JUDGMENT S I. Jafri, J. 1. The fate of this case is in the throes of uncertainty buffeted by repeated reference for determination of certain questions from Bench to Bench, of this court. 2. Dissenting from the view of the division Bench of this Court in Crl. Misc. Application No. 13691 of 1986, Puttan Singh v. State of U. P. decided on 8-1-87. wherein it was held that the power of the Police to investigate into the case registered on the basis of a First Information Report in cognizable offences in unfettered and cannot be interfered with by the court in exercise of its inherent powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC. I had made a request for reference and the matter was referred for reconsideration of the questions by a larger bench consisting of five Judges by my reference dated 28-5-87 in the aforesaid case, for answering of certain issues to the following effect. (1) Whether u/Sec. 482 CrPC, the High Court has inherent powers to interfere with the investigation by the Police ? (2) Whether the High Court has powers to stay arrest during investigation ? (3) Whether the decision reported in 1987 AWG 404 lays down a correct proposition of law ? The answer to question no. (1) by the Full Bench comprising five Judges was as under : "Investigation into an offence is a statutory function of the Police and the superintendence thereof is vested in the State Government. It is only in the rarest of rare cases, and that too, when it is found by the Court that the First Information Report and the Investigation over a reasonable length of time, do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, or any offence of any kind, that the High Court may, under section 482 of the Code, interfere with the investigation. The answer to quest no. (ii) by the Bench was as under : "under section 482 of the Code the High court may not direct stay of arrest during investigation except for a limited period in a case of such exceptional nature as is referred to in the preceding paragraph. The answer to quest no. (ii) by the Bench was as under : "under section 482 of the Code the High court may not direct stay of arrest during investigation except for a limited period in a case of such exceptional nature as is referred to in the preceding paragraph. However, before the papers could reach this court, by reason of the fact that it had been referred to by this court for answer of certain questions to a larger bench, for orders thereon the file was pre-empted by a learned Single Judge of this Court who posed certain issues out of his solicitude to render the approach of the Fell Bench consisting of five Judges as questionable as possible. Upon a reference from the aforesaid single Judge of this court, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court constituted a Bench comprising seven Judges for re-determination whether the ratio of decision in Puttan Singh's case having been upset by full Bench of five Judges was compatible with the correct law without abiding by the due procedure for the file to be sent first to this Court for necessary orders. Again erudite arguments followed and it was concluded by the Bench of seven Judges that the decision rendered by the Bench of five Judges thereby upsetting the conculusions reached in Puttat Singh's case was incorrect and that the inherent powers u/Sec. 482 of the Code was not available unless and until preceded by a charge-sheet having been filed in the appropriate court constituted under the code. It was also held in the decision rendered by the Bench of seven Judges that this court could not step in to interfere with the investigation and also could not put a restraint upon the Police from effecting arrest in pursuance of a FIR in exercise of powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC. In the light of the decision of the Bench comprising seven judges, I proceed to delineate ratio of the decisions rendered by Hon. Supreme Court vis-a-vis the decisions rendered by Full Bench comprising seven judges. One such decision which I propose to advert to is the case of Pavithran reported in 'Judgment Today' page 43 (1990) 2 as well as the case of R. K. Srivastava reported in 1989, 4 SCC 59. One such decision which I propose to advert to is the case of Pavithran reported in 'Judgment Today' page 43 (1990) 2 as well as the case of R. K. Srivastava reported in 1989, 4 SCC 59. In the first case i.e. in the case of Pavithran, FIR had been lodged against a Police officer and investigation lingered for over three years. The aforesaid case came up from the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in which it was held that the investigation was unfair and unjust because of inordinate delay. In the ultimate analysis, the High Court quashed the FIR during the course of investigation in exercise of its powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC. It is worthwhile to underline the fact that in the aforesaid case, no charge-sheet had been submitted before any court under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the matter was very much at the stage of investigation. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, 'he State of Andhra Pradesh went up in appeal before Hon. Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court re-appraised the matter and in the eventual analysis, it upheld the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh modifying only certain observations with the Hon'ble Supreme Court felt, were too broad. A close and careful analysis of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court bears it out that in the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the innerent powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC was available to the court to interfere with a case on a precharge stage for purposes of quashing inordinately delayed investigation, a fortiori investigation based on FIR which discloses no offence, could be quashed in exercise of powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC. 3. Now I turn to the case of R. K. Srivastava for analysis. In the instant case Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC, FIR can be qahshed in the event when no offence is made out though upon a glance through this judgment is not borne out whether the charge- sheet had been submitted before the court under the Code or not. Here, a reasonable question pops out for answer. Here, a reasonable question pops out for answer. If on a bare perusal of the FIR, it can be quashed when no offence is made out, it does not stand to reason as to why the said FlR cannot be quashed in exercise of powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC preceding the submission of the charge-sheet in the Court. In my humble view, it would be most unjust unfair and arbitrary to allow the Police investigation to go on and further to allow the arrest to be effected in the case in which a criminal case is not borne out from a reading of the FIR. It would be nothing but a glaring instance of miscarriage of justice. There is yet another case decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Decision in Ram Lal Yadav's case rendered by Hon. Supreme Court knocks the bottom out of the case decided by Bench consisting of seven judges and upon a consideration of the decision in the light of the decision rendered by Hon. Supreme Court in Ram Lal Yadav's case, the law which the Bench of seven Judges lays down cannot be stretched too tar as to hold it a good law. Another serious taint which the decision in Ram Lal Yadavs case wears, is the footing on which this court had proceeded that the inherent powers of the High Court u/Sec. 482 CrPC is a statutory power and this court has been cued by certain observations in various judgments starting from the case of Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (AIR 1945 PC 18), AIR 1982 SC 949 State of West Bangal v. Swapan Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 628 Pratibha Ram, AIR 1985 SC 1668 Eastern Spinning Mills, AIR 1970 SC 786 , S. N. Sharma and AIR 1960 SC 866 , R. P. Kapoor. 4. In the light of the above discussion, a scrutiny of the phraseology of section 482 CrPC is also rendered imperative. Section 482 CrPC consists of three different phrases (1) to give effect to any order under the code (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court ; and (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 4. In the light of the above discussion, a scrutiny of the phraseology of section 482 CrPC is also rendered imperative. Section 482 CrPC consists of three different phrases (1) to give effect to any order under the code (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court ; and (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the decision rendered by this Court in the Bench consisting of seven judges, scope of these three phrases has not been dwelt upon ana delineated and hence the conclusion of the Bench of seven judges sans this exercise of traversing upon the scope of section 482 CrPC cannot be held to be justifiable by any stretch of imagination, that this power cannot be invoked at a pre-charge sheet stage. In the above observation, I am fortified by a decision reported in AIR i985 SC 218 M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash, Justice O. Chinnappa Reedy's judgment. The relevant portion in the aforesaid judgment which 1 have extracted is being quoted below. "There is one other significant sentence in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A. P. (Supra) with which we must express our agreement. It was said : "with utmost respect these observations of the learned Judge are not to be read as Euclid's theorems, nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other case, that judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the decision is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes they do not interpret judgments. They Interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton 1951 AC 737 at 761 Lord Mae Dermot observed : "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of willes J, as though they were part of an Act of parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge". This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge". Upon a consideration of the above extracts drawn from different decisions, it becomes too implicit to say that the decision rendered by the Bench of Seven Judges wears the taint of precise error against which as quoted above, Mr. Justice Chinnappa Reddy had sounded a warning. The aforesaid Bench has not obviously undergone the tedium of relevant judicial exercise and hence the decision suffers from the infirmity of want of proper judicial exercise and in my view the judgment cannot be held to have laid down the correct law. 5. Now I turn to the phraseology of section 561 A of the Old Code which corresponds to the phraseology in section 482 CrPC as to find out whether the High Court enjoyed unfettered inherent powers u/Sec. 482 CrPC vis-a-vis section 561 A of the old code. The expression in section 561 A old code corresponds to the expression in all the three clauses of section 482 CrPC. The three clauses of section 482 CrPC have been he'd to be an alternative to the section 561-A of 1889 old code by a catena of decision namely, decisions reported in AIR 1959 Alld. 315 (FB) Raj Narain-Paras 21- 27, 82-24, 104 and 105, AIR 1960 Alld. 296 Paras 26 and 27, AIR 1959 Alld. 69 para 5, AIR 1954 Bombay page 65 (FB) and AIR 1958 SC 376 paras 5 and 12. 6. Here it is worthy of mention to advert to the factum that section 561 A continued on the statute even in the post independent era and in this view of the matter the scope of section 561 A which it enjoyed in pre- independence era cannot be held to be the identical. In our anxiety to find out whether the scope of section 82 CrPC stands on the same footing as was the scope of section 561 A of 1989 (old code) and to satisfy this inquisitiveness, 1 embark upon certain relevant facts and circumstances, High Courts were created in India under the High Courts Act 1961 and subsequently by the Letters Patents issued by the British Monarch. The Indian Penal Code and the Police Act were also enacted at about the same time. These enactments were preceded by Ist war of independence in 1857. The Indian Penal Code and the Police Act were also enacted at about the same time. These enactments were preceded by Ist war of independence in 1857. In the above circumstances, it is deducible that the courts and Acts created by the British Monarch were not intended to protect the liberty of Indian Citizens but were brought into existence as a measure of repression Besides the High Courts in colonial India did not enjoy a constitutional status. They were not the courts of a sovereign nation. It would not be too much to say that High Courts in the British era were the colonial courts. In the post independence period they were sanctified by the constitution becoming the repositories of sovereign judicial power. On being conferred with constitutional status the courts were studded with special duties of protecting the fundamental rights. By virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India, the old laws were mandated to continue subject to the provisions of the Const. In the conspectus of the above discussion, the Ineluctable conclusion boils down that under the constitution of India the inherent powers of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, assumed an enhanced and extended status having the sanction of the Constitution rejected by Article 225 and to prove the point, I am fortified by the decisions in cases-AIR 1947 Oudh 210 at 216, AIR 1951 Nagpur 443 (FB), AIR 1959 Madras 406 at 407, AIR 1956 APP 161 at 165, AIR 1967 SC 1639 Paras 9 and 10. These cases held that inherent power as contemplated in section 482 CrPC are not protected and sanctified by Article 225. In the above context, it can safely be inferred that the scope of section 482 CrPC has assumed greater vitality infused by const vis-a-vis the section 561A of the old code, and hence the power u/Ssc. 482 CrPC would be invocable to keep in leash the breaches of power by the Police during the course of investigation and further to pre-empt the unlawful arrest. Constitution of India in post independence era sets great store by Article 21 of the Const of India in its anxiety to protect the unreasonable and arbitrary erosion of personal liberty and hence inherent power under section 482 CrPC would be available to enforce the mandate of Article 21 of the Const of India. Constitution of India in post independence era sets great store by Article 21 of the Const of India in its anxiety to protect the unreasonable and arbitrary erosion of personal liberty and hence inherent power under section 482 CrPC would be available to enforce the mandate of Article 21 of the Const of India. Now, I descend to traverse upon the power of Police to arrest as contained in Chapter V of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Chapter V of the Code does not envisage unbridled power to the Police. Provision of section 44 of the Code contemplates that even a Magistrate can effect arrest if the offence is committed in his presence and the word 'Magistrate' can be stretched to include both 'Executive and judicial'. It would be a Strang and paradoxical proposition that the power under section 44 CrPC can be exercised to prevent such arrest by the Magistrate but not by the High Court u/Sec. 482 CrPC. In certain cases arrest is effected pursuant to the warrants issued by the courts At this stage, it would be useful to quip that courts do not possess any power to issue warrants arbitrartly even it no case in the FIR is made out. In fact, such a warrant can be questioned and since it has been issued by the court, therefore, even according to the decision rendered by a larger bench consisting of Seven Judges, the inherent power u/Sec. 482 CrPC can be invoked. It is definitely a stage betwixt 'during investigation and before the submission of the charge-sheet'. I may also exemplify the point in order to hamper home the point this way. Courts also issue search warrants under section 93 CrPC. Alter arrest, on the basis of warrant, the person is brought before the Magistrate and if such a person points out that no offence is made out and the Magistrate does not focus his attention on the feasibility of the claim and proceeds to consider the question of bail, it would amount to a case of perpetuating a wrong despite the knowledge that it is unjust and wrong in case it is held that in exercise of the powers under section 482 CrPC, the High Court cannot quash the First Information Report simply because the charge-sheet has not been submitted in the court. 7. 7. Reverting to clause 1 of section 482 CrPC it is again useful to illustrate that according to First Clause of section 482 CrPC, this Court can make orders to give effect to any order under this Code. Orders are passed during the continuance of investigation and if the Police does not comply with the orders, then the High Court can step in even at the stage of investigation for securing compliance of any orders. By above-illustration, it can safely be inferred that this Clause appertains to a stage prior to the submission of the charge-sheet before the court. By the same token, if the orders passed during the course of investigation are found to be arbitrary, unjust and unfair and patently illegal then it would be a clear case for the High Court to step in inexercise of its inherent powers under the third clause for securing the ends of justice. The three Clauses by any standard, cannot be said to be over-lapping as was held by the decision rendered by the Bench consisting of five Judges. The Bench consisting of Seven Judges has not adverted to this aspect of the matter nor did it record any finding on this aspect. Hence, it can be concluded safely that there was no basis for the Bench consisting of Seven Judges to conclude that section 482 CrPC, cannot be invoked prior to the submission of the charge-sheet before the Court. 8. Now I turn the focus on the aspect apart from what I have propounded in order to hammer home my point. In a catena of decisions, it has been held that inherent power under section 482 CrPC can be exercised in the contingency when there is no other specific power for dealing with the situation. I would quote the reference of the cases in the pre-independence era and they are-IIR 1923 Cal. 224, AIR 1929 Lahore 705, AIR 1930 Lahore 465, AIR 1979 SC 87 . My view is also lent full justification from the maxim "Omnia Paesumnutur Rite Acta". It means that nothing shall be intended to be out of jurisdiction of the superior court, but that which specifically appears to be so." This is also the implication of the non-obstante clause in section 482 CrPC which begins with 'nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers'. It means that nothing shall be intended to be out of jurisdiction of the superior court, but that which specifically appears to be so." This is also the implication of the non-obstante clause in section 482 CrPC which begins with 'nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers'. This phrasealogy has been lent lull countenance by the decision reported in AIR 1980 SC 758 . Upon a consideration of the decision arrived at by the Bench consisting of seven Judges, I feel that the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council relied upon by the aforesaid Bench do not support the conclusions reached. It was only the case of R. P. Kapur where the question of quashing the First Information Report before the submission of chargesheet had arisen. The observations are clear that the FIR can be quashed if no case is made out. The fact that in certain cases the Supreme Court interferred to quash the First Information Report in exercise of writ jurisdiction does not lead to the conclusion that the quashing can be done only in the writ jurisdiction. It is obvious that the writ jurisdiction is broader than the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 CrPC, but the writ jurisdiction is not exercised when there is an alternative remedy and this includes a remedy under section 482 CrPC. Further the fact that in some cases the Supreme Court was of the view that the First Information Report should not have been quashed would again not lead to a conclusion that in no case, the inherent power can be invoked for quashing the First Information Report. In so far as the reliance on the case Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (Supra) is concerned. 1 shall not scruple to say that the said case was decided on its own special facts. In fact, the Privy council clearly held that a First Information Report can be quashed, if no offence was made out. The Seven Judges' decision observes mat the Privy council was of the view that in such matters, a habeas corpus would be maintainable under section 491 of the Old Code. It is from this view of the Privy council that the decision of Seven Judges drew the conclusion that the writ petition alone would be maintainable for quashing the First Information Report. It is from this view of the Privy council that the decision of Seven Judges drew the conclusion that the writ petition alone would be maintainable for quashing the First Information Report. This view is logically incorrect inasmuch as a habeas corpus petition under section 491 of Old Code would be maintainable only after the arrest. The decision of the privy council in my view did not intend to lay down a rule that where no offence is made out on the bare reading of the First Information Report even then the person concerned should surrender and then move an application under section 491 of the Old Code. In any case, section 491 has been deleted. Assuming that it embodied a specific remedy, the remedy under the Code is no more available. Hence the application under section 482 CrPC would clearly be maintainable. 9. Upon a conspectus, I feel that there is no other provision in the Code enabling an aggrieved person to seek rectification of the illegalities committed daring the course of investigation. In the absence of any specific provisions to that effect, it would be open to the High Court to exercise Its power under section 482 CrPC to correct all illegalities irrespective of the stage which are likely to result in miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court has rightly upheld the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court where the investigation was quashed for inordinate delay. By the same token the investigation can also be quashed where no case is made out on the basis of the First Information Report and investigation pursuant to such a First Information Report can also be quashed. 10. I, therefore, request the Hon'ble Chief Justice to refer the questions given below thereby straining the correctness of the law laid down in case No. 5939/1988 under section 482 CrPC, Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P.. (1989) 26 Alld. Criminal Cases 181, under the Proviso (b) Sub rule IX of Rule 2 Chapter V of the Rules of the Court (High Court Rules) to the larger Bench. (1989) 26 Alld. Criminal Cases 181, under the Proviso (b) Sub rule IX of Rule 2 Chapter V of the Rules of the Court (High Court Rules) to the larger Bench. (1) Whether in view of Pavitran's case (1990) 2 JT 43 and R. K. Srivastava's case (1989) 4 SCC 59 , the Full Bench decision in Ram Lal Yadav's case (supra) is a good law 7 (ii) Whether the inherent power of the High Court recognised under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a reflection of an inherent constitutional power and would be available to correct the breaches of Article 21 committed by the Police during investigation and arrest; and (iii) Whether investigation and arrest on the basis of FIR which discloses no offence would be a violation of Article 21 and not being authorised by CrPC can be checked u/s 482 CrPC ? Office is directed to place the papers of this case before Hon. Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for answering the above questions.