ORDER R.A. Sharma, J. - A registered society know n as Shri Rain Deo Sanskrit Mahavi Jyalaya. Bareri. Tahsil Marivahun. District Jaunpur runs an institution known as Shri Ram Deo Sanskrit Maha Vidyalaya, Bareri, District Jaunpur (here-in-after referred to as the Maha Vidyalaya), which is an affiliated institution to Sampurna Nand Sanskrit University, Varanasi (here-in-after referred to as the University.) There being dispute between the two rival committees of Management of the Maha Vidyalaya. the Assistant Registrar of the University by his order dated 19-6-1982 recognised the petitioner No. 2 as the manager; but at the instance of respondent No. 6, the Assistant Registrar by the order dated 26-6-1982 recalled his earlier order dated 19-6-1982 and there after referred the dispute to the Vice-Chancellor of the University for his decision. Against this order of the Assistant Registrar, petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 10721 of 1982, which was dismissed on 25-1-1983 by this Court on the ground that as the dispute between the parties has been referred to the Vice-Chancellor for decision, it is not a fit case for interference. The Vice- Chancellor there after by his letter dated 13-5-1985 constituted apannel for spot inspection. The V ice-Chancellor on the basis of the compromise entered into between Sri Badri Narain Dubey and Sri Sabhapati Upadhyaya passed the impugned order on 2-8-1990. The terms of the compromise, as mentioned in the impugned order are as follows : (i) Sri Badri Narain Dubey will be life long president and after him his successor will be elected by general body, (ii) Sri Sabhapati Upadhyaya will be the manager, which is acceptable to Sri Badri Narain Debey, (iii) the president and the manager will constitute committee of management and general body, (iv) president and manager will appoint principal and the Assistant Teachers (v) Moveable and immoveable properties of the Maha Vidyalaya will be managed by both the president and the manager, (vi) in future all appointments shall be made with the consent of the president and the manager. on the basis of the compromise containing the aforesaid terms, the Vice-Chancellor by the impugned order in exercise of powers under S. 2(13) of the U.P. State Universities Act. on the basis of the compromise containing the aforesaid terms, the Vice-Chancellor by the impugned order in exercise of powers under S. 2(13) of the U.P. State Universities Act. 1973 (here-in-after referred to as the Act.) has directed that the aforesaid compromise is approved and dispute of management stands resolved, according to which Sri Badri Narain Dubey and Sri Sabhapati Upadhyaya will be president and manager of the Maha Vidhyalaya respectively. It is against this order of the Vice-Chancellor dated 2-8-1990 that this writ petition has been filed by the petitioners. 2. Sri R.N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the impugned order on the ground : (i) that the Vice-Chancellor after the amendment of Statute 12.28 of the First Statutes of the university in 1985 has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute regarding the management of an affiliated college of the University and the person competent to decide such a dispute is the Regional Deputy Director of Education, (ii) Vice-Chancellor has not recorded a finding about the actual possession and control of the college properties and (iii) that the order is against the Act, Statute and Ordinance framed there under. 3. Sri. R.P. Misra, learned counsel for the University and Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for respondent No. 6 have disputed the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and have supported the impugned order. In this connection Sri Sankatha Rai has also filed a written argument and Sri R. P. Misra, learned counsel for the University has very fairly placed before me the decisions of this Court relating to the controversy involved in the present case. 4. Section 2(13) of the Act. Which defines the management' is quoted below :- Section 2113) : "Management' in relation to an affiliated or associated college, means the managing committee or other body charged with managing the affairs of that college and recognised as such by the University." According to this definition 'management' means the managing committee, which is managing the affairs of the college and recognised as such by the University. This provision contemplates the recognition of the managing committee by the University. This provision contemplates the recognition of the managing committee by the University. But Statute 12.28 of the Statutes of the University as it stands after its amendment in 1985, which is quoted below, provides that persons found by the Regional Deputy Director of Education to be in actual possession and control of the properties of the college shall be recognised to constitute the management of the college until decided there wise by competent Court. 12.28 "Where there is a dispute regarding the management of an affiliated college, persons found by the Regional Deputy Director of Education" to be in actual possession and control of the college properties, may for the purposes of the Act and these Statutes be recognised to constitute the management of such college until a Court of competent jurisdiction orders otherwise. 5. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Brahm Deo Tripathi v. Vice-Chancellor, 1988 UPLB EC 104 : 1988 All LJ 355 has laid down that Statute 12.28 of the Statutes provides a forum for getting the dispute pertaining to management adjudicated by the Deputy Director of Education and the Vice-Chancellor in view of the aforesaid Statute has ceased to have any power to adjudicate on the question as to who is legally contituted a managing committee. This Court has accordingly declared that after the amendment of the aforesaid Statutes the Deputy Director of Education has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the controversy on the basis of the actual control. Another Division Bench in the case of Committee of Management v. U.P. Kul-Sachiv, Writ Petition No. 5977 of 1990 decided on 7-3-1990 after noting the apparent conflict between Section 2(13) of the Act and Statute 12-28 of the Statutes has held that when there is a bona fide dispute between the two rival committees before the Vice-Chancellor he will stay his hands before granting recognition and will allow the Regional Deputy Director of Education to decide the dispute and it is only after he has received the decision of the Deputy Director of Education that the Vice-Chancellor can grant recognition under S. 2(13) of the Act. It was further observed that if there is normal or bona fide dispute between the two rival committees then V ice-Chancellor will himself straight away exercise the powers of recognising the committee of management. It was further observed that if there is normal or bona fide dispute between the two rival committees then V ice-Chancellor will himself straight away exercise the powers of recognising the committee of management. There is no conflict between the aforesaid two decisions of this Court in as much as in both these between two rival committees of management (sic). It will be resolved by the Deputy Director of Education. 6. New Law, unless it has retrospective operation, cannot affect pending action. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Garikapati v. Subbiah Chaudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 . where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that (at p. 553 of AIR) : The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed. 7. That apart new law, which changes the forum, does not affect pending action unless it also provides for the transfer of proceedings. In Manujendra v. Purnedu, AIR 1967 SC 1419 after the enactment of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act. 1949. The proceedings were pending before Thika Controller under S. 29 of that Act. During the pendency of these proceedings. S. 29 was deleted and there after it was argued that Thika Controller as result of deletion of S. 29 has lost the jurisdiction over the suit. The Supreme Court rejected this contention by holding as follows : (at p. 1422 of AIR) : "In our view, this contention has no force. Though S. 29 was deleted by the Amendment Act of 1953 the deletion would not affect pending proceedings and would not deprive the Controller of his jurisdiction to try such proceedings pending before him on the date when Amdnement Act came into force." In the case of Mohd. Idris v. Sat Narain, AIR 1966 SC 1499 Supreme Court held that proceedings under S. 12, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act pending at the time of enforcement of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are not affected by the repeal of the former Act by the later Act. Idris v. Sat Narain, AIR 1966 SC 1499 Supreme Court held that proceedings under S. 12, U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act pending at the time of enforcement of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are not affected by the repeal of the former Act by the later Act. One of the reasons given by the Supreme Court was that there is no provision in the later Act providing for the transfer of pending proceedings to the new forum. Relevant passage from this judgment is quoted below (at p. 1501 of AIR) : "The jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector was itself created from July 1, 1952 and there is no provision in the Abolition Act that pending cases were to stand transferred to the Assistant Collector for disposal. Such provisions are commonly found in a statute. Which takes away the jurisdiction of one Court and confers it on another." 8. New Statue 12.28 of the Statutes is neither retrospective in operation nor does it provide for change over of proceedings to the new forum and as such, cannot affect the old existing disputes pending before the Vice- Chancellor. In the instant case the dispute is pending since 1982 before the Vice-Chancellor. for the reasons given above, he will continue to have jurisdiction to decide the controversy in accordance with the unamended Statute 12.28 read with S. 2(13) of the Act. The first plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected. 9. Second plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner, pertaining to non-recording of finding by the Vice-Chancellor about the actual possession and control of the college properties in accordance with the unamended Statute cannot also he accepted. It may be mentioned that the Vice-Chancellor has decided the controversy on the basis of the compromise. The compromise. being based on the consent of the contesting parties can validly be relied upon by the Vice-Chancellor to pass appropriate orders in accordance there with. The moment the contesting parties compromise the dispute. dispute ceases to exist and what the Vice-Chancellor can do in such cases is merely to record the compromise and pass the appropriate order accordingly. In such a contingency it is not necessary for the Vice-Chancellor to record any finding about the actual possession and control of the college properties. 10. The moment the contesting parties compromise the dispute. dispute ceases to exist and what the Vice-Chancellor can do in such cases is merely to record the compromise and pass the appropriate order accordingly. In such a contingency it is not necessary for the Vice-Chancellor to record any finding about the actual possession and control of the college properties. 10. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner however, has substance and is liable to be accepted. S. 31 of the Act deals with appointment of teachers of the University and the affiliated colleges. This section provides that appointment of teachers of the affiliated colleges shall be made by the management of the college on the recommendation of a selection committee, which shall consist of number of persons including Expert. In exercise of powers under S. 49 of the Act. Statute of the University has been framed and part II of the Statute deals with the appointment of the teachers in affiliated colleges. This Statute also provides for appointment by the management on the basis of recommendation of the selection committee. Management has been defined, as mentioned above by S. 2(13) of the Act. Which means the management committee or the body charged with managing the affairs of the college and recognised by the University. Appointment of the teachers in the Maha Vidyalaya can only be made by the management, which means the committee of management and the provision made in the impugned order to the effect that, such,l appointment shall be made with the consent of only the president and the manager runs counter to the aforesaid statutory provision and cannot be sustained. Similarly, other condition, authorising the president and they manager to constitute managing committee and general body is also not sustainable in as much as according to the Act and the Rules of the society two persons cannot constitute a committee of management or the general body. It is also not justified to make life long president and manager of the institution. The terms and conditions of the compromise, which have been made part of the impugned order, being illegal and inconsistent with the Act, Statute and the bye-laws of the society, cannot be sustained. It appears the Vice- Chancellor has passed the impugned order mechanically on the basis of the compromise without ascertaining the legality of the terms and conditions of the compromise. It appears the Vice- Chancellor has passed the impugned order mechanically on the basis of the compromise without ascertaining the legality of the terms and conditions of the compromise. The order oft he Vice-Chancellor is, as such liable to be set aside. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has also raised an objection to the effect that against the order of the Vice-Chancellor petitioner has a remedy before the chancellor and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. It is true that a representation before the Chancellor is an alternative remedy, which may normally be pursued but in the instant case parties have exchanged counter and rejoinder affidavits and the case is ready for final hearing, although at the admission stage, and the controversy involved is not purely a factual controversy. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not consider it a fit case to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. 12. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor of the University dated 2-8-1990 is quashed. Respondent No. 1 is further directed to decide the dispute afresh in accordance with law as clearly as possible. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.