Judgment :- Petitioner styling himself as a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, seeks a writ of mandamus to command the Food Inspector, Cochin Corporation 1st respondent, "not to press and to withdraw from the prosecution in C.C. 8/90, pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam". 2. Petitioner would submit that the Food Inspector demanded illegal gratification from him, that he did not meet the demand, and that chagrined by this the Food Inspector fabricated a charge. When the writ petition came up for hearing, I asked learned counsel for petitioner whether it was necessary to seek adjudication of these matters in proceedings under Article 226, as any expression of opinion (which cannot be avoided altogether) might at least seemingly have, an impact at the trial. Learned counsel pressed for an adjudication. 3. Petitioner would say that he is manufacturing drugs under a licence, the product ' Oli-Oil' is a 'drug and not a food item, and the Food Inspector has no jurisdiction whatever, to take a sample after the product was described as a drug by petitioner on an earlier occasion. Petitioner would also say that he complained against the alleged misdeeds of the Food Inspector, to three 'Vigilance Officers', whose names are not disclosed in the Original Petition. Incidentally the article was seized from 6th respondent a retailer and not petitioner. Petitioner produced a label of 'Oli-Oil' as Ext.P2. 4. Counsel for respondents submits that the article, though described as a drug ('Oli-Oil') is nothing but groundnut oil misbranded, and sold at an enormous price. Counsel further submit that there is no provision in law for the complainant to withdraw from the prosecution, similar to S.321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is also submitted that after the court has taken cognisance of the complaint, there is no question of issuing a writ, and that too, a writ of mandamus to restrain the complainant from proceeding further. 5. Even so, petitioner would contend that powers under Article 226 should be invoked, to save an innocent person like him, from the harassment of a long trial. Counsel for petitioner invited my attention to the decision reported in Calcutta Discount Co. v. I.T. Officer (AIR 1961 S.C. 372) to support the contention. That was a case of reopening assessment under S.34 of the Income tax Act and the question was whether there was jurisdiction at all, in the officer. Counsel for petitioner invited my attention to the decision reported in Calcutta Discount Co. v. I.T. Officer (AIR 1961 S.C. 372) to support the contention. That was a case of reopening assessment under S.34 of the Income tax Act and the question was whether there was jurisdiction at all, in the officer. The court considered whether this could be considered in proceedings under Art.226. The case bears no analogy to the case on hand. Counsel then referred to the decision in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v.Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (AIR 1987 S.C. 294). As seen from paragraph 3 of the judgment "the controversy centres round the conduct, if any, of the appellant in the M.D. Theory Examination". Allegations were made against the Chief Minister and his daughter had appeared at the examination. The court held that an enquiry under Art.226 into the conduct of the examiners in one of the highest medical degrees was justified on considerations of purity of public administration. That decision is of no relevance or assistance to petitioner. Counsel then referred to the decision in S.W.Sharma v. Bipen Kumar (AIR 1970 S.C. 786). The court observed that powers are available under Article 226 in appropriate cases to interfere with investigation. 6. I have no manner of doubt that the powers under Article 226 are wide and can be exercised not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but "for any other purpose". The powers, vast as they are, must be exercised with discretion, as vast as the power itself. Vast powers are conferred by the Article to secure the ends of justice in the variety of cases that come before the court. Power and discretion must be used with sound forensic sense like in a symphony, lest discordant notes are not struck. The discretion is exercised when the court is satisfied that a fact situation exists where the ends of justice require the exercise of power. So viewed, the question is whether this is a fit case for exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226. 7. Counsel for petitioner submitted that if an article is described as 'food', there is no authority in the Food Inspector to proceed further. Petitioner describes his product as a drug. If that description is conclusive, perhaps, the argument is entitled at least to consideration. 7. Counsel for petitioner submitted that if an article is described as 'food', there is no authority in the Food Inspector to proceed further. Petitioner describes his product as a drug. If that description is conclusive, perhaps, the argument is entitled at least to consideration. There is indication in S.3(b)(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, that drug is not "food", and that it is an article "other than food". The report of the Public Analyst Ext. RI(4) shows that the article is nothing, but an article of food. The report is to the effect that the sample is 'wholely ground nout oil'. Groundnut oil is an item of food, enumerated in Appendix 1 Entry A.17.03 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Even misbranding, is an offence under S.2(ix)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Even the label Ext.P2 shows that the ingredients include an article of food, namely groundnut oil, described in Ext.P2 as 'Arachis oil'. Incidentally, the composition of 100 ml. is indicated in Ext.P2 label, while the label itself shows that the content is 180 ml. 8. The facts are very much in dispute. Every assertion of petitioner has been denied in the counter affidavit of 1st respondent. Some of the allegations in the petition do not inspire confidence. For instance, petitioner would say that after 1st respondent , demanded illegal gratification he went to three vigilance officers. The description could not have been more vague. In a fact situation where every fact is disputed, it is not proper to make an adjudication on facts, that too, when there is a forum where the matter can be considered on evidence. This is more so, when the other accused have not come forward before this court to quash investigation and the complaint. It is settled law in this country ever since the judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed (AIR 1945 P.C.18) that: "It is of utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them a duty of enquiry. In India there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping". In India there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping". This view was approved by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. S.W.Basak (AIR 1963 S. C.447). In State of West Bengal v. SampatLal (AIR 1985 S.C.195), the Supreme Court once again, affirmed the principles stated in Nazir Ahmed's Case. In State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanna (AIR 1980 S.C.326 ), the court observed: "There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government the power of the police to investigate into a cognisable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary". Thus, ordinarily the court will not interfere with investigation. The principle applies to a complaint filed by a public officer. Anyway, that stage is past and the complaint has been cognised by a criminal court. 9. Then the question is whether the power under Article 226 should be exercised, when the complaint is pending consideration before a court of competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has counseled against interference in such cases. In Delhi Development Authority v. Lila D. Bhagat (AIR 1975 S.C. 495), the court observed: "It was primarily and essentially within the domain of the criminal court where the prosecutions were pending to arrive at its own conclusion ". (emphasis supplied) Likewise, in Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. (AIR 1982 S.C.33 ) the court held, "When the facts are in controversy it is not for the Supreme Court to interfere under Article 32".(emphasis supplied) As already noticed, the facts are in serious controversy. No allegation remains un controverted, and on the basis of a report of the analyst, prima facie, the article involved is an article of 'food' and it is not a 'drug', as claimed by petitioner. 10. The complaint was filed and the Magistrate took cognisance, on 1-1-90, sixteen days before the writ petition was filed. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus will not issue against a court. Authority is legion for the proposition, and if any is needed, It is found in Naresh & Ors. 10. The complaint was filed and the Magistrate took cognisance, on 1-1-90, sixteen days before the writ petition was filed. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus will not issue against a court. Authority is legion for the proposition, and if any is needed, It is found in Naresh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and another (AIR 1967 S.C.1) and S. Nallakoya v. Administrator, Union Territory of Laccadives (1967 KLT 395). 11. The prayer to require the complainant to keep away from the court cannot be granted, and much less a mandamus will issue because there is, and there cannot be, a public right in that nature. 12. Besides, it is not as if petitioner is left without any remedy if the allegations are correct. Under S.245 of the Code, the accused can be discharged if no case is made against him, which if un rebutted would warrant his conviction. Again, if the complaint is found to be vexatious, ample powers are available to the trial court to compensate an accused, for the injury sustained by him. 13. Petition is without merit and is dismissed with costs, which I fix at Rs.500/ - (Five hundred). I make it clear that the observations made in this judgment were made only for the limited purpose and that this will not be taken as an expression of opinion of facts by courts which may have occasion to deal with. I express appreciation of the help rendered by Shri. K.J. Joseph as amicus curiae.