JUDGMENT N.L. Ganguly 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgments and decrees passed by courts below decreeing the suit of plaintiffs for eviction of the defendant-appellants and recovery of damages for use and occupation of the suit property. 2. This second appeal was filed by the defendant-appellants in May 1984 as indegent persons along with section 5 of the Limitation Act application. More than 6 years were consumed in serving notices, restoration and for orders of section 5 Limitation Act applications. The respondents were served and on 21-11-1990 the applications of the appellants to file the appeal as indegent persons, section 5 Limitation Act was allowed and the second appeal was heard on 26th and 27th November, 1990 under Order 41 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment was reserved which is now being delivered. Plaintiffs-respondents pleaded that house in dispute was owned by Suddhu. Smt. Udasi was mother of plaintiff Satnarain and Smt. Sukha was mother of plaintiff Raja Ram. Smt. Sukha and Udasi were the real sisters of Suddhu. Plaintiff- respondents had claimed the house as sisters' son of the owner of the house. The plaintiffs had further pleaded that Jagarnath the husband of appellant no. 1 and father of other appellants had entered in wrongful possession of Suddhu and were liable to be evicted and pay damages. 3. Jagarnath, defendant no. 1, had pleaded that Suddhu had executed a will in his favour, as the marginal witnesses of the will had been won over by the plaintiffs, the probate proceedings were decided against him. Inspite of it, he pleaded that he had contributed money in purchasing the land and also on construction of the house to Suddhu. He thus pleaded that Sudhu was Benami owner. He also further pleaded adverse possession. 4. Both the courts below concurrently held findings of fact that plaintiffs are sons of Sukha and Udasi, the real sister of Suddhu and thus heirs. The courts below also recorded findings of facts that Jagarnath had failed to prove that he had contributed any money either for purchasing the land or in construction of house. The plea of adverse possession was also negatived by both the courts below on the ground that the suit had been filed admittedly much before expiry of 12 years. 5. The courts below also recorded findings of facts that Jagarnath had failed to prove that he had contributed any money either for purchasing the land or in construction of house. The plea of adverse possession was also negatived by both the courts below on the ground that the suit had been filed admittedly much before expiry of 12 years. 5. All the above mentioned questions of fact have not been challenged in this second appeal and rightly so. In this second appeal the sole point argued in appeal as substantial question of law is whether step son of the deceased sister would be entitled to inherit with real sons' share in property under class I of Schedule I under section 8 of Hindu Succession Act. No such question of law was urged by the appellants in the two court below. In this second appeal stress was made on this point saying that Jagarnath, defendant no. 1, married to Smt. Chander Devi who was the daughter of Suddhu. Chander Devi died in life time of Suddhu. Jagarnath Prasad, defendant no. 1, had married second time Smt. Munnar Devi who is now appellant no. 1/1 and rest of the appellants are her sons and daughter. 6. The arguments is that since appellants 2 to 9 are step sons of Smt. Chander Devi, they are at least related by half-blood to Chander Devi, as such entitled to preference in succession as step sons of predeceased daughter over sister's son. These questions whether the present appellants were step sons of Smt. Chander Devi or not was neither pleaded nor decided by any of the two courts below-thus the objection is about entertaining a new question which is a mixed question of fact and law. In my opinion such mixed question of law and fact cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in second appeal. Sri Siddheswari Prasad urged relying on AIR 1965 SC 1325 that it is a pure question of law and can be permitted in second appeal. In my opinion, the plaintiffs had no occasion to meet these allegations and no opportunity either to admit or deny whether the defendants were steps sons of Smt. Chander Devi. Such a question is nothing but a mixed question of fact and law. 7. In my opinion, the plaintiffs had no occasion to meet these allegations and no opportunity either to admit or deny whether the defendants were steps sons of Smt. Chander Devi. Such a question is nothing but a mixed question of fact and law. 7. Even for argument sake, it is assumed that the present appellants 2 to 9 or steps sons of Smt. Chander Devi, they also they would not be entitled to inherit as heir of Chander Devi.. Admittedly Smt. Chander Devi had died in the life time of Suddhu Suddhu was the owner of the house- The succession in respect to the properties arose only after the death of Suddhu. Smt. Chander Devi, daughter of Suddhu, had died during his life time. Thus, there was no occasion at any point of time when the property over vested in Smt. Chander Devi. The house in question was self acquired property of Suddhu. No one had any right or interest in the said property during his life time. The question of devolution or succession arose after Suddhu's death and on the said date nearest heir alive according to class I of Schedule I under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act were Suddhu's real sisters' sons plaintiffs, Satnarain and Raja Ram. The appellants no. 2 to 9 who are step sons and daughters of the deceased daughter Chander Devi are not entitled to inherit in view of the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. The provisions of section 15 of the Act are quoted as under :- "15. General Rules of succession in the case of female Hindus :- (1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall develove according to the rules set out in Section 16:- (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughthers (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband ; (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband ; (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father ; (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father ; and (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),- 27-Rep.-1991 (a) Any property Inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughther of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son of a daughter), not upon the other heirs referred to in sub- section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father ; and (b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband". The point is covered by the case Ram Sanehi v. District Judge, Banda, 1978 AWC 74. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri R. N. Singh placed reliance on Lachman Singh v. Kripa Singh, AIR 19S7 SC 1616 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting section 15 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act held step sons are not included amongst sons for clause (a) of section 15 (1). 8. All these arguments are purely academic. The appellants never raised this plea in the courts below. It is not pleaded or established that the appellants no. 2 to 9 are step sons of Smt. Chander Devi, daughter of Suddhu, whose property now is being argued to have devolved on them for first time in second appeal. The authority of Supreme Court 1965 AIR 1325 is of no help to the appellants as the question not raised is dependent on the fact whether the appellants no 2 to 9 are step sons of Smt. Chander Devi. The learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on 1972 Punjab and Haryana 419 and 1969 Bombay 205 which considered the question of full blood and half blood. The said case law has no relevance in the present second appeal. In view of the facts, circumstances and legal position as discussed above, there is no merit in this second appeal and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.