JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. - The present First Appeal from Order has been filed against the order dated 29th May, 1989, passed in Suit No. 51 of 1989 by the IV Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi allowing the application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondent under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC. The defendant-appellant has also filed a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ No. 10344 of 1989) for quashing the order dated 25th May, 1989, passed by the District Judge, Varanasi, in Misc. Case No. 16 of 1989 between the parties. Learned counsel for the parties requested and accordingly the said writ petition was also called and since the question involved in this is dependant on the result of the disposal of the First Appeal, the said writ petition is being disposed of by means of the present order. 2. A suit has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent for a specific performance of the contract on the basis of an agreement for sale dated 22nd September, 1986, alleged to have been executed by the defendant-appellant in favour of the plaintiff-respondent regarding plot no. 655, area 7.17 acres situate in Village Bhiti, Pargana Ram Nagar, tehsil and district Varanasi. According to the appellant, the plaintiff set up a case that the defendant-appellant agreed to transfer the aforesaid land to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.3,11,000/ - for which he executed a registered agreement for sale on the 22nd September, 1986, and the defendant-appellant also executed a registered Mukhtarnrama in favour of the plaintiff on the same day and, in fact, out of the aforesaid sale consideration Rs. 40,000/- was paid as earnest money at the time of execution of the aforesaid document. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff-respondent that the parties agreed that the plaintiff will be entitled to receive the compensation in respect of the land likely to be acquired by the state Government in future. Some part of the aforesaid land was already acquired by the State Government for which Rs. 87,185/- was awarded as compensation. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application before the Land Acquisition Officer to pay the aforesaid sum to him but the defendant-appellant withdrew the said amount and his application was rejected as the Land Acquisition Officer passed an order that since he had already decided the matter he cannot pass any order on the same. 87,185/- was awarded as compensation. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application before the Land Acquisition Officer to pay the aforesaid sum to him but the defendant-appellant withdrew the said amount and his application was rejected as the Land Acquisition Officer passed an order that since he had already decided the matter he cannot pass any order on the same. The defendant-appellant also filed a reference as against the aforesaid adjudication of compensation for the part of the land for its enhancement, which was numbered as Land Acquisition Reference No. 103 of 1988 (Shiv Nath v. Collector). 3. It is in this suit the plain tiff-respondent filed an application (Paper No. 6-c) for temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from alienating the property in dispute left after a part acquisition made by the State Government and further for restraining him from withdrawing the amount of compensation of the land already acquired either from the office of the Land Acquisition Officer or from the court of the VII Additional District Judge, Varanasi in Land Acquisition Reference No. 103 of 1988. In the objection to the said application as per appellant's case before this Court the defendant denied the execution of the aforesaid agreement and also the receipt of Rs. 40,000/-. The allegation was that the said agreement of sale was fictious as during the period when the defendant's legs were broken and he was unable to move Daulat Singh, plaintiff, took the defendant in his confidence and obtained a registered Mukhtarnama dated 22nd September, 1986, to act as Mukhtar-e-am on his behalf and in that connection he got the aforesaid ferzi and fictitious agreement of sale executed by playing fraud on the defendant. The Trial Court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from withdrawing the enhanced compensation of Rs. 7,28,400/- awarded for the part of the land already acquired in the land acquisition proceedings and also restraining him from transferring the rest of the land in dispute to anyone during the pendency of the suit. The defendant feeling aggrieved as against the said order has filed the present First Appeal from Order in this Court. 7,28,400/- awarded for the part of the land already acquired in the land acquisition proceedings and also restraining him from transferring the rest of the land in dispute to anyone during the pendency of the suit. The defendant feeling aggrieved as against the said order has filed the present First Appeal from Order in this Court. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that the Trial Court committed an error in granting such an injunction since on the facts of the present case no permanent injunction could be granted to the plaintiff as he is not entitled to the relief under the Specific Relief Act and thus the question of granting any temporary injunction does not arise. Further, the plaintiff, in fact, had a remedy by preferring a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act against the order of the Land Acquisition Officer. He having not preferred the same, the present suit would be barred and, thus, his contention was, when there was other remedy, no injunction could be granted to him. Further, the present suit was filed for the future acquisition of land and not to the part already acquired and thus granting injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from withdrawing the amount of compensation was illegal. 4. Reliance was placed on Section 38 (2) read with Sections 21, 40 and 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. On this basis, it was urged that the appellant is not entitled for any perpetual injunction. We examined these provisions tentatively for the purpose of deciding the arguments of the appellant for our prima facie conclusion, but this has been done without prejudice to the rights of the parties at the regular trial. Initially, the appellant-relied on Section 38(3)(c). Under it, where the invasion of the right of the plaintiff by the defendant is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief a perpetual injunction may be granted. The contention was that since it is a quantified money as far as the relief restraining the defendant-appellant from the amount of compensation already awarded and thus injunction should not have been granted to the plaintiff. We have perused this provision along with Sub-Section (2) of Section 38 of the Act. Sub-Section (2) deals with cases for grant of perpetual injunction where obligation arises from the contract of sale. We have perused this provision along with Sub-Section (2) of Section 38 of the Act. Sub-Section (2) deals with cases for grant of perpetual injunction where obligation arises from the contract of sale. Sub-section (3) deals with cases where the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff s right to, or enjoyment of, property. It has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that the present case falls under Sub-section (2). Thus, the provisions of Sub-Section (3) would not be applicable. Learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show any provision which prohibits grant of permanent injunction under the provisions of this Act except the other provisions, referred to above, Section 21 only deals with cases of award of compensation in certain cases. If refers, in a suit for specific performance of a contract other claim of compensation may be prayed for by the plaintiff. Similarly, Section 40 deals with cases again in a suit for perpetual injunction, a claim of damages in addition to or in substitution for such injunction may be made and the court may if it thinks so, award such damages. Similarly, Section 41(h) deals with cases where equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust, injunction cannot be granted. Thus, we see that Sections 21 and 40 are complementary for further relief in case a suit for specific performance, but does not prohibit filing of a Suit for specific performance of contract under those Sections. Similarly, Section 41(h) only deals with equally efficacious relief which can be obtained by any oilier usual mode of proceeding. Thus, we see that Sections 21 and 40 are complementary for further relief in case a suit for specific performance, but does not prohibit filing of a Suit for specific performance of contract under those Sections. Similarly, Section 41(h) only deals with equally efficacious relief which can be obtained by any oilier usual mode of proceeding. On this learned counsel for the appellant urged that since the appellant had a right for applying for reference after adjudication by the Land Acquisition Officer for enhancement of compensation as under Section 18 of the Act, any person interested in the land will have a right to make a reference and the plaintiff having such a right, it would forbid him to file the present suit on this account We are of opinion that in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act a person has a right to claim compensation in a proceeding thereunder and also if aggrieved for enhancement of compensation, it may be if the present plaintiff was aggrieved and was vitally interested with the amount of compensation awarded he would also prefer to apply for reference. It may be, the Court may have considered for impleading him as a party in the said reference but that would only be for challenging the award of compensation and for enhancement of the said compensation. However, the present suit has nothing to do either with the award of compensation or for the enhancement of compensation in those proceedings. The present suit is based on a ground as aforesaid for enforcement of right, to receive the money for the land for which agreement of sale was executed, which could be awarded in the land acquisition proceeding. There is distinction between receiving money as awarded and claim a right and title and challenge the amount of compensation awarded in those proceedings. 5. In the present case the appellant has not raised any point in the suit for either awarding the compensation or for enhancement of the compensation. Thus, it cannot be said that there is any alternative with the plaintiff and thus even Section 41(h) would not bar prima facie the present suit. 6. 5. In the present case the appellant has not raised any point in the suit for either awarding the compensation or for enhancement of the compensation. Thus, it cannot be said that there is any alternative with the plaintiff and thus even Section 41(h) would not bar prima facie the present suit. 6. Learned counsel relied on the case Ram Chand v. M.C. Gupta and others, 1985 AWC 30 in which it was held:- "Temporary injunction cannot be granted under Rule 2 of Order 39 where no perpetual injunction could be granted under Section 41 of Specific Relief Act." This proposition has not been disputed by the other side. Learned counsel also relied on the case Mohammad Abdul Jabbar and others v. Lalia and others A.I.R. 1947 Nag. 254, in which it was held: "A contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in or charge on such property. Hence where property agreed to be sold is compulsorily acquired, the vendee suing for specific performance is not entitled to the compensation money lying with the Collector. Nor is he entitled to such compensation money under Section 73(2) T.P. Act." This case would not apply to the facts of the present case as in that case there is no specific clause of the agreement as in the present case. Reliance was also placed on S. Ramalingam Pilla v. G.R. Jagadammal and another, A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 960. This was a case under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act wherein it was held: "... there is no room for the contention that the purchaser becomes in equity the owner of the estate under the contract of sale and the vender holds the property in trust for him." It was further held: "... The buyer is entitled to the rents and profits of the property on the passing of the ownership to him by the execution of a sale deed by the vendor." It was further held that since the possession of the vendor was not wrongful, to purchaser cannot sue for mesne profits from the date of contract for sale to the date on which he obtains possession. Thus, this case would have no application to the facts of the present case. Reliance was also placed on the case Hazrat Surat Urdu Education Society v. Abdul Saheb 1988 A.W.C. p. 1485 (S.C.). Thus, this case would have no application to the facts of the present case. Reliance was also placed on the case Hazrat Surat Urdu Education Society v. Abdul Saheb 1988 A.W.C. p. 1485 (S.C.). This is a case where suit was filed for declaration that the order terminating his services was illegal and void. He further claimed relief of reinstatement and in that he made an application for the grant of temporary injunction restraining the appellant-society from interfering with his functions as the Head Master of the institution. It is in that context a question arose and the Supreme Court laid down criteria for the grant of temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1, C.P.C. It was held that since the plaintiff-respondent was claiming relief under the contract of service he could enforce the contract and claim compensation by way of damages in the event of any injury being caused to him for breach of the contract of service. It is in this background the Supreme Court held: "... No temporary injunction should be issued unless the three essential ingredients are made out, namely, (i) primafacie case, (ii) balance of convenience, (iii) irreparable injury which could not be compensated in terms of money." This was a case where the Supreme Court itself clearly pointed out that since the plaintiff in that case was enforcing the contract of service by way of damages no injunction could be issued restraining the society from interfering with the plaintiff's functioning as Head Master of the institution. 7. The facts in the aforesaid case are entirely different. In the present case the suit is for a specific performance of the contract and the party is enforcing his contract of specific performance in terms of the contract. Thus, the aforesaid case would have no application to the facts of the present case. 8. Finally, reliance was placed on the case Saibesh Chandra Sarkar v. Bijoychand Mohatop Bahadur A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 4. In this, a suit for refund of money was filed which had been allowed as compensation for certain lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Ac t and withdrawn by the defendant. In this, notice was served under Section 9, Land Acquisition Act both on the plaintiff and the defendant and the Collector apportioned the compensation half and half. 4. In this, a suit for refund of money was filed which had been allowed as compensation for certain lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Ac t and withdrawn by the defendant. In this, notice was served under Section 9, Land Acquisition Act both on the plaintiff and the defendant and the Collector apportioned the compensation half and half. Neither party thereafter applied for any reference under Section 18 of die Act and the defendant withdrew the amount awarded to him by the Collector. The plaintiff thereafter brought the afore said suit for recovery of the amount which had been withdrawn by the defendant on the ground that the defendant was not en titled to any portion of the compensation money. In this case, the plaintiff tried to raise the question as to the claim under that Act as to who is entitled to receive compensation for the land on the basis of the right and title existing over the land which was acquired. It is in this context it was held: "The Land Acquisition Act creates a special jurisdiction and provides a special remedy. It would not be reasonable to hold that the Legislature having provided a special remedy in the Land Acquisition Act intended to make it optional with a party to apply for a reference under Section 18 or to institute a suit in the ordinary Civil Court. In this case the question was whether a party has a right to apply for a reference under Section 18, it cannot subsequently file a suit. The facts in the present case are entirely different. In the present case, there is no dispute regarding claim of compensation by the defendant in the Land Acquisition Act proceeding. Here, the plaintiff is trying to enforce specific performance of the contract after the stage of adjudication of compensation in favour of the defendant. So, all the stages under the Land Acquisition Act till the stage of receiving compensation by the defendant is not subject matter of dispute in the present case. Thus, on the ratio of this case on the prima facie examination of the facts of this case it cannot be said that the present suit is barred. 9. So, all the stages under the Land Acquisition Act till the stage of receiving compensation by the defendant is not subject matter of dispute in the present case. Thus, on the ratio of this case on the prima facie examination of the facts of this case it cannot be said that the present suit is barred. 9. It was vehemently argued that in the present case as per relief in the plaint at least for the portion which has already been acquired he has not prayed for any injunction and, therefore, the lower Appellate Court committed an error in granting in-junction for that portion. We have perused the prayer in the plaint. It is true it is not very happily worded but reading prima facie to the averments made in the plaint to the relief which originally stood and subsequent amendment in the relief it is revealed that he has prayed for injunction for not transferring the portion not already acquired and for restraining the defendant-appellant from withdrawing the money over the portion of land which had already been acquired and compensation awarded in the aforesaid reference. Therefore, the prayer seems to be split into two portions. Learned counsel for the appellant further made an attempt to argue on the basis of contract that the relief for injunction over the portion for which acquisition has already been taken would not be covered. However, we have deliberately not entered into that controversy lest it might effect the rights of the parties, but even after perusing the same by prima facie look it cannot be said, the prayer has not been made by the plaintiff for relief over the property already acquired. Though, it is true that the relief has not been very happily worded in the present case. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case and specially in view of the ratio in Babu Ram Ashok Kumar and another v. Antarim Zila Parishad A.I.R. 1964 All. 434. and also the decision of the Supreme Court referred in that judgment, we are of opinion that it is not a fit case to interfere with' the order of injunction in the appeal and we do not find that the said order is arbitrary. 10. 434. and also the decision of the Supreme Court referred in that judgment, we are of opinion that it is not a fit case to interfere with' the order of injunction in the appeal and we do not find that the said order is arbitrary. 10. Lastly, an argument was raised on behalf of the appellant that the amount which had been awarded in the acquisition proceedings may be permitted to be withdrawn by the appellant by furnishing security. This was strongly objected on behalf of the plaintiff. On the contrary, a suggestion was made that if this amount is pul in a fixed deposit earning interest, then in the interest of justice and for the balance of convenience it would be given to the person ultimately found entitled in the suit and the party receiving it would not be a loser. We have considered the suggestions made by the learned counsel for the parties and we are of opinion that it would be appropriate on the facts and circumstances of this case that the parties may make an application in the Trial Court, which would pass orders in terms of getting the money already awarded in favour of the defendant-appellant withdrawn in favour of the court to be placed in the fixed deposit and may pass appropriate orders for delivering the same after the conclusion of the trial in favour of the party succeeding. 11. In view of the aforesaid findings the present appeal is dismissed. However, on the facts and circumstances of this case costs shall be borne by the parties. 12. This appeal having been disposed of if is not necessary to grant any relief as prayed for in the writ petition and the said writ petition is also disposed of in terms of the decision of this appeal. Costs of writ petition on parties.