virtue of his office as the Governor of Andhra S.10(1). On ceasing to hold that office he would cease to be the Chancellor and would automatically vacate the other positions occupied by him in the University (Section 30(3)). These provisions do not however necessarily indicate that the functions assigned to him as the Chancellor of the University are intended to be performed by him in his capacity as the Governor. The powers vested in the Chancellor are very limited as compared with the powers exercised by the Visitor under the Delhi University Act. The nature of these powers and the language in which they are couched, would seem to indicate that these powers are vested in him as the leading officer of the University. (4) S.44 of the Act confers powers on the Provincial Government to intervene by order as occasion may require and remove any difficulties which may arise in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. This power conferred on the Provincial Government as a Government supports the inference that the Chancellor under the Act though the Governor of the State does not function in his official capacity as the head of the State but rather as the head of the body corporate of which he is the Chancellor. (5) On the whole, though the matter is not as clear as in the case of the Poona University Act, I am of the view that the Chancellor under the Andhra University Act, 1925, does not perform his functions in his official capacity as the constitutional head of the State. He is not, therefore, bound to act in the exercise of these functions with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. (6) What I have stated above, does not of course prevent the Governor consulting the Ministry if he chooses and give weight to the advice given. Indeed, notwithstanding the position of the Chancellor above indicated, conventions may grow under which the Chancellor would act in consultation with the Ministers " 39. (6) What I have stated above, does not of course prevent the Governor consulting the Ministry if he chooses and give weight to the advice given. Indeed, notwithstanding the position of the Chancellor above indicated, conventions may grow under which the Chancellor would act in consultation with the Ministers " 39. There was a fait argument that if the contention canvassed by the petitior were not accepted, the Governor will be deprived of the immunity available under Art.361 of the Constitution. This aspect has been dealt with by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Barat's case (AIR 1962 M.P. 73). Art.361 gives personal immunity to the Governor for the exercise and performance of the powers of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties. This immunity is not in any manner whittled down or affected by exposing the statutory actions of the Chancellor open to challenge, if they are not in accord with the statute or are otherwise available in law. We do not accept this plea of the petitioner. 40. For all these reasons we are unable to accept the contentions of the petitioner that the nomination made by the Chancellor, of respondents 4 to 10, is unconstitutional, illegal or void. The Chancellor was well within her rights in making the nominations under the powers vested in her under S.17 of the Kerala University Act without being bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. There is no other challenge to the validity of the order Ext.P1 as the charge of mala fides also stands defeated for want of proper pleadings or sustaining materials. 41. The very locus of the petitioner to file this petition is in dispute. He is one of those nominated by the Chancellor. He is not in any manner affected by the nominations made. His complaint is regarding the nomination of respondents 4 to 10 on the ground that they were not in the list submitted by Government. None of the persons included in the Government's list, who were not nominated by the Chancellor, has chosen to challenge the nominations made by the Chancellor. Such a petitioner cannot call upon this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. None of the persons included in the Government's list, who were not nominated by the Chancellor, has chosen to challenge the nominations made by the Chancellor. Such a petitioner cannot call upon this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. We are not, however, resting our decision on this ground as we are satisfied that the original petition is bereft of merit, even otherwise. We dismiss the original petition. We are not satisfied that this case involves any substantial question of interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution or any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence leave prayed for is refused.