ORDER A.A. Desai, J. - What is the impact of sub section (3) of section 397 on the maintainability of application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code") read with/or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is a question posed before me in this application. The question being of a general importance, notice was issued to the Bar. In pursuance thereof, the learned Members, at length addressed on the question. I record my appreciation for the assistance rendered by them. 2. M/s V.S. Sirpurkar, S.D. Deshpande, R.N. Patil, B.S. Wankhade, Mrs. K.V. Sirpurkar, A.S. Mardikar, D.M. Nilanjkar, D.P. Lalwani and Moharir, asserted in support of the maintainability. According to them, the inherent powers - of High Court in their very nature are completely unfettered by the provisions of Code which also include sub-section (3) of sectioI1397. This is abundantly clear from the language of provisions as contained in section 482 which is unambiguous and preemptory. A party unsuccessful in a revision under subsection 1 of section 397 can take a resort to section 482 of the Code, according to them. 3. Messrs A.V. Gupta, P.N. Kothari, A.V. Mehta, K.G. Pande and Mrs. Indira Bodade, the learned Members on the other side, however, countered the argument The power under section 482 according to them can be exercised only in absence of remedy under the Code, on the specific topic. Section 397(1) provides a remedy. Having availed such remedy, the unsuccessful party cannot further agitate grievance by taking resort to section 482 of the Code. Learned members have cited numerous authorities to substantiate their reval claim, which I propose to deal at the appropriate occasion. With a view to appreciate the controversy it would be expedient to reproduce the relevant sections: "Section 397 - Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. - (1). Learned members have cited numerous authorities to substantiate their reval claim, which I propose to deal at the appropriate occasion. With a view to appreciate the controversy it would be expedient to reproduce the relevant sections: "Section 397 - Calling for records to exercise powers of revision. - (1). The High Court or any Sessions judge may call for and examine the record of any: proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may; when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398. sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the either of them". "Section 482 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". 4, The Supreme Court in Amarnath1 has held that the power under section 482 can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter, However, where there is express provision barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot exercise of inherent power. On fact, the Supreme Court held that the order impugned, could not be interlocutory matter, but decides the serious question of right. Revision against under section 397 or 482 was fully competent. On fact, the Supreme Court held that the order impugned, could not be interlocutory matter, but decides the serious question of right. Revision against under section 397 or 482 was fully competent. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaya2 has laid down the three principles in relation to exercise of inherent power of the High Court: (a) That the power is not to be resorted, if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. (b) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of any process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (c) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.” The Supreme Court, however, held that the bar provided by sub-section (2) of section 397 operates only in exercise of revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or other principles enunciated above, the inherent power comes into play, there being no provisions in The Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. The Supreme Court in subsequent decisions in Rajkapur3, Vidyacharan Shukla4 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi5 affirmed the ratio laid down in Madhu Limave. 5. The Supreme Court in case cited supra has examined impact on the inherent power of subsection (2) of section 397 which completely bars the remedy of revision against the interlocutory order, The Supreme Court, therefore, held that such interlocutory orders if situation exists are amenable to' section 482. However, under section 435 of the Code of 1898, unlike section 397 of the present Code, interlocutory orders were amenable to the revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court therefore in Madhu Limaye has held that: "but then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of revisional power of the High Court under Code of 1898, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power". The Supreme Court by the principles as laid down unequivocally issued a writ of prohibition to the High Court, not to exercise inherent power where specific remedy is provided to redress the grievance and where the remedy is specifically barred under the Code. The Supreme Court by the principles as laid down unequivocally issued a writ of prohibition to the High Court, not to exercise inherent power where specific remedy is provided to redress the grievance and where the remedy is specifically barred under the Code. The question, therefore, is as to whether the ratio as laid down in relation to exercise of inherent power qua the bar under sub section 2 in the cases cited supra can be extended to sub-section (3) of section 397 of the Code. The Supporters reiterated that sub-section 2 and 3 are on a common platform. When sub-section 2 cannot control the inherent powers, sub-section 3 is equally ineffective. Sub-section 3 creates embargo against the revisional jurisdiction of High Court. However, inherent powers remain unaffected. 6. In Vidyacharan Shukla's case Cited supra the Supreme Court in para 6 observed that subsection 3, however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in Section 482. The Supreme Court has further made a mention that:- "We need not dilate on this aspect because we are not caned upon to consider the interpretation of section 397(3) of the Code". As laid down by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1968 SC 64 – C-16 such observation since the question was not directly involved does not lay down a binding ratio. The Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh7, referring to the decision in Madhu Limaye has held that the party who is unsuccessful in a revision before the Sessions Judge is precluded from filing second revision in the High Court by virtue of provision of sub-section (3) of section 397. However, the High Court can exercise its inherent powers where that exercise is warranted irrespective of the manner in which the matter has been brought to its notice. The Patna High Court8 and the Karnataka High Court9 took the similar view. The Orissa High Court10 held that sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of section 397 of the Code are on the same footing. It is observed that; "Thus, whether it is a prohibition under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 397 it stands on the same footing while considering the parameter of section 482". 7. The Orissa High Court10 held that sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of section 397 of the Code are on the same footing. It is observed that; "Thus, whether it is a prohibition under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 397 it stands on the same footing while considering the parameter of section 482". 7. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain as to whether sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of section 397 in effect and substance operates on equal footing in relation to exercise of the inherent power. Section 435 of the Code of 1898 corresponds to section 397 of the present Code. Section 435(i) invests the power of calling of record of inferior Court to ascertain legality or correctness of any proceedings, in. High Court, Sessions Court and District Magistrate. Once application is entertained either by the Sessions Court or District Magistrate as per section 435 (4), other was prohibited from entertaining any further application. However, this bar was not extended to the High Court. The Sessions Judge though under section 435(i) conferred with the revisional jurisdiction along with the High Court, it did not then enjoy the same power like that of the High Court in view of section 438. Moreover, the revisional powers of the High Court were distinctly provided under section 439 of the Code of 1898. Section 397 is substituted in the present Code to make trial more speedy. To achieve this purpose by sub-section 2, interlocutory order is omitted from the revisional jurisdiction which according to the Legislature prolongs trial. Sub-section 3 prevents the Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction second time at the instance of the same party. 8. The Supreme Court in Jagirsingh11 his explained the scope and purport of these subsections. Sub-section (2) bars the revisional jurisdiction in relation to the interlocutory order. The object of sub-section 3, as clarified is it is to prevent multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to order (emphasis supplied). The High Court of Delhi in State Delhi Administration12 following decision in Jagirsingh has observed that the scope and purport of the respective provisions contained in sub-section 2 and 3 of section 397 are different. One is a bar to challenge to interlocutory order, an abuse of which in past was defeating expeditious disposal of criminal cases. The High Court of Delhi in State Delhi Administration12 following decision in Jagirsingh has observed that the scope and purport of the respective provisions contained in sub-section 2 and 3 of section 397 are different. One is a bar to challenge to interlocutory order, an abuse of which in past was defeating expeditious disposal of criminal cases. The other is to limit the exercise bf revisional power against orders other than interlocutory to once and no further. The language as contained in section 397, is unambiguous and definite. Sub-section 2 does not admit particular subject matter viz. interlocutory order to the revisional jurisdiction under section 397(i) whereas sub-section 3 does not permit repetition in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397(i). Sub-section 2 completely abrogates remedy. It results in total deprivation of an opportunity to the aggrieved by to redress the grievance. However, sub-section 3 curtails the chances of availing remedy. Dis-satisfaction of a revisionist, a consequence cannot be entertained for the second time. Sub-section 3 with similar rigour of subsection 2 does not secure absolute elimination of remedy. According to the Supreme Court (Jagir Singh) it aims to secure early finality. In a liberal connotation it can ordinarily be described that both the sub-sections create bar against a remedy. However, in effect and its correct perspective both the provisions have different design, purport and also intention. Bar under sub-section 2 eliminates the remedy hi its totality whereas bar under subsection 3 controls chances of availing of remedy. According to me, therefore, sub-section 2 and 3 of section 397 are not on same footing. They in substance, effect and result do not operate on a common pedestal with same parameter. I, therefore, find myself unable to record agreement with the view expressed by Full Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh and other High Courts referred to earlier. The ratio laid down in relation to exercise of the inherent power qua sub-section 2 cannot mutatis mutandis be extended qua sub-section (3) of section 397 of the Code. 9. Section 482 with its clear and preemptory language has placed the inherent power of High Court at a higher pedestal than the other provisions of the Code. Legislative intention under section 397(3) in definite and scheme therein is fundamental in its governance. These Legislative objectives under section 397(3) succumb to the inherent power? 9. Section 482 with its clear and preemptory language has placed the inherent power of High Court at a higher pedestal than the other provisions of the Code. Legislative intention under section 397(3) in definite and scheme therein is fundamental in its governance. These Legislative objectives under section 397(3) succumb to the inherent power? The Code of 1898 has initially not accorded statutory recognition to the inherent powers of High Court. Doubts was expressed about its existence. In 1923, section 561 A was incorporated in the Code of 1898 granting such recognition to the inherent power. Section 561 A corresponds to section 482 of the present Code. 28-3-1990 The Supreme Court in Amarnath has observed that section 482 preserves, the power already possessed by the High Court and does not confer any new power. It is observed that the scope of section 482 and 397 in a given case is more or less the same. In Rajkapur, it is observed that: "Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade the area set apart for the specific power under the Code". it is also observed that: "The limitations are self restrained and nothing more". In State of Orissa13 the Supreme Court has warned that the inherent power cannot be invoked to exercise such power which would be inconsistent with the specific provision under the Code. In Smt. Saroj Devi14, it has candidly made a mention that the inherent power cannot be exercised doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. While considering the scope of section 362 of the Code, it has also explained that the inherent power of the Code is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362. It, therefore, follows that section 482 does recognise inherent power without any shrinkage; The High Court being a custodian, however, has to exercise such power within the bounds carved out by the judicial dictum. I seek support to my conclusion from the views expressed by some of the High Courts. The Kerala High Court in M. Chandran15 while considering the effect of sub-section (3) of section 397 on inherent power under section 482 has held: "If a power has been taken away by the Statute or if the Statute prohibits exercise of power that cannot be saved by resort to section 482, Cr. The Kerala High Court in M. Chandran15 while considering the effect of sub-section (3) of section 397 on inherent power under section 482 has held: "If a power has been taken away by the Statute or if the Statute prohibits exercise of power that cannot be saved by resort to section 482, Cr. P.C. That would be to invoke the section to defeat the policy of law permitting the exercise of what is expressly prohibited". Allahabad High Court in case of Dassu16 has held: 'No second revision lies under section 397(3) of the Code. The provisions under section 482 cannot be invoked for the purposes of circumventing the express provision of the Code". The High Court of Allahabad observed in Mangal Singh17 that: "But certainly these powers cannot be invoked in a manner that the effect would be just entertaining a second revision which has been expressly barred under section 397 of the Code". The Delhi High Court in State (Delhi Administration), cited supra, applying ratio laid down in case of Amarnath, Madhu Limaye and Jagirsingh has held that: "The inherent power under section 482 cannot be invoked if there is a specific provision in the Code for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. It cannot also be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted under the provisions of section 3.97(3)". 11. There is another aspect of the matter. The Sessions Court under the set up of the Code for all other purposes is an inferior criminal Court to the High Court. However, for the purposes of section 397, both High Courts and Sessions Court are the Courts of coordinate jurisdiction. Section 398 empowers both the Courts to order enquiry for the matters stipulated therein. Section 399(1) invests the same power to the Sessions Court as conferred on the High Court by sub-section (1) of Section 401. Moreover, sub section (2) of section 399 which reads as thus: "Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under sub-section (1), the provision of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge". Sub-section (3) of section 399 makes the decision of the Sessions Court in revision as final, and further prohibits even the High Court from interfering with. This provision has thus conferred finality on the decision tendered by a Sessions Court. Taking into consideration the scheme of sections 397, 398, 399 read with section 401, it is apparent that the Sessions Court acts as a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with High Court and both the forums exercise jurisdiction in exclusion of other. This position, as discussed earlier, the Sessions Court did not enjoy under the Code of 1898. This Court in Inayatullah Rizvi18 has observed that: "Under the present Code, full revisional powers are now conferred on the Sessions Judge and the power of the Sessions Judge and High Court are co-extensive and concurrent and held that a Sessions Judge and High Court being now the two parallel forums with an option to a party to approach any of them for redress by way of revision, the inherent power cannot be resorted to interfere the orders passed under section 397(1). Similarly, such power cannot be invoked as against order passed by the Sessions Judge it being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction with same power”. 12. It is urged that section 397(3) has incorporated a bar against a party availing further remedy. However, it does not operate against the High Court. The High Court is therefore not prevents to exercise suo-motu jurisdiction, by calling record to inferior Criminal Court viz Sessions Court in revisional proceedings to ascertain correctness or legality of the revisional order. And the High Court can interfere. According to me, such exercise would be an endeavour to circumvent the statutory bar, by acting in a circutous manner. It would amount to as observed, indirectly doing something which is direct\'y prohibited. Submission is illogical. It is also urged that the revisional order passed by the Sessions Court does not attain finality since capable of being interfered at the behest opponent. Submission is erroneous and somewhat lacks the relevance. Section 397(3) confers finality to the order of Sessions Court qua a 'party which has invoked the revisional jurisdiction. With such order. We principally are concerned herein. The Supreme Court as observed in Amarnath that the scope of section 397 and 482 is more or less same. Submission is erroneous and somewhat lacks the relevance. Section 397(3) confers finality to the order of Sessions Court qua a 'party which has invoked the revisional jurisdiction. With such order. We principally are concerned herein. The Supreme Court as observed in Amarnath that the scope of section 397 and 482 is more or less same. The finality thus attained by the revisional order is irrevocable at the instance of unsuccessful revisionist. The same cannot be made permissible either by exercise of suo-motu power under section 397(1) or by invoking inherent power under section 482. 13. I after considering various aspects, record my conclusion that the High Court is refrained to exercise inherent power to' interfere in the revisional order passed under section 397(i) of me Code, at the behest of unsuccessful revisionist since such exercise would be: 1. derrogatory to writ of prohibition issued by the Supreme Court (Madhu Limaye) as A. the party, has already exhausted the remedy specifically provided by the Code and B. is legally disentitled to avail further remedy having to exclusion as expressly engrafted by the Code; 2. an attempt to encroach on the arena distinctly earmarked by the Statute. 3. inconsistent with the invading over the statutory provisions. 4. amounting to entertain second revision and thereby frustrating the legislative intention to secure expeditious finality. 5. violative of the norms of self restrained (in case of suo-motu exercise). 6. Subverting the co-ordinate jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. 14. However, the next question is that what could not be achieved by making resort to section 482, can it be accomplished by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India? This Article invests the High Court with the power of superintendence over the Court as well Tribunal. Admittedly, the Courts which are subjected to the superintendence under this Article are those which are subordinate to the High Court. Article 235 has been pressed into service. This Article provides a control of the High Court on the subordinate Judges. The control as envisaged under this Article refers to the Ministerial Administration, Article 235 has as such no relevance. As discussed earlier, the Session Court under section 397 is a Court of co-ordinate and concurrent jurisdiction to the High Court, and as regards the powers, the Sessions Court is placed at par with the High Court. The control as envisaged under this Article refers to the Ministerial Administration, Article 235 has as such no relevance. As discussed earlier, the Session Court under section 397 is a Court of co-ordinate and concurrent jurisdiction to the High Court, and as regards the powers, the Sessions Court is placed at par with the High Court. In exercise of the revisional jurisdiction qua a party (emphasis supplied) it decides finally which cannot be called in question in view of sub-section (3) of section 397 before the High Court. Such revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court being concurrent with the High Court, the same cannot be subjected to a superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 which are meant and provided for being exercised on a subordinate Court. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Khurshid Khan Aminkhan v. Husnabanu Mahmood Shaikh19 has specifically held while considering the effect of section 397(3), that: "A second revision application by the husband is barred under section 397(3), Cr. P.C. and he cannot get out by filing a petition under Article 227". 15. However, this Court in Mehbubabi20 took a view that: 'In case the Court acts without jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere under section 482 or under Article 227 of the Constitution". The Division Bench, however, in the case was not posed with a question relating to the effect of sub-section (3) of section 397. Moreover, the decision as rendered being earlier was not benefited by the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, as discussed hereinbefore. Justice Joshi (as he then was) in Criminal Applications Nos 438 and 391 of 1981 decided on 9-9-1981 has referred to a decision of Madhu Limaye and Rajkapur. The learned Single Judge has observed that" the Code including section 397(3) does not control section 482" and the learned Single Judge entertained the application under section 482 read with Article 227. Justice Loney (as he then was) in Radhabai21 Divorce and Matrimonial Cases, Page 505) took a similar view. 16. The Division Bench in Inayatullah (cited Supra) also made an observation in para 4 that there could be no doubt that if the criminal revisions under section 397 of the Code are legally untenable or barred, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 could be invoked. 16. The Division Bench in Inayatullah (cited Supra) also made an observation in para 4 that there could be no doubt that if the criminal revisions under section 397 of the Code are legally untenable or barred, the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 could be invoked. The Division Bench was considering the scope of Section 397(3) and Section 399(3) in relation to a second revision when the' Sessions Judge has reversed the order of the Magistrate. Observation as made did arise out of the question as involved before the Division Bench. As laid down (in Jagirsingh) (section 397(3) has been incorporated with a twin object. One is to provide remedy to both the parties and secondly to prevent either of the parties from availing chances of remedy more than once. As per the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court (in Madhu Limaye) the party to whom remedy is provided and precluded to avail further remedy, according to me becomes legally infirm to take resort to either section 482 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution. The view expressed by this Court in the decisions cited supra is not in accordance with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court. 17. This Court has held that: In Kamlabai22 where the Criminal Procedure Code itself bars a second revision after the one opted by the parties then resort should not be taken to invoke inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code or the powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There has to be a finality to a litigation at one stage or the other and the legislature in its wisdom has preferred to give one opportunity of revision after the trial Court's order is passed". (b) In Bhim Reddy23 "An unsuccessful petitioner cannot approach under Article 227 of section 482 of the Code". (c) In Damodar Das Jain24 while considering the question of maintainability of petition under Article 227 against the order of acquittal, in view of section 378(4) which provides for appeal against acquittal and section 401(3) which provides that in revision a finding of acquittal could not be converted in conviction. "In my opinion in view of the said provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code neither the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution nor an application under section 482, Cr. "In my opinion in view of the said provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code neither the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution nor an application under section 482, Cr. P.C. involving inherent power of this Court was maintainable”. In there recent decision in Nagorao25 (Justice Loney as then he was): "If there is any express provision in a Statute governing a particular subject matter to specific relief, there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the High Court". The view expressed in these decisions is in conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court therefore, needs to be followed. 18. I, therefore, hold that the application or petition purported to be under section 482 of the Code read with or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India at the behest of a party who has availed the remedy of revision under section 397, cannot entertained. Application dismissed. 1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2185. 2. A.I.R. 1978 SC 47. 3. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 258. 4. A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962. 5. A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 67. 6. A.I.R. 1968.S.C. 64-C-1. 7. A.I.R. 1919 A.P 146 (F.B.) 8. 1985 Cri. L.J.1l21 (Pat.). 9. 1985 Cri. L.J. 1706 (Kar.). 10. 1987 Cri. L.J. 60 (Orissa). 11. 1979 Cri. L.J. 318 (S.C) 12. 1984 Cri. L.J. 1866 (Delhi). 13. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 87. 14. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 736. 15. 1982 Cri. L.J. 100 (Ker.). 16. 1976, Cri. L.J. 1221 (All.). 17. 1976 Cri. L.J. 1824 (All.). 18. 1981 Cr. L.J. 1398. 19. 1976 Mh. L.J. 628. 20. 1976 Mh. L.J. 631. 21. 1987 (2) Divorce and Matrimonial Cases P. 505. 22. 1982 (2) Bombay Cases Reports 183. 23. 1985 Mh. L. Reports 798. 24. 1985 Mh. Law Reports 306. 25. 1990 Mh. L.J. 36.