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Allahabad High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 1274 (ALL)

Shyam Bihari Lal v. U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Lucknow

1990-12-21

S.C.MATHUR

body1990
JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioners in all these petitions were employed on various posts in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation and they were sought to be retired on attaining the age of 58 years which is the age of retirement prescribed in the Regulations framed by the Corporation. The petitioners' plea is that the Regulations have not been notified under Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and, therefore, the age of retirement prescribed therein cannot be applied to retiring the petitioners. It is also their case that in respect of some of the Workshops, the Corporation has framed Standing Orders prescribing therein 60 years the age of retirement for the workmen posted therein. The petitioners' plea is that all workmen working in different Units of the Corporation are similarly situated and, therefore, different ages of retirement cannot be prescribed for them. The petitioners claim that the age of retirement prescribed in the Standing Orders framed by the Corporation will have to be uniformly applied to all the employees of the Corporation. 2. The posts on which the petitioners in these petitions were posted are Traffic Inspector, Assistant Traffic Inspector, Assistant Grade II, Booking Clerk and Driver. 3. Admittedly the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, for short. Corporation, has been constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Central Act 64 of 1950). Section 45 of the Act confers power upon the Corporation to frame Regulations. In exercise of this power the Corporation framed the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981. Paragraph-2 of the Regulations makes the Regulations applicable to all employees of the Corporation except officers. Admittedly the petitioners do pot belong to the category of officers, and, therefore, subject to the pleas of the petitioners, the Regulations will be applicable to them. Paragraph-37 provides that an employee of Group "C" shall retire on attaining the age of 58 years and that of Group "D" shall retire on attaining the age of 60 years. The Proviso lays down that if the date of retirement falls on or after the second day of the month the date of retirement shall be that last day of the month. These Regulations had been published in the Official Gazette. 4. The Proviso lays down that if the date of retirement falls on or after the second day of the month the date of retirement shall be that last day of the month. These Regulations had been published in the Official Gazette. 4. Section 13-B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 provides as follows : - "Nothing in this Act shall apply in an industrial establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette, apply. 1' (Emphasis supplied). 5. According to the learned counsel for the Corporation the publication of the Regulations in the Government Gazette amounts to notification of the Rules under Section 13-B also and, therefore, the said Regulations will apply to the petitioners, and not the Standing Orders. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners on the other hand submits that publication of the Regulations in the Government Gazette cannot be equated with the notification contemplated under Section 13-B. The learned counsel lays stress on the words "in this behalf" and submits that there should be a specific notification indicating that the notification has been made under Section 13-B. 7. More or less similar question arose before a Division Bench of which I was a member - Writ Petition No. 4222 of 1983 Sumer Chand v. U. P. State Read Transport Corporation and others, decided on 1-4-1985. The view taken in this case was that notification of the Regulations framed under Section 45 could not be equated with the notification under Section 13-B. The learned counsel for the Corporation has invited our attention to a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in K.V.R. Shetty v. The Secretary to Government, 1Home Department, Government of Karnataka and others, 1980 LAB 1C 194 in which it was held that once the Regulations framed under the Road Transport C operation Act have been notified in the Gazette the said notification was sufficient for the purpose of Section 13-B also. In paragraph-15 of the report it has been observed as follows : - "When the State Government accorded its previous sanction to the Regulations, it must have been aware of Regulation 39 which expressly provides for repeal of the certified Standing Orders applicable to the employees of the Corporation. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the State Government intended that the Regulations should supersede the certified standing Orders in regard to disciplinary control over the employees of the Corporation. It follows that the notification should be regarded as being made also with reference to, and for the purpose of Section 13-B of the Standing Orders Act. We are unable to accept the contention of Messrs Srinivasan, Raikar and Narasimnan that there was no notification in `this behalf' as contemplated by Section 13-B of the [Standing Orders Act to make the Regulations applicable to the employees of the Corporation in supersession of the certified Standing Orders and that such employees were still governed by the certified Standing Orders in disciplinary matters." 8. Learned counsel for the Corporation has submitted that the above aspect has not been considered in the judgment of the Division Bench of which I was a member. He has accordingly submitted that the said judgment requires re-consideration. 9. In my opinion the Karnataka High Court has not laid down any general proposition that publication of Regulations framed under Section 45 of the Corporation Act is sufficient for the purpose of Section 13-B of the Standing Orders Act. The decision is based on its own facts. The Regulations framed by the Corporation and approved by the Karnataka Government contained a clause which specifically repeated the Standing Orders. Taking into consideration this fact it was observed - "it is reasonable to infer that the State Government intended that the Regulations should supersede the certified Standing Orders." Thus, the decision is based on the intention of the State Government which was reflected in the repealing clause. This is apparent from the passage contained in paragraph 15 prior to the passage reproduced here in above. The same reads as follows : - "15. This is apparent from the passage contained in paragraph 15 prior to the passage reproduced here in above. The same reads as follows : - "15. There is no reason why there should be two separate notifications, one under Section 45 of the Act and another under Section 13-B of the Standing Orders Act, and why only one notification cannot perform both the functions, firstly according previous sanction of the Government under Section 45 of the Act for the Regulations framed by the Corporation and secondly notifying these Regulations for the purpose of Section 13-B of the Standing Orders Act. The real question is whether the Government Notification dated 15 3-1972 can be regarded as one under Section 33-B of the Standing Orders Act though there is no express mention of that. Section in that notification. In other words, the question is whether that notification manifests the intention of the State Government that the impugned Regulations should supersede the certified Standing Orders in regard to the employees of the Corporation." Let us now consider whether the Regulations framed by U.P.S.R.T.C. exhibit any intention to supersede Standing Orders 10. The Regulations framed by U. P. S. R. T. C. do not contain any repealing clause. The notification opens with the words - "In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 45 (2) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (Central Act 64 of 1950) and in supersession of all existing Regulations or orders on the subject.................". (Emphasis supplied). The emphasised words are, in my opinion, insufficient to exhibit an intention of the Government to supersede the Standing Orders which is an order issued under statutory provisions. Rather the proviso to Section 2 (ii) exhibits a contrary intention. The Proviso says - "Provided that, in respect of workmen where any of the provisions of these Regulations is less favourable than the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Factories Act, 1948, or of any other Act applicable to them, the provisions of such Act shall apply." A provision of retirement at a higher age is a favourable provision. The higher age of retirement at 60 years is prescribed in the Standing Orders adopted by the Corporation in respect of some of its Units. The Regulations prescribe lower age of retirement viz., 58 years. The higher age of retirement at 60 years is prescribed in the Standing Orders adopted by the Corporation in respect of some of its Units. The Regulations prescribe lower age of retirement viz., 58 years. Thus by application of the Proviso reproduced her in workmen of the Corporation to whom Standing Orders are applicable will be governed by the age of retirement prescribed in the said Standing Orders and not by the age of retirement prescribed in the Regulations. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Regulations framed by the Corporation do not exhibit any intention of the nature exhibited by the Regulations notified by the Karnataka Government. 11. In Sumer Chand's case (supra) it has been observed by me as follows: - "The term `in this behalf' is not without significance. The notification has to be regarding the exclusion of the applicability of the Act. The applicability of the Act and thereby of the model Standing Orders is not excluded by mere framing of rules or regulations in respect of the matters specified in the Schedule and notifying them in the Gazette." 12. The Corporation challenged the judgment of this Court before their Lordships of the Supreme Court by filing SLP No. 13284 of 1985 which was dismissed on 29-1-1986. Once the view taken by this Court has been approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court there is no question of re-considering the said view. Accordingly I reject the prayer of the Corporation's learned counsel for reference to Full Bench. 13. For its workmen working as Central Workshop at Kanpur and its Branch at Kalpi Road as also for workmen working at Juhi Depot the Corporation admittedly has framed Standing Orders providing 60 years as the age of superannuation There is no dispute that the services of workmen working in different Units of the Corporation are transferable. The age of superannuation will have to be constant. It cannot vary with posting. Accordingly there is no justification to retire workmen working at one Unit at the age of 58 years and those working at another Unit at the age of 60 years. The discrimination is not justified. Therefore, the age of superannuation prescribed in the Standing Orders applicable to some Units will apply to the present petitioners also. All the petitioners were sought to be retired before attaining the age of 60 years. The discrimination is not justified. Therefore, the age of superannuation prescribed in the Standing Orders applicable to some Units will apply to the present petitioners also. All the petitioners were sought to be retired before attaining the age of 60 years. The impugned notices of retirement cannot be sustained. 14. In view of the above, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the impugned orders retiring the petitioner on attaining the age of 58 -years are hereby quashed and it is commanded that the petitioners shall be/dontinued in service till they attain the age of 60 years. There shall be no orders as to costs.