Judgment Bhuvaneshwar Prasad, J. 1. This is an application under Sec.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code ). It is directed against the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences under Sections 420 and 467 of the Indian Penal Code and also the order dated 3-6-1986 passed by Sri M. Zafar, Judicial Magistrate, Chapra in T. R. No.1240 of 1986 for issue of summonces for trial under the above mentioned sections, against the petitioner and another. 2. It appears that the opposite party had filed a complaint petition before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chapra on 3-5-1978, alleging therein, that he had an account in Punjab National Bank, Chapra Branch being account No.6784 in which he had deposited Rs.12,243.13 paise on 9-4-1976. On 1-3-1978 he presented his pass-book to the Bank for the withdrawal of rs.400/-. The amount of Rs.400/- was paid to him but the pass-book was not returned back. On demand, the petitioner, who was then working in the aforesaid Bank, told opposite party to contact another accused of the case, namely, Swami Saran Lal, who also at the relevant time was working in the said Bank. When contacted, Swami Sharan Lal, told him that due to rush of work the pass-book in question was not available and he should come to the Bank on some other date to collect the same. Thereafter, he went to the Bank aforesaid and contacted the present petitioner and Swami sharan Lal, but they did not hand back the pass-book to him. Subsequently, the opposite party was pursuaded to apply for a duplicate pass-book which he did. When, however, the duplicate pass-book was handed over to him by Swami Sharan Lal, to his utter surprise he found that a sum of Rs.6.000/-was shown as withdrawn from his account on 2-3-1978. Opposite party submitted in his complaint petition that he had never withdrawn this amount on 2-3-1978 or on any date. He accordingly filed a complaint case which was numbered as complaint Case No.577 of 1978 before the learned Chief judicial Magistrate, who sent it to the police for instituting a case and for submission of the final form. Accordingly, Chapra Town P. S. Case No.21 of 1979 under Sections 420, 406 and 467 of the Indian Penal Code was instituted against the petitioner and Swami Sharan Lal. Accordingly, Chapra Town P. S. Case No.21 of 1979 under Sections 420, 406 and 467 of the Indian Penal Code was instituted against the petitioner and Swami Sharan Lal. The police, however, on the completion of the investigation submitted a final report dated 30-9-1983 showing that there was no evidence against the petitioner and swami Sharan Lal. This final report, so called, was accepted by the learned chief Judicial Magistrate on 12-1-1984. 3. Thereafter, the opposite party filed a protest petition in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 1-2-1984, alleging therein, that though the final report was submitted by the police and was accepted by the court on 12-1-1984, he had no knowledge about it. His witnesses had fully supported his case before the police and there was sufficient material for the submission of the charge sheet. Therefore, he prayed that the petitioner and swami Sharan Lal be put on trial. The opposite party was examined on solemn affirmation by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 8-6-1984 and on the same date the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ordered that he will hold an enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. On 18-1-1985 a witness was examined before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the enquiry under section 202 of the Code. Subsequently, as it would appear from the order sheet on 21-11-1985, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred the case under Sec.192 of the Code to the Court of Sri M. Zafar, Judicial magistrate 1st Class, for the purposes of enquiry and disposal. It was before this Judicial Magistrate that another witness was examined on 5-4-1986 in the enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. Subsequently, by the impugned order dated 3-6-1986, the learned Judicial Magistrate ordered for issuing summonses to the petitioner and Swami Sharan Lal. It is against this order in particular that the present revision application has been filed. 4. It has been contended by the petitioner that the evidence of these two witnesses does not support the case of the prosecution. As a matter of fact, in the impugned order their evidence has not even been discussed. No case against the petitioner has been made out. 4. It has been contended by the petitioner that the evidence of these two witnesses does not support the case of the prosecution. As a matter of fact, in the impugned order their evidence has not even been discussed. No case against the petitioner has been made out. Opposite party had also filed a petition before the Bank for enquiry, in the course of which it was found that the signature on the withdrawal form for Rs.6,000/- tallied with the admitted signature of the opposite party, and as such it appeared that the present case was filed only to harass the petitioner and Swami Sharan Lal. It has been submitted that when once the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had initiated an enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code, it was not open to him to transfer the said enquiry to another Judicial Magistrate, as has been done in the present case. It was also pointed out that since the learned chief Judicial Magistrate had accepted the final report submitted by the police, it was not open to him to examine the complainant. (O. P. No.2) on solemn affirmation on the basis of protest petition filed by him, to start the case afresh and to hold the enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. Thirdly, it was pointed out that the case was itself instituted in the year, 1978 and the cognizance against the petitioner was taken in the year 1986. This is an abuse of the process of the Court. On these grounds amongst others, it was contended that the impugned order as also the entire criminal prosecution against the petitioner be quashed. 5. I have perused the order dated 8-6-1984 passed by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate as contained in Annexure-7. From this order, it would appear that the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on this date and he posted the case for enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code, directing the complainant to produce his witnesses in his court on 8-7-1984. Before the learned Chief Judicial magistrate also an objection was raised that once he had accepted the final report submitted by the police it was no longer open to him to proceed to examine the complainant on solemn affirmation on the basis of the protest petition filed before him and to hold an enquiry under Sec.202 of the code. Before the learned Chief Judicial magistrate also an objection was raised that once he had accepted the final report submitted by the police it was no longer open to him to proceed to examine the complainant on solemn affirmation on the basis of the protest petition filed before him and to hold an enquiry under Sec.202 of the code. By his order dated 18-12-l984, it appears, that the learned Chief judicial Magistrate has repelled this argument on the basis of a decision reported in 1984 PLJR 774 : So far as this point is concerned, I fined that his decision is correct. The matter come up for consideration before a division Bench of this court in the case of Munilal Thakur V/s. The State of bihar, 1984 PLJR 774 . The question for consideration before the Division bench was, whether a Magistrate can, even after accepting the final report submitted by the police, take cognizance of an offence upon the complaint petition or a protest petition on the same or similar allegations of fact. This question was considered by the Division Bench. Relying on a number of decisions it was held that a Magistrate, even after accepting the final report could still take cognizance of the offence upon a complaint, or a protest petition on same or similar allegations of facts. Hence, answer to this question was given in affirmative. From this decision it would appear that the view, to the contrary, expressed by B. P. Jha, J. in the case reported in 1983 PLJR 86 by necessary implication would be deemed to have been overruled. Hence, so far as this point in concerned, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The second contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner is that, once the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate decided to hold himself an enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code as will appear from the order dated 8-6-1984 in the course of which he had examined a witness on 18-1-1985 himself, it was no longer open to him to transfer the case to another Judicial Magistrate under Sec.192 of the Code.1 find some merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. In this connection firstly a reference may be made to Sec.192 (1)of the Code which runs as follows : 192. Making over of cases to Magistrate. 7. In this connection firstly a reference may be made to Sec.192 (1)of the Code which runs as follows : 192. Making over of cases to Magistrate. (1) Any Chief Judicial magistrate may, after taking cognizance of an offence, make over the case for inquiry or trial to any competent Magistrate subordinate to him. On the basis of this provision of law it has been submitted that no doubt it empowers the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to transfer a case for inquiry or trial to another competent Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence, but this sub-section does not warrant that this transfer can be done after the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate himself embarks, On inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. It has been pointed out that it was open to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to hold an inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code himself or to transfer the case to another competent Magistrate for the inquiry under this provision of the Code. However, it has been submitted that, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate cannot produce a mixture by firstly proceeding to hold the inquiry himself under Sec.202 of the code, in course of which he examined one witness and then to transfer the case for the purposes of inquiry and disposal to a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction. In this connection my attention has been drawn to Sec.202 of the Code, which provides for the postponement of the issue of the process. According to it, any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence made over to him under section 192 of the Code, may it he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either enquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by a police office or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not were is sufficient ground for proceeding, it has been further provided in this section, that in an inquiry under sub-section (i) the Magistrate, if he thinks tit can take evidence of witnesses on oath. On the basis of these two sections, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it was no longer open to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to transfer the case under Sec.192 of the Code to another competent Magistrate once he had himself started the inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. On the basis of these two sections, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it was no longer open to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to transfer the case under Sec.192 of the Code to another competent Magistrate once he had himself started the inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. As against it, the learned A. P. P. has drawn my attention to the second proviso to Sec.200 of the Code. It may be mentioned here that Sec.200 of the Code relates to the examination of the complaint. It provides that, "a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate. " Its second proviso runs as follows : "provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Sec.192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them. " On the basis of this proviso to Sec.200, of the Code, it has been pointed out by the learned A. P. P. that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was empowered under law to transfer the case under Sec.192 of the code to another competent Magistrate even after examining one witness himself. 8. One closer examination, however, this contention of the learned a. P. P. does not appear to be correct. Sec.200 of the Code provides that when the complainant along with witnesses in support of his case appears before the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, the law requires that they should be examined fay the said Magistrate and their statemeats resorded in writing and signed by them. It is only under this situatioa that when the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence transfers the case for inquiry and trial under Sec.192 of the Code that the transfree Magistrate need not re-examine them. However, this examination of the witness as mentioned in Stction 200 of the Code is quite different from the examination of the witnesses under Sec.202 of the Code. If the complainant presents his witnesses also before the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Sec.200 of the Code warrants that their statements should be recorded by the Magistrate taking coganizanee of the offence. If the complainant presents his witnesses also before the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Sec.200 of the Code warrants that their statements should be recorded by the Magistrate taking coganizanee of the offence. This is at the initial stage of the case. If, however, the complainant does not present his witness before the Magistrate at that stage and only examines himself on solemn affirmation after which the Magistrate decides to hold an inquiry under Sec.202 of tne Code in the course of which he examines a witness, the position would be quite different. Under this circumstance in my view the law does not permit the Magistrate holding an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, after taking cognizance of the offence, to transfer the inquiry to another competent Magistrate, it is well settled that the provisions of Sections 192 and 202 of the Code do not entitle a Magistrate after he had proceeded under the latter section to make an order under the provisions of former section transferring the case for the purpose of being dealt with under section 203 of the Code or under Sec.204 of the Code with a fresh investigation as contemplated by Sec.202 oi the Code. A reference may be made 10 the case of in re Nateshan Sherbia AIR (38) 1951 Mad 529. both the parties have placed reliance on this decision. In the s ad case. criginaliy In accused were charge sheeted betore the Sub-divisional Magistrate for various offece under Indian Penal Code, Alter the prosecution evidence, was led before him it was found that there was no prirna facie case proved against 7 accused and accordingly, he discharged them. He however, proceeded to frame the charges against the rest four accused under various sections ot the Indian Prnal Code. Alter framing of the charges, the learned sub-divisional Magistrate transferred the case for disposal to the Sub-Magistrate of Sirkali on the footing that the offences ot which the accused were charged were triable ordinarily by a Magistrate exercising and Class powers. Accordingly, the transferee Magistrate held tne thai and convioted the petitioners. This order was upheld by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate un appeal, before the High Court the examination of the provisions of the code regradicg transter oi the cases came up for consideration. A reference was made to sub-section (1) of Sec.192. Accordingly, the transferee Magistrate held tne thai and convioted the petitioners. This order was upheld by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate un appeal, before the High Court the examination of the provisions of the code regradicg transter oi the cases came up for consideration. A reference was made to sub-section (1) of Sec.192. it was held that it must be presumed that Sec.192 oi the Code must be intended to contemplate a case which has not reached the stage ot enquiry or trial. But when once the proceedings have reached the stage of euquiry or trial wholly or partially it cannot be said that sub-section (1) ot Sec.192 of the Code could be availed of for the transfer by the Magistrate who has taken cognizance of the case. It was further held that sub-section (1) of Sec.192 ot the Code speaks of the words : ""enquiry or trial" specially since the section appears at this stage of tne Code which relates to the place of the enquiry or trial or the initial stage of the hearing, it is not intended to mean that sub-section (1) of Section ) 192, would give a superior Magistrate who has heard the case in part power to transfer the case to a subordinate Magistrate to hear the rest of it. " It was accordingly held by a Division Bench of Madras High Court that the transfer of the case at the stage at which it had reached before the sub-divisional Magistrate was illegal and therefore, the conviction of the petitioners by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Sirkali was also illegal. It may be mentioned here that Sec.192 (1) of the Old Code correspondence to Sec.192 (1) of the Present Code. From this decision also it would appear that once the Magistrate had started the trial of the accused in the course of which the evidence was adduced before him. It was not open to him to the transfer the case to another Magistrate under Sec.192 after framing of the charge against accused on the basis of such evidence. Hence, this decision does not held the opposite party. It was not open to him to the transfer the case to another Magistrate under Sec.192 after framing of the charge against accused on the basis of such evidence. Hence, this decision does not held the opposite party. On the other hand, on the question of principle it supports the case of the petitioners that once a magistrate starts the enquiry in a case in course of which he takes evidence, it would not be open to him to transfer the case to another Magistrate at this stage. This decision accordingly helps the case of the petitioner so far as the principle of the transfer of the cases under Sec.192 of the Code is concerned. 9. In the present case, once the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after examining the complainant on solemn affirmation embarked on an inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code, it was not open to him to transfer the case for inquiry and trial to another competent Magistrate without completing the inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. No doubt after examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation it was open to the learned Chief judicial Magistrate to transfer the case for inquiry and trial to another competent Magistrate as will become clear from the provisions as contained in Sec.192 of the Code read with Sec.202 of the Code. This option is always open to him. The another option open to him is to himself proceed to hold inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code. However, the magistrate taking cognizance of the offence cannot produce a mixture of these provisions as has been done in this case and hence, on this ground the order of transfer dated 21-11-1985 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate transferring the case to the Court of Sri Md. Zafar , Judicial Magistrate 1st class under Sec.192 of the Code without completing an inquiry being held by him under Sec.202 of the Code is not m terms of the provisions of law and therefore, this order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 3-6-1986 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ordering for the issue of summons to the present petitioner and one more person also cannot be sustained. In the very nature of things, the aforesaid orders dated 21-1 l985 and 3-6-1980 passed by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate and the learned Judicial Magistrate Md. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 3-6-1986 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ordering for the issue of summons to the present petitioner and one more person also cannot be sustained. In the very nature of things, the aforesaid orders dated 21-1 l985 and 3-6-1980 passed by the learned Chief judicial Magistrate and the learned Judicial Magistrate Md. Zafar respectively cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and have to be quashed. 10. It has further been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the case was instituted in the year 1978 and the police investigation proceeded for about six years and several dates the case was adjourned on account of the non-production of the witnesses by the complainant. Since, however, more than seven years time has passed from the date of alleged occurrence, this ground alone will show that this is an abuse of the process of the Court and accordingly, the proceeding should be quashed. It is well settled that the delay defeats justice and normally a criminal proceeding cannot be allowed to linger for a long period of more than six years. It is surprising to note that the police took a very long time in completing the investingation and finally it submitted a final report (Annexure-2 ). From the concluding portion of annexure-2 ,however, it appears that on the basis of the direction of the circle Inspector, the final report was being submitted by the Investigating officer as true but without any clue. From this also it would appear that this is not one of those cases in which the police after investigate did not find any case against accused. The final report was, however, submitted under the instruction from superior Police officer. Moreover, the allegations made in the complaint petition relate to a very important aspect of public life It is in connection with the proper functioning of the nationalised Banks in which the Public have to repose their confidence If the facts alleged in he complain petition are of any consequence they will simply go to batter the public confidence in the smooth and proper functioning of such an important commercial Institution like a Bank. Hence the allegations made therein cannot be taken liehtlv No doubt there has been a considerable delay in the matter. Hence the allegations made therein cannot be taken liehtlv No doubt there has been a considerable delay in the matter. On this ground alone, however, it cannot be held that the continuance of this case will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court As stated above the case deals with a financial institution in which the public have got to have an enduring faith. If the same is shattered, it is bound to have adverse effect on the moral of the people and also on the business of the community. Also the functionaries of a Nationalised Bank cannot be allowed to take the customers for a ride and if this is tolarated hen there can be no end to various mal-practices alleged to be resorted to by the Bank authorties. Hence, in the interest of justice also I feel that under the facts and circumstances of this case this will not amount an abuse of the process of the Court. So far as the statements made in paragraph No.10 of the present petition that the Bank after inquiry found that the signature on the withdrawal form tallied with the admitted signature of opposite party, this is a question of evidence which could be gone into by the trial Court and cannot be decided in the present proceeding. 11. Sri Jagta Nand, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party has seriously contended before me that since the impugned order dated 3-6-1986 according to which the summons were ordered to be issued against the present petitioner and another is inter-locutory in nature no revision application against the said order will he. In this connection he has drawn my attention to Sec.397 (2) of the Code which specifically provides that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of Sec.397 of the Code shall not be exercised in relation to an inter-locutory order passed in any anneal enquiry trial or other proceeding. It was the submission of Sri Jagta nand that since the impugned order dated 3-6-1986 directing for the issue of summons to the petitioner is an order inter-locutory in nature, no revision application against the said order would he. In support of his contention the learned Counsel has relied on the case of Nageshvar Pd. Singh V/s. The state of Bihar 1977 (25) BUR 493. In support of his contention the learned Counsel has relied on the case of Nageshvar Pd. Singh V/s. The state of Bihar 1977 (25) BUR 493. This is a single Bench decision of this court in this case it was held that, an inter-locutory order is one which is not a final adjudication of the matter in dispute and relates only to incidental or ancillary matters arising in the proceeding and does not affect any right or liability of the parties. According to this decision when a Magistrate take congnizance of the offence under Sec.200 of the Code it will be an interlocutory order not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Since the order taking of cognizance cannot be termed as an order finally deciding the rights of the parties, a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence with a view to proceed in the matter is thus, at the begining of the case and not the end Therefore it was held that an order by which a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence cannot be anything other than an inter-locutory order. Further it was held that an enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code is a step leading determination of the question as to whether the complaint should be dismissed or the accused should be proceeded against. Thus, the order for holding the inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code cannot be held to be an order effecting the rights of the parties. Accordingly, it was held that undoubtedly the order for holding an enquiry under Sec.202 of the code would only be an inter-locutory order not revisible in view of the bar under Sec.397 (2) of the Code. In the said case the Magistrate after examining the complainant on oath decided to hold an enquiry under section 202 of the Code which was challenged by the opposite party by tiling a revision application before the Sessions Judge. 12. The facts of the present case are, however, quite different. Here the order taking of cognizance or the order for holding an enquiry under section 202 of the Code are not under challenge. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, on the other hand, challenged the order dated 3-6-1986, according to which after the close of an enquiry under Sec.202 of the code, the learned Judicial Magistrate had ordered for the issue of summons against the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, on the other hand, challenged the order dated 3-6-1986, according to which after the close of an enquiry under Sec.202 of the code, the learned Judicial Magistrate had ordered for the issue of summons against the petitioner. Hence, this decision is not of much help to the learned counsel for the opposite party. 13. The bar imposed under Sec.397 (2) of the Code as also the scope of Sec.482 had come up for consideration before the Hon ble supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath V/s. The State of Haryana, AIR 1977 sc 2185 and again in the case of Madhu Limaye V/s. The State of Maharashtra, air 1976 SC 47. In the case of Amarnath (Supra), the F. I. R mentioning the number of accused persons including the appellants before the Supreme court was lodged. The police after investigations submitted the charge sheet against other accused persons except the appellants. Accordingly, the judicial Magistrate set the appellants at the liberty after having accepted the charge-sheet. A revision petition was filed by the complainants before the sessions Judge against the order of the Magistrate releasing the appellants. It was dismissed. The informant then filed a regular complaint before the judicial Magistrate against all the accused including the appellants which was also dismissed on meirt. The Sessions Judge in revision, however, sat aside the order dismissing the complaint and order further enquiry. The magistrate on the receiving of the order of the Sessions Judge, summoned the appellants straight away which ment that the appellants were put on trial. A petition under Sections 482 and 397 of the Code against this order of the magistrate was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the order summoning the appellants was an interlocutory order. It was held by the Hon ble Supreme Court that the order of the Magistrate summoning the appellants was one which was a matter of moment. If the appellants were not summon then they could not have faced the trial at all, but compelling the appellants to face the trial without proper application of mind could not te held to be an interlocutory matter, but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. If the appellants were not summon then they could not have faced the trial at all, but compelling the appellants to face the trial without proper application of mind could not te held to be an interlocutory matter, but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. That being the position, a revision against the order was fully competent under Sec.397 (1) or under Sec.482 of the Code, because the scope of both these sections in the matter of this kind is more or less the same. Dealing with the scope of Sec.482 of the Code, it was held that a harmonious construction of Sec.397 and 482 would lead to irresistable conclusion, that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397 (2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Sec.482 would not apply. It was further held that it is well settled that the inherrent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision of the Law on the subject. Where there is an express provision barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to exercise of inherent power. It was this finding in this decision that was modified by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of madhu Limaye (Supra ). In this case also the order of the trial court issuing process against the accused was challenged and the High Court was asked to quash the criminal proceeding either in the exercise of its inherent power under Sec.482 or Sec.561-A (Old Code) or under Sec.397 (1) of the New Code, corresponding to Sec.435 of the Old Code. It was held in this case that ordinarily and generally the expression "interlocutory" order has been understood and taken to in each as a converse of the term final Order. But an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order, must be an interlccutory order is neither warranted nor justified. It was further held that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not the interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec.397 (2) of the Code. It was further held that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not the interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec.397 (2) of the Code. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final but yet it may not be an interlocutory order. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. In the said case, Madhu Limaye the appellant who figured as an accused filed an application to dismiss the complaint petition against him on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint petition. Before learned Sessions Judge the appellant raised three contentions. The sessions Judge, however, rejected all these contentions and framed a charge against Madhu Limaye under Sec.500 of this Code. This order of the sessions Judge was challenged inrevision before the High Court. It was held that since the order was interlocutory in nature, no revision application would lie. Against this order, Madhu Limaye, the appellant took the matter to the Supreme Court. It was held as follows : "we may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, it surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of subsection (2) of section 397 of the Code. In our opinion, it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course". So far as revisional power conferred by under Sec.397 (2) of the code vis-a-vis the inherent power saved by Sec.482 of the Code was concerned it was held that on a plain reading of Sec.482 of the Code it will follow that nothing in the court, which would include sub-section (2) of section 397 of the Code also, shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court. The bar of sub-section (2) of Sec.397 of the Code operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby, that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to an interlocutory order. The bar of sub-section (2) of Sec.397 of the Code operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby, that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to an interlocutory order. Then the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party It was further held that in the case in which the impugned order clearly brings also a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of the justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) of the Code can limit or effect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. The bar under Sec.397 (2) of the Code will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and or to secure the ends of justice. It was further observed that the label of the petitions filed by the aggrieved party is immaterial and the High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. It was held that to this extent the case of Amarnath (Supra) was not correctly decided and accordingly, it was modified by this order. In view of these authoritative pronouncement by the Hon ble Supreme Court, I do not find any force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the impugned order dated 3-6-1986 by which the learned Judicial Magistrate ordered for the issue of summons to the petitioner can be said to be are interlocutory order. Hence, this contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party has to be rejected. 14 For the reasons stated above, the order dated 21-11-1985 of the learned Chief judicial Magistrate as contained in Annexure-7 and the subsequent orders of different dates of the Court of the learned Judicial magistrate as also his order dated 3-6-1986 issuing summons to the petitioner are hereby quashed. 14 For the reasons stated above, the order dated 21-11-1985 of the learned Chief judicial Magistrate as contained in Annexure-7 and the subsequent orders of different dates of the Court of the learned Judicial magistrate as also his order dated 3-6-1986 issuing summons to the petitioner are hereby quashed. The case is remitted back to the learned Chief Judicial magistrate, Chapra in the district of Saran to proceed from the stage as mentioned in the order dated 6-9-1985 which shows that even on this date a witness was present before him for being examined in the inquiry under section 202 of the Code, but he could not examine him tor went to time. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is directed to complete the inquiry under Sec.202 of the Code which he had himself started and to pass necessary legal order in the matter. Accordingly, this application is allowed in part in the light of the observations made above. Application partly allowed.