JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the prayer is that a writ of Certiorari may be issued quashing the order dated 20-12-90 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (Annexure 14 to the petition) and the order dated 27-8-90 passed by the Asstt. Settlement Officer (Consolidation) (Annexure- 12 to the petition). 2. Factual matrix reflects a chequered history of litigation. Plots in dispute contained in Chak Nos. 100 and 113 situate in village Parsurampur, Pergana Sikanderpur East. Tahsil Rasra, district Ballia, were recorded in basic year in the name of Smt. Dularia, the respondent no 3 as her transferable bhumidhari land. It was the case of the petitioners that they obtained bhumidbari land on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 16-9-1971 executed by Smt. Dularia, widow of Ram Nagina Singh, respondent no. 3, the recorded tenure holder. The petitioners made an application under Section 12 of the U P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (for short the Act), with the prayer that their names may be entered as bhumidhars in place of the vendor Smt. Dularia and the name of vendor may be expunged. The case set up by the petitioners was contested by respondent nos. 3 and 4 with the averments that respondent no 3 the alleged vendor has executed not a sale deed but in fact a gift deed in favour of her daughter Smt Rameshwari Devi, wife of Yogendra Singh, respondent no 4 and she did not nor ever intended to execute any sale deed in favour of petitioners. 3. A suit for cancellation of the sale deed was filed by respondent no. 3, the vendor, in the Civil Court alleging that she did not execute nor ever intended to execute the sale deed, rather she has only executed the gift deed. She was a Pardanashin lady and totally illiterate and unacquainted with court proceedings. It was prayed that the sale deed may be cancelled. 4. The petitioners contested the civil suit alleging that the sale deed was void, hence the civil court has no jurisdiction to enteriain the suit. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit, holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction. Against that decree first appeal was preferred which also met the same fate. 4. The petitioners contested the civil suit alleging that the sale deed was void, hence the civil court has no jurisdiction to enteriain the suit. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit, holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction. Against that decree first appeal was preferred which also met the same fate. A second appeal was filed in this Court and the same was allowed on the ground that the sale deed executed in favour of petitioners was void, hence it can be ignored, in such matter not the civil court but consolidation authorities can decide the matter Special appeal was filed by respondent no. 3 before the Supreme Court That appeal was also dismissed by the Supreme Court by its judgment dated 2-3-1990 (vide Annexure-1). In that judgment it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court (page 45 of the paper book) as follows : "She honestly believed that the instrument which she executed and got registered was gift deed in favour of her daughter. She believed that the thumb impressions taken from her were in respect of that single document. She did not know that she executed two documents, one of which alone was the gift deed, but the other was a sale of property in favour of all the defendants. This was, therefore, a case of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document executed by her and not merely as to its contents or as to its legal effect. The plaintiff appellant never intended to sign what she did sign She never intended to enter into the contract to which she unknowingly became the party. Her mind did not accompany her thumb impressions. This is a case that falls within the principle enunciated in Ningawwa v. Byrappa, (supra) and it was, therefore, a totally void transaction. Accordingly as stated in Gorakh Nath Dubey (supra) the suit is not maintainable." It was held in brief that the mind of the executant, namely, respondent no. 3 did not accompany her thumb impression and that the transaction of sale deed by the petitioners was totally void. The matter was agitated before the consolidation authorities afresh and the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 18-1-87 (Annexure-11) held that the sale deed set up by the petitioners was valid and genuine. An appeal was preferred under Section 11 of the Act by Smt. Dularia, respondent no. The matter was agitated before the consolidation authorities afresh and the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 18-1-87 (Annexure-11) held that the sale deed set up by the petitioners was valid and genuine. An appeal was preferred under Section 11 of the Act by Smt. Dularia, respondent no. 3, which was allowed by the judgment dated 27-8-90 (Annexure-12) and the revision under Section 48 of the Act against the judgment preferred by the petitioners was dismissed by order dated 6-12-90 (Annexure-13). Against these judgments dated 27-8-90 and 6-12-90 the present petition has been filed. 5. Sri S. N. Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the effect of the Judgment of the Supreme Court was that it only decided the lack of jurisdiction of the civil court and held that the civil court has no jurisdiction. As it was held to be a totally void transaction, consequently, on the merits of the sale deed nothing was stated or held by the Supreme Court and the same could not be held to be binding in respect of the nature of the sale deed or its legal effect and as the sale deed was executed on 18 9-1971 in respect of the entire Chak, consequently the principle contained under Section 5-C (ii) of the Act did not apply; and that the concept of a Pardanashin lady must not be made applicable when virtually no lady in Hindu society keeps parda these days when society has advanced considerably and Smt. Dularia was not a Pardanashin lady. Respondent nos. 1 and 2, namely Assistant Director of Consolidation and the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation did not consider the evidence on record and their findings are perverse. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, the points for determination are whether the sale deed dated 16-9-1971 alleged to have been executed by Smt. Dularia was void or voidable and its legal effect ? and whether the concept of Pardanashin lady could be extended to Smt. Dularia, respondent no 3; and whether findings of Assisstant Director of Consolidation in revision and Assisstant Settlement Officer (consolidation) in appeal were perverse; and lastly what is the effect of the judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the observations contained in it ? and whether the concept of Pardanashin lady could be extended to Smt. Dularia, respondent no 3; and whether findings of Assisstant Director of Consolidation in revision and Assisstant Settlement Officer (consolidation) in appeal were perverse; and lastly what is the effect of the judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the observations contained in it ? Taking the first and the last points together in brief, the provision of Article 141 of the Constitution have received liberal interpretation in a number of cases. It is to the effect that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all authorities and courts. It is the principle, on which a case was decided is binding. In other words, it is the ratio decidendi which is binding. It is the doctrine of precedent which has been enunciated by Article 141 of the Constitution. The principle of doctrine is that a point already decided by the Supreme Court after having been argued should not be left to be reopened again In the instant case the point before the Supreme Court was as to whether the sale deed dated 16-9-1971 alleged to have been executed by Smt. Dularia was void or not. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the mind of the executant (i.e. Smt. Dularia, respondent no. 3) did not accompany her thumb impressions and there was misrepresentation as to the nature of the character of the document, hence the sale derd was void. This finding was arrived after the matter was argued and the finding was recorded. It was ratio decideni, hence the findings about document being void, was finding binding on all courts and authorities in this country. The consolidation authorities are courts of competent jurisdiction as provided under Section 9-A (3) and 11 (2) of the Act. Even though consolidation courts need not be courts of civil jurisdiction, but the consolidation courts are bound by the precedents and law declared by the Supreme Court. 7. Few words on the concept of void or voidable document as to whether consolidation authorities have considered evidence in support of it. Voidable document means a document binding on the parties unless it is avoided, and void means not binding at all. 7. Few words on the concept of void or voidable document as to whether consolidation authorities have considered evidence in support of it. Voidable document means a document binding on the parties unless it is avoided, and void means not binding at all. In respect of the signed document the general rule may be stated that a document containing contractual terms is binding on the party who has signed it even though he or she might not have read its contents. But this general principle has to excepects (i) the defence of non est factum and (ii) where the party putting his or her signature or thumb impression is induced to do so by fraud or by misrepresentation as to the nature, contents or effect. 8. In fact, the defence of non est factum is derived from a latin maxim 'SCRIPTUM PREDICTUM NON EST FACTUM SUUM' which connotes that one who has executed a document in ignorance of its character is permitted to take the defence that notwithstanding his execution it is not his deed in contemplation of law. The executant has to prove that he or she was mistaken as to its character and was misled or defrauded. In Blay v. Pollard and Morris, (1930) 1 K. B 628, it was held that where a defendant signed a document which was a dissolution of partnership of which he was a member, he objected as it did not contain previous oral agreement, the mistake being merely as to the terms of the document and it was binding. 9. In Foster v. Mackinnon, (1869) L. R. 4 C. P. 7.4, it was held by Bytes, that Mackinnon has signed the document and wrote his name, not knowing the nature of document, but as if he has written his name in a lady's album or on an order for admission to the temple churcn. It was hence found that his mind never went with the transaction hence defendant was entitled to the plea of non-est factum and the document was void. 10. In the instant case the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Assistant Deputy Director of Consolidation have considered the evidence including statement of Smt Dularia, the statement of Sri Ram (witness of the petitioners, page 127 of the paper book) and the statement of Kamta Singh, marginal witness (page 128 of paper book). 10. In the instant case the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Assistant Deputy Director of Consolidation have considered the evidence including statement of Smt Dularia, the statement of Sri Ram (witness of the petitioners, page 127 of the paper book) and the statement of Kamta Singh, marginal witness (page 128 of paper book). Hence it could not be said that findings of the Assistant Director of Consolidation about document being void was based on no evidence or the findings were perverse I am of the considered opinion that the alleged sale deed dated 16-9-1971 was void. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, particularly its ratio decidendi, holding the sale deed to be void after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the arguments advanced, was binding on the consolidation authorities in view of the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution. The last question as to whether the concept of Pardanashin lady was applicable, suffice it to say that it is not necessary as it was assumed in the very remote past that a lady in order to be entitled to the benefit of a Pardanashin lady must be actually observing Parda and must not come out or mix with the people or must lead a seclude life. With the advancement of principles of law and the old concept being assigned wide horizon, now the concept of Pardanashin lady has become proverbial and symbolic. This connotes that any person either male or female can be held to be entitled to this benefit when he or she is ignorant of the proceedings of law or is illiterate or infirm or his or her mental faculties have been influenced otherwise than in accordance with law. He or she on account of his or her weak mental faculties or the ignorance could not know the nature of transaction or the character of document that he or she was required to sign or put her thumb impression. He or she on account of his or her weak mental faculties or the ignorance could not know the nature of transaction or the character of document that he or she was required to sign or put her thumb impression. In other words it can be said that where the circumstances are such that it can very easily be inferred that on account of fraud or misrepresentation her mind could not accompany the signature or the thumb impression in the instant case even though it may be assumed that Smt. Dularia was not observing Parda, but nevertheless on the basis of preponderance of the probabilities, the evidence and circumstances on record it was established that on account of fradulent misrepresentation she failed to understand the character of the document Consequently she was entitled to the benefits available under law to a Pardanashin lady. 11. As regards the submission that permission of the Settlement Officer Consolidation as contemplated by section 5-C (ii) of the Act before making the sale was not necessary, as on the date of sale the entire chak being sold the permission was not necessary, was the correct proposition. Hence the findings of respondent nos. 1 and 2 to that effect may be ignored and that point need not be taken to be decisive. AS the sale deed has been held to be void by the consolidation authorities and also by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, hence no right accrues to the vendees or the petitioners on that basis Hence they are not entitled to get their names entered in revenue papers in place of the vendors Smt. Dularia, respondent no. 3. 12. In view of the premises aforesaid, the present petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed.