ORDER P.S. Chauhan, J. - By means of this petition, the petitioner has impeached the order of his termination dated 5-10-1990 and has sought, in main, the relief for issue of a writ of certionari to quash the same. 2. The petitioner, after a written examination and typing test, was appointed as Assistant Grade II (clerk/Typist) vide order dated 8-7-1987 in the Regional Office of the U.P. Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the corporation' at Dehradun on it probation of six months. In pursuance of the said appointment order, the petitioner, as required, joined his duties at the regional office of the Corporation at Dehradun. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that though he was selected for the post of Typist-.,. cunt-clerk, he was not entrusted the work of typing and as a result whereof the typing speed could not he improved, though one of the clauses in the appointment order was that the petitioner would have to show speed of 40 W.P.M. in English typing or 35 W.P.M. in Hindi typing. It was further asserted that realising the practical difficulty, the Corporation itself issued it circular No. 98 dated 6/9-10-1990 saying that the confirmation of the employee on the post of Assistant Grand II is considered on the basis of their performance in typing as well as on the basis of their report and conduct during period of probation. In order to ascertain their typing speed, a test is conducted at Head Office periodically: It has been observed that most of the candidates are not able to show the required speed in typing and in some cases their speed has gone down considerably. In order to overcome the above situation all sectional Heads are to ensure that in future the services of all Assistant Grade II who are fresh recruits and are on probation should be utilised in typing work at least for half of each working day, so that they may get sufficient opportunity to improve upon their typing speed. It clearly goes to demonstrate the fair conduct and genuine interest of the corporation for well being of such employees appointed on probation. 4. The petitioner asserts that he was never provided any such opportunity of typing work where by he was handicapped from improving upon his typing speed. It clearly goes to demonstrate the fair conduct and genuine interest of the corporation for well being of such employees appointed on probation. 4. The petitioner asserts that he was never provided any such opportunity of typing work where by he was handicapped from improving upon his typing speed. The aforesaid circular dated 6/9-10-1990 is a step to rectify the sufferance of the probationers who would now after (sic) be covered thereby. 5. The petitioner averred that he on 7-1 1988 appeared in it typing test but, due to lack of practice, could not attain the desired speed and as it consequence where of his period of probation was extended w. e. f. 25-1-1988 to 21-7-1988. Thereafter the petitioner requested the Senior Manager 1 Finance) at Deharadun, when he was not provided any typing work in the office, to allow him to join it typing institute, but his request was unreasonably turned down. The petitioner again appeared in the tests held on 18-7-1988, 16-1-1989 and 1-8-1989 but no improvement could he found in the speed. He again appeared in the typing test held on 22-2-1990, the result of which has not yet been communicated to the petitioner. The period of probation of the petitioner was again extended upto 21-1-1989 and thereafter it was extended on 8-2-1989 upto 21-7-1989 and ultimately it was extended upto 21-1-1990. Thereafter no communication of any kind regarding extension of probation was sent to the petitioner. Undisputedly the petitioner completed three years of probationary period on 8-9-1990. 6. The services of the petitioner were terminated on 15-10-1990 saying that the petitioner was appointed on six months probation w.e.f. 22-7-1987 and, in terms of condition No. 3 of his appointment order, he was required to show a typing speed of minimum 40 w.p.m. in English for his confirmation on the said post but he failed to show the said typing speed in English in spite of opportunities having been given through a number of typing tests conducted on 7-1-1988, 18-7-1988, 16-1-1989, 1-8-1989 and 23-2-1990. It was on this basis, the petitioner was discharged from service of the Corporation under regulation 16 of the U.P. Financial Corporation (staff) regulations, 1961 (hereinafter, for brevity, referred to as the 'regulations'). The petitioner is aggrieved by this order. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the Corporation. 8. It was on this basis, the petitioner was discharged from service of the Corporation under regulation 16 of the U.P. Financial Corporation (staff) regulations, 1961 (hereinafter, for brevity, referred to as the 'regulations'). The petitioner is aggrieved by this order. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the Corporation. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made three fold submissions :- (i) that the petitioner having completed three, years period of probation, acquired a status of it permanent employee, as such the impugned order of termination is illegal, as no disciplinary proceedings were taken against the petitioner and without which the services of it permanent employee could not have been terminated; (ii) that the Regulations do not provide any such condition regarding confirmation that he will have to show the speed of 40 w.p.m. in English typing or 35 w.p.m. in Hindi typing, but as such a condition in the appointment order is contrary to the provision of the regulations. Apart from it, the impugned order does not say that the petitioner was not possessed of the speed of 35 w.p.m. in Hindi typing and the condition in the appointment order was for the speed of 40 w. p. m. either in English typing or 35 w.p.m. in Hindi typing and on this ground also, the impugned order is unsustainable and the termination is arbitrary, and (iii) that the petitioner, on compassionate ground is also entitled for the restoration in service inasmuch as the petitioner was not at fault as he was neither provided with the work of typing in the office-nor on application being made, was allowed to join it typing institute. Apart from it, when he is reaching 30 years of age having become ineligible for any job and his liability of maintaining a family hamming increased, the discharge order, which is not related to any misconduct, is liable to he set aside. 9. There is no controversy so far as the facts of the petition are concerned. Apart from it, when he is reaching 30 years of age having become ineligible for any job and his liability of maintaining a family hamming increased, the discharge order, which is not related to any misconduct, is liable to he set aside. 9. There is no controversy so far as the facts of the petition are concerned. The petitioner was discharged by taking shelter to Regulation 16 which is reproduced hereunder :- "an employee of the corporation on probation may be discharged by the Managing Director after one month's notice in that behalf or by payment of substantive pay for one month in lieu thereof provided that in case of officers, no such notice of discharge shall be issued by the Managing Director without the approval of the Board". Regarding extension of probationary period, Regulation 17 provides that the period of probation of an employee may be extended to the discretion of the Managing Director but in no case the total period of probation shall extend beyond three years. 10. Now the question for consideration is as to what would be the effect or what would he the status of a person when he has completed the period of probation and the employer has no right to further extend the period of probation and the Regulation 17 does not permit the continuation of an employee on probation for a period beyond three years. So it has become relevant to find out as to what is the status of an employee after the expiry of maximum period of probation provided under the Regulations. 11. It may he noticed that one such matter involving similar matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co- operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 : (1986 Lab IC 198). In that case, Regulations 17 and 18 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies (Employees Service) Regulations, 1975, read together, provided that the appointment against regular vacancies to he made on probation for a period of one year, which can be extended fora period of one year more. The proviso to Regulation 17 restricted the power of the appointing authority in extending the period of probation beyond the period of one year. The proviso to Regulation 17 restricted the power of the appointing authority in extending the period of probation beyond the period of one year. Thus, the employee appointed against regular vacancy could he placed on probation for a total period of two years and if during the period of probation, the appointing authority is of the opinion that the employee has not improved himself, the appointing authority may discharge the employee or revert him to his substantive post, as the case may be but he had no power to extend the period of probation beyond two years. Regulation 18 stipulates confirmation of an employee by express order after the expiry of the period of probation. The Supreme Court said that the Regulations do not expressly lay down as to what would be the status of an employee at the expiry of the maximum period of probation where no order of confirmation is issued and the employee is allowed to continue in service. It was held that since Regulation 17 does not permit continuation of an employee on probation for a period more than two years, the necessary result would follow that after the expiry of two years' probationary period, the employee stood confirmed by implication. 12. In that case, the Supreme Court relied upon an earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 : (1968 Lab IC 1409), wherein it was held that where the service rules fixed a certain period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended, and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue on that post after the completion of the maximum period of probation without any express order of confirmation, he must be deemed to continue on that post as a probationer by implication. The reason is that such an implication is negatived by the service rules forbidding extension of probationary period beyond the maximum period fixed by it. In such a case, it is permissible to draw an inference that the, employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. 13. In the present case, the position is akin as referred to above. In such a case, it is permissible to draw an inference that the, employee allowed to continue in the post on completion of maximum period of probation has been confirmed in the post by implication. 13. In the present case, the position is akin as referred to above. The Regulations fix the period for probation beyond which it cannot be extended and the maximum period provided is three years. It is not in controversy in this case that three years' period of probation was not completed. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court (supra), the learned counsel for the Corporation found himself handicapped to advance any argument distinguishing the view taken by the Supreme Court. During the period of probation, the services of the petitioner were neither terminated nor on the date of completion of the period, of probation he was discharged from the service. On the expiry of the 'maximum probationary period of three year's, the petitioner could not be deemed to be continuation of probation, but he instead stood confirmed on the post by implication and acquired the status of a confirms employee on the post which he was holding. 14. In the present case, the maximum period of probation was completed on 8-9-1990. The order of discharge was passed orb 15-10-1990. After 8-9-1990 when the probationary period came to an end, the petitioner could not be deemed to continue on probation. His status becomes that of a confirmed employee. 15. The import of Regulation 16, which provides that the Managing Director may discharge a probationer after one month's notice in that behalf or by payment of substantive pay for one month in lieu thereof is to be considered. The words "employee on probation" are very much material and the proper interpretation would be that one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof can be given to the employee for discharging him only so long his status continues to remain as that of a probationer. According to the view taken above, the probationary status came to an end the moment the maximum period provided for probation completed, i.e., on 8-9-1990. No notice was given before 8-9-1990 to the petitioner and no order of discharge was made on 8-9-1990. The impugned order was not issued or served on the petitioner on or before 8-9-1990. According to the view taken above, the probationary status came to an end the moment the maximum period provided for probation completed, i.e., on 8-9-1990. No notice was given before 8-9-1990 to the petitioner and no order of discharge was made on 8-9-1990. The impugned order was not issued or served on the petitioner on or before 8-9-1990. The order did not make a mention about any notice but says for giving one month's salary and since it is issued after 8-9-1990 on which date the status of the petitioner was not that of a probationer, but was of a permanent employee, the order cannot be said or held to be valid in law. 16. The second submission of the learned counsel has also got substance as the impugned order speaks only about the speed in English typing and it does not speak about the petitioner's speed in Hindi typing. Condition No. (3) of the appointment order was not for both but was for either of the two, and so, without expressing any opinion on legality of condition unless it is found that his speed of typing was deficient in Hindi and English, both the question of attracting the said condition could (not) arise. However, the speed is a question of qualification, which was tested at the time of interview. For subsequent purpose, as the Regulations do not provide for any higher speed, there is no justification of insisting upon for testing a period for the same test in which he had already qualified once. 17. The third submission is regarding dealing the petitioner with compassion. In the background of the fact that the petitioner, after joining his job, was not allocated the work of typing and the petitioner's request for permission to join a typing institute was rejected, the petitioner was handicapped in adding to his speed which is a matter relating to practical aspect and such deprivation of opportunity by the employer cannot be allowed to adversely affect the right of livelihood of the petitioner, specially in the background of the circumstances when the petitioner has attained the maximum age is qualifying him from seeking job elsewhere and also in view of his liability of maintaining a family. This aspect of the matter, in a welfare State, is worth being given weightage as it is the job of the Courts of Justice to see that rule of law runs with rule of life. 18. Further the persons, who either have completed their-probation before the issue of the circular dated 6/9-10-1990, referred to earlier, or who were at the verge of completion of probation cannot be blamed either for not speeding up their speed of typing or for their speed of typing having been downgraded because the employer did not provide them the opportunity and the employer though realised this fact but late. In such a situation, it would be hard and harsh to blame the petitioner for no fault of his and to deprive him of his right to livelihood in such a situation specially when he has attained the age in capacitating him for job elsewhere. In this view of the matter also the Management cannot take advantage of its own lapse and cannot be allowed to deprive the petitioner his-right of livelihood. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order is illegal and is liable to be set aside. 20. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 15-10-1990 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. Costs on parties.