M. K. MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) PURSUANT to a chargesheet submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation the petitioner and two others have been arraigned before the 9th Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 468/471, 420 and 120b of the Penal Code. One of the three accused could not however be apprehended and as such the case is proceeding against the petitioner and another. Before the learned Magistrate they filed separate petitions praying for their discharge on the common ground that the allegations made against them for what they were worth, made out an offence punishable under Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 ('act' for short) and in view of Section 6 of the Act prosecution thereunder was not maintainable without a written complaint made by an officer duly authorised by tile Central Government. According to them, the provisions of Section 6 of the Act could not be evaded by resorting to device or camouflage or by misdescribing the offence or putting them under wrong labels. By his order dated January 22, 1985, the learned Magistrate rejected the petitions and thereafter framed the following charges against them :-"first - That you all during the period April, 1973 and November, 1973 at Calcutta and Delhi were party with absconding accused Joginder Singh Narula alias J. S. Narula and others to a criminal conspiracy to do or caused to be done certain illegal acts, viz. to prepare, caused to be prepared spurious documents like I. V. C. particulars, TQR, IVC circular, challan of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi, quota certificate of the office of the JCCI and E, New Delhi, letter and forwarding letters of the said office, to forge or caused to be forged entries and endorsements therein and to use or caused to be used such documents as genuine knowing or having reasons to believe them to be forged in order to obtain import licence from the office of the JCCI and E, Calcutta in favour of a fictitious firm M/s. Associated Auto (India) and thereby to cheat the authorities of the JCCI and E, Calcutta by inducing such authorities to believe that the documents like quota certificate, IVC particulars, Challan, letters, etc. were genuine and upon such belief to issue import licence No. 0240998/c dated 24-11-73 in favour of the fictitious firm M/s. Associated Auto (India) and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 120b, IPC r/w Sections 420, 468/471, IPC. Secondly, that you during September, 1973 and November, 1973 at Calcutta cheated the authorities of JCCI and E, Calcutta by dishonestly inducing them by use of forged document to deliver import licence No. P/e/0240998/c dated 24-11-73 for Rs. 39,169/- to you which was the property of the said JCCI and E, Calcutta and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Thirdly, that you on or about 1st September 1973 at Calcutta fraudulently (or dishonestly) used as genuine or certain documents in the office of the JCCI and E Calcutta to wit, declaration dated 26-6-73 photo copy of I. V. C. particulars, TQR circular No. 5/74 dated 17-8-73, challan No. 159 dated 16-6-73 of the Reserve of Bank of India, quota certificate No. 078774 dated 16-9-74, letter No. V 74 (III) A-27-AM-73-74/fq/ql/cla/1232 dated 28-8-73 and V-74 (III) A-27/fq/ql/cla/1233 dated 29-8-73 and a covering letter dated 26-6-73 on behalf of a fictitious firm viz. M/s. Associated Auto (India) for having possession of an import licence from the said office and which documents you knew at the time you used it to be forged documents and that you thereby committed offence punishable u/s. 468/471 of the Indian Penal Code. " ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED thereby, the petitioner alone has filed this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceeding as against him. ( 3 ) BEFORE this Court also Mr. Islam, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that in absence of a complaint as required under Section 6 of the Act, the learned Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of offences, and, for that matter to frame the above quoted charges which were primarily and essentially offences under Section 5 of the Act and for which filing of a complaint by a duly authorised officer was statutorily required. Mr. Islam further submitted that the provision of Section 6 of the Act could not be circumvented by changing the garb or label of an offence which squarely fulfilled the requirements of Section 5 of the Act. Mr. Islam further submitted that the provision of Section 6 of the Act could not be circumvented by changing the garb or label of an offence which squarely fulfilled the requirements of Section 5 of the Act. ( 4 ) SECTION 5 of the Act, as it stood at the material time, provided that a person who contravened or attempted to contravene, or abetted a contravention of, any order made or deemed to have been made under the Act or any condition of licence granted under any such order should be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which might extend to two years and also with fine; and it prescribed a minimum sentence of imprisonment for six months which might of course be reduced for special and adequate reasons to be recorded in the judgement of the Court. Import (Control) Order, 1955 ('order' for short) which has been issued under the Act provides in paragraph 10d thereof that no person shall make, sign or use or cause to be made, signed or used any declaration, statement or document in obtaining a licence or in importing any goods knowing or having reason to believe that such declaration, statement or document is false in any material particular and that no person shall employ any corrupt or fraudulent practice in obtaining any licence or importing any goods. ( 5 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, in the context of the provisions of paragraph 10d of the Order, it can be said, having regard to the charges framed in the instant case, that the accused persons could be prosecuted under Section 5 of the Act, but then the question is whether the prosecution is debarred from prosecuting the accused for the offences as mentioned in the charges. ( 6 ) IN the case of State of Bombay v. S. L. Apte reported in AIR 1961 SC 578 the Supreme Court observed that if the offences were distinct, there was no question of the rule as to double jeopardy as embodied in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India being applicable. ( 6 ) IN the case of State of Bombay v. S. L. Apte reported in AIR 1961 SC 578 the Supreme Court observed that if the offences were distinct, there was no question of the rule as to double jeopardy as embodied in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India being applicable. The Supreme Court further observed that though Section 26 of the General Clauses Act in its opening words referred to 'the Act or omission constituting an offence under two or more enactments', the emphasis was not on the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constituted two offences with which a person was charged. In making the above observations, the Supreme Court referred to the words 'shall not liable to be punished twice for the same offence'. The Supreme Court held that if the offences were not the same but were distinct the ban imposed by Section 26 of the General Clauses Act also could not be invoked. ( 7 ) REFERENCE may a now be made to the case of Chandrika Sao v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1967 SC 170 , facts of which are similar to those of the instant case. In that case, an Assistant superintendent of Commercial Taxes visited the shop of the appellant and inspected the books of account. On such inspection, he found that two sets of accounts books were being maintained. When he started looking into them the appellant snatched away the books and passed them on to one of his servants, who, in his turn, made them over to another servant. The Assistant Superintendent then directed his peon to recover those books. The peon was however prevented by the appellant from going to the place where the accounts books had been taken and in the scuffle that followed the peon's shirt was torn. On those allegations, a prosecution was launched against the appellant under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code but not under the Bihar Sales Tax Act. In deciding the question whether prosecution was justified in launching prosecution under the Penal Code instead of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, Supreme Court observed as under :"the appellant had committed an offence under Section 26 (1) (h) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act as also under Section 353, I. P. C. because he had used criminal force. In deciding the question whether prosecution was justified in launching prosecution under the Penal Code instead of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, Supreme Court observed as under :"the appellant had committed an offence under Section 26 (1) (h) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act as also under Section 353, I. P. C. because he had used criminal force. He could be prosecuted for either or both these offences at the discretion of the prosecution. It may be that he was not prosecuted for both the offences and the prosecution was restricted to the offence under Section 353, I. P. C. only to obviate the necessity of obtaining the Commissioner's sanction which was required for prosecution under Section 26 (1) (h) of the Act. Even so, the prosecution could not be said to have done something which was unwarranted by law. An offence under Section 353, I. P. C. was a graver offence then the one under Section 26 (1) (h) of the Act. In choosing to prosecute the appellant for a graver offence under the general law the prosecution could not be regarded as having acted colourably. If the prosecution were to be so restricted, graver offences would go unpunished (Emphases supplied ). " ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court further pointed out that it would lead to startling results if it were to be held that the prosecution acted colourably in not restricting the accusation to a minor offence requiring sanction. ( 9 ) AS has already been noticed for an offence under Section 5 of the Act, the maximum punishment that can be imposed is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and also fine whereas the maximum punishment for both the offences under Sections 420 and 468/471 is seven years. Thus there can be no doubt that the offences for which the petitioner is being prosecuted are much graver than the offence under Section 5 of the Act. ( 10 ) FOR the above discussions, I reject this application. Since the case is long pending, the learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the same with utmost dispatch, preferably within a period of six months from the communication of this order. Application dismissed.