JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J—Rattan Singh, respondent in this appeal filed by the State of Himachai Pradesh against an order of his acquittal, was charged with an offence punishable under section 302, I. P. C. for having committed the murder of one Smt. Kanta Devi on or about July 6, 1982 at 11 00 p m at village Bhali, Police Station Shahpur, District Kangra. He was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra, for it. The learned Judge recorded an order of acquittal on July 7, 1983. 2. Rattan Singh is an ex-army person. It is said that he, as also one of his associates Ch ha tar Singh, had an amorous eye for Kanta Devi and her sister-in-law Sheelan Devi. The house in which these two ladies lived in village Bhali, along with Prakram Chand, brother of Sheelan Devi and Bato Devi, the mother of Sheelan Devi and Prakram Chand, is situate in one corner of the village and there are no houses in the neighbourhood Puran Chand, husband of Smt. Kanta Devi and the elder brother of Prakram Chand, was employed in the Public Works Department and stayed away from the village. Several attempts had been made previously according to the prosecution, by Rattan Chand and his associate of molesting the two ladies m which he had not succeeded. Sometimes in the month ot May an unsuccessful attempt was made by Rattan Singh to molest the aforesaid female members of the family by raiding the house. Proceedings were initiated against him under security provisions ; he was apprehended but released on bail by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Nurpur. His gun was also taken into possession but was got released under an order of the Executive Magistrate and taken back by Rattan Singh on May 26, 1982. 3. On the night intervening July 6 and 7, 1982, Prakram Chand his mother Smt. Bato Devi, his sister Smt, Sheelan Devi and his sister-in-law Smt. Kanta Devi, were sleeping on four different cots in the courtyard of their house in village Bhali. A pet dog of the house started barking where upon Smt. Sheelan Devi called out to her mother, Smt. Bato Devi that there might be some person present in the vicinity as the dog was barking Kanta Devi is said to have proclaimed, while rising from her bed that Rattan Singh was standing nearby with a gun. A pet dog of the house started barking where upon Smt. Sheelan Devi called out to her mother, Smt. Bato Devi that there might be some person present in the vicinity as the dog was barking Kanta Devi is said to have proclaimed, while rising from her bed that Rattan Singh was standing nearby with a gun. Soon thereafter Rattan Singh is said to have fired a gun shot hitting Kanta Devi. Sheelan Devi and her mother rushed towards him with a view to over-power him but he managed to escape. Some injuries were caused to him in this process The prosecution also says that, while running away, the gun a torch and a pair of foot-wear were left by Rattan Singh near the scene of occurrence. 4. While Prakram Chand was proceeding to Police Station Shahpur for lodging the First Information Report, Jagdish Singh, Station House Officer of the Police Station met him on the road side at Daraman and recorded the statement (Ex. P-D) of Prakram Chand. The statement so made was sent by S. I, Jagdish Singh to the Police Station through a constable. He himself proceeded to the scene of the incident The accused, according to the S. I. Jagdish Singh was arrested on July 7 1982 from a Nala in the area of village Sihuan where he was hiding himself* The house of Rattan Singh in village Gobbar was searched on July 10 1982, and in a cloth bag hanging from the roof of the said house were found gun-powder percussion caps, lead projectiles, which were taken into possession by the police. The gun licence (Ex. P-7) was also recovered from the house of Rattan Singh The gun itself had been handed over to the Police by Smt. Sheelan Devi, who is said to have snatched it from accused Rattan Singh. It was sent to the Ballistic Expert who examined it and made a report Ex PAD. It was mentioned therein that the gun was in a fit condition to be fired and its left barrel was loaded. The Director of Finger Print Bureau, who examined the gun, also made report (Ex. PAC), wherein it was opined that 15 points of the finger impressions on the gun were similar to the finger prints of the accused. 5. It was mentioned therein that the gun was in a fit condition to be fired and its left barrel was loaded. The Director of Finger Print Bureau, who examined the gun, also made report (Ex. PAC), wherein it was opined that 15 points of the finger impressions on the gun were similar to the finger prints of the accused. 5. The post-mortem examination on the dead body of Smt. Kanta Devi was performed by (PW 16) Dr (Mrs) Sumati Sharma, who was the Medical Officer in District Hospital, Dharamshala, on July 7, 1982 at about 4.00 p m. A number of external and internal injuries were found on the dead body which were ante-mortem in character. In the opinion of the Doctor death had been caused due to shock as a result of haemorrhage and injury to the vital organs like heart and lungs and the death was almost instantaneous, The injuries were sufficient in the normal course to cause death. During her deposition, Dr- Sharma, however, stated that she could not admit or deny whether the injuries found on the person of the deceased could be caused with the gun (Ex P-l) shown to her in the Court. 6. At the trial, a large number of witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Of them (PW-3) Prakram Chand and (PW 10) Smt. Sheelan Devi, gave an eye-witness account of the incident. The incident has been described by (PW 3) Prakram Chand thus: "I was sleeping in my house The wife of my brother, Smt. Kanta Devi, my sister Sheelan Devi and my mother Mst. Bato Devi were also sleeping in the same house. At about 11.00 p. m. (night Hours,) our pet dog started barking. Apprehending the arrival of a visitor to the house, my sister asked my mother to go out and to find out if there is any visitor. We were sleeping in the courtyard of the house. My mother then proclaimed that it be find out if anybody is present there, Whereupon my sister-in-!aw replied that accused Rattan Singh, present in the Court, was standing in the courtyard with a gun. After proclaiming the above said words, my sister-in-law looked behind and in the meanwhile, the accused fired at her The bullet hit on the back side of my sister-in-law towards the upper middle portion of the right shoulder..." 7. After proclaiming the above said words, my sister-in-law looked behind and in the meanwhile, the accused fired at her The bullet hit on the back side of my sister-in-law towards the upper middle portion of the right shoulder..." 7. The statement made by PW 10) Smt. Sheelan Devi was this: “ On 6-7-1982 the accused again came to our house at about 11.00 p.m. We were sleeping at that tine oa cots in our courtyard. Our dog started barking whereupon I suggested to my mother that there might be some stranger near the house as the dog was barking Whereupon, my mother proclaimed as to who could be a stranger at that time. In the meanwhile my sister-in-law, Kanta, proclaimed that accused Rattan Singh was present along with a gun. Soon thereafter, the accused fired the gun and the short landed on the right hand side on her shoulder " 8. Both the witnesses were cross-examined at length. However, they were not questioned about the statement, underlined above, to the effect that Kanta proclaimed that accused Rattan Singh was present along with a gun, also that a gun shot fired thereafter landed on the right side of her shoulder. 9. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, after referring to the statement of the various witnesses produced before him, felt that the prosecution case suffered from some improbabilities which rendered it unworthy of acceptance. 9. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge, after referring to the statement of the various witnesses produced before him, felt that the prosecution case suffered from some improbabilities which rendered it unworthy of acceptance. The factors, which impressed the learned Judge against acceptance of the prosecution story against Rattan Singh accused were that neither in the F. I R. nor in the inquest report it had been mentioned that the gun was snatched by (PW 10) Sheelan Devi, as claimed by her, nor was it mentioned in this document that the accused had left his torch and a pair of foot-wear, so that the story about the snatching of the gun as we as about the traces left behind by the accused at the scene of the crime were the result of embellishment; that the conduct of the investigating officer was not proper and the investigation had been conducted in a slip-shod manner ; that the story of the snatching of the gun by Sheelan Devi from the accused, who is a stout person and is an ex-defence personnel and its subsequent production by Sheelan Devi was an improvement in the prosecution version made during the course of investigation ; that the fact that none of the prosecution witnesses deposed that the gun was partly loaded at the relevant time, led to an inference that it was loaded later on with the ammunition which was seized from the house of the accused and one barrel thereof was fired there to create evidence that the gun shot had been fired with that gun ; that the prosecution evidence about the presence of the foot-wear and the torch near the scene of occurrence was highly discrepant and there was no evidence as to any test having been conducted that the foot-wear (Ex. P 5) were of the size of the feet of the accused, the torch was not seet to the Finger Print Expert for comparison to find out whether the finger prints of the accused appeared thereon or not that the ocular evidence on the record was not sufficient to hold that accused Rattan Singh was guilty of offence of murder, inasmuch as both Prakram Chand and Sheelan Devi were interested witnesses who could be party to the fabrication of a false version; that the story about the arrest of Rattan Singh while he was hiding himself in a Nala, was not believable ; that there was no evidence to show that there was sufficient light at the time of incident on account whereof Prakram Chand and Sheelan Devi could have identified the accused ; that Smt. Bato Devi, the mother of these two witnesses, who was a material witness had not been examined and that there was disparity in the description of the scene of incident by the witnesses and further that there was a strong motive for Prakram Chand and Sheelan Devi to have falsely implicated accused Rattan Singh. 10. The trial judge has written a detailed judgment. The words therein repetition of some facts more than once, but no mention, except in passing, to the unchallenged statement made by (PW 3) Prakram Chand and (PW 10) Sheelan Devi that deceased Kanta Devi had proclaimed that accused Rattan Singh was standing in the courtyard with a gun, shortly before the gun shot was fired and the shot landed on the right side of her shoulder. We find that in the judgment under challenge the learned trial Judge bad noticed the principle, while appreciating the evidence, that a witness can be partly believed and partly not and that improvements made by him and the variations from his earlier statement were, by itself, not sufficient to hold that his testimony was infirm and that the Court must make an effort to separate grain from the chaff and truth from the falsehood, yet, when discussing the evidence and the material on record, these principles were not adhered to by the learned judge. Our impression about the discussion made by the learned judge is that he riveted his attention more on the chaff than on the grain. 11. Our impression about the discussion made by the learned judge is that he riveted his attention more on the chaff than on the grain. 11. The basic fact which was to be found out was as to who was the person who fired the gun shot which resulted in the death of Smt Kanta Devi. The grain, in this context, which was to be separated from the chaff by sifting the evidence offered by the prosecution was to find out who that person was. A very vital piece of evidence, for finding out who the assailant was, was provided by what was stated by deceased Kanta Devi at or about the time of the firing of the gun shot. The statement made by Srnt. Kanta Devi at that time was that accused Rattan Singh was present in the court yard with a gun This statement was heard by (PW 3) Prakram Chand and (PW 10) Sheelan Devi. They have stated so on oath at the trial. What was stated by them has not been challenged in cross-examination. The inevitable consequence is that the court has before it a statement made by deceased Kanta Devi, at or about the time when the gun shot was fired resulting in her death, that accused Rattan Singh was present in the courtyard with a gun. 12. What, then is the worth of such a statement ? The Indian Evidence Act provides an answer. One has only to look at section 32, which, in its material part, says: "32. Case in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant,-—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead....... are themselves relevant facts in the following cases :— (1) When it relates to cases of death —When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that persons death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made* expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question... ." (emphasis supplied). 13. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made* expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question... ." (emphasis supplied). 13. The Privy Council had occasion to consider the provision aforesaid in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Privy Council 47. The appellant before the Privy Council was convicted for the murder of one Kurree Nukaraju and sentenced to death. The dead-body of Nukaraju was found in a steel trunk in the compartment of a train at Puri on March 23, 3937. Evidence was led at the trial by the prosecution to show that it was the accused who had taken the trunk to the train in which it was found. Evidence was also led to the effect that the widow of there deceased had stated that on March 20, the decesa ed had told her that he was going to Berhampur as the wife of the accused had written and told him to go and receive payment of his dues there. The deceased had lent money to the wife of the accused during the year 1936. 14. The above evidence of the widow of the deceased was admitted as falling under the provision of section 32 (I) by the courts in India Its admission in evidence was one of the grounds of appeal before the Privy Council. This was dealt with as the first question by their lordships of the Privy Council. It was held that the statement of the widow was rightly admitted in evidence. To quote the words of their Lordships of the Privy Council: "The circumstances must be circumstances of the transaction; general expressions ^indicating fear or suspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwise and not directly related to the occasion of the death will not be admissible. But statements made by the deceased that he was proceeding to the spot where he was in fact killed or a- to his reasons for so proceeding or that he was going to meet a particular person, or that he had been invited by such person to meet him would each of them be circumstances of the transaction, and would be so whether the person was unknown, or was not the person accused .... ..." Circumstances of the transaction* is a phrase no doubt that conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the analogous use in ^circumstantial evidence" which includes evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other hand narrower than "res gestate." Circumstances must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence : It will be observed that "the circumstances" are of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant. It is not necessary that there should be a known transaction other than that the death of the declarant has ultimately been caused, for the condition of the admissibility of the evidence is that "the cause of (the declarants) death comes into question "In the present case the cause of the deceaseds death comes into question ...The statement made by the deceased on 20th or 21st March that he was setting out to the place where the accused lived, and to meet a person, the wife of the accused, who lived in the accuseds house, appears clearly to be a state agent as to some of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. The statement was rightly admitted... " 15. Relying upon the dictum of the Court a Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court observed (in paragraph 6) in Thanuvan Retnakaran v. State, AIR 1955 TC 87 thus : "The deceased Sumathi was at the time of her death pregnant Sumathi had disclosed the fact of her pregnancy to her friends PW 5 and 6 ; and to PW 8 she had mentioned that the 1st accused was responsible for the same. It was the prosecution case that the 1st accused wanted to do away with Sumathi because of her pregnancy through him. It was therefore a circumstance which had some proximate relation to her death and her statement to these witnesses of her condition and of the person responsible for it would be admissible in evidence under section 32 (I), Evidence Act. This would be a circumstance of the transaction that led to her death and so the statement is as held in *Narayanas\*ami v. The Emperor\ AIR && PC 47 (D) admissible m evidence" 16. This would be a circumstance of the transaction that led to her death and so the statement is as held in *Narayanas\*ami v. The Emperor\ AIR && PC 47 (D) admissible m evidence" 16. The principle found acceptance by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Ram Chandra Sahu and others v. The State, (1963) 1 Cri LJ 377 where, after a reference to the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council and the Travancore-Cochin High Court, it was said (in paragraph 10) that: " In this case the statement of the deceased heard by PW I PW 4 stating that he should not be assaulted and he would produce his brother was certainly a circumstance which had some proximate relation to his death and is clearly relevant under section 32 (1).. . ..." 17. The question was raised before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in re Kalusingh Motisingh and others, AIR 2964 Madhya Pradesh 30. A Division Bench, which decided the case at Indore, was dealing with a case of murder where conviction had been recorded by the learned Sessions Judge under section 302 read with section 1*9 IPC against six persons Of the various persons who died in the incident was one Balya. The incident had taken place on September 20, 1961, Before his death, Balya had told some of the prosecution witnesses who appeared at the trial that there was quarrel between him and one Nandi Patelan about his buffalo-calf which happened to enter her field and that she had said that she would get all the Bagris (the caste to which Balya also belonged) finished off that day. This statement was held dmissible under section 32 (I) of the Evidence Act. The statement that Balya had made to them was proved at the trial by various witnesses produced by the prosecution. It was held admissible as a statement made by a deceased person as to any circumstance of the transaction resultant in his death. 18. In a later decision in Dukhi Dei v, The State, AIR 1965 Orissa 33 G K. Misra, J. speaking for the Division Bench, said (in paragraph 1) that : "The next important circumstance is the evidence of PW 8, the grandmother of Basanti, regarding the statement made by the deceased to her.. 18. In a later decision in Dukhi Dei v, The State, AIR 1965 Orissa 33 G K. Misra, J. speaking for the Division Bench, said (in paragraph 1) that : "The next important circumstance is the evidence of PW 8, the grandmother of Basanti, regarding the statement made by the deceased to her.. ..Her statement in this regard may be quoted ; ‘In the night of Saturday ...Basanti told me that the accused could not give her final medicine as she could not bring it from jungle as there were many persons present in the jungle and that she had told her to give the final medicine on Monday.. on Monday when I came to know that Basanti was lying injured in the jungle, I disclosed to... .....(PW 10) , about what I heard from Basanti in the night of Saturday and Sunday. The next question for consideration is as to the admissibility and evidentiary value of the statement of Basanti made to PW 8. Basanti was found in an injured condition in the jungle where she had gone in the company of the accused to procure the herb. The statement was made by her as to the cause of her death and as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Pakla Nara-yanaswami v. Emperor, AIR 193l> PC 47, fully supports this view............ We are satisfied that the statement of Basanti made to PW 8 is admissible under section 32 (I) and it discloses the circumstances under which Basanti was seriously injured in the jungle ultimately resulting in her death." 19. The legal position is clear. The statement made by deceased Smt. Kanta Devi that accused Rattan Singh was standing in the courtyard with a gun is admissible under section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act as a statement of the circumstances to the transaction which resulted in her death. That the deceased made the above statement is established by the testimony of (PW 3) Prakram Chand and (PW 10) Sheelan Devi made at the trial. The presence of both these witnesses at the scene of the incident is not doubted even by the learned Sessions Judge. That the deceased made the above statement is established by the testimony of (PW 3) Prakram Chand and (PW 10) Sheelan Devi made at the trial. The presence of both these witnesses at the scene of the incident is not doubted even by the learned Sessions Judge. In fact, their presence at the spot stands accepted by the learned Judge when he says in his judgment that: ...It has come in evidence that there is a big mango tree standing in the court-yard of the house of the complainant. It has also come in evidence that the cots had been spread in the said court-yard under the branches of the tree It is significant to note that it was the deceased who proclaimed that the accused was standing while duly armed with a gun. It is not the prosecution case that PW Prakram Chand, Smt. Sheelan Devi PW or Smt. Bato Devi also identified the accused while firing the gun shot. 20. learned Judge does not disbelieve, and we feel, rightly, that the deceased had proclaimed that the accused was standing while duly armed with a gun. 21. fact that deceased Smt. Kanta Devi had proclaimed that Rattan Singh was standing duly armed with a gun and that soon thereafter she sustained a gun shot injury which eventually resulted in her death, can lead only to one conclusion, namely, that it was accused Rattan Singh who had fired that shot. The chain of events was enough, by itself, to establish beyond doubt tbe identity of the assailant. This conclusive piece of evidence was not taken into account by the learned Sessions Judge, Failure to do so vitiates his decision in law. 22. S. S. Kanwar, who appeared before us onbehalf of accused Rattan Singh, argued with some emphasis that where two views of the evidence were possible, as in the present case, this Court would not interfere with the order of acquittal, tie drew our attention to some decisions of the Supreme Court in support of this submission We find it unnecessary to refer to them for the principle in that regard is well settled. We may also mention that some circumstances, appearing from the evidence, were stressed by Shri Kanwar with a view to persuade us not to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded in the case. We may also mention that some circumstances, appearing from the evidence, were stressed by Shri Kanwar with a view to persuade us not to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded in the case. For example, he urged that there were major omissions in the First Information Report lodged in the case like the fact of the snatching of tbe gun by PW Sheelan and leaving behind of the torch and footwear by the accused person. Also, that it was not mentioned in the inquest report that gun had been snatched by PW Sheelan Devi or that footwear and the torch had been left behind near the scene by the accused person. There was no effort, according to Shri Kanwar, made by the prosecution to show that the footwear and the torch allegedly left behind belonged to the accused person and that no blood had been found below the cot on which the deceased Smt. Kanta Devi was said to be sleeping. More than anything else what was significant, according to Shri Kanwar, was the fact that there was enmity between accused Rattan Singh and the family members of the deceased Kanta Devi so that the witnesses were, naturally, interested in foisting a false charge against accused Rattan Singh, as was held by the learned Sessions Judge. 23 We have considered the submissions with the care that they deserved. We however, are of opinion that the circumstances pointed out by Shri Kanwar do not materially affect the conclusion that the decision recorded by the learned Sessions Judge deserves Interference 24. Taking the question of motive in the first instance we may observe that enmity, which is a double edged sword, would, in the present case, have impelled accused Rattan Singh to commit the offence attributed to him. The chances of his implication in it falsely are remote. Our reason for taking this view is that it was the accused who was repeatedly making efforts to establish a reason with the deceased in which attempt he had not succeeded. Frustration in such a situation on his part is more likely to have led him to the commission of the crime. Further, the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime on the fateful night cannot be doubted because he was found standing with a gun in the court-yard by the deceased herself. Frustration in such a situation on his part is more likely to have led him to the commission of the crime. Further, the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime on the fateful night cannot be doubted because he was found standing with a gun in the court-yard by the deceased herself. The statement in this respect has not even been challenged. Further, the presence of the two witnesses, namely, (PW 3) Prakram Chand and (PW 10) Sheelan Devi at the scene of the incident was most natural. As members of the family of the victim they could not be expected to have left out the real assailant and falsely implicated accused Rattan Singh merely because they were allegedly inimically disposed towards him. In any case, deceased Smt. Kanta Devi would be the last person to do so. 25. The absence of the blood from below the cot of the deceased or for that matter the failure of the prosecution to establish the fact that the torch and the footwear, which were said to have been left behind at the scene of the incident, belonged to accused Rattan Singh or the absence of mention about the snatching of the gun and leaving behind of a torch and a pair of footwear near the scene of incident, are not such circumstances as would negate the basic fabric of the prosecution case. May be, as felt by the learned Sessions Judge, some embellishment was made by the prosecution in the evidence led by it at the trial, yet, as held by us, the basic fact that it was the accused Rattan Singh who was responsible for the gun shot injury to the deceased, stands proved beyond doubt. Whether the gun had been snatched by (PW 10) Sheelan Devi, as asserted by her or not, would not be determinative of the basic fact about the identity of the assailant. Merely because (PW 10) Sheelan Devi claims to have snatched the gun from accused Rattan Singh, which fact has not been found to be true, would not adversely affect .her credibility in regard to the identity of the assailant. Merely because (PW 10) Sheelan Devi claims to have snatched the gun from accused Rattan Singh, which fact has not been found to be true, would not adversely affect .her credibility in regard to the identity of the assailant. No one has doubted her presence at the scene of crime nor has her statement that the deceased proclaimed about the presence of accused Rattan Singh at the scene been challenged The statement of (PW 3) Prakram Chand can also not be discarded in this regard merely because some parts thereof, may not be strictly correct. 26. In the view that we have taken it is clear that the present is not a case where two views of the prosecution evidence are possible. The learned Sessions Judge ignored to give due regard to evidence of almost a conclusive nature to the effect that accused Rattan Singh alone was present at the scene of crime with a gun and that a gun shot was fired which landed on the person of deceased Kanta Devi resulting in her death. The only possible conclusion from this evidence can be that it was accused Rattan Singh and no one else who had caused the injury resulting in the death of Smt. Kanta Devi. 27. Shri Kanwar also submitted that, in any case, the offence which could be said to have been committed by accused Rattan Singh could not be one punishable under section 302 IPC. Instead, it would be one punishable under section 304 IPG. We find it difficult to accept this submission. The circumstances found established in the case clearly show that Rattan Singh had committed the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder punishable under section 302 IPC. The principles are not in doubt. Precedents are many but we may only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya and another, AIR 1977 SC 45 In this context. The gun shot injury which resulted in almost instantaneous death of the victim was inflicted, according to our finding, by accused Rattan Singh. When one fires with a gun at another, and causes injury to the victim, one does so at least with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death. When one fires with a gun at another, and causes injury to the victim, one does so at least with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death. The assailant in such a case is clearly guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder. 28. In view of what we have said above, we set-aside that order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge and convict accused Rattan Singh of an offence punishable under section 302 IPC. We sentence him to undergo imprisonment for life. We have heard the learned Counsel about it. Acquittal order set aside. -