K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Writ Appeal is preferred against the order dated 22nd January 1990 passed in Writ Petition No. 1 141/ 1990. The appellant was the petitioner in the Writ Petition. Respondents 1 to 3 herein were respondents 1 to 3 in the Writ Petition. In this Judgment, the parties are referred to with reference to the position assigned to them in the Writ Petition. ( 2 ) IN the Writ Petition, thepetitioner sought for quashing the order dated 20th January 1989 passed by the 3rd respondent in No. RNT/cr/ 15/87 88 and also the order dated 5-12-1989 passed by the 2nd respondent in No. RNT/ap/sr/15/63-89 produced as Aunexures-B and C'respectively in the Writ Petition. ( 3 ) THE premises in questionnumbered as A-2 is situated in the mission Compound, Hubli. There are two premises bearing No. A-1 and A- 2 in the same Mission Compound, Hubli. Both the premises belong to respondent No. 1. The premises bearing No. A-1 was occupied by the petitioner as a tenant. The 1st respondent sought for eviction of the petitioner from the premises bearing No, A-1, on the ground that he required the premises for his personal use and occupation under Section 21 (1) (h) of the karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'act' ). It is not necessary to go into greater details of the proceedings relating to eviction of the petitioner from the premises bearing No. A-1. 3. 1. It is sufficient to state that the Court of first instance, directed eviction which was set aside by the district Court in appeal. However, in the Civil Revision Petition filed before this Court, the order of the district Court was reversed and the order passed by the original Court directing eviction of the petitioner from the premises No. A-1 was restored. The petitioner approached the Supreme court with no success. The Supreme court disposed of the Special Leave petition with the following observations: "this Special Leave Petition is dismissed. The petitioner will be at liberty to apply before the Rent controller for allotment of premises belonging to the landlord at Oeena bandhu Road, Hubli which the petitioner's Counsel states is vacant and the Rent Controller will also find out whether there is any vacancy in accordance with law. The petitioner will be at liberty to apply before the Rent controller for allotment of premises belonging to the landlord at Oeena bandhu Road, Hubli which the petitioner's Counsel states is vacant and the Rent Controller will also find out whether there is any vacancy in accordance with law. He will notify such vacancy and proceed accordingly taking into consideration the need of the present petitioner. " thereafter, the 1st respondent has obtained possession of premises no. A-1 on 21-10-1987. ( 4 ) IN the meanwhile, premisesbearing No. A-2 became vacant on 7-6-1986. The petitioner got this premises bearing No. A 2 notified for allotment by giving the address of the 1st respondent as residing at oeena Bandhu Colony, Hubli, even though the owner of the premises (1st respondent) was residing at belgaum. Consequently, the notice sent by the 1st respondent was returned. On that basis, the Rent controller, by the order dated 20-10-1987 allotted premises No. A-2 to the petitioner. The owner of the premises (1st respondent) challenged the order dated 21st October 1987 passed by the Rent Controller in No. RNT/cr/87-88 in appeal before the Deputy commissioner of the District. The appeal was allowed by the Special deputy Commissioner by his order dated 28th March 1988 and the matter was remitted to the Rent Controller for fresh consideration. After the remand, the 1st respondent claimed for releasing the] premises No. A 2 for his own use and occupation on the ground that he and his wife both are doctors and they require the premises bearing No. A 2 for carrying on their profession and also for their residence. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the premises bearing No. A-2 was also required for the personal use and occupation of the 1st respondent as he and his wife are doctors and they required the premises in order to carry on their consultancy-Accordingly, premises bearing No. A-2 was also released in favour of the 1st respondent by the order dated 20-1-1989 bearing No. RNT/cr. 15/87 88 passed by the Rent Controller. ( 5 ) THE petitioner challenged theaforesaid order of the Rent Controller in the appeal before the Deputy commissioner in No. RNT/ap/sr/15/ 88-89. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 5-12-1989 confirmed the order of the Rent controller. 15/87 88 passed by the Rent Controller. ( 5 ) THE petitioner challenged theaforesaid order of the Rent Controller in the appeal before the Deputy commissioner in No. RNT/ap/sr/15/ 88-89. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 5-12-1989 confirmed the order of the Rent controller. Being dissatisfied with the orders passed by respondent-2 and 3, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 1141/1990 before this Court and the same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 22nd January 1990. ( 6 ) SRIV. H. Ron, learned Counselappearing for the petitioner submits that as the 1st respondent has not occupied the premises bearing No. A-1, the conclusion reached by respondents 2 and 3 that the premises bearing No- a 2 is also required for the use and occupation of the 1 st respondent is not justified in taw; that as the 1st respondent has not occupied the premises bearing No. A-1, the appellant has a right of re-entry under Section 25 of the Act; that if these two aspects were taken into consideration, respondents 2 and 3 could not have held that the 1st respondent required the premises for his bona fide use and occupation. It is also further contended that the premises bearing No. A*2 being residential premises, it could not have been released tor the use and occupation of the 1st respondent on the ground that they required the premises for carrying on their profession as Doctors as respondent No. 1 and his wife are doctors in the light of the prohibition contained in Section 11 of the Act. ( 7 ) IN fact, before the learnedsingle Judge, only two contentions appears to have been urged. In para 3 of the order, the learned Single judge has raised the following points urged before him: 1) It is incorrect to state that premises No. A-2 was available for occupation. 2) In so far as the landlord has not intimated the vacancy, the statutory right has enured in favour of the tenant. ( 8 ) IN the light of the contentionsurged, we shall now consider whether the order passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and of the learned Single Judge releasing the premises in favour of the 1st respondent for his use and occupation suffer from any illegality. ( 8 ) IN the light of the contentionsurged, we shall now consider whether the order passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and of the learned Single Judge releasing the premises in favour of the 1st respondent for his use and occupation suffer from any illegality. The rfinding recorded by the Rent Controlle is that the premises bearing No. A-1 requires repairs, therefore, it is not occupied by the landlord. In the light of this finding of fact, it is not possible to held that the 1st respondent purposely kept the premises vacant or has ceased to occupy the building. When the premises requires repairs, the landlord cannot be compelled to occupy without getting the repairs effected. If a landlord on obtaining possession of the premises under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, undetakes repairs to the premises and therefore, during the period of effecting repairs does not actually reside, it does not amount to ceasjng to occupy the premises so as to attract Section 4 (1) of the Act and it will not also be a case in which it can be held that the premises are not occupied by the landlord so as to attract Section 25 (1) of the Act. It does not also lead to an inference that the landlord does not bonafide require the premises for his personal use and occupation for which purpose he had secured possession of the premises. Hence the contention that the 1st respondent after obtaining possession of the premises bearing No. A-1. purposely kept the same vacant without occupying it; therefore, there are no bona fides on the part of the 1st respondent in securing possession of the premises bearing No. A-1 or seeking release of the premises bearing No. A-2 to his use and occupation, has to be rejected. The contention that the appellant has a right of re entry under Section 25 of the Act can be disposed of stating that the said contention apart from the fact that it is not relevant in this proceeding, it has also to be rejected in the light of tho finding recorded by Ihe rent Controller that premises bearing no. A-1 is under repair. A-1 is under repair. It has also been pointed out above that in such circumstances, if the landlord does not actually reside in the premises, it dos not amount to ceasing to occupy the premises and the premises cannot also be held to have been not occupied by the landlord. Further such a situation cannot throw any doubt on the bona fide requirement of the landlord of the premises for his bona fide use and occupation and further the right if any of the petitioner (appellant) under Section 25 of the Act has to be enforced before the forum prescribed under the Act. Therefore, tho said contention cannot at all be entertained. ( 9 ) THE contention based onsection 11 of the Act cannot also be accepted. Section 11 of the Act reads thus:11. Conversion of residential building-Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no residential building shall be converted into a nonresidential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. 2) If the Controller does not within sixty ditys from the date of receipt of an application for permission under sub section (1) pass any order on the application, he shall be deemed to have granted the permission applied for. 3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that it relates to conversion of a residential building only. Conversion of a residential building into a nonresidential building is riot permissible except with the permission in writing of the Controller. If the Controller does not, within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application for permission pass any order on the applicalion, he shall be deemed to,have grinted the permission applied for Sub-section (3) makes cont ravens ion of sub-sect ion (1) penal and on conviction, a person who contravenes sub-section (1) is liable to be punished with fins which may extend to Rs. 500/ -. ( 10 ) THE question for consideration is as to whetherthe use of a residential building for non-residential purpose would amount to conversion of a residential building into a nonresidential building ? ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a decisionof this Court in B. A. Ramaswamy v deputy Commissioner and Others (1973 [2] Mys. LJ. 434 ). ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a decisionof this Court in B. A. Ramaswamy v deputy Commissioner and Others (1973 [2] Mys. LJ. 434 ). "ln that case, a residential building was allotted to an educational institution to be used for educational institution. Thus it was allotted for being used for non-residential purpose, A learned Single judge of this Court took a view that such an allotment contravened Section 11 of the Act, The learned Judge held:"a close analysis of these provisions would clearly show that the condition precedent thatought to be fulfilled before the Controller could exercise his jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act,is that an owner or landlord of a residential building should have presented an application for conversion of his residential building into a non-residential one. In the instan case, the landlord has not sought for any such permission. Indeed, he has expressed his dissent for the use of his residential building for non-residential purposes. In this state of affairs the orders impugned herein are clearly without jurisdiction. "accordingly, the learned Single judge allowed the petition and quashed the order of allotment made by the rent Controller and also that of the the order of the Deputy Commissioner confirming the order of allotment in the appeal preferred. ( 12 ) FROM the aforesaid decision, it is clear that the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the assumption that the use of a residential building for non-residential purpose amounts to conv9rsion sf a residential building into a non-residential building. The word 'conversion' is used in the context of conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building. The Section specifically states that "no residential building shall be converted into a non- residential building. " It does not say that "no residential building shall be used for non-residential purpose. " Therefore, it is referable to structural alteration in a residential building for converting it intoa non-residential building. A mere use of a residential building for non-residential purpose without any structural alterations or additions, does notamount to conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building as the building remains as it is, and as the one built for residential purpose. A mere use of a residential building for non-residential purpose without any structural alterations or additions, does notamount to conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building as the building remains as it is, and as the one built for residential purpose. According to new Websters Dictionary, College edition, 4th re-print 1988, the word 'conversion' means "the act or state of converting: a physical transformation from ona state or form to another: a change of character; form or function; the diversion of a thing from its original proper or jndended usa "if the Legislature intended that the change in the intended also use would or should amount to conversion, the wordings of the Section should have been quite different. The interpretation placed by us on Section 11 of the Act also receives support from a decision of the Supreme Court in P. KESAVAN's CASE. ( AIR 1988 SC 339 ) in P. Kesavan'scase, the Supreme court considered a similar provision contained in Section 17 of the Kerala buildings (Lease and Rent Control) act, 1965. Section 17 of the aforesaid act was as follows:"17. Conversion of buildings and failure by landlord to make necessary repairs: 1) No residential building shall be converted into a non-residential building or viceversa and no such building shall be divided into separate portions for letting on rent or for ether purposes except with the permission in writiing of the Accommodation Controller. Provided that where such conversion involves structural alteration of the building, the consent of the landlord shall also be necessary. "in the aforesaid case, the building was used for non-residential purpose by the tenant and the bona fide need of the landlord was stated to be for the use and occupation of the landlord and his family for the residential purpose. The contention putforth was that such a need did not justify the eviction of the tenant. After reproducing Section 17 of the Kerala Act referred to above, the Supreme Court held thus:"10. It appears clear that this conversion as contemplated for which permission was required is conversion by the tenant and cannot be aconversi on by the landlord. Quite apart from the fact that in this case there was no conversion of the building sought. The building was used for non-residential purpose and the purpose for which the building was sought was for residential purpose. Quite apart from the fact that in this case there was no conversion of the building sought. The building was used for non-residential purpose and the purpose for which the building was sought was for residential purpose. It appears to us that putting to a different purpose the user of the building is not conversion of the building as such. It has been found that the building as it is without any structural Changs can be put to residential purpose. There was no conversion of ths building as such involved in this case but a change of user of the building. Further-more in any event, the proviso to subsection (1) makes it clear, in our opinion, that such conversion as contemplated by Section 17 of the act for which permission in writing of the Accommodation Controller required is in case of change of the user of the premises by the tenant and not by the landlord. The use of the expression "such conversion" in the proviso indicates that in car,e of conversion by the tenant permission is required on the consent of the landlord. Therefore, the absence of permission in writing of the Accommodation Controller in this case does not in our opinion affect the position. This appears to be the view of the Kerala High Court on this aspect of the matter. See in this connection Muhammed v Abdul rahiman Kerala LT. 874 and Das naik V Narayanan 1980 Ker. L. T. 951. This appears to be the correct view of law. Our attention was also not drawn to any decision of the kerala High Court which has taken any contrary view. The view hald by the Kerala High Court in this aspect has been relied by the High court in the Judgment under appeal. It seems to be logical view. We would therefore follow that view. In view of the proviso explaining the ambit of that requirement that permission sought for or mentioned in Section 17 (1) is in respect of the different user by the tenent and not by the landlord (sic ). Thehigh court has also observed the term "convert" does not denote a mere change in the mode of occupation but covers only alterations of the physical features, the prescriptions of section 17 are not attracted to the present case at all. Thehigh court has also observed the term "convert" does not denote a mere change in the mode of occupation but covers only alterations of the physical features, the prescriptions of section 17 are not attracted to the present case at all. Admittedly the building in question has rooms which can be used as bed rooms, sitting room etc. arid it has a kitchen and dining hall. No alternation or conversion is required if the building is to be used for residential purposes. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) IN the instant case also, it is not the case of either of the parties that the residential building in question needs any structual alterations or additions, for the purpose of using it for residential as well as (or medical consultancy. That being so. the contention of the appellant that the order of allotment made by the Rent controller and affirmed by the Deputy commissioner for use and occupation of the 1st respondent and his wife for residence as well as for carrying on consultancy as they are doctors is bad in law because it amounts to convering the building for non-residential purpose cannot be accepted. It is accordingly rejected. In this view of the matter, we also hold that the decision of this court in B A. Ramaswamys case (1) does not lay down the law correctly. R. 43 as such it is over-ruled. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant next placed reliance on the following observations of the Supreme court in M. M. Quasim v Manohar lai Sharma and others ( AIR 1981 SC 1113 a"it would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possesiorts which ho would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The Court must understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and one of necessities of life-shelter and the way in which one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit a portion of the globe " ( 15 ) IN the instant case, as found by the Rent Controller, the possession of the premises bearing No. A-1 was obtained by the 1st respondent on 20-10-1987 for his personal use and occupation. The landlord respondent No 1could not actually reside in it because it required repairs which were to be carried out. Hence it is not possible to hold that the aforesaid observations are applicable to the case on hand. No other contention is urged. Hence there is no ground to admit the appeal. It is accordingly rejected. ( 16 ) LEARNED Single Judge has granted time for vacating the premises which expires at the end of April 1990. It is relevant to notice that the appellant is residing in the premises pursuant to the earlier order of allotment which had been set asida long back. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any further time. Request for further time is accordingly rejected. Writ appeal rejected. --- *** --- .